The Death Spiral Of Junk Plant Prairie Island

So they are discussing shutting downing PI in 2018. Now a official death cloud is hovering over everyone head. This plant has been

Xcel Remains Positive Despite Decrease in 2015 Earnings 

February 1, 2016

By Michael Brooks 

Xcel Energy last week reported net income of $984.5 million in 2015, a 3.6% decrease from $1.02 billion in 2014, as lagging sales and “negative” weather led to a decrease in revenue. The company brought in about $11 billion in 2015, compared to $11.7 billion in 2014.

extremely troublesome...busy. They are not self directed, the NRC has to hold their hands. They been teetering on the edge for many years. Sounds like they are so poor they have to kick out of the house the eldest child in order to save the youngest. 

Xcel Energy Waiting for Regulators to Approve Study of Nuclear Plant's Future 

Posted on Feb 16, 2016 

by Minnesota News Network 

(Red Wing, MN)  --  Xcel Energy is waiting on approval from the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to move forward with an 18-month study on the future of Prairie Island nuclear plant in Red Wing. The study will examine the economics of possibly shutting down the facility before its

-----------------------------------------------

"Xcel also responded to concerns by state regulators about the ballooning cost of preserving its two nuclear power plants in Minnesota. The utility defended the projected investment of $1.2 billion or more over 15 years as cost-effective but said it is open to discussing early retirement of the Prairie Island nuclear plant in Red Wing, Minn."

----------------------------------------------- 

operating license expires in 2034. Though Xcel Energy believes the plant is a cost-effective part of its goal to

So you justify a two plant dog facility based on inconsequential CO2 emissions? CO2 emissions is making electricity much more expensive and is weakening the grid. Just get in the media eyes with problems. 

I say again, the plant's capacity and edging towards more NRC attention, they are a extremely fragile condition. I don't trust their estimates. I'l add another billion dollars if the NRC gets on your case.    

reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the company is analyzing options for early decommissioning because of higher capital expenses over the next 20 years than originally expected. However, company officials say those are offset by lower-than-predicted operating and maintenance costs. A decision could be reached by 2018.

Xcel open tostudying options for nuclear plant’s future 

The filing, a supplement to Xcel Energy’s 2016-2030 Upper Midwest Resource Plan, states the company anticipates a $175 million increase in expenditures in the next five years over what was predicted in 2012, as well as increases of $600 million to $900 million from 2021 through 2034.

The driving costs are attributed to new requirements

The Fukushima response in not that expensive. It just the go-to excuse when they can't run this plant professionally.  

following the 2011 Diiachi nuclear disaster at Fukushima, Japan, and a general increase in regulations by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

However, the increases are largely offset by lower-than-predicted operating and maintenance costs for the plant,

These guys are crazy. They have been squeezing operating and maintenence budgets for years, It looks like you shifting operating and maintenance cost into the Fukushima response. It looks like they have been putting putting off maintenence work for years...there is a back log of work.   

Xcel Energy noted. The company expects to spend $1 billion less in fixed costs at Prairie Island through 2034.

And the fracking miracle is breathing down their throats. Lets not even talk about Monticello's botched upgrade. 

Xcel Remains Positive Despite Decrease in 2015 Earnings 

“I am pleased with our 2015 results,” CEO Ben Fowke said. “We delivered earnings within our guidance range despite negative weather and certain regulatory challenges.”
The $2.09 EPS excluded a $79 million charge ($0.15/share) from cost overruns on the upgrade of its Monticello nuclear plant. 

The decrease in revenue was partially offset by reduced natural gas costs and operations and maintenance expenses, as Xcel improved efficiency at its nuclear plants. 

These guys are under the Mike Mulligan watch. Monticello and PI are under my watch. 

Moody: Negative outlook For NE Power Generators

Moody’s raises concerns in wake of power auction

Changes outlook to negative for region’s electricity generatorsBy Bruce Mohl  Feb 16, 2016 

MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE on Tuesday issued a negative outlook for the region’s power generators in the wake of a very successful auction held last week to secure electricity supplies for New England in 2019-2020.
Each year, the operator of the regional power grid holds a so-called forward capacity auction to secure electricity supplies three years out. The auction sets the price generators receive for having their plants ready to produce power when needed. (Power generators pay a steep fine of $2,000 per megawatt hour if they are not able to deliver power when needed.) In addition to the capacity payments, generators also get paid a wholesale price for the energy they actually deliver. 

Last week’s forward capacity auction easily secured enough electricity to meet the region’s power needs at a price that was $1 billion, or 25 percent less, than the clearing price of the previous year’s auction. 

Moody’s said in an analysis that the plentiful supplies and the low price “confirm our expectations that the downturn in the merchant sector is likely to persist,” resulting in a negative outlook for the industry.Moody’s said companies such as Dynegy Inc., Exelon Corp., NRG Energy, Dominion Resources, and NextEra Energy will see their cash flows pinched. Moody’s said debt issued by such power generators as Entergy Rhode Island State Energy LP, Essential Power LLC, and FirstLight Hydro Generating Co. will be negatively affected.

The downturn in forward capacity prices was driven by 1,459 megawatts of new generation, 371 megawatts of demand-side resources (promises by large energy users to reduce usage when called upon by the power grid operator), 27 megawatt s of new wind power, and 44 megawatts of new large-scale solar. Moody’s also noted that the region’s power grid operator, ISO-New England, had estimated that rooftop solar installations were reducing overall demand in the region by 390 megawatts, the equivalent of 57 percent of the output of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, which is slated for retirement...

The New York Power Authority and Robert Moses

http://www.nypa.gov/about/history1.htm

Remember when we had the confidence to make private enterprise and government work for us? Remember when we made our big ideas come to life?  

Ultimately what led to the demised of the NYPA was the secrecy placed over the organization to protect the politicians and their cronies.

It's too bad Albany is still wrapped up in state government corruption.

I am surprised the NYPA is still around. 

This is the great story of how we once did Infrastructure.    

New York Power Authority and Robert Moses

"...The 2,400,000-kw Niagara Power Project was the largest hydropower complex in the Western World when it began operating in January 1961, less than three years after construction began. President John F. Kennedy, who joined three former presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harry S. Truman and Herbert Hoover in sending congratulations, called the Niagara project "an outstanding engineering achievement" and an "example to the world of North American efficiency and determination."

The Second Generation 

Low-cost power from the two giant hydroelectric projects flowed to upstate consumers and to factories providing thousands of jobs. But with most of New York's hydroelectric potential already developed, attention shifted to new sources of energy to meet increasing needs. In this climate, the Power Authority's "second generation" of power projects emerged.

In 1967, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller organized a blue-ribbon panel to study the state's power needs and the most economical ways of meeting them. The committee recommended, among other things, that the Power Authority be permitted to build nuclear and pumped storage hydroelectric plants. A bipartisan bill providing such authorization passed both houses of the Legislature in early 1968. Rockefeller, in signing the measure, said it created "a unique partnership between government and private industry in meeting the future power needs of the state."

In 1969, construction began on the Blenheim-Gilboa Pumped Storage Power Project (1,040,000 kw), in the Catskill Mountains, and the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (820,000 kw), named after the Power Authority's chairman at the time and located on the shores of Lake Ontario, near Oswego. The Blenheim-Gilboa project began operation in 1973; the FitzPatrick plant generated its first electricity two years later.

Meanwhile, still other new assignments were transforming the Power Authority into a truly statewide utility.

In 1972, Governor Rockefeller and the Legislature responded to an emerging energy shortfall by giving NYPA the go-ahead to build generating plants to power downstate subways and commuter trains. Then came the 1973 Mideast oil embargo and a four-fold increase in oil prices. To help Con Edison, the New York metropolitan area's primary utility, weather the resulting financial crisis, Governor Malcolm Wilson and the Legislature in 1974 directed the Power Authority to buy, complete and operate two power plants the private utility was building. The arrangement called for the Power Authority to sell most of the plants' output to government agencies in New York City and Westchester County.

One of the plants, the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant (970,000 kw), on the Hudson River in northern Westchester, began operation in 1976. The other facility, located in Queens, was the oil-fired Astoria 6, which began operation in 1977. It was later converted to also burn natural gas and renamed the Charles Poletti Power Project (825,000 kw) for the only person to serve both as governor of New York and a Power Authority trustee..."

Junk Condensers At Pilgrim

The question needed to be posed, does Pilgrim have a pastern of problems with their condenser? 

Pilgrim reactor at half power after condenser leak

Posted Feb. 15, 2016 at 6:36 PM 

PLYMOUTH — Operators lowered Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s reactor to half power early Monday after discovering a water leak in the main condenser. 

The condenser was taken out of service so workers could make repairs, according to Patrick O’Brien, spokesman for Entergy Corp., owner-operator of the Plymouth plant.

Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said the main condenser holds thousands of tubes through which water from Cape Cod Bay is circulated. 

The circulating ocean water cools the steam coming from the plant’s turbine, returning it to its water state. The ocean water, now about 30 degrees warmer, then returns to the bay. 

“This is a condition that periodically occurs at many power plants, including nuclear and other types,” Sheehan said of the condenser leak. By midmorning Monday, the plant was at 48 percent power. “Plant personnel will make preparations to enter the isolated condenser to identify and plug the leaking tubes.”…

Fed 8, 2016  shutdown for blizzard.

(Feb 27,2015) Pilgrim Stuck at 22% After Storm Neptune: Beginning To a Pull Fitzpatrick

(May 2015)More Main Condenser Problems At Pilgrim

Our Electricity Problem: Everyone At War With Each Other On The Grid

Come on, Entergy and national grid at war with Cuomo. These utilities hold enormous influence over the political system. Does this constitute collusion to destroy Cuomo and boost or maintain the prices of electricity. The system makes it more profitable to collude than compete. Everyone is trying to manage their cheap natural gas problem.

If the Market becomes too unstable to preform this vital service to society, too corrupt, then government should step in. Here is an old solution. The solution is for NY to build and operate their own power plants.   

Put this together with FERC going after the NEISO over the fairness our electric rates.

The system is set up where these guys either collude or sabotage each other, often both at the same...is this called the free market and deregulation serving the greater ends of our nation and society??? Who is it serving?     

Cuomo targets power plant that closed after $110M subsidy by National Grid customers

By Tim Knauss | tknauss@syracuse.com The Post-Standard
Email the author | Follow on Twitter
on February 13, 2016 at 8:50 AM, updated February 13, 2016 at 9:44 AM

4

SYRACUSE, N.Y. – Gov. Andrew Cuomo has gone to war with the owner of a Western New York power plant that closed in January after National Grid customers paid more than $110 million in surcharges to keep the plant open since 2012.

Cuomo this week ordered the state Public Service

Basically NRG is a grid speculator company. They once specialized in making money on so called green energy. Speculating of the green energy altruism mirage and stupid government subsidies. The natural gas problem has devastated them. Their stock price is the below the 2000s lows. I think they are right near bankruptcy. Why has anyone in recent times ever trusted these guys?  Green energy today is very much like the early 2000s Enron coruption.     

Commission to investigate NRG Energy's decision to close Dunkirk Power Plant near Buffalo and whether "consumers of the state of New York have been defrauded."

NRG mothballed the coal-fired plant last month, abandoning a plan championed by the governor to convert the plant to burn natural gas.

Cuomo wants the PSC to determine "whether NRG should be allowed to continue to operate as an electric corporation in the state,'' according to a letter from the governor to PSC Chair Audrey Zibelman. (See letter below.)

NRG officials say they fulfilled their agreement to keep Dunkirk open while transmission improvements were made to the regional power grid. That agreement ended in December.

NRG backed away from its plan to convert Dunkirk to natural gas largely because of a federal lawsuit filed by Entergy Corp., said David Gaier, speaking for NRG. Entergy, another company that has butted heads with Cuomo, filed a lawsuit last year claiming that a ratepayer-subsidized conversion of the Dunkirk plant would be illegal and discriminatory.

"The Entergy lawsuit created a tremendous amount of uncertainty and risk for NRG in moving forward with the Dunkirk project.'' Gaier wrote in an email. "Under these circumstances, NRG cannot prudently continue to invest tens of millions of dollars while this lawsuit remains unresolved.''

NRG Energy is the nation's largest owner of merchant power plants, with $16 billion in annual revenues and 51,000 megawatts of generating capacity. NRG owns five other power plants in New York besides Dunkirk, including the 1,628-megawatt Oswego generating station, which seldom runs.

Why National Grid customers paid a subsidy

NRG first notified state officials in March 2012 that they intended to close the Dunkirk power plant, which can make a maximum of 635 megawatts. But the Public Service Commission determined that some power from Dunkirk was necessary to keep the power grid stable.

Oswego Generating Station is owned by NRG Energy, a company that Gov. Andrew Cuomo says might deserve banishment from New York state.Gary Walts  

The commission approved a "reliability service agreement'' under which National Grid customers paid a surcharge to subsidize the plant to keep two of its four generating units available. That agreement was later amended to keep just one unit open. The amended contract was extended once, finally ending in December 2015.

Cuomo said reliability payments totaled more than $110 million since 2012. The surcharges were paid by customers throughout National Grid's Upstate territory, including Central New York. Utility officials could not immediately estimate the impact on a typical residential customer.

Separately, Cuomo announced in December 2013 that he had made a deal with NRG to convert the Dunkirk plant to burn natural gas. The Public Service Commission later approved a "repowering agreement'' under which National Grid customers would pay $20.4 million a year for 10 years to subsidize the conversion. Those payments never began because NRG decided to mothball the plant instead.

Cuomo's wrath at NRG appears to stem from the company's decision to back away from the repowering, which was hailed as a "Christmas miracle'' when the governor announced it three years ago. The conversion would have preserved Dunkirk's ability to retain its employees and pay $8 million a year in local property taxes, Cuomo said at the time.

Nuclear plant owner sues

Entergy Corp., the owner of FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County, sued the Public Service Commission last year in federal court, alleging that the subsidized repowering plan illegally interfered with the state's wholesale energy market.

Unrelated to the Dunkirk case, Cuomo has dueled with Entergy over the pending shutdown of FitzPatrick, which is due to close by early 2017. The governor said the decision to close the plant showed "callous disregard'' for its 600 employees, and he vowed to pursue "every legal and regulatory avenue'' to keep FitzPatrick open.

At the same time, Cuomo has lambasted Entergy's operation of the downstate Indian Point nuclear reactors, which he wants to close because they are too close to New York City.

The uncertainty created by Entergy's lawsuit led NRG to mothball the Dunkirk plant rather than convert it, Gaier said. In the meantime, National Grid has completed a major upgrade to its Western New York transmission system that made it possible to operate without Dunkirk, said Stephen Brady, speaking for the utility.

Cuomo maintains that NRG should have pursued the repowering of Dunkirk, which was originally expected to be done by September 2015.

Cuomo this week directed the PSC to investigate why NRG did not repower Dunkirk and how much that decision cost Upstate consumers. He also wants an investigation into whether NRG should be banned from operating in the state.

"NRG stands behind everything we've done to support the grid and provide ratepayers in New York with reliable power under agreements at the price approved by the state in advance,'' Gaier said. "We look forward to working with the governor and the Public Service Commission to resolve these issues to everyone's satisfaction.''

Hope Creek's Junk SRV: All Applicable Interfacing System Functions

The NRC has put up on Hope Creek's docket their response to my concerns about SRV setpoint failure. Along with old NRC information about industry's problems with SRVs. So everyone is checking their technical information concerning the SRVs. What does interfacing system functions mean?

Basically the maintenence rule is a voluntary bureaucratic system defining the rules of necessary plant maintenence and documentation. It is another process done under the sheets away from public scrutiny.

***Everyone is confused with, throwing worthless documents  at a problem over and over again equates to actually fixing the problem. If it is still broke, just throw a powerless document at it. 

Again, if we had a real NRC, the agency would bark once about "interfacing system functions". It would scare the pants off Hope Creek. I think this all is fraud and falsification, not documenting maintenence rule functional failures.

Everyone is confused with, throwing worthless documents  at a problem over and over again equates to actually fixing the problem...

February 2, 2016

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2015004

Maintenance Rule Program Implementation 

The inspectors have identified multiple examples of PSEG’s failure to evaluate the impact of an equipment issue on interfacing systems, including: 

·         In September 2013, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate the impact of a failure of a feedwater crosstie valve on the feedwater sealing functions for the reactor core isolation cooling system and HPCI system. This observation resulted in the creation of a new feedwater system maintenance rule function and subsequent maintenance preventable functional failure classification that would not have been otherwise counted. (NOTF 20619913) 

·         In May 2014, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate safety relief valve setpoint failures under all applicable interfacing system functions. The condition was evaluated for the automatic depressurization system functions, but not for the main steam functions. (NOTF 20650346) 

·         In August 2015, the inspectors identified that PSEG failed to evaluate the loss of  the 10B431 480VAC (alternating current) 1E motor control center (MCC) as a Maintenance Rule functional failure of the interfacing 1E 480VAC system. 

This is the third instance identified in three years of PSEG failing to evaluate the impact of equipment issues on interfacing systems. This observation resulted in the assignment of a maintenance preventable functional failure to the 480VAC 1E MCC system that would not have been otherwise counted. (NOTF 20702217) 

Along with the items described above, during 2015, the inspectors and the NRC PI&R team inspectors observed multiple other examples of PSEG’s failure to evaluate the impact of an equipment issue on interfacing systems. These repetitive observations related to deficiencies with PSEG’s interfacing system maintenance rule screening resulted in PSEG creating a maintenance rule panel consisting of the maintenance rule program coordinator and engineers that performs an independent, periodic review of issues identified in the CAP to ensure all appropriate screenings are assigned. The inspectors determined that the corrective action implemented to address the issue was reasonable to resolve the identified deficiencies. The inspectors determined all the issues above screened to minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix E, because the systems’ preventive maintenance still demonstrated effective control of system equipment performance as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of the maintenance rule.

Palisades-Junk Plant And Safety Culture

Nobody trust the NRC to be their partners.  Their rules are too stick. Get fired for three years , the humiliation of it, back pay and $5000, its just not worth it.
 
The NRC confuses following the rules, with doing what is best for the USA.

They should paid until the lump goes through snake. But what the hell, we are all powerless as hell as this.

Clashing bureaus 
Posted: Saturday, February 13, 2016 6:00 am

Clashing bureaus By ANDREW LERSTEN - HP Staff Writer The Herald-Palladium | 0 comments


COVERT — In November the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration ruled that two Palisades nuclear power plant security supervisors were wrongfully terminated in 2013.

But the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission also investigated the allegations and reached a different conclusion.

On Thursday it sent Palisades’ owner Entergy a letter stating it could not substantiate that the men were discriminated against and, in turn, wrongfully terminated.

The new information is consistent with the NRC’s original investigation from 2013. The NRC reopened the investigation last year after receiving additional information requiring follow-up, the NRC stated.

Entergy is appealing the OSHA ruling.

Meanwhile, NRC officials told Entergy they are concerned the OSHA ruling may affect the willingness of plant employees to raise safety and security issues.

The NRC is asking Entergy to submit its plans on things it is or will do to address the possible adverse impact of the OSHA ruling, in the next 30 days.

OSHA ruled that Chris Mikusko and Roland Ruby are due back wages with interest, and ordered Palisades’ owner Entergy to reinstate their jobs.

In addition, the ruling ordered Entergy to pay the men $5,000 each in compensatory damages, and to pay their attorney fees.

Regarding the men’s termination, they alleged that they were fired after raising concerns about a fellow security supervisor who was allegedly working without proper firearms qualifications. OSHA agreed there was evidence of their claim.

Palisades is along Lake Michigan in Covert Township. 

Callaway Junk plant: Can't Put Lipstick On This Reverse Engineered Pig.

So they botched the replacement of a electronics controller on a emergency makeup water system for a steam generator. They were reverse engineering this card because of no replacements on the aux feed control to the Steam generator. You got to know everything in this system is aged out and obsolete.

Ameren owns this pig

So Callaway is having troubles replacing aged out equipment. As in my other Callaway article, they had plenty of opportunities to know they put in defective parts into nuclear safety systems and they neglected to fix fixed when the problem emerged.

When does the NRC get overwhelmed and exhausted by all by the degradation going on throughout the industry. The industry wide decline.  

Seven NRC violations on this one event. The magnitude of this speaks volumes.          

January 13, 2016

SUBJECT: CALLAWAY PLANT - NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000483/2015009

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” for the licensee’s failure to assure that the design of the replacement reverse-engineered Modutronics controller cards for the auxiliary feedwater control valves were suitable for their application. Specifically, as of August 11, 2015, the licensee failed to establish suitable interface requirements in procurement documents to Nuclear Logistics Incorporated (the vendor) and verify the adequacy of the design by either design reviews or testing. Specifically, the team identified that neither the licensee nor the vendor had performed a design review sufficient to assure that the Modutronics controller cards were suitable for their application. In addition, the licensee had not provided the vendor with sufficient information to reverse-engineer the controller cards. Lastly, neither the licensee nor the vendor performed testing sufficient to verify the adequacy of the design of the new Modutronics controller cards. As a result, the replacement cards were supplied with motor field current rectifier bridges that were undersized and marginal for their application, such that two of them failed in service, rendering these auxiliary feedwater system valves inoperable. Following performance of a root cause analysis, the licensee replaced the deficient controller cards with those of a higher current rating. The licensee initiated Callaway Action Request 201505796 to place this item into the corrective action program.

• Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for failure to prescribe activities affecting quality using procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, on November 18, 2009, the licensee revised Procedure MTE-ZZ-QA033, “MOVATS UDS [motor operated valve actuator test system universal diagnostic system] Testing of Torque Controlled Modutronics Limitorque Motor Operated Rising Stem Valves,” Revision 3, to incorporate a second method of valve testing, and introduced an error in bypassing a test of the Modutronics board setup feedback potentiometer. As a result, on July 23, 2015, the actuator misinterpreted the actual position of the valve, which subsequently failed to open when operators attempted to open the valve following a forced reactor shutdown. In response to this issue, the licensee has reviewed all maintenance and test activities that could affect the potentiometer and has revised the appropriate procedures. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201505332.

• Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, “Test Control,” for failure to ensure that testing demonstrated that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service. Specifically, on October 24, 2014, the licensee failed to establish a suitable post-maintenance test program to demonstrate that the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater flow control valve Modutronics potentiometer had been set correctly after maintenance. The testing consisted of stroking the valve full open or full closed, and did not consider step changes in valve positioning and did not confirm the potentiometer feedback settings during valve positions that were not full open or full closed. In response to this issue, the licensee performed another calibration of the potentiometer, focusing on the potentiometer position during the valve stroke. The new post-maintenance test included opening the valve in discreet step changes to test the valve position feedback potentiometer. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201505332.

• Green. The team identified two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for the licensee’s failure to implement their corrective action program procedure. Specifically: (1) on November 20, 2014, the licensee designated the improper setting of the auxiliary feedwater flow control valve ALHV005 limit switches as Significance Level 5 (administrative close) instead of Significance Level 3 (lower tier cause evaluation) and (2) on December 9, 2014, the licensee downgraded the failure of the Modutronics card for valve ALHV0005 from Significance Level 1 (root cause analysis) to Significance Level 3 based on unverified assumptions of the failure mechanisms. Following failure of the Modutronics card for valve ALHV0005, the licensee assumed that the early failure was due to a manufacturing defect (infant mortality) without supporting data to prove this designation. The licensee entered these issues into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Requests 201506921 and 201507235.

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition for a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, on May 21, 2015, the licensee received new information that refuted the previously assumed failure mechanism for AFW flow control valve ALHV0005 documented in December 2014, but failed to initiate a new Callaway action request to document the new information and report it to appropriate levels of management. As a result, the licensee failed to identify the failure of the valve as a significant condition adverse to quality, determine the cause, initiate a prompt operability assessment, and identify corrective action to preclude repetition until valve ALHV0007 failed, for the same reason, following a reactor trip on August 11, 2015. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Callaway action request 201506846.

• Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, on March 4, 2014, the licensee performed Job 08505547, and had not correctly accounted for the differential pressure the valve would actually experience, and had incorrectly set and tested the close torque switch on valve ALHV0005. As a result, On November 15, 2015, during steam generator filling operations, Valve ALHV0005 failed to move in the closed direction when the torque switch opened. The incorrect close torque switch setting prevented the valve from going full closed. In response to this issue, the licensee, using Job 14005755, repaired the valve, and confirmed that the close torque switch settings were correct and successfully retested. This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Callaway Action Report 201508399.

• Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for the licensee’s failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, as of September 23, 2015, the licensee had not taken corrective action, following previous identification of undersized field current rectifier bridges, to ensure that an independent review of the modified circuit design had been completed, or that the modified cards had been subjected to a sufficient testing and qualification program. Thus, following questioning by the team, the licensee identified additional components (two other rectifier bridges) on the newly modified circuit cards that were also potentially undersized. The licensee performed an operability evaluation and concluded that the new cards were operable, based on additional circuit analysis that was performed. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201506874.

Junk Plant Callaway: A Pattern of Not Fixing Problems Immediately

Popeye’s J. Wellington Wimpy "I'll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today".

This cost them to shutdown. They blew three shots at fixing it. It started by not property torquing the flange nuts. How many screw-ups does it take to cost expensive unnecessary shutdown?

Right, they got some 5 million parts and components in this plants. If they got a global problem with their maintenence philosophy then the plant is heading towards a lot more costly shutdowns and it is going to impair safety. 

Think of how frustrated the whole staff is with their organization being so chaotic and disorganization.       

Description. On November 29, 2014, during a plant walkdown, the licensee identified boric acid buildup on the bolted flange downstream of valve BBV0400, a drain valve located on the auxiliary spray header. The boric acid corrosion control program owner entered this into the boric acid corrosion control program database. On January 31, February 13, March 11, April 15, and May 21, 2015, the licensee performed follow-up walkdowns on this flange and identified additional boric acid buildup. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program on March 2, 2015, after the third identification of boric acid buildup on the flange.

On March 2, 2015, the licensee initiated Job 15001126 to clean the residue off the flange and stop the source of the boric acid leakage. The licensee initially planned to work the job on September 23, 2015. On May 27, 2015, due to questions with personnel safety, the licensee rescheduled the job to December 3, 2015, when the environment inside containment would be cooler.  

On July 22, 2015, leakage at the flange located downstream of valve BBV0400 increased to a rate of 1.2 gallons per minute which is in excess of the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.4.13, "RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Operational Leakage," for unidentified leakage. This required the licensee to shut down and cool down the plant to repair the leak. 

They put this off once to many times. Basically big systems like turbine control and the feed water control system are ageing out. The licencee is continuously botching the replacement job over and over again...   


Wait till I discuss their new special inspection with reversing engineering components on their aged out and obsolete feed water control system.

Description. On January 31, 2015, while performing turbine control testing, the turbine unexpectedly lowered electrical output from approximately 1250 MWe to approximately 780 MWe. This resulted in the condenser steam dumps opening due to a primary to secondary power mismatch. Operations personnel stabilized the plant and restored steam flow through the main turbine control valves, which allowed the condenser steam dumps to close as expected. The plant stabilized in a normal lineup at approximately 60 percent power. About an hour after the plant was stabilized, the turbine load starting reducing a second time. Operations personnel lowered the load limit setpoint until the load limit was limiting turbine load. The plant reached stable conditions at approximately 53 percent power.

On February 1, 2015, the licensee intentionally lowered power to approximately 46 percent power and placed the turbine control system in standby to support troubleshooting of the turbine control system. Troubleshooting identified intermittent noise in the load set circuitry caused by a +22 V permanent magnet generator power supply and a high resistance connection on the power supply bus due to the bad seating of a load limit and load set runback card.

The licensee’s investigation revealed that a decision was made in 2005 to upgrade the system to a digital platform because of aging and obsolescence of the system components. The system life at that time was approximately 25 years (2008) and technical justification was given to continue using the system for up to 30 years (through 2013). In 2012, the unit reliability team decided to delay the digital upgrade from the spring 2013 refueling outage, to the spring 2016 refueling outage, which effectively extended the operating life to 33 years. The decision to delay the design change was based on the resource requirements of the project and probability of system failure. This decision was made with the knowledge of the upgrade project engineer, but communication with the system engineer to ensure his awareness of the delay was lacking.

Procedure APA-ZZ-00549, Appendix E, “Unit Reliability Team Operations,” Revision 7, step 4.9.8 states, “If implementation of an approved solution is delayed, URT Chair: DIRECT the issue Owner/Project Sponsor to determine IF any intermediate or compensatory measures should be put in place to ensure continued reliability until the solution can be implemented.” 

In February 2014, the system engineer presented compensatory actions to the outage leadership team for inclusion in the fall 2014 refueling outage. This request to add the actions was denied by the outage leadership team due to lack of resources. The outage leadership team did not discuss the need for the compensatory measures with the unit reliability team to acquire the necessary resources. After that time, the upgrade was deferred to the spring 2019 refueling outage, effectively extending the operating life to 36 years without identification of any compensatory measures to reduce the probability of a failure in the plant.

Corrective actions include implementing a bridging strategy to lower the risk to the safe and reliable operation of the turbine control system until the system is replaced with a new digital control system. The bridging strategy includes replacing power supplies and cards within the system to increase the overall reliability of the system.

Junk Plant Perry During Start-up Had Another Complicated Trip

Yep, Yesterday. A slow motion cascade event with broken and degraded equipment. 

This is a case these guys weren't prepared to protect the grid in a severe winter cold snap?  

Two FirstEnergy nukes down for repairs as cold snap continues

 

AKRON, Ohio -- FirstEnergy's Perry nuclear reactor and one of its two Beaver Valley reactors are down for repairs as some of the coldest weather this winter grips the region.

 

Operators re-started the reactor Thursday afternoon, only to encounter a brief electrical disruption in circuits to electric pumps supplying cooling water to the reactor. Although the plant's design includes three sets of cooling equipment, the operators initiated a second shutdown, said Young.  Another engineering "root cause" team was looking into what caused the power disruption Thursday evening.

Cascading out of control!!!

AUTOMATIC START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AND LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

"At 1504 EST on February 11, 2016, with the plant shutdown in a forced outage, the Division 1, 4.16 Kv Safety Bus (EH11) lost power. Division 1 Shutdown Cooling was in service at the time and the Division 1 Shutdown Cooling pump A tripped. The Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded EH11 as designed. However, the Emergency Service Water (ESW) A pump, which supplies cooling water to the EDG did not start. Due to

So a important valve failed to open 

the absence of cooling water to the EDG, operators took manual action to secure the Division 1 EDG. Division 2 Shutdown Cooling was operable during this transient and was subsequently started. The Division 1 Shutdown Cooling common suction isolation valve (1E12F0008) had

They were working on the other side. 

previously been de-energized in the open position to support planned maintenance. The Division 2 Shutdown Cooling isolation valve was not affected by the loss of bus EH11. Shutdown Cooling was re-established at 1544 EST using the Division 2 Shutdown Cooling

Then they lost shutdown cooling.  

pump. Reactor coolant temperature rose from approximately 89 degrees Fahrenheit to 115 degrees Fahrenheit during the event. The cause of the loss of EH11 and subsequent failure of ESW A pump to start are currently under investigation.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a specific system actuation due to the auto start of the Division 1 EDG on a valid signal.

"The plant remains shutdown with Division 2 Shutdown Cooling in operation. The plant is in a normal electrical line up with the exception of bus EH11 being de-energized."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

 

Perry Is or Getting Sloppy?

Reposted from 2/9...

So about 17 days from this Jan 29 leak and reactor vessel control fumbling...we got this new scram on two SRVs opening up.

NRC: you happy about this?

Can they afford this?

Reported-originally posted from 2/2/2016

Lots of loop instrumentation, vent and drain pipe line leaks in the industry. So a leak caused them to begin the shutdown and the feedwater system went haywire on them scramming the plant. The shutdown didn't go smoothly as designed.

Vessel or steam generator level control is becoming a big problem for the industry.  

Simulator fidelity issues and just poor training? 

Perry is owned by FirstEntergy. Their stock price is in the gutter and OHIO sits on the Marcellus Shale field. When they going bankrupt?   

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION

January 29, 2016

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-III-16-001

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. Some of the information may not yet be fully verified or evaluated and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.

Facility

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

SUBJECT: UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS DUE TO REACTOR

COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

LIMITS

On January 23, 2016, at 2100 EST, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant commenced a controlled plant shutdown due to an increasing trend in reactor coolant system leakage in the drywell. At 2122 EST leakage exceeded Technical Specification limits. On January 24, 2016, at 1007 ESTwith the plant at approximately 8 percent power, plant operators placed the motor-driven feedwater pump in service. During this operation, the reactor water level rose to the reactor trip set points. The reactor protection system auto-initiated, as designed, scramming the reactor.

The licensee continues to investigate the cause for the feedwater transient and reactor water level rise.

Following the plant shutdown, licensee personnel entered the drywell and identified the leak on recirculation loop ‘A’ pump discharge valve vent line. As required by Technical Specifications, on January 24, 2016, at 2059 EST the plant was cooled down to Mode 4 to conduct repairs. The leakage was contained in the plant. There was no impact on public health.

The State of Ohio has been notified.

This preliminary notification is issued for information only.

The Resident inspector responded to the control room to monitor plant parameters and licensee

actions. The NRC resident staff assisted by inspectors from the NRC Region 3 Office

monitored licensee actions to identify the leak and continue to monitor the repair activities.

The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee, and is current as of

4:10 p.m. EST on January 29, 2016.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML16032A394

Contact: B. Dickson

(630) 829-9827

Billy.Dickson@nrc.gov