Friday, August 01, 2014

Hinsdale NH: The Terrible Toll With a Unengaged Police Force and Drug Addiction

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***Brattleboro, Vermont - June 15, 2009
A 26-year-old Dummerston man is dead after being stabbed in the neck. The incident took place early Monday morning on Elliot Street in downtown Brattleboro. Police have the man in custody who they say is responsible for the murder. According to witnesses, the victim was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
According to court papers, Andrew Sheets, 41, became enraged in downtown Brattleboro early Monday morning after he was robbed of money he was trying to use to buy cocaine. Papers state that Sheets confronted several people about the money including the victim's brother, who was on scene. The victim, David Snow, 26, happened to be out walking his dog and saw the argument. Papers state Snow stepped in between his brother and Sheets. Witnesses told police that Sheets pushed Snow, and then after Snow tried to punch him, Sheets stabbed Snow in the neck fatally wounding him. When police arrived on scene, Sheets still had the knife in his hand and was immediately taken into custody.
"Fifty dollars, somebody get mad cause this kid owes him 50 dollars. It's late at night and they have been drinking," said Jesse Forrett, who knew Snow.

***RUTLAND, Vt. — The trial of a Holyoke man accused of the execution-style slaying of a Vermont woman got underway Monday in U.S. District Court in Rutland.
Frank Caraballo, 31, is charged with fatally shooting Melissa Barratt in the head on July 29, 2011, because he believed Barratt had stolen $10,000 worth of drugs from him, according to Vermont State Police and federal prosecutors.
Authorities say Barratt, 31, was found dead in a wooded area of Dummerston, a rural Windham County town just north of Brattleboro.
Prosecutors' claim they have witnesses, phone statements, recordings and forensic evidence proving Caraballo murdered Barratt, who sold drugs for Caraballo after he left Holyoke to establish a drug-dealing network in southeastern Vermont
 
Looks like she is taking a shot at the ingredients of the spider web shooting. Drug courts are reactionary and under funded. We basically need a voluntary and mandatory jobs and public works program. An incentive program. If nobody else will hire you, we will put you in a job and provide many other services. If you don't show up for work today, then you sleep in jail tonight!

I think there is a large group of listless and hopeless youths and adults in my community...they need to find something productive to do. They have basically given up because nobody has ever found a place for them in our society. These people are basically immature and susceptible to drug and alcohol abuse. Another large component through no fault of these people, they were exposed to horrendous family problems. These crap gets passed on from one generation to the next and the next.

Remember the results of the attorney general investigation revolves around events leading up to the murder on April 14, 2012. I suspect the drug scene in our area has substantially changed since then.
 
We need to know what is going on today.

Prescription drug and heroin abuse is another top-of-mind issue for state and local residents these days, and Shaheen took some time to address the problem. 
In New Hampshire, the percentage of residents who report having used heroin at least once in their lifetime has increased from 1.2 percent in 2004-2005 to 3.3 percent in 2010-2011, according to data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health. 
The percentage of New Hampshire residents seeking drug treatment has also risen sharply. In the last 10 years, the percentage of people admitted to state-funded treatment programs rose by 90 percent for heroin use and by 500 percent for prescription opiate abuse. 
The sharpest increase has been between 2012 and 2013, according to a news release from the N.H. Bureau of Drug and Alcohol Services. 
Shaheen said earlier this year, she was startled to hear that drug overdose deaths have surpassed traffic fatalities. 
Via a federal appropriations bill, the senator said she had recently made a request to give more funding to New Hampshire drug courts. 
And she said she hoped more focus would be put on prescription drug use.
“One of the challenges is looking at how we can provide additional education for doctors in terms of prescribing,” she said. 
Shaheen said she and other senators recently introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to reauthorize the National All-Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting program, which provides funding for states to maintain and expand their prescription drug-monitoring programs. 
Ayotte has also taken a stance on prescription drugs, introducing legislation to help reform prescribing practices for pain medication. 
“This is the kind of issue that everyone needs to come together on,” Shaheen said. “We really need an all of the above approach. This is an issue that affects all income levels, all ages.”

 
Facebook Group:


Hinsdale Crime Watch, Police and News
This spring, the authorities concluded Douglas M. Farr Jr., 32, of Hinsdale shot and killed Mark T. McAuley, 39, also of Hinsdale, on April 14, 2012. From the beginning, Farr had admitted to the killing, according to N.H. State Police investigators. Farr claimed to investsgators that he shot McAuley in self-defense.

Why didn't the friends and mother turn these guys into the police?

The overloaded, overwhelmed and resourced starved Attorney General’s and state police investigative office.

The high turnover of Hinsdale police.

The poor communication of the police.

The widespread mistrust of our police department.

The cliques within the town and the interaction with the police department.

Hinsdale is gun and murder central, as with the Spider web shooting and Dustin Curtiss…as there is never a competent police investigation and they never have the 110% proof that the shooter is guilty…so the case never goes to court.

Is the state’s attorney…have they gone too far with the proof level necessary to convict or go to court, so they don’t have the guts to bring it to trial. It is really money based? They need a 99.5% conviction rate.

I am really irked we had a safety threat to the community in a murder case…the police failed get  and warn the community with the message the police have indication there is heavy duty drug use and dealing going on in town…the police want all information on this as possible. 



 Breault and Farr’s mother, Burdette, had speculated in interviews with police that the April 14, 2012, shooting was drug-related. Acquaintances of Farr’s told police Farr had driven McAuley to the North Hinsdale Road area for a drug deal that went bad.

Widespread indications the police doesn’t follow up on complaints and communicate properly to the community.

Widespread indications the police response times in emergencies is erratic.

Need to publicize 911 and police response times.

Indications 911 can’t connect the dots and other problems with communications under an emergency situation.
The Terrible Toll With a Unengaged Police Force

By ALYSSA DANDREA Sentinel Staff
Posted: Friday, August 1, 2014 12:00 pm
SentinelSource.comThe N.H. Attorney General’s Office has released a nearly 1,300-page report detailing the authorities’ probe of a 2012 homicide in Chesterfield.
The report sheds new light on the relationship between the prime suspect and the victim, and includes statements from acquaintances who say they both had struggles with drugs.
This spring, the authorities concluded Douglas M. Farr Jr., 32, of Hinsdale shot and killed Mark T. McAuley, 39, also of Hinsdale, on April 14, 2012. From the beginning, Farr had admitted to the killing, according to N.H. State Police investigators. Farr claimed to investigators that he shot McAuley in self-defense.
McAuley’s body was found one-quarter mile south from the Bradley Road and North Hinsdale Road intersection, according to police.
An autopsy revealed McAuley had been shot multiple times and suffered wounds to his lower back, left underarm, left shoulder, right hip and head, according to documents included in the case file.
The shooting occurred in a secluded network of old logging roads in Chesterfield known as the “spider web.”
The Sentinel filed a Right-to-Know request seeking a copy of the report more than one year ago, after Farr died in a fiery car crash on Keene’s Route 12.
And although the Attorney General’s Office wrapped up its investigation into the fatal shooting in May, The Sentinel just received the documents by mail Thursday.
Farr was never arrested, because of a lack of eyewitnesses and because investigators needed time to probe the relationship between Farr and McAuley, according to the Attorney General’s Office.
But while the investigation continued, Farr and his fiancee, Erin Breault, 35, of Hinsdale, were killed May 3, 2013, when Farr swerved into the oncoming lane of traffic on Route 12 and collided with an oil tanker head-on near the Routes 9-10 interchange in Keene. Both Farr and Breault were pronounced dead at the scene.
Keene police later determined Farr was distracted by his cellphone at the time of the crash.
The authorities considered Breault a material witness in the homicide investigation. She had one child. Farr is survived by his three children from a previous marriage, and was involved in a lengthy court dispute over custody of the children and child support at the time of his death.
In the year between the shooting and Farr’s death, police made multiple, yet unsuccessful, attempts to interview Farr; his attorneys, including public defender Caroline L. Smith, told police he was unavailable, according to the report released Thursday.
Interviews State Police conducted with key witnesses about the homicide, before and after the fatal crash, tell varied and convoluted tales about Farr and McAuley’s relationship, as well as how and why they came to be in the North Hinsdale Road area April 14, 2012.
That morning, Hinsdale police received a phone call from Farr’s mother, Monica Burdette, saying she could not find her son and he was “upset,” according to the authorities.
Shortly before 2:30 p.m., Chesterfield police learned of the shooting through a broken 911 call, in which someone reported that a man had been shot. Within minutes, an officer responded to the area of North Hinsdale Road and met with Farr, who was found in Burdette’s vehicle with Breault and Burdette.
Farr was crying, visibly upset and had a gunshot wound to his shoulder, the authorities said. A .40-caliber pistol belonging to Farr and a loaded magazine were inside the vehicle, according to the AG’s office.
It was then that Farr told police “there was another guy in the woods,” and that he’d shot him, according to a May news release from the Attorney General’s Office.
That brief summary is just a glimpse into what the authorities learned may have happened in the woods off North Hinsdale Road that April day.
Initial reports to police from Burdette and Breault suggest McAuley had used zip ties to strap Farr to a tree before shooting him in the shoulder. Farr also allegedly told the women that he was able to cut himself free with a knife McAuley dropped, and that he shot McAuley with the same gun, which Farr owned.
But investigators told Breault and Burdette there were gaps in the story and that the pieces of the puzzle didn’t add up.
Documents show police found black zip ties in McAuley’s hand and near his body, and that those ties matched the 39 discovered in a small baggie in Farr’s vehicle. J & J Autobody of Troy repossessed Farr’s 2005 Chevrolet Blazer April 23, 2012, because of nonpayment of an automobile loan, and mechanics discovered the zip ties during an inventory of the car.
The Sentinel is continuing to study the 1,297 pages released Thursday by the AG’s office in an effort to provide answers to many looming questions, and to give a glimpse into the information provided by those who knew Farr and McAuley.
The Attorney General’s Office redacted personal identifying information and medical information under exceptions allowed in the Right-to-Know law and through the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. They also did not include an interview with a minor, criminal records and certain photographs that would constitute an invasion of privacy, according to a letter dated Monday from the AG’s office.
State Police conducted several searches during their two-year homicide investigation, to include Farr’s residence; McAuley’s residence; Breault’s vehicle; the vehicle belonging to Farr’s mother; and various cellphones and accompanying records.
Seven months prior to the homicide, Farr was shot by his then-7-year-old son at their Hinsdale home. The authorities have remained quiet about the shooting, but Farr’s fiancee agreed to go on the record April 14, 2012, to police about what she claimed happened.
She described Farr as an avid hunter, who frequented shooting ranges, including a spot near where the homicide occurred.
On that October day, Farr got out one of his rifles to show the boy, Breault told police.
She remembered seeing the boy sitting on the couch as he played with the bullets, but didn’t believe the gun was nearby. But next thing she knew, the boy was pointing it at Farr’s chest.
When he fired it, a bullet tore through Farr’s shoulder, Breault said in that April 2012 interview.
And after that day, Farr’s shoulder never healed due to reoccurring — and somewhat mysterious — infections, she said. He also became addicted to prescription pain medication, specifically Oxycontin and oxycodone.
The couple had experienced difficult times financially, and, in an attempt to bring in money, Farr began dealing in drugs, according to Breault. Meanwhile, his own addiction advanced, she told police.
Breault and Farr’s mother, Burdette, had speculated in interviews with police that the April 14, 2012, shooting was drug-related. Acquaintances of Farr’s told police Farr had driven McAuley to the North Hinsdale Road area for a drug deal that went bad. Multiple witness reports indicate Farr and McAuley were in the same car, owned by Breault.
McAuley and Farr knew each other through mutual friends, and lived just 3 miles apart at the time of the shooting.
McAuley had dated Katherine G. LeVasseur, who told police she had been friends with Farr since grade school and that she and Farr had reconnected about three years prior to the shooting.
Alyssa Dandrea can be reached at 352-1234, extension 1435, or adandrea@keenesentinel.com. Follow her on Twitter @ADandreaKS.

Thursday, July 31, 2014

How "Flex" is weakening the nuclear industry

Updated June 9 @ 10pm 
I recently talked to a NRC official about this a month ago. Basically because the flex system isn't safety related, the official said it can't be used to justify operating with more degraded equipment at power. 
He thought if it was safety related...it could justify operating with more degraded equipment...
Seems to be a little more traffic on this article recently...I wanted you to know how the NRC looked at it.
I was wrong...



The impact of FLEX on outage risk: Part 1 (theory)

 
http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurethe-impact-of-flex-on-outage-risk-4331405/

You know how they are really using this, they including this flex stuff into PRAs risk perspectives…it justifies more operations with degraded equipment and it reduces the punishment when they violate the laws and procedures. The reframe of, it is not safety related.

It is corrupting the staff on a global scale and it is polluting capacity factor on a amazing scale.

The impact of FLEX on outage risk: Part 1 (theory)

31 July 2014            

Palo Verde has developed a plan for post-Fukushima modifications following US industry guidance. It found these changes generated extra outage safety and performance benefits. By Mike Powell, Kevin Graham and Jeff Taylor

Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued order ES-12-049 [1] requiring nuclear plants in the US to implement mitigation strategies to cope with a beyond- design-basis external event.
The event is assumed to result in an extended loss of all AC power and loss of access to the ultimate heat sink for all units on the site, with no expectation of either returning. The initial phase requires installed equipment and on-site resources to be used to maintain or restore cooling capability for the core, containment and spent fuel pool (SFP). The transition phase requires the use of portable onsite equipment to provide sufficient cooling for these functions. The final phase requires the use of offsite resources to sustain these functions indefinitely.
The US commercial nuclear industry, working through the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), developed guidance for flexible and diverse strategies (hereafter referred to as FLEX) that would address the NRC order. NEI 12-06 [2] was developed and discussed with the NRC over several months, and after several drafts and many public meetings, was eventually approved by the NRC as Interim Staff Guidance (JLD- ISG-2012-01) [3] on 29 August 2012. Operating licence holders had to submit an "overall integrated plan" on how they would comply with the NRC order and guidance by 28 February 2013. They were then required to complete full implementation of the order within two refuelling cycles following submittal of their plan, or by 31 December 2016, whichever came first (see also 'Developing the FLEX plan', April 2013, pp. 21-3).
Palo Verde nuclear station is a three-unit site 50 miles west of Phoenix, Arizona, operated by Arizona Public Service Company (APS). All three units are two-loop Combustion Engineering System 80® designs, which are licensed for 60 years and will operate well past 2040. APS must implement the new requirements. Based on the outage schedules, Unit 1 will be the first to achieve full compliance, in the third quarter of 2014, Unit 3 will be compliant in the first quarter of 2015 and Unit 2 will be compliant by third quarter 2015.
APS completed the baseline coping capability in the engineering phase and established conceptual modifications (typical for PWRs) to comply with the FLEX order. To comply with the order and to provide diversity and defence-in-depth, a primary and alternate means of accomplishing each function is needed.
Modifications were made to:
  • The auxiliary feedwater system (AFW), to allow for primary and alternate steam generator injection with a FLEX pump (right-hand green line in Figure 1)
  • The high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system, to allow for primary and alternate reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup with a FLEX pump (yellow line above). If steam generators are not available (for example during an outage) the HPSI modification also would allow the SG injection FLEX pump to inject into the RCS (purple line)
  • Two new seismically-qualified pipes (primary and alternate) discharging into the spent fuel pool for makeup with a FLEX pump (red line above)
  • The 480V Class 1E load centres, to install primary and alternate FLEX junction boxes to allow for FLEX generator hookup
  • The 4160V Class 1E switchgear, to install primary and alternate FLEX connection (disconnects) to allow for FLEX generator hookup
  • A variety of tanks to allow suction and refilling of the condensate storage tank (CST) and the refuelling water tank (RWT).
In accordance with NEI 12-06, the FLEX strategies were designed assuming the reactor is at power, but the diverse and flexible approach to the strategies allows them to be implemented in essentially all plant states. While the FLEX strategies were not specifically designed for outage conditions (with the exception of RCS makeup (orange line above), which was designed to support core cooling during an outage), providing multiple connection points does help provide redundancy when installed plant equipment is out of service during an outage.
During at-power conditions, the portable equipment cannot be credited for recovery during the initial phase of the event (which lasts 36 hours at APS). However, during an outage, the FLEX portable equipment can be pre-deployed as long as it is within the allowed out-of-service time of the equipment as defined in NEI 12-06. This approach has been confirmed by an NRC-approved NEI position paper on the use of FLEX equipment in shutdown modes [4].
Using a combination of the FLEX modifications and the pre-deployment allowance, APS has made significant enhancements to reduce the outage risk profile and outage time. The following is a review of some of these approaches.

Palo Verde approach to managing outage risk

At Palo Verde, outage risk is communicated in terms of risk management action level (RMAL). From NUMARC 93-03 [5], risk management is accomplished by defining action levels and using risk management actions. These actions are specific to a given maintenance activity and vary depending on the magnitude and duration of the risk impact, the nature of the activity and other factors.
RMAL is a risk scale that provides a tool for station management to monitor and manage nuclear risk. By law [6] risk assessment must be performed for maintenance activities prior to performing the task. Having a scale is an excellent way for management to evaluate the risk level of the proposed activity in combination with other maintenance activities by reviewing the schedule and changing it if necessary.
The outage scale (shutdown risk) is a qualitative method based on managing safety functions via defence-in-depth. The latter refers to:
  • Providing systems, structures and components to back up shutdown safety functions using redundant, alternate or diverse methods
  • Scheduling outage activities in a manner that optimises safety system availability
  • Providing administrative controls that support or supplement the above elements.
Determination of the RMAL is based solely on the available mitigating equipment. The shutdown RMAL does not convey relative differences in plant risk due to plant operating state and time after shutdown. For example, the plant risk is greater with all mitigating equipment available at lowered pressuriser level then it is with all mitigating equipment available when pressuriser level is normal. But the defence-in-depth model concludes that both plant operating states have the same number of layers of safety.
The safety function RMAL value is based on N+1 criteria, where "N" is the safety-significant control needed to meet the safety function, and colour-coded as follows:
  • Green RMAL: N+2
  • Yellow RMAL: N+1
  • Orange RMAL: N
  • Red: 0 safety function success paths available

Although "N" meets the safety function, it lacks defence-in-depth and is an undesirable risk level, so it constitutes an orange RMAL. The minimum acceptable defence-in-depth is N+1, and this constitutes a yellow RMAL.
As a general philosophy, the Palo Verde expectation is to maintain green RMAL conditions. If a non-green condition cannot be avoided by rescheduling activities, work that affects the risk shall be completed as quickly as possible.

Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Two Unit Millstone Nuclear Facility Going Crazy On Us.

 
The media really is missing this...this kind of event and resultant shutdown is rather unprecedented.

A turbine drive feed pump is a relativity simple component. They been having unfixable problems for a year or more.

1) So a unprecedented two special inspections over this pump..they they found a piece of metal somewhere in the newest event.

2) A two plant trip over a switchyard bum relay, total loss of off site power. Then component and personall issues during the incident.

3) First the media failed in Fukushima in notifying the extent of the nuclear village …then they had the earthquake.

4) The NRC just doesn't have the education or the skills necessary to keep a facility away from extreme chaos and this unnecessary complexity.
July 30: Sheehan says the turbine-driven auxiliary water pump leading to the shutdown was tested and its flow rate is acceptable. The cause of low flow from the pump was identified as a piece of metal in an opening. The object is being analyzed.

The media doesn't catch what is important here...where did the metal come from.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP FAILURE

"At 1458 [EDT] on 7/26/14, the [Technical Specification] 72 hour action statement for TDAFWP [Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump] inoperable expires (LCO 3.7.1.1 Action C). Per Technical Specification Action Statement, plant is required to be in HOT STANDBY by 2058 on 7/26/14 (6 hours) and in HOT SHUTDOWN by 0858 on 7/27/14 (additional 12 hours). MPS [Millstone Power Station] Unit 2 shutdown (using normal procedures) has commenced at 1411 when troubleshooting and repairs were unable to determine and correct cause of low pump recirculation flow. Additional activities will continue to correct issue."

Unit 3 is not affected by this event. All safety-related systems and equipment required for safe plant shutdown are available.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Waterford Dispatch, and State of Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection.
Originally posted om June 2,2014 
June 3
Hmm, so I called the resident inspectors...they decided to sic the Branch Chief at me (their boss). He basically didn’t know much of the design of the facilities. If I hear one more time,” that is in an investigative process, I can’t discuss that issue with you” I am going to throw up.
Basically, the air compressors are a non-safety system and the cooling water system to the air compressor is non safety system...so they lose the cooling water system to the air compressors during accidents that gets them to the diesel generators.  
They lost the air compressors on no cooling water...
I believe they botched the emergency operator procedures...either they did an improper valve line-up or they just forgot to do the lineup. So they have to manually realigned from one cooling water system into another cooling water...it is like the plant was built in the 1950’s third world of Guatemala. Why wasn’t the realignment automatic like ABS brakes?  The control room operators in this event were grossly and severely overwhelmed with garbage, chaos and complexity.
What would indicate safety for the exacts same parameter readings and switch operations...the simulator playback of the event...a quiet and confident control room staff’s response to these events s or a control room staff in disarrays, disorder and in object panic...
I got the cheap fix to this guy, it will never happen again...mandate that air compressors can never be used for any future shutdown, either normal or transient. Hey, they aren’t safety related. Then they will be properly trained on it. The NRC tells me it’s human performance issues.
The chief doesn’t know if it’s a single air compressors system for the two units or individual air compressors system.  I asked, why didn’t the plants use their onsite diesel air compressors? At this point, I thought the chief was getting irked at me. I said a lot of plants out there have a temporary and prepositioned onsite emergency diesel air compressors with quick disconnects and hookups. He said Millstone are not one of them guys. This will be in the inspection report.
Seems the aux turbine driven feed pump just had flow or pressure perturbations during the LOOP. They caught the problem on recorders way after the shutdown. You can tune these guys for operations at power or operations after a scam...but it is extremely hard to tune them for both kinds of operations. Right, there are different amounts of steam flows, DPs and pressures between them. Bet you they don’t have sufficient time and opportunity to tune them on the way to shut down.
Or these machines are dinosaurs and they don’t have any old women and men around to know how to tune them.  

I predicted a special inspection from the first day the event notification came out...
"I wonder if a special inspection is around the corner with this guys...."
 
June 2:

Why didn't the NRC disclose this many days ago when they decided to perform this special inspection...why wait to disclose this once on site?

I bet you they thought, WTF...Mike Mulligan called the site before we even announced it.

NRC Special Inspection to Review Issues during Unplanned Outage
On May 25th at Millstone Nuclear Power Plant
“Specifically, there was an unexpected loss of “non-safety instrument air” at Unit 3 following the loss of off-site power
In addition to these problems, the NRC team will review the operation of the unit’s turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump during the event.”
Just saying, at 10:30 am this morning I gave the Millstone’s senior resident inspector a call. I inquired if he had time to discuss the LOOP events. He talked about going to a meeting, he asked could I call back tomorrow at about the same time.
Told him, you better bone up on the “air compressors” problem for tomorrow...
Isn’t this another amazing coincidence?
June 1 in Linkedin:
“As far as Dave C, don’t forget about Millstone’s power excursion accident in late 2011 and another special inspection of this year over the repetitive failures of the turbine feed pump. These guys are sicker than the NRC makes them out to be. Overt capture behavior!”
Then the day before at the Vermont Yankee, with me talking to Region I Administrator Bill Dean and speaking about our NE nuclear infrastructure problems. “We are watching you very carefully.”
Feb 3

NRC Begins Special Inspection At Millstone Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant
"Among the areas to be reviewed during the Special Inspection are Dominion’s responses to the issues, including the adequacy and completeness of testing on the pump and root-cause evaluations of the problems. It will expand on earlier assessments performed by the NRC Resident Inspectors assigned to Millstone on a full-time basis and by NRC specialist inspectors.

“We have witnessed problems involving this safety-related component stretching back to last May,”NRC Region I Administrator Bill Dean said. “The fact that these issues occurred on multiple occasions despite repeated efforts to repair this component has prompted us to take a closer look at the situation.”

On May 15, 2013, at the end of a refueling and maintenance outage, plant personnel observed that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was experiencing speed oscillations, or unexpected fluctuations, during testing. There were also problems involving the pump on several other dates, most recently on Jan. 23, 2014. The issues included oscillations and overspeeding.”
 
I am just saying having multiple degradations and failures like these over a short period of time, having the regulator throw two rare special inspection at a plant for the same troubles...indicates the agency is captured and they don’t have enough fear or horsepower to turn the hearts of a bad actor plant. This is a failure of the NRC. Throwing more paperwork at a plant doesn’t change their hearts or knowledge in itself isn’t sufficient to make a plant operate in the straight and narrow.
The NRC must be into the closing process of the first special inspection. I going to asked the NRC to finish up writing it without seeing anything in this recent aux turbine pump troubles and then include it in Adams...  
You catch it, the troubles seem to be escalating...

June 1

Madalina,

That is just great. Now i am going to have to look up another difficult word in a dictionary (divagate). I spend half my time here looking up new words. Just because I am stupider than you, it shouldn’t give you the right to hold me up to higher standards than all the rest of you smarter people. This is the bane of existence to the poor and disenfranchised all over the world.


I never really you understood why educated people have a penchant to put issues in any old artificial category or order. I am sorry I just don’t get it. You’d rather debate what category to put an issue in, than fix it or acknowledge it is a problem.
A person here brought up environmental issues with coal and many and many other issues unrelated to the category at hand. Some even admitted than their entries really aren’t related to the title. We all draw outside the lines here at one time or another. I do respect your enforcement of order on this discussion site and have great respect, more than you than you realize with a central authority or even in government. Certainly I don’t think many people respect their government here, and the antis are worse than you!
Yes, I do have less education than you and have difficulty with writing...why do you openly have to humiliate me over it.
In the whistleblower businesses we call this rules-ies. It when a person has a disagreement over a safety or corruption issue...then management holds the troublemaker to a different set of standard or rules enforcement then their friends. If you aren’t in my group, then we will hold accountable to a different set of rules. If I am a national regulator and worst my vaulted rules and policies... but I can subvert the reputation of a regulator...undermine government itself... by protecting the agency and a troubled plant through the selective releasing of information at a public annual public meeting. Many times the game of rule-sies leads to both sides tattling to higher manager or the regulator over any perception of rules violations. It is a war of the rules. ..the first causality in war is truth.
What I find so despicable here is the anonymous managers assuming they understand what my comment meant (in my head) without a chance to explain. This is so very cowardly. So you have anonymous managers and unknown infractions...or secret infractions. These are all ingredients of the McCarthy era, Guantanamo Bay or the Ceausescu era. It is a rule or law is applied one way for your friends, then another way for someone who sees the world differently than you.
I won’t even go there in you game of painting me as a fallacy maker...you haven’t even had the courage to identify my fallacy making. I think it was unprofessional to paint me with the word rant. If I called you or one of your managers as ranting, I’d be banned for life. I wonder what kind of environment it be if you had anti-nuclear managers...how many of you pro nuke guys would be moderated.
Continued
I was at the last Vermont Yankee annual ( 2013) conduct of plant operations meeting with the NRC last week. We put on a pretty sophisticated presentation to the NRC. They wanted public feedback and we gave it to them. My job was to talk about the problems with their new diesel generator...it is the last ditch power source to the plant. Course it is my diesel generator...I forced them to get it. I talked about regional infrastructure problems to the top NRC’s regional administrator. The Millstone recent LOOP, Pilgrims issue with their switchyards and their repetitive LOOPs, and the whole thing not designed for the climate. As far as Dave C, don’t forget about Millstone’s power excursion accident in late 2011 and another special inspection of this year over the repetitive failures of the turbine feed pump. These guys are sicker than the NRC makes them out to be. Overt capture behavior!
So the NRC is playing rules-ies here in the annual meeting. It is the selective release of information saying its one kind of meeting and then doing another kind of meeting...they didn’t want to get the violations into the newspaper. Basically, everyone is given 3 minutes to speak or ask questions...hardly enough to even get a response. It is common knowledge the NRC security guy with the microphone gives 2 minutes to some people and 6 minutes or more to other people. If we can’t trust the NRC not to play rules-ies, the selective release of information to make a plant look better than they are...to be ethical and moral...why would you expect the owners on managers on linkedin to play fair and be moral? Our whole political system was invented to prevent the tyranny of the majority over the minority. This is a huge symptom of the NRC being captured. This below story was carried all over the state.
“We feel the public was shortchanged by NRC's shifting the emphasis of the meeting to general information on decommissioning at the expense of focused discussion about significant deficiencies in management and operations at Entergy Vermont Yankee," said Clay Turnbull, a trustee and spokesman with the nuclear watchdog group New England Coalition.
Turnbull, who attended the meeting, said in an email, "Nowhere in print, on a screen or verbally did NRC present the ten violations of 2013 to the public. The violations repeatedly point to management making poor decisions, poor project planning, and cutting costs at the expense of safety."
I afraid my reputation will be sullied if I continue to participating in such an unfair and unjust site. If the moderation ever clears, I’ll still have the sword of Damocleshanging over my head within a secretive Ceausescu era star camber. I will never be completely free to express my thoughts and concerns. I do think the atmosphere has been permanently changed over these events. I am going to miss this place and the awfully smart people I’d seen here. I honestly don’t know what you could say to make me stay and you never rescinded the moderation.
I had 759 visits to my Palisades RCP problem.

Come over and get the real story about the issues of day...instead of that Pablum from linked in. Some pretty big investigations going in Millstone of recent.

NRC CITES MILLSTONE UNIT 2 NUCLEAR PLANT

(The following is a reformatted version of a press release issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and received via electronic mail. The release was confirmed by the sender.)
NRC CITES MILLSTONE UNIT 2 NUCLEAR PLANT FOR INSPECTION FINDING OF LOW TO MODERATE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
   
The Millstone Unit 2 nuclear power plant will receive additional oversight from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a result of a “White” (low to moderate safety significance) inspection finding that has now been finalized.
   
The inspection finding involves the failure of Millstone Unit 2 personnel to carry out their assigned roles and responsibilities and inadequate reactor power-level management during main turbine control valve testing. This contributed to an unanticipated reactor power increase, from 88 to 96 percent of rated thermal power, on Feb. 12, 2011.
   
An NRC team identified the finding during a Special Inspection conducted from Feb. 22 through April 14, 2011, at Millstone Unit 2, which is located in Waterford, Conn., and operated by Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. The Special Inspection was initiated in response to the unintended reactor power change.“While the NRC did not identify any impacts on plant safety due to the Feb. 12th event, the agency holds control room operators to the highest standards,” NRC Region I Administrator Bill Dean said. “This inspection finding signals the need for plant personnel to step back and learn from this event in order to prevent it from occurring again.”
US NRC launches special inspection at Dominion's Millstone-3
Washington (Platts)--3Feb2014/606 pm EST/2306 GMT
A five-member team from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has begun a special inspection at Dominion's Millstone-3 nuclear power unit in Waterford, Connecticut, to investigate "repetitive problems" with a pump in the reactor's safety system, the agency said Monday.

NRC said in a statement that the inspection at the 1,276-MW unit "will focus on a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump" that is part of one of several systems that can provide cooling water to the reactor's steam generators.

"We have witnessed problems involving this safety-related component stretching back to last May," NRC Region I Administrator William Dean said in the statement. "The fact that these issues have occurred on multiple occasions despite repeated efforts to repair this component has prompted us to take a closer look at the situation."
Note: It sure looks like Madalina has shifted me to a approving comment mode or worst. Or it could be issues with my computer or with Linkedin itself slowing down. But this has been going on for days so I find that unlikely.
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May 29: Waterford — About 420 of the 1,080 workers at the Millstone Power Station will decide in a two-day election next week whether to unionize.
 
John Fernandes, business manager for Local 457 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, said today that the vote will take place at the power station on Tuesday and Wednesday. Operators, electricians, plant equipment operators and instrument and controls technicians are among the categories of plant workers deemed eligible to vote by the National Labor Relations Board.
Fernandes said workers need the protection of a contract that union representation would provide. IBEW represents workers at Connecticut Light & Power and Yankee Gas as well as at Norwich Public Utilties and the NRG Energy plant in Montville. A previous effort by IBEW to unionize Millstone workers in 2002, a year after Dominion became the owner of the plant, failed to win enough votes.
 
“Since Dominion’s taken over, a host of benefits have been taken away,” Fernandes said.
There have been changes in how pensions are calculated, pay differentials for various shifts, vacation allocations, retiree health benefits and overtime, among other areas, he said.
 
Ken Holt, spokesman for Millstone, said Dominion maintains that a union is not needed.
“Dominion respects the rights of its employees to organize,” he said, “but we think the best way to move forward at Millstone is in a non-union environment where we work together on an individual and personal basis.”
 
Workers at Dominion’s two nuclear power plants in Virginia are unionized. 
Played them like a fiddle. Got the Millstone Coalition to e-mail Dave before the end of discussion…they were utterly asleep. But not Dave. I wanted her to call around to the local media to get them interested. We talked before and she remembered who I was. Radiation leak and whistleblower gets them all the time…but you have to stay within the facts…
This is an example how the greatest democracy on the planet works….
Both reactors go down together for first time  
Waterford — Millstone Power Station remained off-line Tuesday as operators worked to complete cleanup and repairs of two pressurized tanks for cooling water that ruptured after the unexpected shutdown of both reactors Sunday due to a power failure. 
Millstone spokesman Ken Holt said this is the first time both reactors have had to shut down simultaneously. The outage occurred about 7 a.m. Sunday after a short in the transmission lines that supply power to operate plant systems even as the reactors produce power and send it out onto the grid.
Holt said that the problem originated in a relay switch on the Connecticut Light & Power transmission lines and that power was restored by noon Sunday. But Millstone 2 and 3 remain offline as crews repair damage that occurred in the aftermath of the outage and analyze exactly what happened and any lessons that can be learned, he said. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified of an unusual event, the lowest of four levels of emergency classification.
"We want to understand why we lost offsite power," Holt said. "We called in people over the holiday weekend to come in. Our equipment and operators responded as they were trained to."
During the shutdown, emergency diesel generators automatically supplied power to keep reactor safety systems operating.
Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said Millstone crews will have to clean up contaminated water that leaked from the ruptured tanks, as well as repair the pressurized tanks.
"We are continuing to review the company's actions and are considering whether the event warrants a more detailed inspection," he said.
In a Preliminary Notification issued Tuesday on the shutdown, the NRC said the loss of offsite power caused an "extended loss of instrument air" and "complicated the recovery actions." Monitors at the plant indicate normal levels of radiation at the site of the leaks, the notification said.
David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the water that leaked had low levels of radioactivity and is "not much danger to workers or the public." Still, he said, the fact that two leaks occurred in two different buildings in Unit 3 during the shutdown is cause for concern.
"A relatively uncomplicated event became relatively complicated," Lochbaum said. "There were things that occurred that shouldn't have happened."
He said it is not yet clear whether the problems were the result of equipment failures, design flaws, gaps in operator training or from operators not following proper procedures. While this is the first time both reactors have had to shut down at the same time at Millstone, multiple shutdowns have occurred four or five times this year at other nuclear power stations across the country, he said.
Essentially, he said, the incident revealed that there are "holes" in Millstone's safety net systems. 
Dominion has a reputation for doing thorough analysis of shutdown and safety incidents and learning from any mistakes that are uncovered, Lochbaum said.
"That's something Dominion does well," he said.
 j.benson@theday.com
 
Off the grid for 6 hours! 
HARTFORD, Conn. (AP) - A malfunctioning relay has been identified as the cause of a weekend power outage at Connecticut’s nuclear plant, which supplies half of all power in the state and 12 percent throughout New England, a spokesman said Tuesday.

The Millstone Power Station is still not operating though power has been restored. Officials don’t know yet when operations will resume and it will have to go through many steps before it does.
Ken Holt, a spokesman for the Millstone plant in Waterford, said the culprit was a relay on a transmission line that carries power to and from the Waterford plant.

“It didn’t do what it’s supposed to do,” he said.

An “unusual event,” the lowest of four levels of emergency classification used by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was declared at 7:15 a.m. Sunday.

The plant’s emergency diesel generators activated and powered safety systems. Electrical power was restored several hours after it failed at the plant, owned by Dominion
Resources Inc.

The outage, which affected both units at the plant, was Millstone’s first,
Holt said.

ISO-New England, which runs the region’s grid, operates with a daily
margin of reserve of about 2,200 to 2,600 megawatts for the possibility that plants could lose power, spokeswoman Marcia Blomberg said.

“We could lose resources and we routinely manage through unexpected and unplanned
resource outages,” she said.

One megawatt powers about 1,000 homes.
No emergency actions were needed and the reliability of the region’s high-voltage power grid was maintained, Blomberg said.

Frank Poirot, a spokesman for Connecticut Light & Power, said the relay problem was tracked to equipment at an electrical substation and the results of a detailed investigation are not expected for a month.


Dominion, ISO-New England and CL&P; are looking at what caused the equipment to fail and the broader impact on the system at Millstone, he said. 
 
Think of what a dinosaur....obsolete... that switchyard panel (all the relays and detectors are) is, as it took them 6 hours or more to discover it was a relay...it wasn’t immediately self-identifying.
WATERFORD, Connecticut — A spokesman for the Millstone Power Station nuclear plant says a malfunctioning relay caused the loss of power over the weekend.
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

At 0702 EDT on 5/25/14, Millstone Units 2 and 3 experienced a loss of offsite power and subsequent trip of both units. An Unusual Event was declared by Millstone Units 2 and 3 at 0715 EDT.

Power is currently being supplied to all emergency busses by the emergency diesel generators. Offsite power is not available.

At this time, it appears that the loss of offsite power is due to a localized issue in the Millstone switchyard. The surrounding areas were not affected.

A decision was made to take the NRC to monitoring mode at 0749 EDT with Region 1 in the lead.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, DOE Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL CICCONE TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1330 EDT ON 5/25/14 * * *

All EDGs have been secured and offsite power has been restored.

The licensee is reporting the loss of two stack radiation monitors - 8168 and 8169. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

Notified R1DO (Gray), R1DRA (Lew), NRR EO (Kokajko), IRD MOC (Grant).

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL CICCONE TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1548 EDT * *

At 1414 EDT the licensee terminated the Unusual Event.
The complicated shutdown with the loss of the instrument air...the media never caught that. It is like bringing home groceries by riding a bicycle with one leg.
 
Instrument air should be considered a primary safety system. It usually is not considered a safety system to save pennies... It is the motive force to a lot of important valves.

I wonder if a special inspection is around the corner with this guys....

So they had a radiation leak...
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

At 0702 EDT on 5/25/14, Millstone Units 2 and 3 experienced a loss of offsite power and subsequent trip of both units. An Unusual Event was declared by Millstone Units 2 and 3 at 0715 EDT.

Power is currently being supplied to all emergency busses by the emergency diesel generators. Offsite power is not available.

At this time, it appears that the loss of offsite power is due to a localized issue in the Millstone switchyard. The surrounding areas were not affected.

A decision was made to take the NRC to monitoring mode at 0749 EDT with Region 1 in the lead.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, DOE Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL CICCONE TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1330 EDT * * 
"The loss of offsite power was due to one main line coming into the plant shorting to ground. Emergency plan procedures have been implemented, natural circulation has been established, and the plant is stable. Offsite electrical power has been restored to both Unit 2 and Unit 3. Emergency diesel generators have been secured, and plant equipment has been restored to a normal line up.

"Extended loss of instrument air following the loss of offsite power complicated the recovery actions. The normal reactor coolant system letdown flow path was not able to be established. This resulted in the rupture of the pressurizer relief tank rupture disk inside containment. The relief valve on the volume control tank lifted when restoring normal letdown. This caused the primary drains transfer tank to overflow into the auxiliary building. This overflow path has been isolated. Supplementary leakage collection system radiation monitor HVR-RE19B, and auxiliary building normal ventilation radiation monitor HVR-RE10B, are indicating normal levels."

Notified R1DO (Gray), R1DRA (Lew), NRR EO (Kokajko), IRD MOC (Grant).

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL CICCONE TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1548 EDT * * 
At 1414 EDT the licensee terminated the Unusual Event.

Notified R1DO (Gray), R1DRA (Lew), NRR EO (Kokajko), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, DOE Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, and Nuclear SSA via email.
 
May 26: This is a example with how captured the media has become. They didn’t millstone was actually in a UE.  Well, a hollowed out media might more explain it.

A LOOP tremendously jacks up the chance of a meltdown...
I think it is a mistake they didn’t declare a UE…a unusual event. 
Just saying, what does it mean when they say a electrical short cause the Loss of offsite Power (LOOP) event. They have four or five high voltage transmission lines coming into their site. One shorting line is never suppose to trip a plant let alone the whole site. Protective devices are supposed to immediately isolate the fault and the rest of the lines should be able to handle the load of both plants.
I think it is a mistake they didn’t declare a UE…a unusual event…

Just saying, what does it mean when they say a electrical short cause the Loss of offsite Power (LOOP) event. They have four or five high voltage transmission lines coming into their plant. One shorting line is never suppose to trip a plant let alone the whole site. Protective devices are supposed to immediately isolate the fault and the rest of the lines should be able to handle the load of both plants.

Six hours without power....don't forget how vunerable the Pigrim plant has become with lost of lines and site blackouts, caused by the system not spending money on the lines going to their plant.

Power restored. This is terrible PR.

Something "big big" was going on in the grid an hour before the two plant trip.

WATERFORD, Connecticut — Federal officials say Connecticut's nuclear plant in Waterford has lost power, with an electrical short likely to blame.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission says the two reactors at Millstone Power Station shut down at about 7 a.m. Sunday. Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the regulatory agency, says Connecticut Light & Power determined that a short in a power line is the likely culprit.

A spokeswoman says CL&P is investigating and would not confirm the cause of the outage.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission says automatic trips of the reactors were uncomplicated, safety systems functioned properly and public health and safety are not affected.

Diesel generators at the plant, which is owned by Dominion Resources Inc., activated and are providing power to safety systems.

A spokesman for Millstone said it's in a "safe and stable condition."