Junk Plant Braidwood: What Is Going On?

Two independent components failing on the diesel generators is not good. Sounds like a not spending enough money on maintenance problem. 

Basically the second one is a safety injection test. It simulates a LOCA up to the injection valves including the pumps. It is a very important test and indication the reliable of these systems since the last test.  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53353
Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: ALEX TRESPALACIOS HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 04/20/2018 Notification Time: 17:57 [ET] Event Date: 04/20/2018 Event Time: 10:42 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/20/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP	Person (Organization): KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

BOTH DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE On Friday, April 20, 2018 at 1042 CDT, Braidwood Station Unit 1 was at 0 percent power in Mode 6. The 1A Diesel Generator (DG) was inoperable with troubleshooting in progress. The 1B DG was being run for a normal monthly run in accordance with 1 BwOSR 3.8.1.2-2, 'Unit One 1B Diesel Generator Operability Surveillance,' and subsequently tripped. The trip was due to a failure of the overspeed butterfly valve actuator and springs, and not an actual overspeed condition. The unit entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2, 'AC Sources - Shutdown,' Condition B for required DG inoperable. All required TS actions were met at the time of the 1B DG inoperability. The offsite power source remains available. At no time was residual heat removal lost. "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat. "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

ower Reactor	Event Number: 53358
Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: RICH ROWE HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 04/22/2018 Notification Time: 22:40 [ET] Event Date: 04/22/2018 Event Time: 16:46 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

UNDERVOLTAGE ACTUATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE BUS "On Sunday, April 22, 2018 at 1646 CDT, a valid actuation of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Bus 141 Undervoltage (UV) Relay occurred. At the time, Braidwood Station Unit 1 was performing a pre-planned 1A Diesel Generator (DG) Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Actuation Surveillance, initiating the 1A DG to emergency start and sequence loads on a safety injection signal. Following the 1A DG solely supplying electrical power to Bus 141, the 1A DG lost voltage, resulting in an unplanned UV actuation of ESF Bus 141. The 1A DG output breaker was manually opened and local emergency stop of the 1A DG was attempted. The 1A DG continued to run at idle. Fuel supply was secured to the 1A DG and the engine stopped. Subsequently, operators restored power to ESF Bus 141 from the Unit 1 Offsite Power Source. Shutdown cooling was maintained throughout the event as the 1B Residual Heat Removal train was unaffected by the actuation. "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed...', specifically 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8) for the 'Emergency ac electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs)...'. "The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector."

Junk Braidwood's Head: Astonishing Cracks On "Top Head To Upper Center Disc Weld"

I don't remember ever seeming something like this? 

A crack in the head would is considered a impossible accident. It would bypass every safety system in the plant. There is no question there would be a meltdown. They would quickly lose all indications of water level. This is worst than the "hole in the head" at David Besse because it is a head weld. 

Something is funny with this? It doesn't seem probable all these cracks and indications would show up in one testing interval. Did they use a updated UT device? There has been a lot of NRC discussions with the accuracy of UT testing. Did the changes with these discussion lead to better UT testing. The implication are these flaws and cracks for many years, the new UT testing just showed them. What implication nationwide-how many non detected cracks and flaws are active at other plants.     

The UT identified 19 indications, 9 of which are not acceptable per ASME Section XI, 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, Paragraph IWB-3510.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53354
Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: RICH ROWE HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 04/20/2018 Notification Time: 22:22 [ET] Event Date: 04/20/2018 Event Time: 17:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/20/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION	Person (Organization): KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Refueling	0	Refueling

Event Text

DEGRADED REACTOR VESSEL HEAD "On Friday, April 20, 2018 at 1730 CDT, during the Braidwood Station Unit 1 refueling outage (A1R20), a scheduled ultrasonic test (UT) was performed on the top head to upper center disc weld of the Unit 1 reactor head. The UT identified 19 indications, 9 of which are not acceptable per ASME Section XI, 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, Paragraph IWB-3510. "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded'. "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Junk Plants Vogtle 3&4: Can Only Afford To Hire Crap Skill Labor

You would think they would hire the most expensive and skilled employees. To reduce the over all cost of the plants, it is all back of labor. More stupid republican crap.   

This guy is going to have horrendous capacity factor for the first five years and much rework. I'd like to find out what is the total skill labor rework occurring at the plant. 

“The wages at plant Vogtle are much lower...

AJC: Skilled labor shortages hit Vogtle as Georgia Power reports progress

Posted: 4:00 p.m. Friday, April 20, 2018

Georgia Power says completion of the two new nuclear units being built in Waynesboro faces skilled labor shortages, despite the project being ahead of its revised schedule.

A report filed by the company to the Georgia Public Service Commission ahead of Vogtle construction progress hearings next month identified difficulties in meeting craft labor requirements at the plant as one challenge that could hamper efforts to meet its completion forecast of 2021 and 2022.

The report says Bechtel, the nation’s largest construction company recruited last year as project contractor has been facing challenges in providing skilled labor to the plant that employs over 5,000 people.

“Bechtel must attract the necessary labor force to support the project completion goals,” the report read in part.

According to Will Salters, business manager at the Augusta office of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the shortage in skilled workforce in a statewide issue, which he attributes in part to an abundance of ongoing construction projects across the state.

He said hiring for Vogtle is especially difficult as other companies are providing better pay and incentives, luring some skilled workers away from the plant.

“The wages at plant Vogtle are much lower than they are in other parts of the state…A lot of these other jobs pay more incentives, so they do get more manpower before Vogtle,” added Salters in an interview...

Massachusetts State Police Scandal: Looking for Serpico

 

 Massachusetts State Police:Looking for Serpico

Reforms urgent as state police scandal deepens (Editorial)

By The Republican Editorials

The scandal engulfing the Massachusetts State Police continues to widen, appalling citizens who have only begun to realize the depth of the problems.

The probe expanded to criminal charges with payroll director Denise Ezekiel accused of using her position to steal more than $23,000 in travel and reimbursement funds. Suspended since November, Ezekiel is on indefinite leave and could face further discipline once the investigation is completed.

State Police payroll director on unpaid leave, under investigation for theft

Denise Ezekiel, the civilian head of the agency's payroll department, was placed on leave on November 1.

Ezekiel's guilt or innocence will be determined by the legal process. Even so, Massachusetts taxpayers have a right to be angry and stunned as the state police department repeatedly lands in the news for allegations of institutional abuse.

How could it get to this point? Where were the watchdogs and the checks and balances? These are fair questions as State Police Colonel Kerry Gilpin begins a cleanup process with reforms announced in early April.

The offices of Governor Charlie Baker and Attorney General Maura Healey are involved with sorting out impact and depth of the scandal. Maybe they should call in 82-year-old Frank Serpico, whose whistleblowing exposed corruption within the New York Police Department in the 1960s and led to massive reform.

Government officials and Col. Gilpin would prefer to move forward and guarantee that the unseemly activity within the department, brought to light by a scandal over overtime pay and the alleged mishandling of a case involving the arrest of a judge's daughter, can never happen again.

That goal will compete for attention with disposition of cases already brought to light. Colonel Gilpin has the difficult job of balancing reform on the one hand with justice on the other. She must deal with the future and the past at the same time.

What happens with Ezekiel's case remains to be seen, and a presumption of innocence must be attached to these proceedings. Taxpayers cannot be blamed for wondering what hammer will fall next, though.

At a time in our country where law enforcement is asking for the public support it needs to do its job to the fullest, the Massachusetts State Police have badly, badly bruised itself and it will take years to recover. Skeptics might say the agency never will.

It is important to remember the many good and honest police officers within the department. They suffer most of all because they know the department's reputation for corruption spills onto even its most dedicated, honorable employees.

The need for reform is urgent and must be done transparently if citizens are to regain a measure of confidence in their state police. Justice must also be served whenever applicable. These are difficult times for the Massachusetts State Police, with no indication the picture will brighten anytime soon.

Pilgrim's Startup

1% power.

Junk Plant Hatch SRVs: Utter Fraud and Corruption Over Extending Testing Frequency

Update May 20

Meant this: "The pre-mature abutment gap closure is most likely due to loose manufacturing tolerances leading to SRV setpoint drift. The phrase "most likely" is killing me. We are operating these plants in a casino. There is certainly collusion  going on between the vendor and licensee...certainly the NRC is in the game too. 

This abutment gape thing has been going on in other plants and it is a rather new phenomena. It started in Pilgrim. 

They can't knowingly put counterfeit and fraudulent parts in a safety system and startup the plant.  

They are certainly putting these new and refurbished valves in the plants at the edge of stability. A little wear then shows up and they don't pass their test. The design is and has always been unstable.

  

As time goes on, as the industry continues to decline, they won't have the resources to keep these valves at the edge of stability. As the valve's support systems and Target Rock continues to decay...

And they are barely used and tested. I don't think any one knows the true operability and reliability = of these valves...their true condition and how they might malfunction. The testing and infrequent usage is cover-upping the true and real reliability of these valves. You put a stress of them, surprises are going to show up.

***Update: Had a talk to the NRC project manager Mr Hall. He essentially agreed to everything I said about this valves...  

New LER: On June 30 2017, with Unit 2 at 100 percent rated thermal power {RTP), "as-found" testing of the 3-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) (EBS Code RV) showed that two of the eleven main steam SRVs that were tested had experienced a drift in pressure lilt setpoint during the previous operating cyde such that the anowable technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 limit of 1150 +/-34.5 psig had been exceeded. Below is a table illustrating the Unit 2 SRVs that failed as found testing results alter being removed tom service during the Spring 2017 refueling outage. 

MPL 2821-F013C 2821-F013E
Event cause Analysis
Drift -39 psig -49 psig 

The SRV pilots were disassembled and inspected while investigating the reason for the drift It was found that the abutment gap closed prematurely during testing using a linear variable differential transformer (l von to measure pilot stroke distance. The pre-mature abutment gap closure is most likely due to loose manufacturing tolerances leading to SRV setpoint drift

Proposed Alternative RR-V-12 Regarding Main Steam SafetyRelief Valve Testing

Hatch Plant 1 and 2

Reason for Request Section ISTC-5240, "Safety and Relief Valve," directs that safety and relief valves meet the inservice testing requirements set forth in Appendix I of the ASME OM Code. Appendix I, Section l-1320(a) of the ASME OM Code states that Class 1 pressure relief valves shall be tested at least once every 5 years, starting with initial power generation. This section also states a minimum of 20% of the pressure relief valves shall be tested within any 24-month period, and that the test interval for any individual valve shall not exceed 5 years. The required tests ensure that the SRV main bodies will open at the pressures assumed in the safety analysis. Due to the current 24-month operating cycle for each HNP unit, SNC is required to remove and test approximately half of the 11 SRV main bodies every refueling outage to ensure that SRV main bodies are tested in accordance with the ASME OM Code requirements. This ensure compliance with the ASME OM Code for testing all Class pressure relief valve within a 5-year interval. With the current 5-year interval, Hatch is required to remove and test all11 SRV main bodies over two refueling cycles (i.e. 4 years). Approval to extended the test interval to 6 years with a 6-month allowable grace period would reduce the number of SRV main bodies removed during an individual refueling outage such that the full scope of 11 SRV main bodies are tested over 3 refueling cycles (i.e. 6 years). Without Code relief, the incremental outage work due to the inclusion of the additional two SRV main bodies per outage would be contrary to the principal of maintaining radiation dose As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). The removal and replacement of the additional SRV main bodies per outage results in an additional personnel radiation exposure of approximately 2.4 Rem every 6 years per unit.

LER 1-2014-003, identified multiple SRV setpoint drifts for 5 of the 11 two-stage SRVs installed on Unit 1. The two-stage SRVs with platinum-coated pilot discs were removed from Unit 1 during the 2014 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs that have a modified pilot. The modified pilots will help reduce spurious openings and leak-by due to system vibration.

LER 1-2012-004, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 2-stage SRVs whose pilot discs had undergone a platinum surface treatment which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue.

LER 2-2011-002, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 3-stage SRVs during the Unit 2 Spring 2011 refueling outage which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue. Subsequent to that outage the 3-stage SRVs exhibited signs of unacceptable leakage which resulted in two separate outages that involved changing out four SRVs during the first outage and the remaining seven SRVs during the subsequent outage in May 2012. The 3-stage SRVs were replaced with 2-stage SRVs containing pilot discs that had undergone the platinum surface treatment.

LER 1-2010-001, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 5 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included refurbishment of the pilot valves and included the replacement of the pilot discs with discs made from Satellite 21 material. Additionally, the insulation surrounding each SRV was upgraded to improve resistance to

Previous Similar Events:

LER 2-2008-004; identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for three of the four tested SRV's. Corrective actions for that LER, replacement of discs were implemented but discs made of stellite 21 for the Unit 2 SRV's were not available for all of the replaced discs and thus could not have prevented the current event.

LER 1-2008-002; identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for three of the eleven SRV's. Corrective actions for that LER, replacement of discs with stellite 21 discs, were not yet implemented for the Unit 1 SRV's and thus could not have prevented the current event.

LER 2-2007-006; identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for five of the eleven SRV's. Corrective actions for this LER, replacement of discs with stellite 21 discs, were not yet implemented for the Unit 2 SRV's and thus could not have prevented the current event.

LER 1-2006-003; which identified an error in reporting multiple SRV setpoint drift, also described results from the previous three outages where multiple SRV setpoint drift had occurred. Corrective actions for this LER focused on ensuring the proper reporting of SRV se!point drift was performed.

The Saga Of Michael Buhrman And Land Brittain (Dresden Nuclear Plant) II

Update April 24

About the secret DUIs, there was national implications. How maybe other employees in the industry had hidden DUIs? That is the problem with voluntary submissions and rules. With the outcome of this, the nationwide fix is all licensed employees go through the FBIs data based looking for any illegalities.   

***Hmm, When the worst accident in VY's history occurred, I was up in training and being tested on the simulator. They were in the process of yanking my license. It was nothing unexspected. 

Life isn't fair, but it is...oh, so perfect. 

The Saga Of Michael Buhrman And Land Brittain (Dresden Nuclear Plant)

We were wizards at the technology, but the big money and difficult jobs isolated us from society. The controversy with nuclear power out in our society. We were very narrowly developed human beings, totally missing the liberal arts, feelings the struggles of our society on the outside. That is when extremist Republicanism views takes hold of your brain...

Van was totally color blind. They did backflips to get him in management. When he was just a regular employee he did all the pressure testing of primary piping system and did the valves leak testing. I think that's where management began to favor him. So he got SRO license and quickly put in the control room. He was the youngest SRO candidate ever. He quickly had problems up there with the people he owned. So they had to yank him out of there because of his maturity. They stuck him in a high level maintenance position to oversee all maintenance.  

Our safety batteries in the switchyard had issues with the NRC. Diodes were later found degraded in the chargers also. It is basically control power for all the big breaker in the switchyard. Two independent DC safety circuits with chargers and batteries. The NRC ordered us to replace the batteries. The plant should have been shutdown for this. They were cross connecting the safety circuits, yanked out one battery (bank), where one charger and one battery was supplying both circuits. A low level ops person entered the switchyard building and yelled boo. The chargers were basically regulating the voltages with the two systems normally. The chargers were never designed for this job. So one charger supplied one battery and both systems. The remaining components went haywire tripping all the big breaker out in switchyard. We had a plant trip, a loss of all off site power, and all sorts of other equipment problems. It was the worst accident in the plants history.

The outcome was, the switchyard was already a dinosaur. And everyone including the grid authorities wasn't doing the proper maintenance in the switchyard breakers and other components, including all the big breakers offsite. They just wasn't enough time in our short outages to do the proper testing, updating and maintenance in our switchyard and their surrounding outside breakers.  

I already had my letter on the Vermont's governor desk saying we are not getting enough resources at the plant and was heading for a terrible accident. This was the guy I predicted.

We finally got brand new sparkling switchyard two years before the permanent shutdown...