Friday, February 27, 2015

Pilgrim Stuck at 22% After Storm Neptune: Beginning To a Pull Fitzpatrick

I keyed Mary into this?

Does Pilgrim need a new Condenser? Will it come down in power 21 times in 6 months? How old is Pilgrim's condenser? 
Leaks force FitzPatrick nuclear plant to operate at reduced power

SCRIBA, N.Y. - The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Oswego County has been operating at reduced power since mid-June to compensate for persistent leaks in the plant's aging cooling system that have plagued the facility for the past two years.

Entergy Corp., owner of the 39-year-old nuclear plant, cut power output to about 85 percent of capacity in mid-June to try to reduce the frequency of leaks in its condenser.

The condenser, which circulates water from Lake Ontario to cool the reactor, sprouted leaks on average nearly once a week during the first six months of this year, each time forcing plant operators to reduce power until the leaks could be plugged.

Entergy officials have said they plan to replace all the condenser tubes during a refueling outage scheduled to begin next month. Crews will replace the existing brass condenser tubes with titanium tubes designed to be resistant to Lake Ontario sediments, which are abrasive and contribute to leaking, said Tammy Holden, speaking for Entergy.

Operating at reduced power cuts into what Entergy can earn from the nuclear plant, which company officials described last year as a "challenged facility'' because of its uncertain financial prospects.

The condenser is a large metal box positioned beneath the nuclear plant's generating turbine. Steam that drives the turbine then passes through the condenser, where it is cooled and returned to a liquid state by water from Lake Ontario, which circulates in thousands of small metal tubes.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has said the condenser leaks do not affect public safety, but the leaks have forced numerous unplanned power reductions.

During the first six months of 2014, Entergy was forced to reduce power 21 times to plug condenser leaks, according to NRC inspection reports. From April through June, the facility endured unplanned power reductions at a rate of 23 per 7,000 hours of operation, far exceeding the NRC's recommended limit of six.

NRC officials have criticized Entergy for not addressing the condenser leaks earlier. The condenser at FitzPatrick was last replaced in 1995, and the metal tubes within the condenser have an expected lifespan of 15 years, NRC officials said.

Entergy has not released the date when it plans to begin the September outage. Maintenance during the outage will employ more than 1,500 outside contractors in addition to the regular work force of 623, Holden said.
Love that Mary Lampert? 
Pilgrim’s delay in restart - tube plugs falling out 
My understanding is that the startup delay resulted from the following; please correct me if this is not accurate. 
  • Tube plugs fell out of the condensate tubes. Sea water then leaked into the fresh side of the condenser that contains the water that will go back into the reactor vessel.  
  • Because salt water would cause the stainless steel of the reactor to corrode and eventually cause a failure of the vessel and all its stainless steel pipes, the water is cleaned in the condenser demineralizer.
  • During Pilgrim’s startup, because of the loss of tube plugs, the salt water intrusion was too much for the condensate demineralizers to remove and the feedwater system and the reactor vessel were in jeopardy of massive salt water intrusion. 
  • As a result, the condensate demineralizers were shut down and the resin in the demineralizer was replaced and the tube plugs were re-installed.
Questions:
1. Were some tubes in the condenser plugged because they had failed and were leaking?
a. When did the tubes start to leak?
b. Why were they plugged and not replaced?
c. Did NRC approve that fix?
d. What is the industry history of outcomes of plugging tubes versus replacement?
2. Why did the plugs come out- sounds like poor maintenance is that correct?
a. Is there a guidance or protocol calling for inspection of plugs prior to startup?
b. Were the tube plugs inspected before the recent plant started up?
c. What is the maintenance schedule and how does it match Entergy’s performance?
d. If there was an inspection, was it done right?
e. Supposedly there is a map of the tube sheet that shows what tubes are supposed to be plugged
i. Was the map accurate?
ii. Did the maintenance crew read the map correctly?
3. Did any salt get into the reactor?
a. What tests were performed to assure that salt did not get into the reactor?
b. If any salt did get into the reactor, what protocol should, and will be, followed?
Thank you in advance,
Mary Lampert
Pilgrim Watch
148 Washington Street -Duxbury, MA 02332
Tel. 781-934-0389/Email: mary.lampert@comcast.net

From: McKinley, Raymond
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 12:58 PM
To: mary.lampert@comcast.net
The Annual Assessment Meeting will most likely occur on March 18. A public meeting notice will be forthcoming soon. We also plan to discuss the results of the 95002 Supplemental Inspection during that meeting. The Special Inspection that was launched following winter storm Juno is still in progress. That report will be issued within 45 days from the exit meeting, so we will not be in a position to discuss the findings of that inspection at the March meeting. 
We can answer some questions relative to the facts surrounding winter storms Juno and Neptune, but we will not be able to discuss any pre-decisional findings.
To your attached questions: 
Were some tubes in the condenser plugged because they had failed and were leaking? 
Yes, some tubes were previously plugged due to previously identified leaks. 
a. When did the tubes start to leak? 
The previously plugged tubes began to leak again following the planned shutdown for winter
storm Neptune. 
b. Why were they plugged and not replaced? 
Tube plugging is the most common repair used in the industry. Condensers are constructed with more tubes than needed to allow any leaking tubes to be plugged. Eventually, condenser efficiency is impacted which results in lost generation revenue for the licensee. 
At or near that point, licensees will either re-sleeve the tubes or replace the condenser water
boxes. 
c. Did NRC approve that fix? 
This is non-safety related equipment repair, and NRC approval is not required. However, as stated above, this is a normal repair used in industry. 
d. What is the industry history of outcomes of plugging tubes versus replacement? 
Plugging is very effective. However, plugs can and do fall out or become loose. The decision to repair or replace is a licensee decision. 
2. Why did the plugs come out- sounds like poor maintenance is that correct? 
Thermal and hydraulic cycling associated with shutdowns and startups were most likely the cause. There is no reason to suspect poor maintenance. 
a. Is there a guidance or protocol calling for inspection of plugs prior to startup? 
Licensees will typically inspect water boxes during a refueling outage but not for mid-cycle outages unless they perform water box work. They did not perform water box work during the Juno or Neptune outages, so there was no reason to perform a water box inspection. 
b. Were the tube plugs inspected before the recent plant started up? 
No, see previous answer. 
c. What is the maintenance schedule and how does it match Entergy’s performance? 
NRC does not regulate condenser maintenance activities. Licensee’s typically perform condenser maintenance during refueling outages or during online maintenance windows. It is in their own best interests to perform condenser maintenance to avoid unplanned down powers / outages from an economic perspective as well as to protect their capital investment. In addition, NRC does have a Performance Indicator which tracks unplanned down powers, so such issues can draw regulatory scrutiny. Pilgrim’s unplanned down power Performance Indicator is solidly in the GREEN range, so it has not been a problem to this point. 
d. If there was an inspection, was it done right? 
NRC does not inspect licensee condenser water box inspections. 
e. Supposedly there is a map of the tube sheet that shows what tubes are supposed to be plugged 
i. Was the map accurate? 
ii. Did the maintenance crew read the map correctly? 
As stated above, NRC does not inspect this activity. However, when leaks were identified
following the winter storm Neptune startup, the licensee used their tube sheet maps to make
sure plugs were still there and tight. They replaced missing plugs and tightened or replaced
any loose plugs.
3. Did any salt get into the reactor? 
The licensee monitors the condenser hotwell and condensate demineralizer discharge for conductivity and chlorides. They detected rising chlorides and conductivity in both locations during the startup which drove them to take corrective action 
a. What tests were performed to assure that salt did not get into the reactor? 
See previous answer. 
b. If any salt did get into the reactor, what protocol should, and will be, followed? 
The licensee follows Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidance, and their procedures drive them to take timely and appropriate action based on the severity of the chemistry conditions. In this case, the action was to hold at reduced power until the issue was corrected. Severe chloride or conductivity excursions can require an immediate shutdown, but the chemistry levels were manageable in this case. The problem was identified and corrected and chemistry levels returned to normal. The licensee will continue to monitor reactor water chemistry and take appropriate action in accordance with the EPRI guidance and plant procedures. Our inspectors will follow up to ensure that the licensee follows their reactor water chemistry procedures. 
Sincerely,
Ray McKinley
Chief, Division of Reactor Projects Branch 5
U.S. NRC Region I
Subject: RE: Comments and questions regarding Pilgrim's delay in restart - tube plugs falling out.
Attachments: 02.23.15 QUESTIONS NRC TUBE PLUGS DELAYING RESTART.pdf
Mary,

Thursday, February 26, 2015

Bailing Out The Exelon Nuclear Plants?

My problems with this. 

1) This is going to support the Exelon structure.

2) No money is mandated into maintenance and updating plant equipment.

3) At the end of it, you still get stuck with these obsolete dogs.

Honestly, you'd be better throwing in a few more bucks for new nuclear plants.

Exelon wants $2 a month more for nuclear plants

SRINGFIELD — Electricity users would have to dip into their pockets a little more to help cover costs of Exelon's nuclear power plants under legislation unveiled Thursday that the influential corporation maintained would save jobs and keep service steady and reliable.Exelon is backing the proposal because it could prop up what it says are three money-losing nuclear plants that produce a relatively clean energy compared to other sources of power. Opponents question whether Exelon would get an unnecessary bailout when a trio of its other nuclear plants are in the black, and supporters of a separate bill prefer a broader approach that would build up renewable resources. 
Where the state ends up on the issue will play out in the months ahead as the spring session unfolds, with companies like Exelon wielding clout at the Capitol through campaign contributions to lawmakers. 
The Exelon legislation comes out of a joint report rolled out last month by multiple state agencies charged with examining the impact of closing nuclear plants and potential ways to keep them open. House Speaker Michael Madigan, D-Chicago, backed the resolution that led to the report. 
Under the Exelon-backed bill, residential customers would pay about $2 more a month, a figure Exelon calculated based on the average bills of customers of Commonwealth Edison and Ameren, which serves much of Downstate. The average residential customer's bill from ComEd, for example, was about $90 in January, the company said. 
The Citizens Utility Board questioned how Exelon, which has made billions of dollars in profit, can ask electricity users to shell out more money to help pay for money-losing plants when "consumers have already paid for those plants several times over."

David Kolata, CUB's executive director, estimated ComEd and Ameren electricity users would pay an additional $300 million a year.

Exelon executive Joseph Dominguez did not directly answer questions about how the legislation may boost Exelon's bottom line and suggested that helping to keep the plants open would benefit consumers.

"What it will help us do is not make profits but avoid losses that otherwise would be treated by retiring plants," said Dominguez, the company's senior vice president for governmental and regulatory affairs and public policy. "The right way to look at this is the consequence of losing the plants."

Under questioning, Dominguez acknowledged the legislation does not include a guarantee that Exelon would keep open the money-losing plants at Byron, the Quad Cities and Downstate Clinton. But he said the company likely would commit to keeping those plants open during the five-year life of the proposal. Such an expiration date is a common clause in Springfield, giving lawmakers a chance to gauge whether changes should be made or a law should go off the books.

The measure would require the state's independent Illinois Power Agency, which buys power on behalf of utility customers, to set up an auction beginning in 2016 to establish the lowest price for low-carbon energy credits. The new money collected from consumers would help pay for those credits, which ComEd and Ameren would purchase. The subsidy would ensure that 70 percent of the electricity the two companies deliver is low-carbon energy.  
If ComEd and Ameren paid too much for the power, based on market value, customers could get a rebate on their bills. Annual increases would be limited to about 2 percent of rates from six years ago, officials said. 
Under the proposal, Exelon would compete against other energy producers that emit little or no carbon dioxide, including wind, solar and clean-coal firms. Critics questioned whether the bill was tilted to favor Exelon.  
Dominguez said Exelon would "hope to be the lowest bidder" but would expect competition to be stiff. 
Democratic Rep. Larry Walsh, whose Will County district includes many nuclear plant workers, said the proposal probably would end up as part a compromise bill negotiated with proponents of separate legislation designed to boost clean energy use and jobs in Illinois.

Walsh, the Exelon bill's lead sponsor, maintained closing the nuclear power would hurt reliability and cost jobs." "If that power were to go away, where's it going to be made up at?" Walsh asked. 
The $31 billion company, the largest owner of nuclear power plants in the country, has been lobbying for positions that would reward it for not emitting greenhouse gases. More than half of the power produced in Illinois comes from coal and natural gas plants and renewable energy....

Simple Door Latch Sticking Problem At Millstone, Indicates A Bigger Problem?

This event reminds me of their LOOP, dual plant trip and the repeated failures of the aux turbine driven feed pump.  
LER 2014-004-00:Unlatched Dual Train Help Door Results in Potential Loss of Safety Function
On December 12, 2014, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) at 100% power in operating mode 1, an operator

Honestly, why did begin to occur last Dec instead of five years ago?  It this about issues with inadequate budget; the philosophy of a half ass repair job instead of purchasing a new door and its mechanism. I think the door has come to end of life. I called the Millstone resident trying to ask him how old is the door and its mechanism.
There has been a lot of door latch problem with HELB, security and radiation barrier doors in the industry
Why didn't they bring in a door expert instead of depending on a regular maintenance without wide experience and training with doors? 
discovered a door for the MPS3 East Motor Control Center Rod Control area would not latch upon exit from the room. Upon discovery, the door was declared non-functional. Since this door is a dual train High Energy Line Break (HELB) boundary door, it affected the operability of both trains of 480 volt safety related switch gear. Plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered.
Maintenance personnel repaired the lockset mechanism.

*(So they repaired the door, but nothing was ever wrong with it)
Proper operation of the door was restored within 35 minutes of being identified not functioning properly and TS 3.0.3 was exited. On January 15, 2015, with MPS3 at

Why does it take two bites of the apple? Why isn't this an excuse to rip out this door and replace it with a modern door who is alarmed when not fully latched.  

Why not purchase a heavy, heavy duty door, a high quality industrial door with security and high energy safety quality. The latching mechanism is heavy duty and high traffic quality...it doesn't matter how you open the door? Bet you the door are extremely heavy and the door hinge is worn...it is a misalignment thing.    

100% power in operating mode 1, an individual processed through the door normally and upon checking the door after passage the worker noted the door did not latch. The Control Room was promptly notified. The door was repaired and retested satisfactorily. TS 3.0.3 was

*(The the second time it was repaired, but nothing was ever broken?)
entered and exited appropriately. The door was inoperable for approximately 19 minutes. Although no definite failure mechanism was identified, there have been several occasions where a security door Iockset has been jammed due to usage of the emergency-use-only door hardware (crash bar/thumb piece). In both cases the door Iockset mechanism was manually manipulated, lubricated and then tested several times satisfactorily by maintenance personnel. Inspection of the Iockset mechanism did not find any foreign material in the lockset mechanism. Management issued a special communication to remind plant personnel that security doors not be accessed by the use of the crash bar or door thumb piece/knob/lever except for an emergency. Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.
These events are being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Yea, but they were too stupid to test it in all manners of use. 

The latching mechanism was manually manipulated and lubricated by maintenance personnel. Proper operation of the door was restored within 35 minutes of being identified not functioning properly and TS 3.0.3 was exited. This door was then tested over a dozen times without failure.
The door passage mechanism consists of a crash bar on one side of the door and a lockset thumb piece, connected to the latch mechanism in the lockset, on the other side. Utilizing the thumb piece/crash bar causes the lock-set
***I got the problem, the latch and strike or striker is not aligned properly. When you slam the door or it retracts on its own, the full force of the door closing falls on the latch against the strike. Over time this damages or bends the latch…thus it sticks in the retract position.
latch to retract into the lockset, unlocking the latch from behind the strike. When the strike is activated by the personnel security key card, the strike releases the latch. Personnel are then required to simply push the door open. Once the door is opened, the strike resets to its original locked position. The door then closes and latches. The door is now locked in the closed position preventing the door from opening. After the door is unlocked utilizing the security key card, if personnel accessing the door use the crash bar or the thumb piece to open the door, instead of simply pushing the door open, the lockset latch sometimes retracts far enough
Jammed means something is warn and broken...it has to be fixed!!!

I think this occurred a lot more frequently than documented...meaning the exposure time was a lot more.  
into the lockset to jam inside the lockset and fails to return to its normal position, behind the strike, thus leaving the door unlatched. The use of the crash bar/thumb piece is intended for emergency use only and not intended for normal passage.
Although no definite failure mechanism was identified,
*(Just saying, repaired twice and no real failure mechanism to show) 
there have been several occasions where a security door Iockset has been jammed due to usage of the emergency use only door hardware (crash bar/thumb piece).
Another one? Why does it take two bites of the apple
On November 19, 2013 while operating in MODE 1 at 100% power, a security door in the auxiliary building at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) was found unlatched during a door seal check. Upon discovery, the door was successfully latched and the control room notified. In addition to being a security boundary, this door is also a secondary containment boundary, specifically a supplemental leak collection release system (SLCRS) boundary. The door was previously verified properly latched on November 16, 2013. On November 20, 2013 operators determined that the unlatched door resulted in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The direct cause of the condition was an unlatched door that did not ensure proper sealing of the credited SLCRS boundary. Upon discovery, the door was successfully latched and the control room notified. Since the door is a SLCRS boundary, it is sealed to tight tolerances and is stiff to open, close, and latch due to the sealing design. The stiffness of the door can be misleading to persons who pull/push on the door to verify it is latched. The door seals and latching mechanism were inspected with no apparent failure and received minor adjustment. Positive assurance of proper latching of doors continues to be reinforced at MPS. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
Why didn't the door alarm... 
The direct cause of the condition was an unlatched door that did not ensure proper sealing of the credited SLCRS boundary. This door is infrequently accessed and has an alarm if opened. Since the door is a SLCRS boundary, it is sealed to tight tolerances and is stiff to open, close, and latch due to the sealing design. The stiffness of the door can be misleading to persons who pull/push on the door to verify it is latched.

Monday, February 23, 2015

Questions Remain At Pilgrim Plant During the Winter of 2015

Pilgrim Nuclear Plant shutdowns leave questions unanswered for Outer Cape

By Peter J. Brown
Posted Feb. 23, 2015 at 4:12 PM

Just across the Cape Cod Canal, nestled in the hills of Manomet, Plymouth, sits the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. During the two blizzards — winter storms Juno and Neptune — that struck over the past couple of weeks, Pilgrim was temporarily taken off line twice. And while there was no apparent threat to the public at any time, the decisions to do so have once again raised questions about the ability of plant operators to maintain safe operations at a nuclear power plant that is over 40 years old.

“In preparation for Storm Neptune, Pilgrim Station made the decision to take the plant off line. We are following plant procedures to prepare for a potential loss of offsite power or the grid's inability to accept the power Pilgrim generates. As always, safety is our number one priority and there is no threat to the safety of plant workers or the general public,” said Meghan Leahy, spokesperson for Entergy Government Affairs on Feb. 14, in an e-mail. Entergy is the plant’s operator.

Danger signs

Keep in mind that even former Nuclear Regulatory Commission chair Gregory Jaczko placed Pilgrim on his list of nuclear power plants that needed to be closed down permanently — the sooner the better.

“[Jaczko] has stated his concern publicly about the safety of these aged Mark 1 GE boiler reactors and recommended that they be decommissioned. The Pilgrim plant has the same containment structure that failed to contain hydrogen gas explosions in the Fukushima plant,” stated Rich Delaney, director of Center for Coastal Studies and chair of the Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission in a letter to Gov. Charlie Baker dated Jan. 22.

“As you now know it remained shut down for several days [after Juno struck] and then reconnected to the grid on Feb. 7. It powered down again on Feb. 14,” said Maureen Burgess, a Truro selectman who serves as that town’s representative to the Seashore Advisory Commission, where she chairs the subcommittee on Pilgrim Safety Concerns.

While the shutdown during Neptune was performed proactively, the events during Juno cascaded along in such a way as to invite scrutiny at many levels. It started with partial loss of off-site power, followed by failure of a condensate pump motor associated with the plant's high-pressure coolant injection system. Then came the malfunctioning of one of the plant's four safety relief valves, and a loss of instrument air resulting in a loss of water level indicators in the seawater intake bays.

Whether these events during Juno spurred plant operators to prudently cease operations during Neptune remains unknown.

“Pilgrim was relicensed for 20 years in 2012 in spite of a sea of protest and concerns about what could be the worst economic and ecological disaster for Massachusetts and make the surrounding areas uninhabitable for generations and poison Cape Cod Bay,” said Burgess. “These areas might include Boston and Cape Cod, depending upon wind direction. Systems are old and subject to deterioration. What appliances do you have in your home that are 40 years old? How old is your car?”

“Entergy has not followed the advice of the NRC's own experts who came up with suggested safety improvements after the catastrophe at the Fukushima Daichi power station in Japan. At Fukushima, all three nuclear reactor cores melted down and exploded within three days,” added Burgess. “The project was called ‘Fukushima Lessons Learned.’ Entergy has not improved the hardened vents on the plant to reduce a release of radiation in the event of a meltdown and explosion, as suggested by the experts.”

No evacuation plan

While other concerns, including the susceptibility of Pilgrim to a seismic event, are raised time and time again, the most troubling dimension of any discussion of the plant’s safety is the fact that there are no evacuation plans for the Outer Cape, or the entire Cape for that matter.

In his letter to the Governor, Delaney said that the advisory commission supported legislation that would expand the radiological Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone around Pilgrim, an approximately 10-mile-radius area, to include all of Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket counties.

“This commission is unanimous in its ongoing concern about the myriad of issues related to [Pilgrim]. The communities on the Outer/Lower Cape and the National Seashore are located only 20 miles downwind from the plant. We continue to be frustrated that the concerns of the citizens on the Cape are not taken seriously by the plant owners or the [NRC], especially in this post-Fukushima era,” wrote Delaney. “One of the principal concerns is the lack of responsible emergency planning for communities on the Cape which would have to be addressed if the emergency planning zone was to be expanded.”

His letter also pointed out that last November, 74 percent of voters in the Cape & Islands Senatorial District voted yes to a ballot question authorizing the state senator to vote in favor of legislation expanding the emergency planning zone.

Mary-Jo Avellar, who represents Provincetown on the advisory commission, is adamant about shutting down Pilgrim and clearly uncomfortable with the fact that the Outer Cape lies so close to, and directly downwind of, the nuclear plant.

“They need to close it down,” said Avellar. “It is unsafe. And it’s terrifying that here we sit in harm’s way and there is no way out for us. We are stuck.”

She commended Burgess for her hard work on the issue. “Maureen has really done yeoman’s work on this. She has been amazing.”

According to Burgess, in the event of a worse-case scenario at the plant, the plans drawn by the Mass. Emergency Management Agency call for all traffic to be stopped at Exit 4 in Sandwich with the ultimate goal of having everyone on the Cape “shelter in place.”

If everyone, including those tourists who are part of the four million people who visit the Cape Cod National Seashore per year, had to be relocated, “where to remains unknown to us. It is possible that we may be unable to return for days, months, years, perhaps never,” said Burgess.

“We have no designated shelters on the Cape, and certainly none that would offer adequate protection. The basement of a typical house would offer 10 to 40 percent protection for a few hours.”

“Our vulnerability has been acknowledged by the industry because our local health departments have been provided with potassium iodide (KI) pills to prevent our thyroid glands from taking up radioiodine. It is unknown how many citizens have availed themselves of these KI pills. So in a sense we have been given a Band-Aid to stop a hemorrhage,” Burgess added. “My concern is that people will see this measure as all they need to do to protect themselves. There are many other radioisotopes that we would not have protection from, e.g., strontium which is absorbed by our bones.”

Public ‘oblivious’

Burgess is most concerned that so many citizens “seem to be oblivious to the danger that lies across the bay. She credits state Rep. Sarah Peake and state Sen. Dan Wolf for putting forth bills “to address the threat to public safety that Pilgrim poses.”

“Now we need Gov. Baker to step up to his charge of ensuring public safety and take on the NRC which licenses Pilgrim. I urge people to let our governor and state and federal representatives know their concerns in this matter,” Burgess said. “An accident is something unexpected and unplanned for. If there is a major radiological event at Pilgrim, we will not be able to call it an accident because too many of us have been anticipating the possible consequences of such an event. It will not be an accident. It will be sheer neglect.”

While Sen. Wolf is mindful of the safety-conscious dimension of a decision to shut down a nuclear plant in advance of a major storm, he is uncomfortable with it at the same time.

“How much confidence does it give us if they have to shut down a nuclear power plant before a storm?” asked Wolf. “What is troubling to me is that each incident there involves its own peculiar set of circumstances. As it ages, it is becoming more unpredictable and inconsistent — two things we don’t want to see with any nuclear plant. And it just gets stranger and stranger.”

“How many warning signs does that plant need to send us?” Wolf asked rhetorically.

Thursday, February 19, 2015

Pilgrim Stuck at 22% Power for 24 hours: Chickens Coming Home to Roost with Poor Maintenance

Feb 27: The whole Story: 
Pilgrim Stuck at 22% After Storm Neptune: Beginning To a Pull Fitzpatrick
Feb 20 update
  • (NRC) Entergy is working through some non-safety related balance-of-plant equipment issues. The company is taking appropriate action to work through these issues, and they will restore full power once they are resolved. None of current equipment problems involve safety related equipment.
    Diane Screnci
    Region I
Hmm, "work though these issues"
That is more like it, early this morning Pilgrim is up to 92% power. Did Pilgrim get a special exemption?  
This report is made at midnight. So sometime on Tues they started up and we have no idea actually what time it was started up.
What do you expect, all these preventable hard scrams, normal scrams, downpowers and shutdowns are beating the hell out of the plant. 
Being stuck at about 22% power in a start up is highly unusual for greater than 24 hours. 

Something big is wrong and all these maintenance periods of recent and they still can't get it right?

Bet you they are listening to the operations department now?  
Yesterday Wednesday. 
Power Reactor Status Report for February 18, 2015 
Region 1 
Unit Power
Beaver Valley 1 100
Beaver Valley 2 100
Calvert Cliffs 1 100
Calvert Cliffs 2 0
FitzPatrick 100
Ginna 100
Hope Creek 1 100
Indian Point 2 100
Indian Point 3 100
Limerick 1 100
Limerick 2 100
Millstone 2 100
Millstone 3 100
Nine Mile Point 1 98
Nine Mile Point 2 100
Oyster Creek 100
Peach Bottom 2 89
Peach Bottom 3 100
Pilgrim 1 18
Salem 1 100
Salem 2 100
Seabrook 1 100
Susquehanna 1 100
Susquehanna 2 100
Three Mile Island 1 100

Today Thursday 
Current Power Reactor Status Report for February 19, 2015 
Region 1 
Unit Power
Beaver Valley 1 100
Beaver Valley 2 100
Calvert Cliffs 1 100
Calvert Cliffs 2 0
FitzPatrick 100
Ginna 100
Hope Creek 1 100
Indian Point 2 100
Indian Point 3 100
Limerick 1 100
Limerick 2 99
Millstone 2 100
Millstone 3 100
Nine Mile Point 1 98
Nine Mile Point 2 0
Oyster Creek 100
Peach Bottom 2 89
Peach Bottom 3 100
Pilgrim 1 22
Salem 1 96
Salem 2 100
Seabrook 1 100
Susquehanna 1 96
Susquehanna 2 96
Three Mile Island 1 100

So here below is the Pilgrim start up from Storm Juno. 0% to 79% power in 24 hours. 
Power Reactor Status Report for February 7, 2015 
Region 1
Unit
Power
Beaver Valley 1
100
Beaver Valley 2
100
Calvert Cliffs 1
100
Calvert Cliffs 2
100
FitzPatrick
100
Ginna
100
Hope Creek 1
100
Indian Point 2
100
Indian Point 3
100
Limerick 1
100
Limerick 2
100
Millstone 2
100
Millstone 3
100
Nine Mile Point 1
100
Nine Mile Point 2
100
Oyster Creek
100
Peach Bottom 2
89
Peach Bottom 3
100
Pilgrim 1
0
Salem 1
100
Salem 2
90
Seabrook 1
100
Susquehanna 1
100
Susquehanna 2
79
Three Mile Island 1
100
Power Reactor Status Report for February 8, 2015
Region 1 
UnitPower
Beaver Valley 1100
Beaver Valley 2100
Calvert Cliffs 1100
Calvert Cliffs 2100
FitzPatrick100
Ginna100
Hope Creek 1100
Indian Point 2100
Indian Point 3100
To top of pageLimerick 1100
Limerick 2100
Millstone 2100
Millstone 3100
Nine Mile Point 1100
Nine Mile Point 2100
Oyster Creek100
Peach Bottom 289
Peach Bottom 3100
Pilgrim 179
Salem 1100
Salem 2100
Seabrook 1100
Susquehanna 1100
Susquehanna 2100
Three Mile Island 1
Power Reactor Status Report for February 9, 2015

Unit
Power
Beaver Valley 1
100
Beaver Valley 2
100
Calvert Cliffs 1
100
Calvert Cliffs 2
100
FitzPatrick
100
Ginna
100
Hope Creek 1
100
Indian Point 2
100
Indian Point 3
100
Limerick 1
100
Limerick 2
99
Millstone 2
100
Millstone 3
100
Nine Mile Point 1
100
Nine Mile Point 2
100
Oyster Creek
100
Peach Bottom 2
89
Peach Bottom 3
100
Pilgrim 1
97
Salem 1
100
Salem 2
100
Seabrook 1
100
Susquehanna 1
100
Susquehanna 2
100
Three Mile Island 1
100
 

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Ratcheting Up The pressure To The NRC, Entergy and Pilgrim

One thing is certain, the NRC is telegraphing they still have complete confidence and trustworthiness in Entergy. 
Hey Frank, how come they didn't answer your question on if operation's employees advised a shutdown on Juno Jan 26,2015? I can hear it now, it's under investigation? 

My request to Frank Maud yesterday. Amazing turn around Frank and Dave.  

Wait, you asked the question, but they dodge it... 
Tofmand@wickedlocal.comFeb 17 at 5:13 PM 
Frank, 
Entergy employees leaked to me that the operations department requested a precautionary safety shutdown prior to Juno…Entergy said go to hell, we are going to ride the storm out. There is a fear of a cover-up…management didn’t report this to the NRC resident inspectors or the special inspection team. I worry the ops employees went to the NRC asking for the agency’s help with helping Entergy do the right thing…the NRC said they could do nothing?

If Entergy lied or played word games...it would be a big deal to the NRC. 
http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2015/02/operations-advised-precautionary-plant.html 
'Operations Advised Precautionary Pilgrim Plant Shutdown in Juno (1/27): Higher Management said Go to Hell'I am getting a NRC Office Inspector General to investigation. It would be nice if you began asking question on this to the players. 
 Mike Mulligan 
Hinsdale, NH 
1-603-336-8320

I am happy, everyone knows I am breathing down their necks about the operations thing...they all know it is my question. There is a awareness that question was posed.
NRC says Pilgrim shutdown was prudent, precautionary plan
By Frank Mand 
fmand@wickedlocal.com
Posted Feb. 18, 2015 at 10:00 AM 
NRC says Pilgrim shutdown was prudent, precautionary plan
“The decision to shut down the Pilgrim nuclear power plant was a voluntary action on the part of Entergy,” NRC Spokesman Neil Sheehan said. “It was not an action sought or required by the NRC." 
By Frank Mand 
fmand@wickedlocal.com Posted Feb. 18, 2015 at 10:00 AM

PLYMOUTH – This time, Entergy shut the nuclear plant down before the storm hit. But the last two times that Pilgrim Station was about to experience a major blizzard, the company chose to keep the plant running. 
During the two recent storms in which Pilgrim opted to remain online, it lost power to one or both of its transmission lines and had to scram (perform an emergency shutdown). 
Just prior to winter storm Juno, critics made a concerted effort to convince plant officials to err on the side of caution. 
A joint letter from Pilgrim Watch and the Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee asked Entergy to heed the weathermen’s warnings. 
“The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on Cape Cod Bay is directly in the path of the potentially historic winter storm due to hit Plymouth, Mass., starting tonight, Monday, Jan. 26,” the letter read. “There is a coastal flood warning, coastal flood watch, blizzard warning and hazardous weather outlook in effect for Plymouth, according to NOOA.” 
But the plant remained operational at the start of Juno, until power supply problems forced Entergy's hand. 
Last Saturday, however, Pilgrim decided early on to shut down the nuclear reactor. 
Just before the plant went offline Saturday, the plant issued the following statement: “In preparation for Storm Neptune, Pilgrim Station made the decision to take the plant off line. We are following plant procedures to prepare for a potential loss of offsite power or the grid’s inability to accept the power Pilgrim generates. As always, safety is our number one priority and there is no threat to the safety of plant workers or the general public.” 
When asked why Pilgrim opted this time to err on the side of greater caution, Pilgrim Spokesperson Lauren Burm said, “We follow plant procedures that direct specific actions based on weather conditions.” 
When plant critics and the NRC were asked if there were any further explanations or motivations, critics responded with, among other things, a list from Dave Lochbaum, with the Union of Concerned Scientists, of all the times since 1975 that Pilgrim has officially experienced a LOOP (Loss Of Offsite Power). 
In 1975, Lochbaum wrote, ”Operators were shutting down the reactor when the turbine tripped. During the ensuing in-plant electrical power transfers, blown fuses de-energized the startup and auxiliary 345 kilovolt lines, causing a loss of offsite power and an automatic reactor scram.” 
During the famous Blizzard of 1978, the reactor was scrammed, as well, when “heavy snowfall caused electrical breakers in the 345 kilovolt switchyard to flashover and trip.
In August of that year, Lochbaum wrote, “The reactor automatically scrammed from 100 percent power when lightning struck transmission lines causing a loss of offsite power.
The plant experienced additional LOOPs in 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993, but not again until 2013 and then twice this year. 
Lochbaum noted that the cause of these events was power supply transfers (twice), lightning strikes (four times), high winds (four times), storms (twice), ice and snow during blizzards (five times), plus a solar storm and a forest fire (once each). 
Since 1975, the plant has lost offsite power 20 times.
That would appear to be an argument for the precautionary shutdown of the plant as major storms approach. But when the plant is shut down, Entergy loses, by some estimates, close to $1 million a day. 
NRC Public Affairs Officer Neil Sheehan said the plant was not pressured, and that his agency was in close communication with Entergy during the decision-making process and the shutdown. 
“The decision to shut down the Pilgrim nuclear power plant was a voluntary action on the part of Entergy,” Sheehan said. “It was not an action sought or required by the NRC. 
“That said,” Sheehan added, “given the forecast intensity of this particular storm, and in light of other challenges Pilgrim has experienced during severe winter storms, this planned and orderly shutdown in advance of the approaching blizzard was a prudent precautionary action.”

Follow Frank Mand on Twitter @frankmandOCM.

New NRC: Project Aim 2020. Believe in a cause greater that self!

The New NRC, I like it.

But this is just the pathetic NRC’s response to the expected bludgeoning by Senate and House investigation in the upcoming months.   
The NRC can expect to continue operating with a safety first mindset and fostering an open, collaborative work environment. Workload will be distributed equitably and with less reliance on functional organizations. The agency functions as “One NRC” where the needs of the Nation are considered above an individual or an office. The NRC is more agile, flexible, and able to adapt quickly to changing workloads and needs to accomplish its mission, not for the sake of doing work. The NRC embraces change as an opportunity to enhance service to the country.

The NRC teabagger agenda

Because a lot of utilities have cutback in building new nukes and many 'end of life' of other plants...the NRC's job will be less and thus the NRC won't need as much budgeting, employees and resources.

The counter argument the NRC never advances

The market with lower cost or displaced electricity creating less funding to the nuclear plants and the quickly aging and obsolete nuclear power plants leading to the necessity of much more agency funding and a much better educated and experience NRC workforce.

The agency comes back with a report on say on the oldest 5 nuclear plants, say the worst 3 economically strained plants...these are the unique problems these plants face. This is the world we anticipate based in 2020 with a aging fleet and more economic problems.

Where is the Nuclear Industry's Project Aim 2020?

Why Does the NRC Need to Change?
The NRC needs to improve efficiency to meet future challenges. For forty years, the NRC has successfully met its safety, security, and safeguards mission and has met or surpassed agency performance measures, but adjustments are necessary for success in the future.
Efficiency is one of the NRC’s five Principles of Good Regulation, which were established by the Commission in 1991. The efficiency principle stipulates that the NRC should have the best management and administration, the highest technical and managerial competence, a continual upgrading of its regulatory capabilities, and timely decision-making while minimizing the use of resources. Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, the agency has grown significantly to enhance security and incident response and to prepare for projected growth in the use of nuclear power in the United States (U.S.). That forecast in growth has now been adjusted downward in response to changes in the nuclear industry resulting in fewer new nuclear power plants and earlier decommissioning of some of the existing plants. These adjustments, in turn, are prompting the NRC to adapt its structure, workforce, culture, and regulatory processes to achieve the agency’s safety and security mission in an era of constrained resources. The NRC must reposition itself to function as an effective and efficient regulator in this new environment,while retaining the capability to respond in an agile manner to a range of possible futures.