Our Electricity Problem: Everyone At War With Each Other On The Grid

Come on, Entergy and national grid at war with Cuomo. These utilities hold enormous influence over the political system. Does this constitute collusion to destroy Cuomo and boost or maintain the prices of electricity. The system makes it more profitable to collude than compete. Everyone is trying to manage their cheap natural gas problem.

If the Market becomes too unstable to preform this vital service to society, too corrupt, then government should step in. Here is an old solution. The solution is for NY to build and operate their own power plants.   

Put this together with FERC going after the NEISO over the fairness our electric rates.

The system is set up where these guys either collude or sabotage each other, often both at the same...is this called the free market and deregulation serving the greater ends of our nation and society??? Who is it serving?     

Cuomo targets power plant that closed after $110M subsidy by National Grid customers

By Tim Knauss | tknauss@syracuse.com The Post-Standard
Email the author | Follow on Twitter
on February 13, 2016 at 8:50 AM, updated February 13, 2016 at 9:44 AM

4

SYRACUSE, N.Y. – Gov. Andrew Cuomo has gone to war with the owner of a Western New York power plant that closed in January after National Grid customers paid more than $110 million in surcharges to keep the plant open since 2012.

Cuomo this week ordered the state Public Service

Basically NRG is a grid speculator company. They once specialized in making money on so called green energy. Speculating of the green energy altruism mirage and stupid government subsidies. The natural gas problem has devastated them. Their stock price is the below the 2000s lows. I think they are right near bankruptcy. Why has anyone in recent times ever trusted these guys?  Green energy today is very much like the early 2000s Enron coruption.     

Commission to investigate NRG Energy's decision to close Dunkirk Power Plant near Buffalo and whether "consumers of the state of New York have been defrauded."

NRG mothballed the coal-fired plant last month, abandoning a plan championed by the governor to convert the plant to burn natural gas.

Cuomo wants the PSC to determine "whether NRG should be allowed to continue to operate as an electric corporation in the state,'' according to a letter from the governor to PSC Chair Audrey Zibelman. (See letter below.)

NRG officials say they fulfilled their agreement to keep Dunkirk open while transmission improvements were made to the regional power grid. That agreement ended in December.

NRG backed away from its plan to convert Dunkirk to natural gas largely because of a federal lawsuit filed by Entergy Corp., said David Gaier, speaking for NRG. Entergy, another company that has butted heads with Cuomo, filed a lawsuit last year claiming that a ratepayer-subsidized conversion of the Dunkirk plant would be illegal and discriminatory.

"The Entergy lawsuit created a tremendous amount of uncertainty and risk for NRG in moving forward with the Dunkirk project.'' Gaier wrote in an email. "Under these circumstances, NRG cannot prudently continue to invest tens of millions of dollars while this lawsuit remains unresolved.''

NRG Energy is the nation's largest owner of merchant power plants, with $16 billion in annual revenues and 51,000 megawatts of generating capacity. NRG owns five other power plants in New York besides Dunkirk, including the 1,628-megawatt Oswego generating station, which seldom runs.

Why National Grid customers paid a subsidy

NRG first notified state officials in March 2012 that they intended to close the Dunkirk power plant, which can make a maximum of 635 megawatts. But the Public Service Commission determined that some power from Dunkirk was necessary to keep the power grid stable.

Oswego Generating Station is owned by NRG Energy, a company that Gov. Andrew Cuomo says might deserve banishment from New York state.Gary Walts  

The commission approved a "reliability service agreement'' under which National Grid customers paid a surcharge to subsidize the plant to keep two of its four generating units available. That agreement was later amended to keep just one unit open. The amended contract was extended once, finally ending in December 2015.

Cuomo said reliability payments totaled more than $110 million since 2012. The surcharges were paid by customers throughout National Grid's Upstate territory, including Central New York. Utility officials could not immediately estimate the impact on a typical residential customer.

Separately, Cuomo announced in December 2013 that he had made a deal with NRG to convert the Dunkirk plant to burn natural gas. The Public Service Commission later approved a "repowering agreement'' under which National Grid customers would pay $20.4 million a year for 10 years to subsidize the conversion. Those payments never began because NRG decided to mothball the plant instead.

Cuomo's wrath at NRG appears to stem from the company's decision to back away from the repowering, which was hailed as a "Christmas miracle'' when the governor announced it three years ago. The conversion would have preserved Dunkirk's ability to retain its employees and pay $8 million a year in local property taxes, Cuomo said at the time.

Nuclear plant owner sues

Entergy Corp., the owner of FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County, sued the Public Service Commission last year in federal court, alleging that the subsidized repowering plan illegally interfered with the state's wholesale energy market.

Unrelated to the Dunkirk case, Cuomo has dueled with Entergy over the pending shutdown of FitzPatrick, which is due to close by early 2017. The governor said the decision to close the plant showed "callous disregard'' for its 600 employees, and he vowed to pursue "every legal and regulatory avenue'' to keep FitzPatrick open.

At the same time, Cuomo has lambasted Entergy's operation of the downstate Indian Point nuclear reactors, which he wants to close because they are too close to New York City.

The uncertainty created by Entergy's lawsuit led NRG to mothball the Dunkirk plant rather than convert it, Gaier said. In the meantime, National Grid has completed a major upgrade to its Western New York transmission system that made it possible to operate without Dunkirk, said Stephen Brady, speaking for the utility.

Cuomo maintains that NRG should have pursued the repowering of Dunkirk, which was originally expected to be done by September 2015.

Cuomo this week directed the PSC to investigate why NRG did not repower Dunkirk and how much that decision cost Upstate consumers. He also wants an investigation into whether NRG should be banned from operating in the state.

"NRG stands behind everything we've done to support the grid and provide ratepayers in New York with reliable power under agreements at the price approved by the state in advance,'' Gaier said. "We look forward to working with the governor and the Public Service Commission to resolve these issues to everyone's satisfaction.''

Hope Creek's Junk SRV: All Applicable Interfacing System Functions

The NRC has put up on Hope Creek's docket their response to my concerns about SRV setpoint failure. Along with old NRC information about industry's problems with SRVs. So everyone is checking their technical information concerning the SRVs. What does interfacing system functions mean?

Basically the maintenence rule is a voluntary bureaucratic system defining the rules of necessary plant maintenence and documentation. It is another process done under the sheets away from public scrutiny.

***Everyone is confused with, throwing worthless documents  at a problem over and over again equates to actually fixing the problem. If it is still broke, just throw a powerless document at it. 

Again, if we had a real NRC, the agency would bark once about "interfacing system functions". It would scare the pants off Hope Creek. I think this all is fraud and falsification, not documenting maintenence rule functional failures.

Everyone is confused with, throwing worthless documents  at a problem over and over again equates to actually fixing the problem...

February 2, 2016

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2015004

Maintenance Rule Program Implementation 

The inspectors have identified multiple examples of PSEG’s failure to evaluate the impact of an equipment issue on interfacing systems, including: 

·         In September 2013, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate the impact of a failure of a feedwater crosstie valve on the feedwater sealing functions for the reactor core isolation cooling system and HPCI system. This observation resulted in the creation of a new feedwater system maintenance rule function and subsequent maintenance preventable functional failure classification that would not have been otherwise counted. (NOTF 20619913) 

·         In May 2014, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate safety relief valve setpoint failures under all applicable interfacing system functions. The condition was evaluated for the automatic depressurization system functions, but not for the main steam functions. (NOTF 20650346) 

·         In August 2015, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate the loss of  the 10B431 480VAC (alternating current) 1E motor control center (MCC) as a Maintenance Rule functional failure of the interfacing 1E 480VAC system. 

This is the third instance identified in three years of PSEG failing to evaluate the impact of equipment issues on interfacing systems. This observation resulted in the assignment of a maintenance preventable functional failure to the 480VAC 1E MCC system that would not have been otherwise counted. (NOTF 20702217) 

Along with the items described above, during 2015, the inspectors and the NRC PI&R team inspectors observed multiple other examples of PSEG’s failure to evaluate the impact of an equipment issue on interfacing systems. These repetitive observations related to deficiencies with PSEG’s interfacing system maintenance rule screening resulted in PSEG creating a maintenance rule panel consisting of the maintenance rule program coordinator and engineers that performs an independent, periodic review of issues identified in the CAP to ensure all appropriate screenings are assigned. The inspectors determined that the corrective action implemented to address the issue was reasonable to resolve the identified deficiencies. The inspectors determined all the issues above screened to minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix E, because the systems’ preventive maintenance still demonstrated effective control of system equipment performance as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of the maintenance rule.

Palisades-Junk Plant And Safety Culture

Nobody trust the NRC to be their partners.  Their rules are too stick. Get fired for three years , the humiliation of it, back pay and $5000, its just not worth it.
 
The NRC confuses following the rules, with doing what is best for the USA.

They should paid until the lump goes through snake. But what the hell, we are all powerless as hell as this.

Clashing bureaus 
Posted: Saturday, February 13, 2016 6:00 am

Clashing bureaus By ANDREW LERSTEN - HP Staff Writer The Herald-Palladium | 0 comments


COVERT — In November the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration ruled that two Palisades nuclear power plant security supervisors were wrongfully terminated in 2013.

But the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission also investigated the allegations and reached a different conclusion.

On Thursday it sent Palisades’ owner Entergy a letter stating it could not substantiate that the men were discriminated against and, in turn, wrongfully terminated.

The new information is consistent with the NRC’s original investigation from 2013. The NRC reopened the investigation last year after receiving additional information requiring follow-up, the NRC stated.

Entergy is appealing the OSHA ruling.

Meanwhile, NRC officials told Entergy they are concerned the OSHA ruling may affect the willingness of plant employees to raise safety and security issues.

The NRC is asking Entergy to submit its plans on things it is or will do to address the possible adverse impact of the OSHA ruling, in the next 30 days.

OSHA ruled that Chris Mikusko and Roland Ruby are due back wages with interest, and ordered Palisades’ owner Entergy to reinstate their jobs.

In addition, the ruling ordered Entergy to pay the men $5,000 each in compensatory damages, and to pay their attorney fees.

Regarding the men’s termination, they alleged that they were fired after raising concerns about a fellow security supervisor who was allegedly working without proper firearms qualifications. OSHA agreed there was evidence of their claim.

Palisades is along Lake Michigan in Covert Township. 

Callaway Junk plant: Can't Put Lipstick On This Reverse Engineered Pig.

So they botched the replacement of a electronics controller on a emergency makeup water system for a steam generator. They were reverse engineering this card because of no replacements on the aux feed control to the Steam generator. You got to know everything in this system is aged out and obsolete.

Ameren owns this pig

So Callaway is having troubles replacing aged out equipment. As in my other Callaway article, they had plenty of opportunities to know they put in defective parts into nuclear safety systems and they neglected to fix fixed when the problem emerged.

When does the NRC get overwhelmed and exhausted by all by the degradation going on throughout the industry. The industry wide decline.  

Seven NRC violations on this one event. The magnitude of this speaks volumes.          

January 13, 2016

SUBJECT: CALLAWAY PLANT - NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000483/2015009

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” for the licensee’s failure to assure that the design of the replacement reverse-engineered Modutronics controller cards for the auxiliary feedwater control valves were suitable for their application. Specifically, as of August 11, 2015, the licensee failed to establish suitable interface requirements in procurement documents to Nuclear Logistics Incorporated (the vendor) and verify the adequacy of the design by either design reviews or testing. Specifically, the team identified that neither the licensee nor the vendor had performed a design review sufficient to assure that the Modutronics controller cards were suitable for their application. In addition, the licensee had not provided the vendor with sufficient information to reverse-engineer the controller cards. Lastly, neither the licensee nor the vendor performed testing sufficient to verify the adequacy of the design of the new Modutronics controller cards. As a result, the replacement cards were supplied with motor field current rectifier bridges that were undersized and marginal for their application, such that two of them failed in service, rendering these auxiliary feedwater system valves inoperable. Following performance of a root cause analysis, the licensee replaced the deficient controller cards with those of a higher current rating. The licensee initiated Callaway Action Request 201505796 to place this item into the corrective action program.

• Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for failure to prescribe activities affecting quality using procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, on November 18, 2009, the licensee revised Procedure MTE-ZZ-QA033, “MOVATS UDS [motor operated valve actuator test system universal diagnostic system] Testing of Torque Controlled Modutronics Limitorque Motor Operated Rising Stem Valves,” Revision 3, to incorporate a second method of valve testing, and introduced an error in bypassing a test of the Modutronics board setup feedback potentiometer. As a result, on July 23, 2015, the actuator misinterpreted the actual position of the valve, which subsequently failed to open when operators attempted to open the valve following a forced reactor shutdown. In response to this issue, the licensee has reviewed all maintenance and test activities that could affect the potentiometer and has revised the appropriate procedures. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201505332.

• Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, “Test Control,” for failure to ensure that testing demonstrated that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service. Specifically, on October 24, 2014, the licensee failed to establish a suitable post-maintenance test program to demonstrate that the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater flow control valve Modutronics potentiometer had been set correctly after maintenance. The testing consisted of stroking the valve full open or full closed, and did not consider step changes in valve positioning and did not confirm the potentiometer feedback settings during valve positions that were not full open or full closed. In response to this issue, the licensee performed another calibration of the potentiometer, focusing on the potentiometer position during the valve stroke. The new post-maintenance test included opening the valve in discreet step changes to test the valve position feedback potentiometer. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201505332.

• Green. The team identified two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for the licensee’s failure to implement their corrective action program procedure. Specifically: (1) on November 20, 2014, the licensee designated the improper setting of the auxiliary feedwater flow control valve ALHV005 limit switches as Significance Level 5 (administrative close) instead of Significance Level 3 (lower tier cause evaluation) and (2) on December 9, 2014, the licensee downgraded the failure of the Modutronics card for valve ALHV0005 from Significance Level 1 (root cause analysis) to Significance Level 3 based on unverified assumptions of the failure mechanisms. Following failure of the Modutronics card for valve ALHV0005, the licensee assumed that the early failure was due to a manufacturing defect (infant mortality) without supporting data to prove this designation. The licensee entered these issues into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Requests 201506921 and 201507235.

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition for a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, on May 21, 2015, the licensee received new information that refuted the previously assumed failure mechanism for AFW flow control valve ALHV0005 documented in December 2014, but failed to initiate a new Callaway action request to document the new information and report it to appropriate levels of management. As a result, the licensee failed to identify the failure of the valve as a significant condition adverse to quality, determine the cause, initiate a prompt operability assessment, and identify corrective action to preclude repetition until valve ALHV0007 failed, for the same reason, following a reactor trip on August 11, 2015. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Callaway action request 201506846.

• Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, on March 4, 2014, the licensee performed Job 08505547, and had not correctly accounted for the differential pressure the valve would actually experience, and had incorrectly set and tested the close torque switch on valve ALHV0005. As a result, On November 15, 2015, during steam generator filling operations, Valve ALHV0005 failed to move in the closed direction when the torque switch opened. The incorrect close torque switch setting prevented the valve from going full closed. In response to this issue, the licensee, using Job 14005755, repaired the valve, and confirmed that the close torque switch settings were correct and successfully retested. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Callaway Action Report 201508399.

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, as of September 23, 2015, the licensee had not taken corrective action, following previous identification of undersized field current rectifier bridges, to ensure that an independent review of the modified circuit design had been completed, or that the modified cards had been subjected to a sufficient testing and qualification program. Thus, following questioning by the team, the licensee identified additional components (two other rectifier bridges) on the newly modified circuit cards that were also potentially undersized. The licensee performed an operability evaluation and concluded that the new cards were operable, based on additional circuit analysis that was performed. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201506874.

Junk Plant Callaway: A Pattern of Not Fixing Problems Immediately

Popeye’s J. Wellington Wimpy "I'll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today".

This cost them to shutdown. They blew three shots at fixing it. It started by not property torquing the flange nuts. How many screw-ups does it take to cost expensive unnecessary shutdown?

Right, they got some 5 million parts and components in this plants. If they got a global problem with their maintenence philosophy then the plant is heading towards a lot more costly shutdowns and it is going to impair safety. 

Think of how frustrated the whole staff is with their organization being so chaotic and disorganization.       

Description. On November 29, 2014, during a plant walkdown, the licensee identified boric acid buildup on the bolted flange downstream of valve BBV0400, a drain valve located on the auxiliary spray header. The boric acid corrosion control program owner entered this into the boric acid corrosion control program database. On January 31, February 13, March 11, April 15, and May 21, 2015, the licensee performed follow-up walkdowns on this flange and identified additional boric acid buildup. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program on March 2, 2015, after the third identification of boric acid buildup on the flange.

On March 2, 2015, the licensee initiated Job 15001126 to clean the residue off the flange and stop the source of the boric acid leakage. The licensee initially planned to work the job on September 23, 2015. On May 27, 2015, due to questions with personnel safety, the licensee rescheduled the job to December 3, 2015, when the environment inside containment would be cooler.  

On July 22, 2015, leakage at the flange located downstream of valve BBV0400 increased to a rate of 1.2 gallons per minute which is in excess of the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.4.13, "RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Operational Leakage," for unidentified leakage. This required the licensee to shut down and cool down the plant to repair the leak. 

They put this off once to many times. Basically big systems like turbine control and the feed water control system are ageing out. The licencee is continuously botching the replacement job over and over again...   


Wait till I discuss their new special inspection with reversing engineering components on their aged out and obsolete feed water control system.

Description. On January 31, 2015, while performing turbine control testing, the turbine unexpectedly lowered electrical output from approximately 1250 MWe to approximately 780 MWe. This resulted in the condenser steam dumps opening due to a primary to secondary power mismatch. Operations personnel stabilized the plant and restored steam flow through the main turbine control valves, which allowed the condenser steam dumps to close as expected. The plant stabilized in a normal lineup at approximately 60 percent power. About an hour after the plant was stabilized, the turbine load starting reducing a second time. Operations personnel lowered the load limit setpoint until the load limit was limiting turbine load. The plant reached stable conditions at approximately 53 percent power.

On February 1, 2015, the licensee intentionally lowered power to approximately 46 percent power and placed the turbine control system in standby to support troubleshooting of the turbine control system. Troubleshooting identified intermittent noise in the load set circuitry caused by a +22 V permanent magnet generator power supply and a high resistance connection on the power supply bus due to the bad seating of a load limit and load set runback card.

The licensee’s investigation revealed that a decision was made in 2005 to upgrade the system to a digital platform because of aging and obsolescence of the system components. The system life at that time was approximately 25 years (2008) and technical justification was given to continue using the system for up to 30 years (through 2013). In 2012, the unit reliability team decided to delay the digital upgrade from the spring 2013 refueling outage, to the spring 2016 refueling outage, which effectively extended the operating life to 33 years. The decision to delay the design change was based on the resource requirements of the project and probability of system failure. This decision was made with the knowledge of the upgrade project engineer, but communication with the system engineer to ensure his awareness of the delay was lacking.

Procedure APA-ZZ-00549, Appendix E, “Unit Reliability Team Operations,” Revision 7, step 4.9.8 states, “If implementation of an approved solution is delayed, URT Chair: DIRECT the issue Owner/Project Sponsor to determine IF any intermediate or compensatory measures should be put in place to ensure continued reliability until the solution can be implemented.” 

In February 2014, the system engineer presented compensatory actions to the outage leadership team for inclusion in the fall 2014 refueling outage. This request to add the actions was denied by the outage leadership team due to lack of resources. The outage leadership team did not discuss the need for the compensatory measures with the unit reliability team to acquire the necessary resources. After that time, the upgrade was deferred to the spring 2019 refueling outage, effectively extending the operating life to 36 years without identification of any compensatory measures to reduce the probability of a failure in the plant.

Corrective actions include implementing a bridging strategy to lower the risk to the safe and reliable operation of the turbine control system until the system is replaced with a new digital control system. The bridging strategy includes replacing power supplies and cards within the system to increase the overall reliability of the system.

Junk Plant Perry During Start-up Had Another Complicated Trip

Yep, Yesterday. A slow motion cascade event with broken and degraded equipment. 

This is a case these guys weren't prepared to protect the grid in a severe winter cold snap?  

Two FirstEnergy nukes down for repairs as cold snap continues

 

AKRON, Ohio -- FirstEnergy's Perry nuclear reactor and one of its two Beaver Valley reactors are down for repairs as some of the coldest weather this winter grips the region.

 

Operators re-started the reactor Thursday afternoon, only to encounter a brief electrical disruption in circuits to electric pumps supplying cooling water to the reactor. Although the plant's design includes three sets of cooling equipment, the operators initiated a second shutdown, said Young.  Another engineering "root cause" team was looking into what caused the power disruption Thursday evening.

Cascading out of control!!!

AUTOMATIC START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AND LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

"At 1504 EST on February 11, 2016, with the plant shutdown in a forced outage, the Division 1, 4.16 Kv Safety Bus (EH11) lost power. Division 1 Shutdown Cooling was in service at the time and the Division 1 Shutdown Cooling pump A tripped. The Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded EH11 as designed. However, the Emergency Service Water (ESW) A pump, which supplies cooling water to the EDG did not start. Due to

So a important valve failed to open 

the absence of cooling water to the EDG, operators took manual action to secure the Division 1 EDG. Division 2 Shutdown Cooling was operable during this transient and was subsequently started. The Division 1 Shutdown Cooling common suction isolation valve (1E12F0008) had

They were working on the other side. 

previously been de-energized in the open position to support planned maintenance. The Division 2 Shutdown Cooling isolation valve was not affected by the loss of bus EH11. Shutdown Cooling was re-established at 1544 EST using the Division 2 Shutdown Cooling

Then they lost shutdown cooling.  

pump. Reactor coolant temperature rose from approximately 89 degrees Fahrenheit to 115 degrees Fahrenheit during the event. The cause of the loss of EH11 and subsequent failure of ESW A pump to start are currently under investigation.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a specific system actuation due to the auto start of the Division 1 EDG on a valid signal.

"The plant remains shutdown with Division 2 Shutdown Cooling in operation. The plant is in a normal electrical line up with the exception of bus EH11 being de-energized."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

 

Perry Is or Getting Sloppy?

Reposted from 2/9...

So about 17 days from this Jan 29 leak and reactor vessel control fumbling...we got this new scram on two SRVs opening up.

NRC: you happy about this?

Can they afford this?

Reported-originally posted from 2/2/2016

Lots of loop instrumentation, vent and drain pipe line leaks in the industry. So a leak caused them to begin the shutdown and the feedwater system went haywire on them scramming the plant. The shutdown didn't go smoothly as designed.

Vessel or steam generator level control is becoming a big problem for the industry.  

Simulator fidelity issues and just poor training? 

Perry is owned by FirstEntergy. Their stock price is in the gutter and OHIO sits on the Marcellus Shale field. When they going bankrupt?   

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION

January 29, 2016

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-III-16-001

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. Some of the information may not yet be fully verified or evaluated and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.

Facility

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

SUBJECT: UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS DUE TO REACTOR

COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

LIMITS

On January 23, 2016, at 2100 EST, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant commenced a controlled plant shutdown due to an increasing trend in reactor coolant system leakage in the drywell. At 2122 EST leakage exceeded Technical Specification limits. On January 24, 2016, at 1007 ESTwith the plant at approximately 8 percent power, plant operators placed the motor-driven feedwater pump in service. During this operation, the reactor water level rose to the reactor trip set points. The reactor protection system auto-initiated, as designed, scramming the reactor.

The licensee continues to investigate the cause for the feedwater transient and reactor water level rise.

Following the plant shutdown, licensee personnel entered the drywell and identified the leak on recirculation loop ‘A’ pump discharge valve vent line. As required by Technical Specifications, on January 24, 2016, at 2059 EST the plant was cooled down to Mode 4 to conduct repairs. The leakage was contained in the plant. There was no impact on public health.

The State of Ohio has been notified.

This preliminary notification is issued for information only.

The Resident inspector responded to the control room to monitor plant parameters and licensee

actions. The NRC resident staff assisted by inspectors from the NRC Region 3 Office

monitored licensee actions to identify the leak and continue to monitor the repair activities.

The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee, and is current as of

4:10 p.m. EST on January 29, 2016.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML16032A394

Contact: B. Dickson

(630) 829-9827

Billy.Dickson@nrc.gov

Junk Perry-Extremely Infrequent Event With Two SRVs Opening At Power

Reposted from 2/9...

Mike I see you have this and the prior Perry shutdown posted.

I highly suspect that steam leak drove a lot of steam / condensate into some instruments and controls. 

This condensate might have caused this erratic SRV control problem.

and looking ahead, there may be more problems, this one event may be just the tip of the iceberg.

You can add in to your blog"Is there a link between the steam leak and SRV inadvertent actuation?"  

I am disappointed the manual scam didn't come sooner. This is such a rare event, I am not sure their emergency procedures carry a specific event with two SRVs slamming open. You would think this is a so rare event and they never trained on it, they would emediately scram the plant.  

So what would happen if all the SRVs would open at the same time? How about opening and shutting two or more SRVs many times while at power. I'll bet you this was the first time in the plant's history two SRVs were opened at the same time while at power?

This is the example with inadequate resources and maintenance, you just might create an event never before seen in the industry. There is no way to predict how a complex machine will fail with not enough funding?   

Opening a SRV adds negative reactivity to the plant at power (void coefficient). Shutting a SRV adds positive reactivity. Say all SRVs open then shut...how much reactivity would it add? Would it be controllable? Would it break something? I'll bet you only one SRV opening at power was ever analyzed. SRVs basically are a system assumed to be used when the reactor is shutdown.   

Do you really think reactor water level was controllable with TWO SRVs open?

Say on two SRVs opening without any operator action, what would  automatically end the transient? I am saying the low steam pressure scram?  

This guy is so infrequent it calls for a special inspection.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51716
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL DOTY HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD	Notification Date: 02/08/2016 Notification Time: 17:50 [ET] Event Date: 02/08/2016 Event Time: 15:03 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL	Person (Organization): DAVID HILLS (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING SPURIOUS OPENING OF TWO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES "At 1500 EST on February 8, 2016, two safety relief valves (SRV) opened upon a spurious Division 2 initiation signal. This caused suppression pool temperature to increase. At 1503 EST, plant operators took action to manually SCRAM the reactor at 95 degrees Fahrenheit in the suppression pool per plant procedures. The SRVs closed immediately following the scram at 1503 EST. The cause of the SRVs opening is currently under investigation. "During the scram, all rods fully inserted into the core. Reactor Pressure is stable with decay heat being removed via turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Reactor level control is currently being maintained via feedwater. Main Steam Isolation Valves are open. Cool down and depressurization to Mode 4 to follow. The plant is in a normal post SCRAM electrical line-up." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

Reverse Engineering Is Dangerous

Name and address of the individual or individuals in forming the Commission.
Tad Gray
General Manager
Curtiss-Wright - Nuclear Division
Nova Machine Products
18001 Sheldon Road
Middleburg Heights Ohio 44130
(ii) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is
created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Nova did not establish adequate design control measures to verify and check
adequacy of the Reversed Engineered HCU accumulators used in control rod
drive systems of boiling water reactors. This deviation potentially could create a
SSH by not allowing the accumulator to perform its intended safety function under
certain conditions.
During the recent NRC inspection of Nova performed 12/4/2015, it was
determined that HCU accumulators using the reverse engineering EPRI
guidelines process had not been fully qualified per Criterion III, "Design Control" of
Appendix B. This was identified as Nonconformance 9990105/2015-201-02.
(iii) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
December 4th, 2016
(iv) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of
the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of
time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The corrective action associated with this verification testing has been entered
into the Nova Corrective Action system as CAR # 279. Nova Machine has
initiated Design Verification testing to be performed on the HCU accumulators to
assure that design input/output requirements have been met. This is being
accomplished through alternate calculations, and qualification testing to
demonstrate design performance against design input requirements. Completion
is targeted for April 30th, 2016.

Fitz SRVs: NRC Selective Enforcement of Regulations Based On The Buddy System

I guess the regulator isn't interested in a 64% failure rate?

 

A responsible federal regulator would asked:

 

Is the magnitude of the failures out of bounds in this LER. Could 100% of the valves fail and the NRC would just consider it a generic issue.

 

Does this repeat every cycle?

 

From cycle to cycle, is the magnitudes increasing?

 

Are there replacements out in the market where these valves don't have illegal set point accuracy problems? (there is).

 

The NRC is satisfied with the unacceptable status quo with these unreliable valves. Repeated problems like this and the agency selectively enforcing  the rules intimidates the employees of the plants. It degrades the safety culture of the plant.  

 

February 10, 2016

SUBJECT: JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2015004 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 07200012/2015001

 

FitzPatrick personnel had removed all 11 S/RV pilot assemblies during the previous refueling outage (R-21) and identified that seven S/RV pilot assemblies had as-found lift set-points above the tolerance limit allowed by TS 3.4.3.1. FitzPatrick staff’s root cause analyses for this and previous S/RV set-point drift issues determined that the most probable cause of the out of tolerance S/RV setpoints was corrosion bonding between the S/RV pilot disc and seat, which has been an industry generic problem.

 

TS 3.4.3 requires that at least nine S/RVs shall be operable in operating modes 1, 2, and 3. Contrary to this, on June 1, 2015, FitzPatrick personnel identified that the plant had operated in these modes during cycle 21 with less than nine operable S/RVs. FitzPatrick personnel documented this condition in CR-JAF-2015-02493.

 

FitzPatrick personnel had removed all 11 S/RV pilot assemblies during the previous refueling outage (R-21) and identified that seven S/RV pilot assemblies had as-found lift set-points above the tolerance limit allowed by TS 3.4.3.1.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

River Bend Six Violations: Extreme Bureaucratic Chaotic Conditions In Junk Plant.

Right, this is how a plant descends into destructive and chaotic disorganization. Just before it enters into a huge loss of capacity factor. The NRC placed River Bend’s capacity factor on artificial respiration and feeding is happening through the veins. This plant is in an extremely fragile conditions.

NRC Begins Special Inspection at River Bend Station

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has begun a special inspection at the River Bend Station nuclear power plant to review circumstances surrounding events that occurred following an unplanned reactor shutdown on Jan. 9. The plant, operated by Entergy Operations, Inc., is located in St. Francisville, La.

The plant was operating at full power when a lightning strike caused a momentary surge in the plant’s offsite power supply, triggering an unplanned shutdown. Operators subsequently took appropriate actions to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The following day, operational errors led to a one hour loss of shutdown cooling.

“The purpose of this special inspection is to better understand the circumstances surrounding the loss of shutdown cooling, determine if operator response was appropriate, and review the licensee’s corrective actions to ensure that the cause of the event, including associated equipment problems and any contributing operator actions have been effectively addressed,” NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas said.

Several NRC inspectors will spend about a week on site evaluating the licensee’s root cause analysis, maintenance of some plant systems and adequacy of corrective actions. An inspection report documenting the team’s findings will be publicly available within 45 days of the end of the inspection.

Remember the NRC has spent a considerable amount of resources at this plant last year. This report and the new special inspection indicates the medicine never worked.

Your get it: 

Inspection report completed on Jan 7

Problematic scram and cooling the core on Jan 9

Then special inspection called a month later on Feb 8

God only knows what the inspectors bosses told them not to report on.

I think the plant is addicted to shading the truth and activity falsifying documents. Their credibility is on the line.  They are maliciously disrupting federal oversight and the NRC is allowing them to get away with it. This is the example of harmlessly paper-whipping never changes behavior.  I don’t think anyone knows the true configuration or condition of this site. I think Entergy has trained their employees' the NRC is the enemy and nobody in Louisiana respects any form of government.  

This Inspection Report anticipated the problems with keeping the core cooled last shutdown. 

I consider this very troubling inspector report "a cry for help" by the local inspectors.

February 10, 2016 

SUBJECT:RIVER BEND STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015004

Dear Mr. Olson:

On December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your River Bend Station, Unit 1. On January 7, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
NRC inspectors documented six findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. One of these violations was determined to be Severity Level IV under the traditional enforcement process. Further, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Indian Point and Vermont Yankee radioactive leak

Update 2/14

I knew it had boron in it from my early article.

NRC: No Further Leakage at Indian Point

February 14, 2016

Radiation Levels Continue to Fluctuate

By William Opalka
A visual inspection by a Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspector Thursday found no active leakage of radioactive water at the Indian Point plant, where elevated levels of tritium have been detected in test wells.
Early indications had pointed to a sump pump failure that allowed contaminated water to leach into the wells during preparation for refueling, according to an NRC spokesman.
“There was evidence of boric acid deposits, which gives credence to the working theory of leakage related to the operations of the plant [in preparation for refueling],” NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan told RTO Insider on Friday.
The inspector spent one day at the plant but will continue to work with the three permanent inspectors there and could return if needed. 

update 2/11

This thing needs a different form of communication. This thing of only talking across press releases and newspaper articles is dysfunctional and undemocratic. Waiting for months on the results of a NRC inspection is so 20th century. It should be a daily or weekly press conference. All the big players such as the governor's representative, the NRC, other government representative, the media and public comments should be discussed in the news conference. We should be all mature enough to understand this is all past of the process of writing the final definitive document on the nature of the problem. 

The NRC should shift from primary writing documents three months to a year after the event, to communicative and explaining in real time.

We don't understand why the media doesn't explain what a troubled company Entergy is. As example, Pilgrim and ANO is the two worst operating plants according to the NRC.           

Remember Vermont Yankee started off with increasing radioactivity in their wells. They kept dragging a leg telling us what was causing it till almost the shutdown. I thought they knew all along, but they wanted to stay operating to the outage and schedule contractors. To save money. Then even when they knew it was the AOG piping, they refused to emediately shutdown the reactor and the NRC totally agreed with Entergy.

I suspect Indian Point knows where they are leaking and they don't want to be shutdown waiting for the offsite contractor troops to show up just like the VY trick.

I would interpret the increasing radioactivity as the leaks continues unabated.  

Does the water have boron in it? Does IP have a safety injection and refueling tank? They are notorious leakers? I guess it has to have boron in it. What concentration?

Everyone knows with Entergy, covering-up emediately disclosing when the leak started, it is a plant ender.  Now stalling finding where the leak comes from and repairing the leak...the industry has a 100% success rate on this.

Everything now depends on risk perspectives, how safe their calculation informs them... Risk perspective's is not understandable!

Groundwater Problem Emerges at VY

It is just as likely radioactive water is leaking into the building from the outside.  An old leak is reentering the building.

I don't buy this is not going to increase the ultimate cost of decommissioning. 

Groundwater problem emerges at VY

Entergy says it had expected leaking in a turbine building, but the amount has far exceeded expectations.

By Mike Faher/The Commons

VERNON—Greater-than-anticipated amounts of groundwater—a total of 90,000 gallons so far—are encroaching into a key building at Vermont Yankee, and plant administrators are weighing options to deal with the contaminated liquid.

The NRC inspection report says Entergy is tracking the plant’s water inventory daily, and Sheehan said the company has been pumping and storing groundwater—about 90,000 gallons at this point. He characterized the liquid as having “slight radioactive contamination” after having come into contact with the turbine building.

South Texas Emergency CRDM Admendment ???

 The UCS take on it.

D6 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) housing without the drive rod

Resource

From: Regner, Lisa

Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 8:02 PM

To: Brost, Wendy (webrost@STPEGS.COM); cralbury@stpegs.com

Cc: Sterling, Lance (lsterling@STPEGS.COM); Michael Murray; Richards, Drew

(amrichards@STPEGS.COM) Subject: DRAFT Request for Additional Information - Emergency Amendment
Importance: High

Wendy, Charlie,

Below are the draft questions that the staff needs answered for us to complete our review of your Emergency Amendment submitted on December 3. As discussed with you on December 8, your acceptable response is requested within 24 hours, for the staff to make its decision by December 11, as requested in your December 3 submittal.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Thank you,

Lisa

1. Confirm that the most positive moderator density coefficient remains bounding for the moderator
feedback effects assumed in Chapter 15.1.5, ‘Spectrum of Steam System Piping Failures Inside and
Outside Containment

2. For the Departure from Nucleate Boiling analysis related to Steam Line Break, provide additional
information on why the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio changed from 3.011 to 1.811.

3. Provide the impacts to the reactor protective system from the modifications to the Digital Rod Position Indication system associated with the removal of control rod D6.

4. Provide the impacts to operator actions or emergency operating procedures as a result of the removal of control rod D6.

5. In order for the staff to assess the potential of the proposed flow restrictor generating loose parts,
provide a description of any relevant design features of the flow restrictor, and justify how the thermal expansion of the flow restrictor and its component parts has been addressed.

6. In order for the staff to verify the structural adequacy of the D6 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) housing without the drive rod, when subjected to Loss of Cooling Accident or seismic excitations, provide a description of relevant analyses that were performed to model the CRDM without the mass of  the drive rod.

Lisa M Regner, Sr. Project Manager, Branch LPLIV-1

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation