Whistleblowing can be used as a potent creative tool to help your bureaucracy evolve towards a more enlightened organization.
Phone: 1-603-209-4206 steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
Note: I constantly update my articles.
Comments at the bottom of the article are always welcome!!!
Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale, NH
What does the plague of problems with the Pilgrim nuclear plant recovering their off site power mean?
The great 1938 hurricane and does our grid transmission engineering codes take into consideration our climate and climate change. Our transmission system isn't designed for our climate and future climate.
P.Jayachandran M.ASCE, Brian M. Reynolds, P.E.b and Mark S. Browne, P.E.b Worcester Polytechnic Institute,100 Institute Road, Worcester, MA, 01609 National Grid, 40 Sylvan Road, Waltham, MA 02451-1120 Abstract "The extreme wind speed region for New York and New England is described in this paper. The wind speed data from the National Climatic Data Center, National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the US National Meteorological Service are analyzed using software from NIST to develop the probability distribution functions. Contours were drawn for extreme wind speeds and their corresponding mean recurrence interval in a map and data for the New York and New England region. Gumbel Type I distribution model is used to predict probability of any unknown wind speed exceeding observed wind speeds. Recommendations are made to use these wind speeds in design of transmission line systems. Present National Grid US Transmission (UST) wind speed design standards follow the basic wind speeds denoted by the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC). Wind speed design requirements are most extreme along the sea coast lines and gradually taper off at points more inland. The minimum basic wind speed is 90 mph on a 3 second gust interval (See Figure 1). The area highlighted in red is denoted as a “Special Wind Region” by the NESC. The NESC provides no guidance on wind speeds in this area other than to recommend regional wind studies be performed as part of design.''
The minimum design of our electric transmission system is 90 MPH for 3 seconds...around the Pilgrim nuclear plant it is 110 mph. In Pre Katrina Entergy designed their transmission system for 150 MPH and at 130 MPH the wind severely damaged it.
How high a gust of wind would destroy our transmission system? Do our grid transmission codes take into consideration our climate and project future climate change...wind speed as an example? As is, all they look at is in the rear mirror of our historical meteorological record...they don't take into consideration our future climate change. Generally this is done in order to save construction cost.
Can you even imagine the impact to NE if a hurricane destroyed a significant proportion of our societal backbone...our electricity transmission system? Potentially millions of people and business would be without electricity well into winter...let alone, all the economic damage. What would be the worst hurricane strike that would destroy the most transmission assets?
Our transmission system is particularly vulnerable because it is based on 50 year old obsolete engineering codes and most of the transmission system is 50 years old, obsolete and degraded...
While performing an extent of condition review associated with the adequacy of air operated equipment inside containment to withstand containment main steam line break (MSLB) and loss of coolant accident (LOCA) temperatures, it was discovered that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop 1A Charging Line Stop Valve, the RCS Loop 2A Charging Line Stop Valve, and the Pressurizer RC-4 Auxiliary Spray Inlet Valve have nitrile based elastomers used in the air filter regulator and actuator. The design temperature limit for the nitrile elastomers used in the valves is 180°F which is acceptable for the normal operating conditions inside Containment of 120°F. However, during the MSLB and LOCA accident the temperature inside Containment is analyzed to reach 370°F. Since these valves have both open and close functions supported by an air accumulator, failure of the nitrile based elastomers could prevent the valves from fulfilling their intended safety function.
The causal analysis did not determine why the nitrile elastomers were installed during original plant construction. However, it was determined that a procedural deficiency and human error resulted in the wrong type of elastomer material being used in the instrument air filter regulators when the air accumulators were added to the valves to support their safety function.
Should disclose how if these valves all failed in the worst accident..how much harder it would be for the control room operators if these valved for a unknown surprise reason...what would be the poorest outcome of a plant in their DBA accidents? That is the only thing that matters. The public has a right to be protected thoroughly in these accidents.
Since these valves have safety functions, the failure of the nitrile based elastomers could have prevented the valves from fulfilling their intended function. However, FCS has not experienced any event that would have subjected this material to a temperature above the design temperature limit for the nitrile elastomers of 180°F.
1) Request nationwide all nuclear plants be notified this make and model "air filter regulator and actuator" is defective and needs to be replaced. To shutdown immediately and replace defective components. 2) Request nationwide all nitrile elastomers and buna seals, gaskets and 0-rings in nuclear safety component and especially containments be immediately checked for inappropriate (my Peach Bottom and Vermont Yankee SRV actuator threaded seals 2.206...their inspection reports and LERs) environmentally unqualified and unsafe sealing materials much like Fort Calhoun, Peach Bottom and Vermont Yankee.
So this was released today....or released for the first time. This is part of the SRV Amendment Request for the new three stage valves. One wonders why they are releasing it...it educates me how the valve works.
Right, all the new temperature and bellow pressure instrumentation is a hell of an advancement from the old two stage valves. As the three valves failures subsequently showed us on thesnew valves, the containment is still a formidable barrier with understanding what was failing on these valves.
September 21, 201
Entergy Response to NRC Request for Additional Information dated July 21, 2010, in support of Proposed License Amendment for Pilgrim Setpoint and Setpoint Tolerance Increases for Safety Relief Valves (SRV) and Spring Safety valves (SSV), and Related Changes (TAC NO. ME3543.
Feb 15: Doesn't sound like there was a NRC inspector in the control room the night of the historic blizzard, considering all the troubles with the SRV valves...? Feb 14: Stand corrected, two 345 kv lines and one 23 kv line for a total of three lines...
Feb 13: Is reactor water debris or particles of some kind causing the valves to leak. Hmm, are these valves cycled upon first start-up, thus getting particles flushed through them and stuck between the seat and disk?
A plague of problems with new nuclear safety components at Pilgrim...SRV valves.
You notice, Entergy is utterly silent with the on going events at the plant...the only source of information on Pilgrim is the neutered NRC. It sounds like my influence?
Pilgrim nuclear plant remains shut for repairs By Erin Ailworth, Globe Staff
The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, which shut down after losing power to its safety systems during the weekend snowstorm, once again has electricity, but will remain out-of-commission while repair work is done on a leaky safety relief valve that caused a problem at the plant last month, federal regulatory officials said,
The power, provided by local utilities, returned at midnight on Tuesday, according to a statement from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
“Our resident inspectors assigned to Pilgrim will continue to closely follow the repair work and other activities as the company plans to return the unit to service,” the Commission statement said.
Pilgrim, which is owned by Entergy Corp. of Louisiana, first lost power Friday night when three offsite power lines were knocked out of service during the storm, according to regulatory filings and the NRC. The plant was taken offline, and diesel generators powered its safety systems. Electricity temporarily returned to the plant on Sunday morning, but went out again when plant operators believe a transformer was struck by falling ice.
Entergy representatives did not immediately be reached for comment. But Entergy spokeswoman Carol Wightman said Sunday that Pilgrim would only come back online once it had gone through testing and maintenance. She could not say when that would be.
Pilgrim’s current shutdown is its third this year. The first two -- both in January -- were caused by equipment issues at the plant, not an offsite power loss.
The leaky safety valve that is now being repaired caused one of the January shutdowns. The other happened when the plant’s recirculation pumps, used to adjust power levels, stopped working.
I think he did mention it or maybe I already knew it...the three lines can sway in the heavy wind. So two line can get close to each other in the sway and thus this creates huge short circuits.
Neil told me indeed Pilgrim did have "offsite linepower availability has been fluctuating" while the plant was up at power...huge swings in power to the lines. The safety breakers to the lines were opening and shutting like a mad man having not a clue why this was happening.
Pilgrim does have procedures requiring them to start up the diesels generators in preparation for their emergency use, even scram and disconnect the whole site, if the transmission system become extremely unstable. The transmission system did become extremely unstable this night. Why didn't they follow their emergency procedures?
"Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site.
I asked him about the startup transformer inoping right at the reactor scram, then failing later with the ice, the main transformer faulting a few years earlier by ice on the insulator or breakers, why can't they stop it, implied there is nothing they can do about it, asked him, well how come Millstone had more snow and blizzard and they never had troubles with ice crashing on their start-up and main transformer, asked actually what was causing the off site lines to trip. He said trees were falling on the 345 kv lines. I said these towers and lines were 65 feet off the grounds...the right of ways were designed so no tree could ever fault a line. I asked him did you ever see a right away on the 345 kv transmission corridors. Most of the questions he knew nothing about and he was trying to feed me or throw me off by absolute bs not depending on the facts.
...This is Entergy's public relations spokesmen within the NRC. I called the on site resident inspector today. They generially don't answer their phones to take direct questions from the public. The agency allows you to leave a recoding, but the history is they never call people back because telling the truth is too troublesome.
Neil Sheehan,
From: Michael Mulligan To: "neil.sheehan@nrc.gov" Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 12:35 PM Subject:
Remember Pilgrim with all the recent shutdowns indicate they were a very stressed and troubled plant.
The new SRV valves in May 2011, the shutdown for leaking SRV in Dec 26 2011, another shutdown for a leaking SRV in Jan 20th this year, then the same SRV leaking again into this blizzard causing the plant to be a 80%. So the D SRV, the B SRV and then the B SRV again...who knows what condition the A and C main steam line SRVs are doing. And the most humorous of it all in the "first" new SRV shutdown, Entergy, Target Rock, the Southern Company and the NRC could find no reason for the seat erosion. Couldn't prevent it from happening twice more. This isn't the results of a strong federal regulator or competent engineering of Target Rock or Entergy.
By the way, at VY and Peach Bottom in around 2010 they replaced all their SRV's with new ones...on the first cycle a threaded seal failed on the actuator causing two SRVs to fail their leak test and were secretly broken most of the at power time. They had put the wrong seal material in the SRV. Pilgrim today sounds exactly like VY?
Again, because of the ongoing VY state issue, Indian Point, Pilgrim and Entergy in general, the nuclear safety credibility crisis throughout the liberal bastion of the Northeast...we think the NRC is covering up events at Pilgrim this shutdown. You are afraid disclosures would worsen the agency's image...thus the agency is shaping the public image at Pilgrim with selective disclosers of information...
All I am interested in right now is the issue over blizzard shutdown... down to the big break and large asterisk. I didn't want you to think I was a lonely nut who could on and on about nothing.
This guy is interesting to with the grid transmission system:
http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/
Sincerely,
Mike Mulligan
Feb 12: Think about this, In Hurricane Sandy the Oyster Creek nuclear plant only lost all off site power for 11 hours.
The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL SU 1.1 based on loss of offsite power greater than 15 minutes [at 2200 EST]."
The licensee originally experienced an automatic reactor scram at 2117 EST due to a load reject with a turbine trip/reactor scram due to loss of power. Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site. The licensee states that all systems are functioning as required. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is stable in Mode 3. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are providing power to the safety related buses. The loss of offsite power is believed to be weather related.
So the scram accrued at 21:17...they seemed to be saying they lost offsite power at 2200.
What does the below statement mean...was the start-up transformer damaged in the power surges? Was the start up transformer damaged after the scram and during the power surges before the the UE at 22:00? Should Pilgrim have isolated the start-up transformers in all the offsite lines power fluctuations beginning with a scram. Was there other equipment damaged in this.
"The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable."
What does this really mean, how long was the offsite power fluctuating while they were up at power before the scram? This questions if they should have been up at power at all as the storm was closing in on them. What would have been the conservative call? Should Pilgrim began shutting down at the first hint of offsite power fluctuations while at power. Where was the grid authority with a big warning phone call to the site, our transmission system has become extremely unstable, you better scram and shutdown before we damage you.
"Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site.
Then these lying bastards tell you ice mysteriously took our both start-up transformers when they initially called the start-up transformer inop on the scram more than 24 hour earlier? Remember they pay absolutely no penalty telling your lies and knowing inaccuracies.
"On Sunday, February 10, 2013 at 1405 [EST], with the reactor at 0% core thermal power, all control rods fully inserted, and in cold shutdown conditions, the plant experienced a loss of off-site power. With Pilgrim Station aligned to off-site power via the start-up transformer (SUT), a fault on the 'B' phase of the SUT was experienced due to suspected falling ice striking the phase's insulator
So Oyster Creek had a 11 hour LOOP in Super Hurricane Sandy...we are going on a four day LOOP with a unstable grid or serious plant damage with no hints when Pilgrim will recover offsite power.
On all levels this was a terribly botched response to the approaching historic Nor'easter and resultant unstable grid and scram going on for four days.
...Whether it was a Millstone nuclear plant last summer being forced to shutdown because they didn't have enough plant cooling capacity for the expected increase of the Long Island Sound summertime water temperature or the Pilgrim Nuclear plant trip during the lead up to a severe winter snow storm-blizzard...the commonality is the corporate interest, the federal and state regularity interest and the politicians don't have the power to enforce nuclear supplied electricity reliability in the seasonal extremes of expected New England weather.
I can't tell if it is they are bringing on poorly designed new equipments and components or allow old and obsolete equipment to fail or be degraded going into a seasonal hard weather.
...So what about the extent of condition/cause in the LER-006-00 I identified a few days ago?
The Main Transformer wasn't designed for the climate in 2008 and now the Start-up Transformer is shown to be poorly designed. So when the plant was in a LOOP and on the Diesel Generators, considering how vulnerable the plant is to severe winter weather, how come all the components of the Main Transformer and Start-up Transformers weren't thoroughly inspected for ice and snow as itwas a known vulnerability? How come there wasn't a check off list on that?
The root cause of the event was ice and snow build up on ACB-105 "A" phase bushing on the main transformer side and flashover which resulted in a significant current to ground fault. ACB-105 is an ac circuit breaker; model number HVB-SF6, manufactured by the General Electric-Hitachi company.
Come on, we are in the year 2013 and they can't design transmission and switch yard components into being ice resistant to faults, damage and trips. How come Millstone is still up at 100% power and they had much more snow.
Notification Date: 02/10/2013 Notification Time: 20:20 [ET] Event Date: 02/10/2013 Event Time: 14:05 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/10/2013 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY "On Sunday, February 10, 2013 at 1405 [EST], with the reactor at 0% core thermal power, all control rods fully inserted, and in cold shutdown conditions, the plant experienced a loss of off-site power. With Pilgrim Station aligned to off-site power via the start-up transformer (SUT), a fault on the 'B' phase of the SUT was experienced due to suspected falling ice striking the phase's insulator. This resulted in the tripping of the feeder breaker, ACB-102, and the loss of power to 4160 KV buses A1 through A4. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 'A' and 'B' auto-started as designed and are powering emergency buses.
"The loss of off-site power resulted in de-energization of both Reactor Protection System (RPS) channels resulting in a reactor scram signal and isolation of shutdown cooling. At 1418, shutdown cooling was returned to service. All other plant systems responded as designed. Station personnel are in the process of establishing back-up power in accordance with plant procedures. "The following press release was made at 1715 hours: 'Offsite power to Pilgrim station was interrupted this afternoon. The plant is in a cold shutdown condition and Pilgrim's diesel generators are providing power to the site. There is no worker or public safety concern. Plant personnel are troubleshooting the cause of the interruption
So basically the NE ISO and all the grid/transmission authorities have lost control of the power going into the Pilgrim nuclear plant. All this tearing up the grid responsibilities, is the very troubled National Grid responsible for this...so the grid is balkanized into many companies and government authorities...thus nobody is in charge of maintaining the quality power to a nuclear plant. The idea that all these grid companies have lulled the state and federal regulatory authorities into sleep walking to the nothing ever matters philosophy ...have lulled all the politicians to turn their heads with managing the quality of the electricity on the grid.
I can't begin to tell you how dangerous it is for off site electricity/power to be supplied to a nuclear power plant erratically...how unprofessional it is to tolerate that. These are huge amounts of electricity and energy. Event Number: 48736 Facility: PILGRIM
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN Notification Date: 02/08/2013
Notification Time: 22:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2013
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2013
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"Pilgrim Station scrammed on a loss of offsite power. All systems performed as designed. Groups I, II, VI went to completion. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is injecting to the vessel controlling level. High Pressure Coolant Injection is in pressure control and slowly cooling down. Offsite power was lost multiple times. The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL SU 1.1 based on loss of offsite power greater than 15 minutes [at 2200 EST]."
The licensee originally experienced an automatic reactor scram at 2117 EST due to a load reject with a turbine trip/reactor scram due to loss of power. Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site. The licensee states that all systems are functioning as required. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is stable in Mode 3. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are providing power to the safety related buses. The loss of offsite power is believed to be weather related.
The uncertainty with not exactly knowing what is causing the power fluctuation..."believed to be weather related"...is a pall over every citizen of Massachusetts and the electrical engineering profession as a whole. The NE ISO is doing a horrible job at managing the transmission and electricity quality... whatever service provider who owns the grid transmission components. It goes to say, the transmission system is not designed for the current climate and future climate. This plant didn't have one LOOP...they multiple LOOPs in a very short time.
Pilgrim terminated the Unusual Event and has transitioned to recovery effective at 10:55 AM on 02/10/2013. Offsite power has been restored to safety-related and non-safety-related electrical buses through the station Startup Transformer via a single 345 KV line. The other two offsite power sources remain out of service. The emergency diesel generators have been secured and are in standby. Residual heat removal is in shutdown cooling mode maintaining the reactor in cold shutdown. Fuel Pool Cooling is in service with fuel pool coolant temperatures trending down.
Feb 11:
The Associated Press
Pilgrim and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced that power resumed on Sunday, restored from one of the three off-site lines. As work was continuing to restore the other two lines, Pilgrim offiials said off-site power was interrupted.
Eleven inches of snow took out three independent high voltage power lines...come on. Sounds like something locally took out the switch yard effecting the ring bused.We will find out tomorrow morning with the event report...
Hmm, something is really wrong, Plymouth-Boson Globe (Pilgrim nuclear plant ) got 11.5 inches while Old Saybrook-New Londen Day got 30 inches.... Pilgrim got a dusting and had LOOP...Milstone got 30 inches of snow and still making power at both units...
...Just saying, for the NE ISO and all the local power authorities, Pilgrim nuclear plant must have had the highest resource priority above everyone else for power restoration. They stole resources from everyone else....
The local distribution system is supposed to be devastated by a storm like this...the transmission system is supposed to be designed to be survivable...
Remember, I have complained to the NRC that Pilgrim has 4 bad quality SRV valves. They were at 80% power because of a leaking SRV B valve. You know they were banging around the SRV valves during this scram...
On December 19, 2008, at 1831 hours, an unplanned automatic reactor protection system scram signal and scram occurred while operating at approximately 100% power. The event occurred with a severe winter storm in progress with predominantly easterly winds and snow depositing at a rate of approximately one (1") inch per hour
The root cause of the event was ice and snow build up on ACB-105 "A" phase bushing on the main transformer side and flashover which resulted in a significant current to ground fault. ACB-105 is an ac circuit breaker; model number HVB-SF6, manufactured by the General Electric-Hitachi company.
The turbine trip resulted in automatic closing of the turbine control valves and stop valves. Three (3) turbine steam bypass valves opened to divert steam flow to the main condenser. These turbine steam bypass valves have a capacity for diverting 25% of the rated steam flow. In accordance with the analyzed transient analysis for a load reject event, reactor pressure increased and three (3) of the four (4) main steam relief valves (MSRVs) opened when mechanical set pressure was exceeded. The MSRVs reset and long term reactor pressure control was accomplished using the turbine -steam bypass valves.
What Pilgrim is saying...that the Pilgrim plant is not designed for the extremes of our existing and future climate...
A review was conducted of Pilgrim Station LERs since 1974. The review identified a number of similar events which involved switchyard electrical faults resulting in load rejection and reactor scram. LERs 1985-025, 1992-016, 1993-004, and 1993-022 identify events where reactor scram occurred due to the effects of severe weather events including lightning strikes and winter storms. LER 2003-003 identifies an event where a fault on the UAT resulted in load rejection and reactor scram.
Remember, the locality all around the the Pilgrim plant had their transportation, electrical distribution and grid transmission severely disruptive and destroyed in the Nemo Nor' Easter.
Right, you have seen a peek at Fukushima...the outlines of a future crisis. A media that is asleep at the wheel totally isolated by a region in a crisis of infrastructure isolation. A historic Nor'easter or a 9.0 tsunami...society in a deep crisis with disconnection caused by physical, communication and electrical separation. The media wholly caught up with pubic crisis...with being totally dependant on the NRC and corporate disclosures with problems at a nuclear plant in a deep crisis. All the local government organizations terrified a public declaration of a troubled nuclear plant will drain emergency life saving resources away from the weather emergency. So shut up says government authorities to the nuclear plant and NRC...let us do life saving duties without your nuclear plant disruptions.
Will the nuclear corporation or NRC dare tell you the whole story when it is most needed or will they keep their problems close to the vest for their own self protection and for the protection of life savings to the whole regional community... I think the regional society, the local governments and the media are terribly overloaded with the emergency...the natural response is to ignore the nuclear power plant.
A hint might be in tomorrows NRC event report by Entergy...if they begin reporting it was a complicated shutdown. That means in the heart of the LOOP and regional weather crisis with widespread loss of electricity and the ability to evacuate the public around the plant...the selective disclosures were an attempt by the NRC of a beginning to shape the image of the industry and Entegy to the public.
They could have had a nicely controlled and slow shutdown during day and 24 hour before the snow hurricane struck...
One of the most worrisome meltdown accident initiators is a stuck open relief valve. Most LOOPs are two hours or less and a LOOP of 5 or 6 hours are very rare event. A multi day LOOP is an extremely rare event like Pilgrims.
All LOOPs are very dangerous events and should be avoided at all cost. A LOOP going into it with leaking and questionable SRVs is extremely reckless and shutting down a plant in a historic Nor'Eastor...
So what is the LOOP rate from "Analysis of Loss of Offsite PowerEvents: 1986-2004-NUREG/CR-6890" to today?
"Overall, LOOP frequencies during power operation decreased significantly over the 37 years from 1968 through 2004. The overall trend shows a statistically significant decrease through 1996, and then stabilized from 1997 through 2002. This decrease in the frequency of LOOP events is largely attributable to a decrease in the number of plant-centered and switchyard-centered events beginning in the mid-I 990s. In fact, only one plant-centered event occurred during the period from 1997 through 2004. Nonetheless, the number of LOOP events in 2003 and 2004 was much higher than in previous years. Specifically, 12 LOOP events occurred in 2003, and 5 occurred in 2004. The analyses documented in Volume I also indicate that, on average, LOOP events lasted longer in 1997-2004 than in 1986-1996. However, the LOOP duration data for 1986-1996 exhibited a statistically significant increasing trend over time. By contrast, no statistically significant trend exists for 1997-2004. However, when we focus on grid-related LOOP events, the SBO risk has increased. Our current results show that the grid contributes 53 percent to the SBO core damage frequency. Severe and extreme weather events, which are generally related to grid events, contribute another 28 percent. Therefore, the increasing number of grid-related LOOP events in 2003 and 2004 is a cause for concern."
You got to know, it is a hard plant trip like a loss of all off site electricity and the lost of the main condenser for decay heat removal and cool down. Least they were at 80% power when it happened. So the main steam line isolation valves tripped shut. They were solely dependant on HPCI, RCIC and the SRV valves...turbine driven pumps for decay heat removal and pressure control. You know for a fact, they shifted into using the safety relief valves for pressure and level control at some point.
Entergy and the NRC have the total control when to announce the bad news about plant personal problems in an incident...they absolutely control the timing of disclosures usually many days, months and years later when it won't make the industry look bad... First published on Feb 2, 2013
Think about it, if it was a worst accident, would you admit it if it was an alert or a site area in this weather and frighten all the people living around the plant who couldn't leave anyway. Think about more, you think those Diesel Generators were designed for a snow storm as this and actually tested for these conditions. It is piss your pants time, if the air suctions into the engine became clogged with snow and stopped the engines. The area around the plant are also in a blackout...that is 400,000 people surrounding the plant. *****Feb 9, 1130 PM:Pilgrim just had a plant trip and a loss of all off site Power. It is not the first time they had a bad scam in a blizzard****
The Plymouth nuclear power plant has lost power and has declared an emergency condition, a spokesman at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said tonight. The plant is on generator power -- as designed -- yet has issued a low-level warning of "an unusual event," the NRC told the Herald tonight. The plant has been shut down and back-up power is taking care of the plant's needs, at this time, the NRC added. Plymouth fire officials said there were widespread outages in town. Nstar reports 81-90 percent of the town is without power tonight. (See the outage map here.)
Feb 8 still 83% power and Boston is being shutdown...
Feb 7: See, this can set up a big accident. Pilgrim plant is going to enter a snow Super-Hurrican wounded with at least three injuried SRV valves that includes A,C and B?
Feb 7: 83% power
I think as they reduce pressure and power...it is leaking less stream still at such a rate as being non detectable. The lesser leak is still there and leaking...you are just not picking up the temperature with the detectors. I had a bazillion 2.206 over SRV problems at Peach Bottom and Vermont. It is very similar to this?
From: Michael Mulligan To: "Kim, James" Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2013 9:28 AM Subject: Re: PRB's Initial Recommendation on your 2.206 petition-Peach Bottom 2 and 3 SRVS
Mr Kim,
You remembered I talked about a 300% increase with BWR SRV LERs in about a decade, then now Pilgrim's with new SRVs on the first cycle shutdown with the D SRV leaking, then a shutdown with B leaking, then leaking B again threatening another shutdown that brings us to today. We know VY's SRV actuators were brand new and on their first cycle when they discovered grossly inappropriate sealing material that was used in the actuator. I still don't know if the Peach Bottom's actuators were new and how Buna n material got in there. I suspect now all the buna material is out of Peach Bottom (2 and 3) if you can still trust Exelon with their integrity issues on decommission funding and Pentas Controls. Like i have been saying, the NRC doesn't have enough horsepower and independence in order to make the nuclear industry behave in a coherent manner and serve our long term national interest. And the environment is getting much worse at an increasing rate.
I laughed my ass off when I read all the organizations involved with the first Pilgrim SRV investigation stated in their LER, saying the "failed and eroded pilot valve" showed no defects... the NRC, Entergy, the Southern Company, Target Rock and the laboratory. I'd die laughing to see all the internal documents on this?
I suggest a special NRC with the Pilgrim new SRV problems and consider all the Pilgrim's SRVS defective and unsafe?
Please may I have another shot at the PRB.Mike
Feb 6: 80 %...they still got a problem. How can they not call it inop and require a shutdown.
"The valve is the same one that was replaced in January after a similar leak was detected.'
The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth is again experiencing problems with a finicky safety relief valve that shut the plant down last month.Power at the plant was reduced Sunday because of a leak in a safety relief valve that helps control steam pressure at the facility, according to Carol Wightman, spokeswoman for Entergy Nuclear, which owns the plant.
Reducing the power allowed the valve to reseat itself, but as power gradually was increased again another minor leak was detected, Wightman said. When power was reduced again the valve again reseated itself and the leak stopped, she said.
"Right now we're holding at about 82 percent," she said at about 1:30 p.m. Tuesday, adding that plant officials were continuing to evaluate the problem. The NRC website later showed power at the plant had increased to 87 percent.
The valve is the same one that was replaced in January after a similar leak was detected. The plant has four of the valves, Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan wrote in an email to the Times.
Entergy officials installed new safety relief valves during the last refueling and maintenance outage, Sheehan wrote.
"They are used to relieve/control pressure in the reactor coolant system and therefore perform an important safety function," he wrote
This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in Plug Insulators (P/N: GB-1A-1) supplied as part of GRAYBOOT 'A' (GB-1A) Connector Kits. There are two affected lots of Plug Insulators (Lot #: BA59961 and BA67711). The potential defect is an out of tolerance dimension that will possibly affect the sealing ability of the Plug Insulator to wire interface.
Event date: Dec 25.,2011
Report date: Feb 23, 2012
2011 007 01
Event date: Dec 25, 2011
Report date: Dec 12, 2012
In other words, they are winging the valve full open and then shut it. They might do it more than once. It is a hail Marry pass. Something is up when they can't right back up to power.
2pm: "Entergy spokeswoman Carol Wightman said Monday afternoon that plant
engineers and crews cut the output to 80 percent on Monday morning because they
needed to reseat a pilot valve that’s connected to one of the plant’s four
safety relief valves.'
I am calling for a special NRC inspection. So maybe not shutting down right away to fix the SRV...maybe Entergy is running away from the penalty of more inspections and NRC attention as stated in there last post shutdown nRC evaluation? .
"...there have been three unplanned shutdowns at Pilgrim in just more than six months:
Last May: Reactor scram from degrading condenser vacuum due to a valve failure.
Jan. 10: Reactor scram due to trip of both reactor recirculation pumps due to personnel error during testing.
· Jan. 20: Reactor shutdown due to a leaking safety relief valve (These safety release valves are a new design and have been installed since the last outage in 2011.)
The NRC does compile with what it calls “performance indicators,” Sheehan explained. These are the records of unplanned nuclear power plant changes and shutdowns. We look back at the last 7,000 hours of online operation to see if they have more than three” shutdowns, said Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan. “As of now, the latest shutdowns would not appear to put them over the performance indicator"...that performance indicator would cross from ‘green’ to ‘white.’ ”
If that happened at Pilgrim, according to Sheehan, Entergy would have to perform a root cause evaluation and the NRC would evaluate the cause and the corrective actions Entergy took in a supplemental inspection.
“Pilgrim is currently ‘green’ in all performance indicator categories,” Sheehan said, “including unplanned shutdowns.”
But if another scram occurs in the next month or so, it would be time for a root cause evaluation."
...newly installed in April/May, 2011, during Refueling Outage 18.
1) December 26, 2011: SRV RV-203-3D
In conclusion, the as-found tests and inspections could find no evidence of a defect in design, material, or workmanship that could lead to the onset of leakage. The pilot and second stage were leaking as-received at the TR facility and the as-found condition of both the pilot and second stage disc/seat was directly attributable to the installed plant leakage. The tests and inspections did not conclude any direct cause for the leakage.
2) Jan 20, 2013: RV-203-3B
3) Feb 3, 2013 RV-203-3B
...You remember my issues with VY's and Peach Bottom and SRV actuators threaded seal leaks. They were brand new replacement components. They had defective and wrong poor quality threaded seals in the actuators which lead to two of four actuators failing their fist leak test.
So Pilgrim has four SRV's as VY. We are heading to our third shutdowns and failure with Target rock Relief valves at Pilgrim. The new 3D valve leaked first in late 2011 requiring a shutdown. The new 3B leaked in Jan 20th this year and required a shutdown...supposedly the pilot assembly was replaced. Fourteen days later the 3B is leaking again and is INOP requiring another shutdown.
So Pilgrim went from 2 stage SRVs to brand new three stage SRVs in the April/May 2011 refueling outage.
You get it, these guys don't need the certainty of operability with this important nuclear safety components.
So we are on the first LER revision or update already. Here are excepts for LER-2011-007-01 dated Dec 26, 2011. The defect is on the 3D valve. This guy was a 3 day shutdown... "On Monday, December 26, 2011, at 1250 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, the station entered a 24-hour action statement to initiate a controlled shutdown and be less than 104 psig reactor pressure due to suspected leakage across the first stage of safety relief valve (SRV) RV-203-3D. The SRV was declared inoperable due to criteria specified in a Pilgrim plant procedure. Specifically, the SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature. The safety relief valve was declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D was entered. Due to the valve being declared inoperable, the station was required to be shutdown and reactor coolant pressure be below 104 psig within 24 hours per TS 3.6.D.2."
I don't know what is wrong with this damn valve...so just stick another pilot valve in there and button her up. Following the shutdown, RV-203-3D was repaired with a new pilot valve and the plant was returned to full power operation.Hey baby, we got absolute positive triplicate proof that nothing is wrong with these valves; where the industry and us have 43 years of perfect mature operational experience with the design of these valves. We are mature people here I tell you.
The following observations were made during the inspection and disassembly observations
1. There was no evidence of a design defect that could be the root cause for the onset of leakage. The basic design of this 3-stage valve is mature and had been in operation since 1970. Adherence to design and specification parameters were certified by witnessed steam tests before the valve left the Target Rock (TR) factory. The valves were assembled and tested under TR's ASME Section III, 'NV' stamp. The pilot assembly and second stage assembly were steam tested at TR to confirm steam pressure within 1% of 1155 psiq and shown to be leak tiqht at 1055 psiq (91%).
2. There was no evidence of material defect that could be a root cause for the onset of leakage. All components were found to be structurally sound. The only damage observed was the seat cutting that resulted from a pilot stage steam leakage described earlier.
3. There was no evidence of a defect in workmanship that could be considered a root cause for the onset of leakage, including bellows run out and preload gap,In conclusion, the as-found tests and inspections could find no evidence of a defect in design, material, or workmanship that could lead to the onset of leakage. The pilot and second stage were leaking as-received at the TR facility and the as-found condition of both the pilot and second stage disc/seat was directly attributable to the installed plant leakage. The test and inspections did not conclude any direct cause for the leakage.Yea babe, the extent of condition investigation was surely accurate. Can you trust any future "extent of condition investigation" at any other Entergy nuclear plant.
EXTENT OF CONDITION
The identified condition is a leaking SRV pilot. Based on a review of plant data, the only pilot to exhibit signs of leakage is RV-203-3D. The leaking pilot has been replaced. No additional pilots have this condition at this time. Any corrective actions that are identified to prevent reoccurrence of leaking SRV pilots will be applied to all four SRVs.
The complete list of dopes sitting in Entergy's Pilgrim engineering conference room.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
To determine the root cause, a joint team of Wyle Laboratories, Target Rock, Entergy and Southern Nuclear Operating Company engineering staff worked together to disassemble and inspect the pilot and second stage of the valve.Excepts from my Vermont Yankee Dec 5, 2012 2.206 complaining about Inaccurate Documents and Reports: So the plant, industry and NRC will conspire to allow the plant to cold bloodily start-up and remain in operation with bad nuclear safety parts, usually under the euphemism of we always get what we want out of risk informed and nothing ever matters regulation...running with knowingly unsafe replacement or new parts in the plant. This is what happened with Vermont Yankee. They just might secretly allowed a unsafe plant to operate for a cycle or two until the unavailable and appropriate quality components and repaired parts are reverse engineered, acquired or purchased.
I suspect they throw these broken, wrong or defective and degraded components to contracted investigative or testing vendors...the sole purpose of it just might be a delay mechanism to get past the heat of a brewing scandal. It is more protective if a vendor gets caught in a lie...that won’t challenge continued plant operation. I think these investigative and testing contractors are corrupt as hell... they are lying professional engineering gunslingers. It is a pay-to-lie engineering service business and absolutely no NRC enforcement of integrity and truth telling. The stinking lying abscess of payola with investigative contractor and vendors testing is a critical nuclear safety sore on the whole industry and it is a national energy security threat also. It might throw the broken or wrong material part investigation to a half ass testing contractor or vendor testing process, again, the sole purpose is to come up with a first wrong investigative result. It has nothing to do with finding the whole truth "so help me god" at the earliest opportunity. Then you have to throw it into another troubled testing contractor...it eats up years of wasted time and it gets out past the bad result many years after problem. Most worrisome, is they throw the bad part investigation to vendor or contractor who manufactured the bad part...they would never be expected lie of fudge the facts in support of stock price due diligence. Worst, in order to get business from a nuclear plant or corporation, it becomes a contractual requirement the investigation service lies to the regulator and the public. This corruption allows the plant to operate with defective nuclear safety equipment for more than one cycle and this has the ability to destroy the nuclear industry.Worst, in order to get business from a nuclear plant or corporation, it becomes a contractual requirement the investigation service lies to the regulator and the public.This corruption allows the plant to operate with defective nuclear safety equipment for more than one cycle and this has the ability to destroy the nuclear industry.
Most of these defective or degraded parts get thrown into vendor or manufacturer investigation who have total control of the results. It is like investigating, prosecuting and judging your own robbery. How can you expect to get a clear and accurate investigation when so much self interest is on the line?
You just have to have much shorter investigative periods...it has to be enforced to the industry by the NRC. People should be punished for coming up with wrong answers! I think the NRC has to take control of many of these investigations and pay the contractors. The results of these investigation should be in the interest of the rate payers, stockholders and in our national interest. An investigative and testing result should never solely support CEO lying bonuses and the destructive short term utility stock prices. A broken part or degraded safety system investigative report should never try to support and mitigate sinking stock prices by telling structured half truths for years on end. These kinds of lying games destroys the conscience of good employees all through the nation." The second new SRV leak causing a shutdown occurred about fourteen days ago. It is on the 3Bvalve. It is Event notification Number: 48685 dated Jan 20, 2013. Exact same problem as the one above. This guy is a two day shutdown to repair. "While at full power, indication of a steam leak across the first stage pilot of RV-203-3B was determined in accordance with criteria specified in procedure 2.2.23. Specifically, the SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 35 degrees F below its baseline temperature (with a lower decrease at the 2nd stage thermocouple) and cannot be explained by a corresponding downpower. The safety relief valve was subsequently declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D was entered. Due to the valve being declared inoperable the station is required to be shutdown and reactor coolant pressure below 104 psig within 24 hours per TS 3.6.D.2. Then today's event notification number 48712 dated Feb 3, 2013. You don't think it could get worst with these three stooges, worst than three leaks on different brand new SRV valves. The SRV that caused the shutdown and replacement of the pilot...FIXED..is re-leaking.
So everyone is comfortable with a leak developing in a defective designed and manufactured safety component...then they get it to reset by changing the pressure. Insanity!
"On February 3, 2013 at 1245 EST, with the reactor at 100%
core thermal power (CTP) safety relief valve, RV-203-3B was declared inoperable
as required by station procedural direction due to an observed reduction in
first stage pilot valve temperature of greater than 35 degrees F from baseline
temperatures. At 1300 EST, reactor power was lowered to approximately 80% CTP
at which time the relief valve parameters returned or trended to normal steady
state values. Consistent with a reactor power reduction, reactor pressure also
lowered from 1035 psig to 1000 psig. This action was taken consistent with
industry operating experience related to three stage target rock relief first
stage pilot valve leakage.
"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the operability
of RV-203-3B. Additionally, the current valve performance is being closely
monitored by the main control room operating crew.
"Station Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 requires that the
safety modes of all relief valves (four for [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station]
PNPS) shall be operable during reactor power operating conditions and prior to
reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown, or whenever reactor coolant pressure is
greater that 104 psig and temperature is greater than 340 degrees F. If this
specification is not met, Technical Specification 3.6.D.2 requires that an
orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor coolant pressure shall be
below 104 psig within 24 hours.
"This is an informational notification at this time. PNPS has
not initiated an orderly shutdown as of this notification; rather reactor power
was lowered to reseat the safety relief pilot valve and there is a high degree
of confidence that the high standard of operability will be restored for
RV-203-3B and the associated Technical Specification will be exited. If
RV-203-3B is not restored to an operable status, a formal and required
notification will be completed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i),
'Initiation of any plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications.'
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the
public.
"On February 3, 2013 at 1245 EST, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) safety relief valve, RV-203-3B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed reduction in first stage pilot valve temperature of greater than 35 degrees F from baseline temperatures. At 1300 EST, reactor power was lowered to approximately 80% CTP at which time the relief valve parameters returned or trended to normal steady state values. Consistent with a reactor power reduction, reactor pressure also lowered from 1035 psig to 1000 psig. This action was taken consistent with industry operating experience related to three stage target rock relief first stage pilot valve leakage. "Currently, station engineering is evaluating the operability of RV-203-3B. Additionally, the current valve performance is being closely monitored by the main control room operating crew. "Station Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 requires that the safety modes of all relief valves (four for [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] PNPS) shall be operable during reactor power operating conditions and prior to reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown, or whenever reactor coolant pressure is greater that 104 psig and temperature is greater than 340 degrees F. If this specification is not met, Technical Specification 3.6.D.2 requires that an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor coolant pressure shall be below 104 psig within 24 hours. "This is an informational notification at this time. PNPS has not initiated an orderly shutdown as of this notification; rather reactor power was lowered to reseat the safety relief pilot valve and there is a high degree of confidence that the high standard of operability will be restored for RV-203-3B and the associated Technical Specification will be exited. If RV-203-3B is not restored to an operable status, a formal and required notification will be completed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'Initiation of any plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications.' "This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
December 5, 2012 R. William Borchardt Executive Director for Operations US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dear Mr. Borchardt, Request an immediate shutdown of VY because the NRC and Entergy can't keep their nuclear safety paperwork and documents accurate and up to date. I wonder how that fits into risk informed regulations? So here below is how the VY's SRV degraded thread seal LER 2010-002-01 dated March 1, 2011 expresses the "cause of the event"...
February 7, 2013 12:37 PM GMTUpdated: 02/07/2013 07:37:22 AM EST
(AP Photo/Vermont Yankee Corporation) Thursday February 7, 2013
BRATTLEBORO -- Entergy is not to be trusted and should not be given permission to continue its operation of Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant in Vernon.
That's the gist of a document submitted by the Vermont Department of Public Service to the Vermont Public Service Board, which is considering whether Entergy should receive a certificate of public good that would allow it to run Yankee for another 20 years.
"One of the criteria the board has traditionally applied to a business that wants a certificate of public good has been, is this company a fair business partner for the state and the customers to be dealing with?" Geoffrey Commons, the director of public advocacy for DPS, told the Reformer. "The department's position is Entergy has not demonstrated that they should be issued a certificate of public good. They don't meet the criteria."
In the filing, Commons noted Entergy made a number of promises to the board prior to receiving a CPG in 2002 approving the sale of Yankee to Entergy. However, Entergy has broken at least two of those promises, he wrote.
"Entergy's assertion that it ‘has not strayed from' its commitment in the 2002 (sales order) to seek a CPG for continued operation beyond March 21, 2012 is simply false," wrote Commons. "Entergy did not commit merely to seek a CPG for continued operation ... it committed not to operate (Yankee) ... unless it sought and received a renewed CPG."
During previous hearings before the board, Entergy officials "frequently and unequivocally" made repeated promises that they would only continue operation if the CPG application was "made and granted," wrote Commons in the filing.
And in 2002, Entergy recognized the near-total authority the state has to regulate Yankee, but "now attempts to minimize the state's authority and is aggressively asserting a theory of broad federal preemption."
"Entergy can't have it both ways," said Sandy Levine, senior attorney for the Conservation Law Foundation, which opposes Yankee's continued operation. "Throughout Entergy's ownership of Yankee it has been before the Public Service Board and has requested things from the PSB while always acknowledging the board's authority over a wide range of matters, including ones that Entergy is now saying are off the table."
In 2002, Entergy took the position that "Vermont Yankee is subject to cradle-to-grave regulation of almost all aspects of its functioning other than two areas where federal jurisdiction supersedes the board's (authority) ..."
Those two areas are the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction over rates and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction over radiological safety.
However, now that state utilities and Entergy failed to enter into a new power purchase agreement, Entergy is contending the board no longer has "traditional authority to regulate need, reliability (and) cost," wrote Commons.
But nowhere in the agreement authorizing the sale of Yankee to Entergy does it say the board's authority is dependent on the existence of a PPA, noted Commons.
Operation of Yankee imposes a number of burdens on the state that the PSB needs to consider, wrote Commons.
They include: Yankee harms the Vermont brand; it damages Vermont's tourism and agriculture industries; it may be adversely affecting fish in the Connecticut River; and "imposes other environmental, aesthetic, and economic burdens on Vermont including those associated with the storage and transportation of spent fuel."
"Entergy contends that Vermont must endure those burdens but lacks any meaningful authority to evaluate whether the station's future existence is justified in light of them," wrote Commons. "Under the guise of federal preemption, Entergy has sought to preclude evidence related to almost every rational area of interest regarding (Yankee) ..."
And finally, noted Commons, Entergy has contended its position stated in current filings and those from 2002 are "entirely consistent," which he wrote is "demonstrably false."
"Reduced to its core, this issue demonstrates that Entergy, as a business, is prepared to promise whatever it takes to achieve its immediate business objectives, and, is prepared to violate such promises if honoring them would be inconsistent with subsequent business objectives," he wrote. "The board should not issue a new CPG for the VY station to a business that conducts itself as Entergy has here."
Jim Sinclair, spokesman for Vermont Yankee, had little to say about the DPS' most recent filing.
"If a response is appropriate, we will make it in our own filing."
Levine said that in the DPS filing, the Department of Public Service finally came out and said what Entergy critics have been saying for years.
"Entergy cannot be trusted and should not be awarded a CPG to operate Yankee for another 20 years."
"We think that Entergy has not made its case to show it deserves a new CPG," Commons told the Reformer. "If that state of affairs continues, we think the board will deny one."
Bob Audette can be reached at raudette@reformer.com, or at 802-254-2311, ext. 160. Follow Bob on Twitter @audette.reformer.
Duke Energy is permanently shutting down Crystal River today. Dominion is shutting down Kewaunee sometime during the middle of this year. Teabagger extremes "i hate the government" Republicans are governors in Florida and Wisconsin. Florida right wing Rick Scot is governor of the state Crystal River is in and Wisconsin extremist teabagger Scot Walker is governor of Kewaunee nuclear power plant.
So if you want to destroy nuclear power plants, hire a Republican...
Check out all that warmer water in the ocean off the coast of NE. It is 2 degrees warmer than normal. Jan 22: 12 January 2013 Last updated at 17:07
I don't know, so this sudden stratopheric warming transfers very cool air from the polar vortex into the wider open ocean? I don't know? But it brings warmer air to the artic. Sudden stratospheric warming responsible for UK's icy blast You catch that spin of the blocking high over Europe...it is pumping intensified moisture from the intensified Gulf Stream into a mega snow making monster.Ask Mosco? Jan 21: So what would our world look like if our Thermohaline Gulf Stream Intensified...what would we look like if we had a runaway Gulf Stream?
More on the Labrador Current and The Gulf Stream Diversion...
We a seasonal computer model of the Labrador and Gulf Stream Current.
...I'll put it is simple terms. The Virginian southern carpetbaggers think it is their only prerogative to extract profits at any cost out of Millstone and the NE electric customers. Their only priority is to squeeze every penny out of Millstone just short of melting down the plant or pissing off the state regulator so they get kicked out of New England.
Basically Dominion is saying the Millstone facility is not profitable if they are fully forced to handle global warming...if both plant have to easily pass the rigger of any conceivable climate for the rest of the plant's life.
It just gets you wondering if grid prices and state financial recovery to Millstone can support nuclear safety and vital New England societal electric reliability responsibilities.
...What I can say about this, the NRC's nuclear plant license amendment process has become nothing but a corporatize public relation spin operation. Just pick and chose the facts you want to use. It's nothing about painfully explaining truthfully the predicament you got in.
The bottom line here for Millstone is, we have seen global warming coming and we are too cheap to fix it. And we don't want to tell anyone.
The societal implication, what if all the electric utilities could make more money by shutting down for a month in a grid and heat crisis, by not having an adequate cooling systems? It's called spiking electricity cost and an unstable grid.
Temperature data collected by environmental scientists at Millstone shows average temperatures of the waters around the plant have risen by 0.67 degrees per decade since 1976, Holt said. In 1976, the annual mean temperature was 51.6 degrees, compared to 53.4 degrees in 2009.
WATER TEMPERATURE, THEN AND NOW Temperature data collected by environmental scientists at Millstone shows average temperatures of the waters around the plant have risen by .67 degrees per decade since 1976, Holt said. In 1976, the annual mean temperature was 51.6 degrees, compared to 53.4 degrees in 2009. The mean temperature in August 1976 was 67.3 degrees, compared to 69.8 degrees in August 2009. The next year, the temperature went still higher in August. In a 2010 annual environmental report, Millstone scientists noted that April and May of that year had the warmest temperatures on record, and that the mean August temperature was 70.3 degrees.
Last year, the mean August temperature was slightly lower, 69.9 degrees, while the annual mean for 2011 was 53.8 degrees.
Aug 15: fixed it up a little to read better. I am always a work in progress.
This is my theory on what is going on at Millstone. Yea, therearesome
serious climate change events going on in the Long IslandSound. You can clearly see it on my
NOAA's 10 hottest Julys. I am sayingthe
Millstone facility weatheris
pretty mild and incremental compared to theMidwest this year. I will bet you each year's the peak summer heat sink temperatures for a decade or more
the (inlet temperatures) have shown a clear increasing indication. Millstone
knew it in their late July panic LAR filing after we brought up the Braidwood high cooling water temperature problem that their site
was going to be screwed in August. Millstone should have seen this day coming from a million miles and had prepared their site for it.
The spotty summer peak heat sink temperatures have repetitively challenged regulations at Millstone for decades. Millstone’s and the NRC’sbiggestsinwas not seeingthe big picture 15 years ago and
causing the site to fudge numbers to stay up at power. So everyone had to come
up with tricks, jacking up the limit of a degree or so, playing around with
shifting seawater measurement from the control room indication into temperature
averaging at far flung areas of the plant without automatically recording the
temp and its time. You began fudging 8ths of a degree to keep the plant upatpower.
And we know there arelotsof seawater temperature noise out there,
maybe plus or minus 3 degrees of slugs of different temperatures and tons of
swirling eddies directly outside plant. A ridiculously small 2 degree swing
from a normal yeartothe hottest summer since 1895 with
heat sink temperature could make you start banging the plant up and down in
power. You are smart enough to cherry pick the temperatures you want. It is insanity!
So you would have
a huge crisis keeping the plant up at power one hot summer over 8ths of a
degree decades ago. I don't know, maybe you wrote it off as a fluke after the crisis is over. Maybe the
next summer was cooler and you never challenged the limit. A few years down the
pike, another hot summer of operational challenges and you would use the
experience of the last crisis to get thought it. You just got into a
repetitive pattern of squeaking through a hotter than normal summer and never
constructing new cooling water capacity in defense of the good public you serve.
I ask, could
incremental climate changes lead to subtle heat sink increases,astruggle to not be impacted by the approaching legal cooling water without plant
expenses? Then sliding into widespread lying and falsification by the utility
and the NRC...into destroying the plant safety culture. I am saying it is a widespread
known agency and utility problem over decades....the utilities will fight to
death and destroy the NRC if they have to spend one more penny on a plant if a
new problem shows up no matter how justified it is. The fact don’t matter and
they will rip the agency apart over spending pennies. It is these ideological nuts on K street and the Washington politicians.
If you are lying and falsifying, everyone knows you have to have
plant enforcers.
So one employee "plays the game" and fudges numbers in unrecorded far flung dark corners of
the plant and gets promoted. The new guys wonder, doihave
to do the same thing to be respected and have a job. It always rips the plant
safety culture apart and pits one innocent employee against another innocent
employee.
So unattended
climate change threatens the nation...lying and falsification can destroy almost
immediately the culture of a huge facility and also an invaluable governmentregulator.
I think it is a
big deal whenaNRC official says the climate is the
hottest since 1895 to cover-up fudging 8ths of a degree temperature of cooling
water while NOAA says it only the 9th hottest summer around Millstone. The NRC did not fully express to the public and understand, what they were really dealing with with this emergency amendment request. They are
just picking facts for their own agenda and not explaining the whole story.
I think the
Millstone facility, with the help of the NRC, should have seen this day coming
many years ago and spent the appropriate amount of resources to make the hot
summer of 2112ainsignificant blip on the radar. The
Millstone staff this summer should have had many excess luxuriousdegreesof cooling capacity to enjoyanotherendless summer without any worry in
the air...
It drives me
really crazy when highly educated employees play stupid and then gets away with
it.
That just might
big threat of climate change to a nuclear plant. It “frog boils” everyone into
complacency and fudging 8ths of degree of water temperature at a time ...then
the lying destroys the safety culture of nuclear plant without insiders knowing
it.
Drought Washing
Using a drought emergency to improperly get regulatory, corporate and business sympathy to make more pennies and profits.
Using the drought emergency as an excuse and accepted, which gets a federal and state regulation reduction without a breath of a connection to a drought emergency.
Gaining obscene totally unjustified profits with blackmail over a drought emergency and screwing the vulnerable.
July 14: Using a local measuring location, nothing specifies how often the temperatures needs to be recorded. It is a huge hole. In the control room it is not a issue because the points are automatically recorded by regulation and stored on the paper recorder roll or on the computer.
You got crawling under ocean sand dunes at the tip the discharge peninsula...when was the last time Millstone dredge this area. You got an assortment of hurricanes or their ruminates, lots of nor'easters, big waves, big and small tides to churn up the Sound, Hurricane Irene gravel and sedimentation shooting down the Connecticut River and like rivers. Hurricane Irene walked right up the Connecticut River. It raked massive amounts of gravel and debris from Vermont.
How about a list of all the peak summer time heat sink inlet temps and their dates since beginning of operations with Millstone unit 2?
I still don't buy it. AP:
Robert Wilson, a professor at Stony Brook University's School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences, said readings show temperatures in central Long Island Sound are nearly 80 degrees, much higher than the more typical 74 degrees.
...Basically, the central LI Sound, whatever that is, is a million miles away from the Eastern Sound's high velocity throat flow directly opposite the open Atlantic...
I dare you to do a Google search on this:
"Water temperatures in Long Island Sound, warmest on record"
Don't you find it suspicious as hell nobody outside the Millstone site reported record breaking hot waters in the Long Island Sound this year? There is nobody else reporting the warmest water temperatures ever on Long Island Sound. Isn't that news...
So what would it take to cool my jets on this. Say the last five hottest summers...a comparative graph of inlet time versus temperature for the whole year with the 5 hottest summers and this year. I'd want the all the data points on one graph...with the granularity to see the results of the tides on temperatures.
Aug 13 11 AM : The NRC says they wouldn't be surprised if Millstone 3 has to shutdown in the near future as they are also on the edge...same temperature limit.
They have been asking questions about the discharge heat backwash into the suction in recent days and are closely watching temperature parameters to see if there are any changes with Unit 2 as being down associated with backwashingheat.
Ok, so what is the evidence the unit 3 suction takes a deeper suction from the bay, they are less than 50 away from each other...or are these blind assertions by Millstone accepted by the NRC without a shred of proof. I asked, so why doesn't Millstone blast out a channel similar as unit 3 allowing access to similar cool bay water? Got a "good question mike?
I asked, as there are four or five worst hotter Julys since construction...then Unit 2 must have a large record with heat sink temperature shutdowns? So why hotter summer climates and no shutdowns?
Published 08/13/2012 12:00 AM Ken Holt, spokesman for Millstone owner Dominion, said this is the first time Unit 2 has had to shut down due to water temperature since it began operating in 1975. The plant’s license states that it must be shut down when the water temperature is 75 degrees or higher over a 24-hour period. Water temperatures in Long Island Sound this summer are the warmest on record. (So Ken, what is the proof of that...)
The above added at 3 PM
A news story like the NRC infers, but two week ago. Like, "The Long Island Sound seawater temperature is on pace to beat 1895 records"...the hottest temperature since 1895. "The Long Island Sound seawater temperatures are the hottest its ever been for this time of year since records began. How come there are no news stories like that before last Friday...?
The NRC is oblivious to the heat sink temperature historical record at the Millstone facility and it is astonishing for an engineering organization!!!
Yesterday:
Notification Date: 08/12/2012 Notification Time: 01:48 [ET] Event Date: 08/12/2012 Event Time: 00:44 [EDT] Last Update Date: 08/12/2012 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO ULTIMATE HEAT SINK EXCEEDING TEMPERATURE LIMIT Millstone Unit 2 reported that it is in a technical specification shutdown condition based on the ultimate heat sink average water temperature exceeding a temperature limit of 75 degrees Fahrenheit. The ultimate heat sink is supplied by water from Niantic Bay. At the time of this report, the bay water temperature is slightly below the 75 degree temperature limit but the time average calculation for the ultimate heat sink temperature limit still exceeds 75 degrees. The Ultimate Heat Sink Technical Specification, TS 3.7.11.a, requires the unit to be in hot shutdown within 6 hours when the average temperature limit is exceeded. The licensee is in a slow power ramp-down while monitoring the ultimate heat sink average temperature for water temperature conditions to drop below the limit. The high heat sink temperatures are based on natural environmental conditions and not from plant operation. Millstone Unit 3 is not impacted at this time. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE AT 0518 EDT ON 8/12/12 FROM WOLLERY TO HUFFMAN * * * The licensee reported that it had exited the Technical Specification LCO based on a current average heat sink temperature below 75 F. However, the licensee will hold power at 65% to ensure the temperature is stable and will remain below the limit during the day shift. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified. * * * UPDATE AT 1001 EDT ON 8/12/12 FROM NICHOLS TO HUFFMAN * * * At 0943 EDT on 8/12/12, the average ultimate heat sink temperature on Unit 2 exceeded the 75 degree limit again. The licensee re-entered TS LCO 3.7.11.a and commenced to shutdown the unit from a starting power level of 65%. The licensee plans to proceed to Hot Standby in compliance with the TS action statement even if the heat sink temperature drops back below the TS limit. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified. * * * UPDATE AT 1650 EDT ON 8/12/12 FROM PATRICK SIKORSKI TO JOHN KNOKE * * * At 1645 EDT on 8/12/12, Unit 2 is in Hot Standby and the heat sink temperature is below the 75 degree limit. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified.
...Why unit 2 and not unit 3...because the warmer plant discharge water gets sucked into unit 2 preventing most of it from getting to unit three plant suction... Right, the most important thing for a nuclear plant is to know how the plant and components interact with the environs...to have a perfect model with how the flow interacts...
At Vermont Yankee we'd seen plant discharge heat climb 500 feet upstream and uphill on a fast moving river. In the winter, we'd seen the heat signatures of discharge climbing upstream to our suctions of the plant. There would be a free area of ice from the discharge to the intake?
July 18 to NRC:
"Pathetic, you people think a drought just uncovers the low rocky shoals and sand bars of our baking steams, river and
waterways. I know a drought mostly uncovers a staggering build up and amount of
fraud and corruption in our society. A 50 and 100 year drought of staggering
dimensions is really an amazing transparency device or tool..."
"I suspect the NRC is going to be
confronted with a pan on the stove of popping popcorn amount of NOEDs at many
plants before the summer is over. "All I can think of is in the drought of
1998 thru 2000, the massive amounts of paper whipping NOEDs and tech spec changes
that occurred back then. Braidwood did it."
This below quote is a sickening intentional falsification...the NRC is gaming the national drought crisis in order to gain pennies of profits for an undeserving facility who is not in the bulls eye of a historic drought. A national emergency is not a reason to reduce safety margins to every undeserving nuclear facility...
It is strictly illegal for anyone to falsify NRC documents...this is surprising for highly educated NRC engineers.
"Ambient air temperature in July were the hottest on record in the contiguous United States since record keeping began in 1895 according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and temperature continue to remain high in August."
"The Braidwood nuclear facility safety cooling water temperature limit is 100 degrees, while Millstone's is 75 degrees. It is well within the state of the art of engineering to design and updated a plant to make the limit 100 degrees. The Millstone facility has been banging around this facility's defect of not being designed for the 1970s climate, as with today's and tomorrow's climate.
As example, the Millstone facility could tunnel out in into the Long Island Sound and take a suction into deeper water like Seabrook or cooling towers or increase plant cooling capacity....
Is should be noted, the NE ISO has been surprising clear of grid alerts and warning so far this summer with the Connecticut climate hotter than anything since 1895?
Top 10 July temperature anomalies
1st July 1913 +5.4°F
2nd July 1912 +5.1°F
3rd July 1955 +4.1°F 4th July 1994 +3.9°F
5th July 1949 +3.7°F July 1999 +3.7°F 7th July 2010 +3.6°F 8th July 2006 +3.4°F 9th July 2012 +3.2°F
10th July 1952 +3.1
Is it a much hotter than normal summer in Conn. this summer?
Holt said the difference between the highest temperature and the average of three temperatures taken at different locations is just a few tenths of a degree, but it can make the difference when it comes to the water being within the limits.
Intake water used to cool Unit 3 is drawn from a deeper part of Long Island Sound, so it is a few degrees colder than the intake water used for Unit 2, he said.
I'll bet you plant discharge heat is backwashing into plant two's suction and it only shows up in hot weather? It is like shitting in your own nest?
" NNECO indicated that tidal effects in the Long Island Sound can cause the UHS to experience temperature swings of 2 to 3 degrees during hot weather conditions. In its application, NNECO reported that a review of plant data for the past 18 years revealed that the 75 F UHS temperature limit has been exceeded approximately five times, each with a duration of less than 2 hours. During hot weather conditions, in anticipation of exceeding the UHS temperature limit, NNECO has previously sought, and the NRC has granted, temporary relief from the shutdown action required by TS 3/4.7.11. Most recently, on July 10, 2000, the NRC approved a TS\ change of this nature that was valid through October 15, 2000 (License Amendment No. 247). The TS change allowed continued plant operation for up to 12 hours if the UHS temperature limit was exceeded, provided that NNECO confirmed on an hourly basis that the UHS did not exceed 77 F while the temperature was above the TS limit. DNC expects the UHS temperature to continue to approach the TS limit during hot weather conditions and, on rare occasions, expects the UHS temperature to exceed 75 F for short periods of time. The proposed change is expected to enhance safe operation of MP2 by avoiding (a) the risk associated with unnecessary unit shutdown transients, and (b) the administrative burden of processing temporary relief requests during periods when weather conditions are expected to be hot and dry for prolonged periods of time. 3.0 EVALUATION Licensees have historically experienced elevated UHS temperature conditions during prolonged periods of hot, dry weather and, on occasion, TS temperature limits have been exceeded. Typically, these situations are infrequent, of short duration, and do not pose a challenge to accident mitigating systems and components. Unfortunately, when these conditions arise, prompt action is required by licensees to address TS requirements, which typically include a request for the NRC to exercise enforcement discretion. The Nuclear Energy Institute’s TS Task Force (TSTF) proposed a change to the Standard Technical Specification (STS) requirements in order to deal more efficiently with short-lived elevated UHS temperatures that...
****August 10, 2012
SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 -ISSUANCE OF EMERGENCY AMENDMENT RE: REMOVAL OF LICENSE CONDITION, PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGE AND FSAR CHANGE FOR ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT (TAC NO. ME9108)
In it's July 17, 2012, and August 9,2012 (2 supplements) letters, the licensee requested that this amendment be treated as an emergency amendment. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5), the licensee provided the information regarding why this emergency situation occurred and how it could not be avoided. This emergency situation results from prolonged adverse environmental conditions in the area. Under these conditions, ONC could not have reasonably applied for this emergency license amendment in advance of the event or in a more timely manner following the event. The current situation at MPS2 satisfies the criteria for an emergency situation in that MPS2 TSs require shutdown of the unit in the event that the temperature of the UHS exceeds the 7S of temperature limit in TSs. This emergency situation is caused by environmental factors beyond the control of DNC. Approval of the subject license amendment request would allow continued operation of the unit by providing additional operational margin for measurement of UHS temperature. In this instance, an emergency situation exists in that failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown or a nuclear power plant. Based on the above, the requirements for an emergency situation as stipulated in 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5)has been satisfied.
10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5)
The Commission expects its licensees to apply for license amendments in timely fashion. It will decline to dispense with notice and comment on the determination of no significant hazards consideration if it determines that the licensee has abused the emergency provision by failing to make timely application for the amendment and thus itself creating the emergency. Whenever an emergency situation exists, a licensee requesting an amendment must explain why this emergency situation occurred and why it could not avoid this situation, and the Commission will assess the licensee's reasons for failing to file an application sufficiently in advance of that event.
