Is Cooper Plant Going To Flood Like Fort Calhoun in 2011?

Update March 25

Got out of the UE yesterday. 

Update March 21

The characteristics of the Missouri River have change since the Cooper plant has been built due to climate change. The plant now is not designed to be safe with a river system running out of control for the foreseeable future.

The Cooper plant now is a ticking nuclear time bomb out to destroy the nuclear industry and horribly damage out economy. The scenario I worry is if the plant melts down in just the right political environment. The meltdown could be so politically ugly it would cause us to shutdown all the nuclear plants in the USA in a extremely short period of time. We would quickly lose 20% of our electricity. The prolonged power shortages and price spikes and elevated cost of electricity would throw us into a depression. This is not a far fetched scenario, Japan shutdown all their nuclear plants in the aftermath of Fukushima. It would take us a decade or more to replace 20% of our electricity.    

The Fight to Tame a Swelling River With Dams Outmatched by Climate Change

Along the Missouri, John Remus controls a network of dams that dictates the fate of millions. ‘It was not designed to handle this.’

By Tyler J. Kelley

March 21, 2019

There were no good choices for John Remus, yet he had to choose.

Should he try to hold back the surging Missouri River but risk destroying a major dam, potentially releasing a 45-foot wall of water? Or should he relieve the pressure by opening the spillway, purposefully adding to the flooding of towns, homes and farmland for hundreds of miles.

Mr. Remus controls an extraordinary machine — the dams built decades ago to tame a river system that drains parts of 10 states and two Canadian provinces. But it was designed for a different era, a time before climate change and the extreme weather it can bring.

“It’s human nature to think we are masters of our environment, the lords of creation,” said Mr. Remus, who works for the United States Army Corps of Engineers. But there are limits, he said. And the storm last week that caused him so much trouble was beyond what his network of dams can control.

“It was not designed to handle this,” he said.

The storm, the “bomb cyclone” that struck the upper Midwest, dumped its rain onto frozen soil, which acted less like dirt and more like concrete. Instead of being absorbed, water from the rain and melted snow raced straight into the Missouri River and its tributaries…

Update March 19

I thinking flooding debris is overwhelming the intake cooling water trash racks or the big transmission towers around the plant are compromised due to flooding?  

The flooding is worsening or Cooper is having equipment problem. Power is now at 48% power(still at 100% power). So the NRC and industry is drastically restricting information to outsiders. They are going to get use to just not saying anything. A bad accident is going happen, the NRC is still going to still play this disclose nothing game, and public credibility is going to crater and wreck the industry.

I really don't get this. Just shutdown the plant in the beginning when a big flood is lapping at your feet. I'll bet most of the shutdown cost is tax deductible.

Reposted from 3/15  

***Update March 17

So here it is Sunday and they are still at 100% power. The river has been lapping right up to it shutdown limit. How long are they going to operate like this with the water so high? It could be three months before the water recedes, god knows what weather will show up in three months. 

Remember, right after shutdown, the decay heat is putting out 10% power with the plant shutdown. A few days or a week they are still putting out a lot of heat. Would you like to get into a jam with the core putting out 10% power or .2 percent power?  

Update March 16

Heading for shutdown!

This plant has the highest risk of a meltdown or terrible accident for the next month in the USA 

This is going to be a long lasting flooding...probably still flooded during the summer. At least Fort Calhoun is permanently shutdown. It is setting up to be worst than 2011. The problem with flooding is the potential of a so called unexpected dam collapse. It could quickly overrun the plant with flooding.

These rising river levels mean the unthinkable is possible: that 2019 could be the year that two terrible flood years — the devastating flooding on the Elkhorn River in 2010 and the record-shattering flood of 2011 on the Missouri River — wrap into one.

“The 2011 flooding was probably one of the bigger disaster events in our history. I think we can safely say ... this event rivals it,” said Bryan Tuma, assistant director of the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency.

 Deadly, Historic Midwest Flooding Threatens Ericson Dam, Nuclear Plant in Nebraska

By Pam Wright and Ron Brackett
2 hours ago
weather.com

Flooding in parts of the Midwest has left one man dead threatens a Nebraska dam and nuclear power plant as heavy rains mixed with a melting snowpack swell waterways to historic levels.

An unidentified Nebraska farmer was killed Thursday after the tractor he was using to try and save a stranded motorist was carried away by floodwaters, the Omaha World-Herald reports. The incident occurred at Shell Creek near Columbus, in eastern Nebraska.

Ericson Dam in north central Nebraska is at risk of failing as the Cedar River continues to rise, according to a report by the National Weather Service.

Officials in Boone County, downstream from the dam, also warned of the "imminent failure" of the dam, Boone County News reported.

Both agencies are warning impacted residents to seek higher ground.

In Nebraska, a utility company was placing sandbags around a threatened nuclear power plant Thursday as the Missouri River continued to rise, the Omaha World-Journal reports.

Mark Becker, spokesman for the Nebraska Public Power District, told the newspaper that should the river hit the level of 45.5 feet as projected by the National Weather Services this weekend, the Cooper Nuclear Station, which accounts for 35 percent of NPPD's power, will have to be shut down.

(MORE: Flooding Continues in the Plains, Midwest As Snow Melts; Severe Threat Waning in Midwest, South)

Becker noted that should the plant shut down, DPPD will be able to get power elsewhere and they don't expect the closure to lead to outages.

On Thursday, DPPD lost another small electrical plant when the Spencer Dam failed at the Niobrara River and caused a large ice floe to jam a hole in the building. Workers inside the building were uninjured, Becker told the newspaper. The failure also forced the evacuation of dozens of residents along the river.

We are Heading For A Meltdown.

Nuclear industry pushing for fewer inspections at plants

---

by ELLEN KNICKMEYER Associated Press

Thursday, March 14th 2019

FILE - In this March 16, 2011, file photo, steam escapes from Exelon Corp.'s nuclear plant in Byron, Ill. (AP Photo/Robert Ray, File)

WASHINGTON (AP) — The nuclear power industry is pushing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to cut back on inspections at nuclear power plants and throttle back what it tells the public about plant problems. The agency, whose board is dominated by Trump appointees, is listening.

Commission staffers are weighing some of the industry's requests as part of a sweeping review of how the agency enforces regulations governing the country's 98 commercially operating nuclear plants. Recommendations are due to the five-member NRC board in June.

Annie Caputo, a former nuclear-energy lobbyist now serving as one of four board members appointed or reappointed by President Donald Trump, told an industry meeting this week that she was "open to self-assessments" by nuclear plant operators, who are proposing that self-reporting by operators take the place of some NRC inspections.

The Trump NRC appointees and industry representatives say changes in oversight are warranted to reflect the industry's overall improved safety records and its financial difficulties, as the operating costs of the country's aging nuclear plants increase and affordable natural gas and solar and wind power gain in the energy market.

But the prospect of the Trump administration's regulation-cutting mission reaching the NRC alarms some independent industry watchdogs, who say the words "nuclear safety" and "deregulation" don't go together.

For example, "the deregulatory agenda at SEC is a significant concern as well, but it's not a nuclear power plant," said Geoffrey Fettus, a senior attorney for nuclear issues at the Natural Resources Defense Council, referring to the federal government's Securities Exchange Commission.

"For an industry that is increasingly under financial decline ... to take regulatory authority away from the NRC puts us on a collision course," said Paul Gunter, of the anti-nuclear group Beyond Nuclear. With what? "With a nuclear accident," Gunter said.

The industry made its requests for change in a letter delivered by the Nuclear Energy Institute group. A "high-priority" ask is to eliminate press releases about lower-level safety issues at plants — meaning the kind of problems that could trigger more inspections and oversight at a plant but not constitute an emergency.

The industry group also asked that the NRC reduce the "burden of radiation-protection and emergency-preparedness inspections."

Nuclear plant operators amplified their requests at an annual meeting in the Washington, D.C, area this week.

Scaling back disclosure of lower-level problems at plants is "more responsible ... than to put out a headline on the webpage to the world," said Greg Halnon, vice president of regulatory affairs for Ohio-based FirstEnergy Corp., which says its fleet of nuclear and other power plants supplies 6 million customers in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic.

When the NRC makes public the problems found at a plant, utilities get "pretty rapid calls from the press, SEC filings get impacted because of potential financial impact," Halnon said.

Requests by utilities for rate increases also can be affected, Halnon said.

Trump has said he wants to help both the coal and nuclear power industries. So far, it's the more politically influential coal industry that's gotten significant action on the regulatory rollbacks that it sought from the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies.

In January, Trump appointees to the NRC disappointed environmental groups by voting down a staff proposal that nuclear plants be required to substantially — and expensively — harden themselves against major floods and other natural disasters. The proposal was meant to be a main NRC response to the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster after Japan's 9.0 earthquake and tsunami in 2011.

Caputo, who previously worked for nuclear plant operator Exelon Corp, told operators this week her aim was "risk-informed decision-making," concentrating regulatory oversight on high-risk problems.

"We shouldn't regulate to zero risk," said David Wright, a former South Carolina public-utility commissioner appointed to the NRC board last year.

"The NRC mission is reasonable assurance of adequate protection — no more, no less," Wright said.

Tony Vegel, a Texas-based reactor safety official for the NRC, pushed back when industry executives publicly made their case for fewer NRC inspections.

"It's difficult to come across as an independent regulator and rely on self-assessment" from plants, Vegel said.

The current review, commissioned by the new NRC panel, was looking at the inspections issues and related ones, NRC spokesman Scott Burnell said. Commissioners will decide after receiving the staff recommendations whether to adopt any of them, Burnell said

Oconee SRV problems.

I don't like the idea between Oconee and Lasalle they all having two test fails per cycle. It is not big problem, but it is interesting contrasting both plant's Cosby SRVs.

Oconee Nuclear Station

RA-18-0042
June 19, 2018

Subject: Licensee Event Report 287/2018-001, Revision 00 - Two Main Steam Relief Valve Setpoints Found Out of Tolerance

On 4/20/18, prior to shutdown of Unit 3 for refueling, all 16 of the Unit 3 Main Steam Safety Valves, referred to as Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRV) at Oconee, were tested to satisfy Technical Specification (TS} Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3. 7.1.1. The testing found that the as-found lift pressure for two valves was higher than allowed by SR 3. 7.1.1. The remaining fourteen valves met the SR. Guidance from NU REG 1022 Revision 3 states "the existence of similar discrepancies in multiple valves is an indication that the discrepancies may well have arisen over a period of time and that...the condition existed during plant operation". Thus, the event is considered an operation or condition prohibited by TS and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a}(2)(i)(B).
The causes of the MSRV test failures were determined to be a combination of setpoint drift and binding of spindle and upper spring washer. Although the lift pressures were. above the acceptance criteria, this condition is bounded by current safety analysis limits and assumptions.

EVALUATION:
BACKGROUND

System Design and lnservice Testing (1ST) Program Information There are two steam lines with eight self-actuated safety valves on each line designed to limit over-pressurization of the Main Steam System [EIIS: SB] to 110% of design pressure under all conditions. The Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRV) [EIIS: RV] actuate to relieve excess steam pressure during plant accidents or events such as Turbine/Reactor trips, rod withdrawal accident at power, etc. These valves have staggered set pressures with nominal values that vary from 1050 psig up to 1104 psig. The allowable tolerance range varies from +3 % to -3%; depending on the specified valve. This acceptance criteria is maintained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 10.3.3, "Main Steam System - Safety Evaluation".
Number of Nominal Set Pressure Allowable As-Found Relief Valves per Line ' (psig) Pressure (psig) ' 1 1050 1019-1060 (+1%/-3%) 1 1065 1033 -1096 (+/-3%) 1 1070 1038 -1102 (+/-3%) 1 1075 1043 -1107 (+/-3%) 2 1080 1048 -1112 (+/-3%) 1 1090 1058-1122 (+/-3%) 1 1104 1071-1137 (+/-3%)
Each Oconee Unit has sixteen (16) Crosby, Model HA/HC-65W valves. All sixteen (16) valves are as-found setpoint tested each refueling outage in accordance with the lnservice Testing (1ST) Program. Each valve is disassembled/inspected and refurbished every ten (10) years. These inspections are staggered such that a sample of the population is inspected each refueling outage. Valve 3MS-5 was last disassembled in 2010. Valve 3MS-8 was last disassembled in 2012.
Related Technical SQecifications (TS) and TS Bases Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.1 states: "Eight MSRVs shall be OPERABLE on each main steam line," and is applicable in Modes 1, 2 and 3. The only Condition in TS 3.7.1 is Condition A, which is entered when one or more MSRV is inoperable. Required Action A.1 requires entry into Mode 3 within 12 hours and, A.2 requires entry into Mode 4 within 18 hours, if any MSRV is inoperable. The only Surveillance Requirement (SR) for this specification is SR 3.7.1.1 which states: 'Verify each MSRV lift setpoint in accordance with the lnservice Test Program."
The TS 3.7.1 bases states: "To be OPERABLE, lift setpoints must remain within limits, specified in the UFSAR."
Plant 0Qerating Conditions At the time of this event, Oconee Unit 3 was in Mode 1 at approximately 83% power (Note: Unit 3 was in an end-of-cycle power coastdown in preparation for a refueling outage). There are no safety systems or components that interact with the MSRV's ability to function. No structures, systems, or components were out of service at the time of this event that contributed to this event.
ReQortability Basis Guidance from NUREG 1022 Revision 3 states "the existence of similar discrepancies in multiple [safety] valves is an indication that the discrepancies may well have arisen over a period of time and that. .. the condition existed during plant operation." Thus, the event is considered an operation or condition prohibited by TS and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). '

In 2012, a similar event was reported in LER 287/2012-001-00. The cause of these setpoints being out of tolerance was attributed to setpoint drift. The internal inspection of the valves did not reveal signs of actual binding; however, the potential for binding was identified. Planned actions from the 2012 LER included revision of the appropriate procedures to incorporate the latest manufacturer's criteria for the guide bearing inner diameter (ID) into MSRV scheduled Preventative Maintenance (PM). Additionally, the inspection of the spindle, top spring washer ID, and adjusting bolt ID in their contact area was incorporated into station procedures.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On April 20, 2018, Oconee Unit 3 was preparing to shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage (03R29). As part of the planned activities, maintenance personnel performed MSRV testing prior to shutdown. All sixteen (16) of the MSRVs were tested. Fourteen (14) MS RVs were found within tolerance but two (2) were out of tolerance. t t t
Specifically, valves 3MS-5 and 3MS-8 as-found set pressure was outside the +3% and +1 % allowable range, respectively. Immediately following each testfailure, the control room was notified, the valves were declared inoperable, and the affected valves were adjusted within the as-left acceptance range. Operations was notified that the valves were back within setpoint tolerance.
The following are the specifics for each valve found out of tolerance:
Valve
3MS-5
3MS-8
CAUSAL FACTORS:
3MS-8
Nominal Setpoint (psig) Limit (psig) As-Found (psig)
1080 1112(+3%) 1129 (+4.5%)
1050 1060 (+1%) 1062 (+1.1%)
Time Found Time Restored
0906 0937 1037 1132
The as-found measured setpoint for 3MS-8 was 1.1 % above nameplate. Since no observable abnormalities were found when the valve was disassembled, the failure itself was attributed to setpoint drift; a historical characteristic with relief valves of this design. While enhancements to maintenance and testing can influence setpoint drift, it is recognized as a phenomenon that can't be totally prevented (IN2006-24).
3MS-5 The as-found measured setpoint for 3MS-5 was 4.5% above nameplate. This is outside normal setpoint drift and abnormalities were found when the valve was disassembled. The 3MS-5 MSRV degradation/failure mechanisms were determined to be binding of spindle and upper spring washer coupled with setpoint drift; which accounted for the total +4.5% setpoint variation.
The binding was due to the spindle being bowed out of tolerance. The guide bearing inner diameter was also found to be smaller than the manufacturer's recommended tolerance. Although no obvious signs of binding were found in this area, it could have affected the set pressure. The inner diameter of the guide bearing would have been inspected and increased during the next scheduled disassembly of 3MS-5 based on corrective actions from the 2012 LER.

During a second test (prior to disassembly), the measured setpoint dropped to +3% of nameplate which further suggested internal valve parts were binding during the first lift. Because the second lift was +3% of nameplate and subsequent lifts following adjustments were consistent, there was also an indication of setpoint drift present with this valve.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Immediate:
Subsequent:
3MS-5 and 3MS-8, which had an as-found result outside of the allowed tolerance, were promptly adjusted within in tolerance and acceptably retested.
3MS-5 and 3MS-8 were disassembled during the 03R29 refueling outage (Work Orders 20247773 and 20247772, respectively). Both valves were machined to the increased inner diameter of the guide bearing. 3MS-8 was reassembled when no abnormalities were found and set to the as-left setpoint criteria at the end of the unit refueling outage. The spindle and spring assembly were replaced on 3MS-5. The valve was reassembled and set to the as-left setpoint criteria during the unit refueling outage.
None of the above corrective actions are NRC Commitment items. There are no other NRC Commitment items contained in this LER.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
The as-found setpoints of 3MS-1 thru 16 measured on 4/20/2018 were reviewed in aggregate and found to maintain peak secondary pressures that are within safety analysis of record. The feedwater flow capacity for decay heat removal and long-term plant cooldown is determined by the lift pressure of the lowest lifting MSRVs. In this case, 3MS-8 and 3MS-16. Although the lowest lifting valve on the "A" Steam Generator (SG) (3MS-8) was found to be 2 psi too high, this condition is more than offset by the lowest lifting valve on the "B" SG (3MS-16) being 22 psi lower than the design value. These as-found setpoints provide sufficient feedwater flow for decay heat removal and long-term plant cooldown when using either the Emergency Feedwater (EFW), Protected Service Water (PSW), or Standby Shutdown Facility Auxiliary Service Water (SSF ASW) systems. Thus, it is concluded that the impact of this condition on overall plant risk is insignificant and had no impact on public health and safety.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A search of the Oconee Corrective Action Program (CAP;) database for the preceding five (5) year period revealed no similar events that occurred at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). Additionally, a review of industry Operating Experience (OE) databases was conducted using applicable keyword searches, i.e., "MSRVs setpoint," etc., to ascertain other reported events.
One related event occurred at Oconee prior to the preceding five (5) year period on April 13, 2012. This LER is discussed in the Background section.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
This event is considered INPO Consolidated Events System (ICES) Reportable.
There were no releases of radioactive materials, radiation exposures or personnel injuries associated with this event.

Vogtle: US-designed Chinese nuclear reactor forced to shut by pump defect

Electric Power
14 Mar 2019 | 20:31 UTC
Washington 

US-designed Chinese nuclear reactor forced to shut by pump defect 

Author William Freebairn
Editor Keiron Greenhalgh
Commodity Electric Power

Washington — China's Sanmen-2 nuclear reactor, the third US-designed Westinghouse AP1000 unit to begin operating in the world, has been shut temporarily because of a defect in a reactor coolant pump, which is being replaced, a top Chinese nuclear regulator said Thursday.

A replacement reactor coolant pump has been shipped from the US and is expected to arrive at the Sanmen site in the next several weeks, Shirong Zhou of China's National Nuclear Safety Administration said during the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's annual conference in Washington.

The unit is the third of four US-designed reactors to operate in China. Chinese companies gained ownership of the technology for the design for domestic use as part of a deal to acquire four units from Westinghouse.

The AP1000 design is a next-generation reactor model that is also being built at Georgia Power's Vogtle plant in the US.

Each AP1000 includes four of the sealed reactor coolant pumps, which have had design and quality problems before.

The AP1000 design at one time had been considered for widespread deployment in China, but delays in construction related to earlier issues with the US-built reactor coolant pumps have reportedly led Chinese decision-makers to favor a domestic reactor design for deployment in larger numbers.

The problem appears to be related to the motor for the giant pump, Zhou said. An initial investigation shows there was leakage around supports for the pump, but a full investigation will have to wait until the defective pump is disassembled and examined after removal, he said.

The reactor coolant pumps, which move coolant around the primary cooling circuit of the reactor, are the largest so-called "canned pumps" to ever be used in a nuclear reactor. The hermetically sealed pumps are designed to operate without leakage and contain a sealed motor system.

Sounds like Curtiss-wright with their safety relief problems. Doesn't look good with all the prestartup problems and now they got to replace the pump.  

The pumps were manufactured by US-based Curtiss-Wright. During construction of the Sanmen and Haiyang units in China, several of the pumps were returned from China to the US for repairs after a defect was discovered that resulted in localized heating of the pumps.

Westinghouse and Curtiss-Wright are engaged in a dispute over responsibility for delivery delays for the pumps in China and the US, Curtiss-Wright has said in financial filings.

With the exception of the pump problem, the overall operating experience of the four AP1000 reactors in China has been good, Zhou said...

LaSalle Crosby Safety Relief Valve LERs

Update May 13 works in progress

I was in a phone meeting with at least two NRC region III officials yesterday, the inspectors boss and a regional equipment specialist.

My pitch is the cosby SRVs have worked flawlessly for at least a decade. I actually might have added pressure in and around 2003, that the current SRVs was defective in 2003 and that is why they got the Crosby in them today. They had a host of leaking and valves with operational problems. See the docket on my comments in and around 2003. I believe this is when they went to the cosby valves.

Pressure setpoint drift problems: Technical Specification violations

Unit 1

LER-2018-003-01 (2 vlvs failed test)

Unit 2

LER-2017-002-02 (2 vlvs failed test

LER-2017-004-02 (2 vlvs failed test)


So they have been working perfectly till 2015. This isn't a one plant facility...its a two plant facility. Then unit 1 had two SRV's setpoint drift problem out of 13 SRVs. Plant 2 began having problem in about 2017 with two valves failing teck specs and then again in 2018 with two failing again on  setpoint drift. My take is all of a sudden in 2015 setpoint drift failures showed up ending with 6 failed test, albeit it failed by just a few psi. All found failing for unknown reasons. The NRC's take is the laSalle discovered defected and corrected the problem like in 2015. I came back with, "well, it seems the corrective actions didn't work in 2015, as we had a another failure 2017. And the corrective actions in 2017 didn't work also as we had another failures of two in 2018. So out of three LERs, with got 6 valves that failed for unknown reason. The NRC could throw at LaSalle a expensive route cause analysis on the failed SRVs, but they don't have a good enough reason for as yet. I thought that would be a good idea as it would send a message to LaSalle and the rest of the industry. I told them I thought we had reason to suspect we got vendor testing paperwork falsification issues going on. Out of three testing cycles, we got three LERs describing two failed test each. Finding exactly two failed test over three cycles seems like wining the $800 million dollar lottery to me. I reminded the NRC I think the testing vendors can make the testing result sing to  any tune of the licensees.

NRC officials poorly trained on SRV operations and maintenance issues throughout the industry precipitated by the NRC's poor documentation of historical operation and maintenance. This poor historically documentation, like some kind of repetitive 2 year industry notification, leads to the effect of inadequate training on reactor safety equipment to inspectors and within the senior leadership of the NRC. I believe this effects more than safety relief valve issues.             


Update May 12

I got a call yesterday afternoon from Allegations Sara that new information has just come in and the agency wants me to hear it. I got a tele conference with a few NRC officials and the licensee this morning at 9:30 am. That is why I am looking over this article this morning. Bells are ringing when the NRC says they got new information they want me hear and maybe the license will be in the meeting. Is this coming from the new US House election?      
***reposted from 2/20

***Reposted from 2/19 

NRC search for safety relief valve LERS for the last ten years

Unit 1 Cosby LERs

Licensee Event Report 2018-003-01, Two Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Failed lnservice Lift Inspection Pressure Test 

These Below LER are not into the system. 

During the February 2015 Unit 2 refueling outage L2R15, two main steam safety relief valves (SRV) did not pass TS Surveillance Requirement 3.4.4.1 and lnservice Testing Program lift pressure requirements. Both SRVs lifted below their expected lift pressures and were replaced during the outage. A failure analysis was conducted by a vendor testing laboratory, but the cause for the valves lifting below their set-point was indeterminate. 

LER Unit 2 374-2017-004-01 : During the February 2017 Unit 2 refueling outage, two main steam safety relief valves (SRV) did not pass TS Surveillance Requirement 3.4.4.1 and lnservice Testing Program lift pressure requirements. Both SRVs lifted below their expected lift pressures and were replaced during the outage. A failure analysis was conducted by a vendor testing laboratory, but the cause for the valves lifting below their set-point was indeterminate.

LER Unit 2
SRV 1 B21-F013U 
1 B21-F013U 

Unit 2 LERs

Licensee Event Report 2017-004-02, Two Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Failed lnservice Lift Inspection Pressure Test 

SRVs 2B21 ·F013C
2B21·F013L

Licensee Event Report 2015-002-00, Two Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Failed Inservice Inspection Pressure Test
SRV 2B21-F013S 
 2821-F013M

***I talked to Sara of Allegations and then to two inspectors at the plant. These two inspectors couldn't believe a utility would routinely enters LCOs over SRV lift setpoint drift inaccuracies, a required shutdown over disc and seat corrosion bonding if known, are required to fix the problem or submit a license amendment request to change TS. I told these guys plants like Hope Creek and Pilgrim routinely with SRVs, either refurnish the valves on site or replace the refurbished valves from a vender. These is utterly no necessity of fixing the latent problems like corrosion bonding. The NRC decided these setpoint drift repeated problems violated tech specs and are defined as safe on a whim. I found these inspectors light on training surrounding SRVs, Tech Specs and problems with SRVs.    

Mike, the utilities only has two choices here with this problem. These guys are so naïve and poorly trained on TS and SRV problems in the industry. I said, these plants regularly go into a LCOs over the SRVs.

***Everything is deregulation. Granted they failed Tech Specs by a small amount. These are Crosby valves which have a good reputation as far as I can see. But if they were up at power and discovered a LCO, they would have had to shutdown. This penalty is supposed to get them to fix or replace the valves. They seem to not have the same problem with Target Rock valves seat and disc sticking together...corrosion bonding.

You notice, they have no idea why the valves failed?

The valves pressure set point test probably started out at  plus or minus 1% many years ago. After troubles, they relaxed the testing requirements to plus or minus 3% that needed a LAR. Now in the future, its going to be plus or minus 5%. They are going to plus or minus 5% on the target rock relief valves. I think this is dangerous behavior, just repetitive relaxing requirements because of component failures

LER 2018-003-01

During the February 2018 Unit 1 refueling outage, two main steam safety relief valves (SRV) did not pass Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 3.4.4.1 and lnservice Testing (IST) Program lift pressure requirements. Both SRVs lifted below their expected lift pressures. On February 27, 2018, SRV 1B21-F013R was required to lift within plus or minus three percent of 1205 psi (i.e., 1205 psi plus or minus 36.1 psi), but lifted at 1167 psi. On February 27, 2018, SRV 1 B21-F013U was required to lift within plus or minus three percent of 1150 psi (i.e., 1150 psi plus or minus 34.5 psi), but lifted at 1109 psi.  

Multiple test failures are reportable under 1 O CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS. Both SRVs lifted prior to their expected lift pressures, which is conservative regarding maintaining reactor pressure vessel over-pressure limits. Both SRVs were replaced during the outage. A failure analysis was conducted; however, it did not identify a cause for the valves lifting below their expected lift set-points.

LaSalle County Station (LSCS) Unit 1 is a General Electric Boiling Water Reactor with 3546 Megawatts Thermal Rated Core Power.  

The main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) are designed to prevent over-pressurization of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) during transients and abnormal conditions, which protects against a failure of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). There are thirteen SRVs installed on the four main steam lines, which discharge near the bottom of the suppression pool to condense the steam through SRV tailpipes that exhaust beneath the suppression pool surface.
CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT
Unit(s): 1 Date: Reactor Mode(s): 5 Mode(s) Name:
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
February 27, 2018 Refueling
Time: Power Level:
1520 CST O percent
01
During the February 2018 Unit 1 refueling outage, two main steam safety relief valves (SRV) did not pass Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.4.1 and lnservice Testing (IST) Program lift pressure requirements. Both SRVs lifted below their expected lift pressures. On February 27, 2018, SRV 1 B21-F013R was required to lift within plus or minus three percent of 1205 psi (i.e., 1205 psi plus or minus 36.1 psi), but lifted at 1167 psi. On February 27, 2018, SRV 1 B21-F013U was required to lift within plus or minus three percent of 1150 psi (i.e., 1150 psi plus or minus 34.5 psi}, but lifted at 1109 psi.
CAUSE OF EVENT
A failure analysis was conducted; however, it did not identify a cause for the valves lifting below their expected lift set-points.
Station operating experience has shown a tendency for a portion of LSCS SRVs to experience minor setpoint drift sufficient to exceed the acceptance criteria of minus three percent over time. A license amendment request (LAA) was submitted to the NRC on February 27, 2018 to revise TS SR 3.4.4.1 to lower the setpoint tolerances for Unit 1 and Unit 2 SRVs. This proposed change would revise the SRV as-found lower tolerances from minus three percent to minus five percent to account for minor SRV setpoint drift in the conservative direction. This proposed change will reduce the unnecessarily restrictive surveillance requirement and will not impact the reliability of the SRVs or adversely impact their ability to perform their safety function. The change will reduce the number of TS SRV surveillance test failures for early lift pressure and preclude the submittal of previously reportable licensee event reports to the NRC due to setpoint drift in the low (conservative) direction... 

NRC's 2018 Plant Assessment: Every One Got 'A' s and 'B' s

NRC Issues Annual Assessments for Nation’s Nuclear Plants

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued annual letters to the nation’s 98 commercial nuclear power plants operating in 2018 regarding their performance throughout the year. All were in the two highest performance categories.

Ninety-three of 98 fully met all safety and security performance objectives and were inspected by the NRC using the normal “baseline” inspection program.

Four reactors were assessed as needing to resolve one or two items of low safety significance. For this performance level, regulatory oversight includes additional inspection and follow-up of corrective actions. Plants in this level are: Grand Gulf (Mississippi); Peach Bottom 2 & 3 (Pennsylvania); and Watts Bar 2 (Tennessee). Watts Bar 2 resolved its issues since the reporting period ended and has transitioned to the highest performing level.