Officially Submitted To The NHDOT: The Mike Mulligan Memorial Bridge

Update Jan 23

Oh, so what did you get arrested for? I was riding over that bridge walkway on for years on my bike. Riding over the boards sounded abnormally rickety. They sounded loose. Then much later, I am walking on the bridge when I scuffed my shoe across the a board. The board was moving in its place. I am able to pull the board up with just my hands. The screws holding boards to the bridge had completely rusted away. Then to my shock, the one next to it was loose too. I discovered the vast majority of the boards not attached to the bridge. All the screws had rusted away. I thought it was a danger to anyone walking on the bridge. I knew the NHDOT was indifferent to keeping the bridge in a repaired state. So I came up with plan with getting it emediately repaired. Life or limb was at stake. I removed about ten boards on both sides of the bridge and hocked the loose boards from the bridge. I emediately called 911 to tell them what I did. I further pictured up all my work and put up the substantial safety barriers to prevent people from falling in the holes.

I love it when a plan works. Within 12 hours, the NHDOT had employees nailing down all the rest of the planks. I had pictured up the beginning of "my" repair work and sent my blog links to the all the local media. I had intentionally provided the police the pictures to convict me. There was much more damage to walkway than even I could see. Two hundred and sixty one days later, the NHDOT completely rehabbed the walkway with a $30,000 project. The courts charged me about %1500 and the Bridge replace the wooden planks project cost about $30,000...what is wrong with this. All the boards were completely replaced. My court pleading date had came and went before the rehab job...We came up with a agreement. It was pretty damn stanky from my lawyer's side of it and NHDOT. They didn't discover or notify me a big rehab was being planned. If I would have known the complete rehab was going to be done, I would have gone to a jury trial. I would have gone to trail at the district and then superior courts without doubt. But they were keeping the true safety and dangerousness of the bridge from me. They wanted to make me a nut job...   

I got a court appointed lawyer...he just didn't get it. He poorly communicated with me. I told him we got to put the NHDOT on trail. He told me he was OK to put on solely a "political trial". I sized his skills up...I thought he was only qualitied to be a perfunctory. I wasn't guilty of anything. I was a hero. The state of NH and their Dot was so dysfunctional over funding and keeping up with their bridges...I had to emediately get the state to bring back the Brattleboro-Hinsdale bridge walkway to a safe condition. I just thought the district court was so dysfunctional and poorly funded itself, there was no way I could get justice.  

I walked into court on the pleading date. The court is full of hung-over college kids. At least a hundred kids. They had a riot in the proceeding weeks and they was their first court proceeding. There was some confusion over whether the courts wanted everyone else or the college kids to come back at a later date. So, I walked out of court without making a pleading. For all the court knew, I just didn't show up. I had been sitting there from opening till about noon when I left. The court entered a bench warrant on me on a no show. I was nervous leaving the court. It was a Monday. On Tuesday, I called the prosecutor wanting to ask how to get all the evidence from them. So told me it was way too premature for that at this stage, but do you know, I got a bench warrant for your arrest out there. I explained the mix up. She told me, if you promise to go to court next Monday, I’ll pull the bench warrant. I profusely agreed.

So the next Friday comes up, (after Wednesday, Thursday), its 6pm with a knock on the door. It’s a policeman coming to arrest me on a bench warrant (Bumba). I tell him your warrant is no good with a smile. He laughs heartily at me saying, “you know how many times that has been pulled on me. I talked him into calling the district court, where he discovers indeed the warrant was no good. The police officer then just about has a "cow shit" on my kitchen saying over and over again “I was just about going to a arrest a guy with no warrant”. He tells me that is a first for me in my career.

By the way, lets say I could have a do-over over with the attempted arrest and bum warrant. If I had my wits on. In the aims of furthering my bridge building "attention gathering" tactics. I should have kept my mouth shut. I should have aimed for going to jail and over the weekend. I could have made a lot of hay with improperly getting arrested and going to jail.  

I embarrassed the hell over everyone here. I think the crusty old police Chief strategized about how he could hurt me the most. He maliciously planned to arrest me on Friday hoping I’d have to spend the weekend in jail. Bumba told the warrant was "hanging around" the police station since Tues or Wednesday.

I explained this to my lawyer. I wanted him to use this in my case or make a complaint about the police chief. He politely went onto a new subject like I was just a little boy. This was involved in my decision to plead.
     

Updated Jan 22

If you want to see everything: Just google on "Mike Mulligan, Hinsdale NH".

Example of my disgusting bridge March 2013 pictures.   

***Keene Sentinel: "One attendee had a suggestion for naming the new bridge. Michael J. Mulligan of Hinsdale, who refers to himself as a “bridge angel,” proposed that the new bridge be named the Mike Mulligan Memorial Bridge.

Mulligan has been known in recent years for his demonstrations and protests on the bridge, where he posted warnings to drivers that they were traveling over what he claimed were unsafe structures."   

Honestly, $1500 in a plea deal to the courts turned into a $45 million dollar bridge? Think of the return on my investment. The back story: a dirt poor loser decided he had a lot of extra time on his hands. Thought about how the Brattleboro-Hinsdale bridge desperately needed a replacement. Came up with the stupidest plan imaginable to picture up the disgraceful bridge and engage all the local officials, police, politicians, the surrounding communities and the disgraceful and extremely underfunded NHDOT. I comprehensively documented my adventures on my blog and the Brattleboro Topix. 

As I told the NHDOT, local and regional politicians and community at the Hinsdale NH meeting last night...we had a hapless bridge committee who couldn't accomplish a damn thing in thirty years. I had the stupidest thought come into my head, acted on it...got the bridge planed and funded (well, almost funded)and built in just a few years considering the span of history. I created that bridge out of nothing... 

President Trump all campaign was saying we need a big infrastructure project nationwide. He recently proposed a $300 billion dollar infrastructure program. He is throwing mere pennies at the scale of our infrastructure problems. He is getting just like the democrats. We need a infrastructure program to the tune in excess $10 trillion dollars to even begin to the turn the corner on our problems.

I loved doing a host of skits at the dilapidated bridge. I had a blast out there until the police came to my house to arrest me.  Something had to entertain me during mostly boring times in protest. So I dress up as a construction worker. I had a safety helmet on and a dirt shovel in my hands. I was simulating lets start digging dirt soon for the new bride I had a big sign next to me saying lets begin digging dirt next year for the new. At times, I held the shovel way over my head, and just a little pumping action, in anticipation of my triumph over these large organizations. Then a cop pulled up to saying some person saw you assaulting another person with your shovel. I asked the cop, did you get the name of my accuser and did he file a report. I thought the police just made this up to get me to stop protesting at the bridge. 

What I liked the most, was throwing kisses at pretty women in speeding cars. I utterly love it when pretty girls just smiled at me. I also got a lot to scowls.   What I like most, was when the women threw kisses at me before I could get my kissing hand up to my mouth. It happened a lot. Then I began throwing kisses at men in moving cars for the first time in my life. I swear, some men even threw kisses at me. I thought I was going to the emergency room when a angry husband showed up. He took severe umbrage with me for throwing kisses at his wife. I never stopped throwing free kisses ever!!!

A interesting adventure with my wife occurred during at this time. My first rendition of a bridge angel consisted of summer shorts, a homemade halo and a white sheet simulating the shimmering body of a angel. I cut a big hole in the middle of a white sheet and put it over my head. The sheet was my shimmering body. Then one day my wife and daughter passed my station. Their mouths were wide open in shock... My wife didn't approve of this actions. I though I was going to get one of those screaming, "I am divorcing" things again. "This time I mean it"! I caught her later in the kitchen, she had a ugly and mean face on. It was really a scary situation. (I am still married to her.) I knew she would say anything to try to stop me from embarrassing her and the family. My shimmering white sheet came down to just above my knees with shorts on. It looked like a dress, I am told by other humans. It was hot as hell with my getup on. With her really ugly face on and bellowing authoritarian voice, she blurts out, "I KNOW WHAT IS WRONG WITH YOU". "You are a latent homosexual". I never put back on my shimmering body sheet again. The halo stayed. I always have a halo on my head. Just sometimes you are allowed to see it.       

Questions raised about old bridges at hearing for new Hinsdale-Brattleboro span

HINSDALE — As state highway officials move forward with plans for a new bridge connecting the town to Brattleboro, members of the public have raised concerns about what will happen to the current bridges spanning the Connecticut River.

Several people asked about the future of those structures, and access to Hinsdale Island, at a public hearing Thursday night about the estimated $46 million project.

The bridges, named after Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh, are Pennsylvania truss-style spans built in 1920 and rehabilitated in 1988. N.H. Department of Transportation officials classify the narrow bridges as functionally obsolete, which means they’re outdated, don’t meet current design standards and have height and weight restrictions.

In addition to building a new bridge, the transportation department plans to convert the old bridges for use by bicycles and pedestrians. The department has also applied for a TIGER grant to provide additional funds for the old bridges’ refurbishment.

The rest of the money for the bridge replacement project will come from federal highway funds, New Hampshire funds and Vermont funds, officials said Thursday.

Steve Lindsey, a former state representative from Keene, spoke in favor of maintaining the bridges so that people still have access to Hinsdale Island.

“It’s a wonderful public space. It’s a place for the public to go in nature, and it’s access to the river,” he said. “ ... We should maintain the old bridges as heritage structures, as access to a wonderful public resource for everyone to gain access to the island.”

Lindsey also noted that he had originally submitted the bill to name the bridges after Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh, and that this style of bridge is no longer common.

However, Joseph Conroy, a Hinsdale resident who serves on the town’s budget committee, opposed maintaining the existing bridges and advocated for tearing them down sooner rather than later, which he said would be more inexpensive in the long-run.

“What are we going to do with them? Will they rot and fall into the river?” Conroy said. “ ... If we keep those bridges, 10 years from now, what’s it going to cost to take those bridges down? $10 million? $8 million? Taxpayers gotta pay for that.”

Hinsdale resident Edwin O. “Smokey” Smith, a former state representative, emphasized that if the bridges are maintained, the island should be cleaned up and turned into a “usable space” for the public.

A project to replace the bridges has been included in the state’s 10-year transportation improvement plan since fiscal year 1994, with its start date being delayed several times. It was bumped completely from the 2013-22 plan because of a lack of funding before being put back in the 2015-24 plan.

The new steel girder bridge, to be built several hundred feet downstream of the existing bridges, will stretch 1,782 feet across the Connecticut River. It will vary in width between 49 feet along the majority of the roadway and 53 feet at the Vermont-side intersection, which will be slightly wider to accommodate a turning lane where Route 119 intersects Route 142. That intersection will be controlled with a traffic signal. The plans also call for a 6-foot-wide sidewalk on the bridge’s north side, with a few viewing platforms for pedestrians to enjoy views of the river.

The state will begin accepting construction bids in late 2019, with work likely to begin in spring 2020 and continue into 2023, state officials said Thursday night.

The public hearing, which was moderated by a governor-appointed commission, drew about 50 people to Hinsdale Town Hall, including several state and town officials. The commission is chaired by Terry M. Clark, and area residents Christopher C. Coates and James M. Tetreault also serve on it.

State Sen. Jay V. Kahn, D-Keene, spoke in favor of the project, along with state Rep. Michael D. Abbott, D-Hinsdale.

“This project has been going on or in the works since basically 1973. It has been on and off the 10-year plan from that time forward ... I think that it’s been thoroughly vetted and explored and its time has come,” Abbott said. “I think that any delay in its implementation would have a very detrimental effect on the economic, social and basically the safety concerns of the Hinsdale community and all the other communities along Route 119.”

One attendee had a suggestion for naming the new bridge. Michael J. Mulligan of Hinsdale, who refers to himself as a “bridge angel,” proposed that the new bridge be named the Mike Mulligan Memorial Bridge.

Mulligan has been known in recent years for his demonstrations and protests on the bridge, where he posted warnings to drivers that they were traveling over what he claimed were unsafe structures.

A few hearing attendees asked about the process the project needed to go through on the Vermont side of the river.

They included Daniel Cotter, the director of plant and operations maintenance at Marlboro College, who expressed concern about the number of parking spaces the college’s Brattleboro location would lose because of the new construction.

Officials referred his concern and other questions to the Vermont Agency of Transportation.

The official record of the public hearing will remain open for 10 days. Members of the public can submit information or testimony for the record by mail to Peter E. Stamnas, director of project development at the N.H. Department of Transportation, at P.O. Box 483, Concord, 03302.

Entergy and NextEra Has Fired the Nuclear Entergy Institute

Hmm, that 13% of all nuclear plants in the USA. 

The NEI historically has put their need above their clients. The services were too inflated.

The industry is crumbling and disorganizing right before our eyes...

Two utilities withdraw from leading nuclear energy trade group

Written By Jim Pierobon

The parent companies of two major Southeast utilities have pulled out of the leading trade group that advocates for grants and tax breaks for nuclear power plants.

A spokesman for the Nuclear Energy Institute confirmed that Entergy and NextEra Energy have decided not to renew their memberships with the trade group.

The withdrawals are the latest sign of nuclear energy’s murky future as costs to safely operate reactors continue to rise and new types of reactors are met with growing skepticism about their ability to compete with natural gas, solar and wind.

“We are disappointed by the decision but remain committed to our role as the voice for the nuclear industry,” spokesman John Keeley said.

The withdrawals come on the heels of the failed construction of two heavily subsidized reactors in South Carolina managed by South Carolina Electric & Gas, a unit of SCANA Corp. A similar construction effort, by Southern Company’s Georgia Power unit, faces similar hurdles that complicate the completion of two reactors at Plant Vogtle even after deadlines have been extended to preserve taxpayer subsidies.

Entergy operates 12 nuclear reactors throughout the eastern United States, including five in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. NextEra Energy, a leader in utility-scale solar and wind energy, operates three reactors, one each in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin.

Neither utility would provide details about their decisions to exit the trade group.

Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, which tracks the industry safety record, said several factors could be at play. The group recently underwent a leadership change and significant staff cuts. It’s also had little success in engaging the Trump administration on reducing the industry’s regulatory burden and had a questionable public relations strategy.

“NEI has not been able to stop the bleeding,” Lyman said, despite the group’s initiative to slash plant operating costs by 30 percent by lobbying the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for changes to inspection and enforcement of safety and security regulations. “Trying to cut costs by reducing safety and security is penny-wise and pound foolish, and it apparently isn’t having the economic impact that NEI hope to achieve.”

Entergy spokesman Michael Bowling said the company will continue to engage with the industry. “We strongly believe that nuclear power remains an important part of our company’s and country’s diverse resource mix, and we will continue to work to deliver power to our customers in a safe, reliable, and affordable manner.” 

Crazed And Suicidal Submarine US Sailor Kills All Officers In Maneuvering And Takes Over The Fast Attack Nuclear Submarine Off The Coast Of Conn.

Correction

"Maneuvering" is where sailors control the nuclear reactor.
The "Conn" is where sailors control the whole submarine. 

Is it me or what? I see similarities in the attempted suicide story and the collision of the McCain and Fitzgerald. The Navy public relations people pump these negligent senior officers stories up in  faux altruism, triumphalism and extreme heroism stories.

Maneuvering/the Conn is where they steer/dive the boat and firing their sub weapons.      

The think this puff Navy story is a cover-up for the implications of what damage a suicidal sailor could cause with a automatic weapon in the Conn or Maneuvering. 

Can you even imagine how the major news media would play this up?       

Sailor’s suicide attempt prompts heroic response by sub crew

The crew of the submarine North Dakota raced through bad weather to save a shipmate’s life after an unidentified petty officer shot himself in the chest with his military-issued rifle while the vessel was underway, according to Navy officials and a post on the boat’s Facebook page.

Cmdr. Mark Robinson, the boat’s captain, praised his crew in the post for their feverish efforts on Friday to get the sailor back to land.

Corpsmen leapt into action to treat and stabilize the man’s injuries, while radiomen kept communications open in bad weather, allowing trauma doctors to remotely lend assistance, according to the post.

The boat’s navigation and driving teams charted the fastest way back to port and cut through heavy seas on their way to the mouth of the Thames River in New London, Connecticut, where they transferred the sailor to a waiting tug.

“From gunshot to ambulance took about 7 hours,” Robinson said in the post. “We drove up the river in dense fog, in the dark of night, with intense rain and wind. It was the worst weather I’ve ever seen for something like this.”

Other crew members helped in other ways.

Some lashed themselves to the boat’s deck in “Pea Soup” fog around midnight to form a human safety net, blocking the weather for paramedics conducting the transfer, he said.

“Sailors dissembled parts of the ship to set up ways to get the sailor off in a stretcher more comfortably,” Robinson said. “When the sailor was lucid, other crew members held a phone in front of his face to let him watch music videos.”

ome stood exposed in the storm to flash lights and help lead the tugs.

“I can’t truly express the amount of heroism I saw in the last 48 hours,” Robinson said in Tuesday’s post. “As a result, the Sailor is recovering from surgery in a hospital in New Haven with his parents by his side.”

“It was a terrible event,” he said, “but the sailors of (North Dakota) are heroes.”

Mike Mulligan ·

Springfield Technical High School

Let start counting it up within the last few months. Two boomer sailors overdosing on potentially heroin/ concain in and around Kings Bay. Now a sailer trying to commit suiside with his loaded on a fast attack while steaming.

I got a worst senario. How about the crazed sailor taking his rifle (automatic ?) to the Conn and killing the CO and other officer there. He effectively takes over the submarine. Can you just imagine the national news on this???

Mike Mulligan ·

Springfield Technical High School

So, it the submariners are such an extraordinarily brotherly bunch, why didn’t they get help for this guy before he shot himself? Why didn’t his department people know who he was? You got to wonder about the command climate after this. This utterly strange story looks like the navy coverup story…

Oh No, Now ANO Is Down to 81% for two days.

Plus Grand Gulf and River Bend. You keep being at 100% Waterford...

State Sen. Chuck Hufstelte: Vogtle

What is wrong with this picture. The longer they dittle in construction and the more expensive the plant gets, the more profits they make. Way more profits.  

State Sen. Chuck Hufstelter questions financial plan for Plant Vogtle

By Maria Saporta  –  Contributing Writer, Atlanta Business Chronicle

an hour ago

A Georgia state senator is strongly criticizing the financial plan to pay for the two new nuclear power plants at Plant Vogtle.

Speaking at Friday morning’s Sustainable Atlanta Roundtable (SART), State Sen. Chuck Hufstetler (R-Rome), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, openly criticized Senate Bill 31 that passed in 2009 that approved the financial plan for Plant Vogtle. It was called the Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, which permitted the utility to begin recovering the costs of financing the construction of the new nuclear plants from consumers before they came on line.

Pointing out that he wasn’t yet in office when that bill passed (he was elected in 2012), Hufstetler said, “It was probably a mistake to go forward the way it did.”

After the SART meeting, which is organized by Southface, a nonprofit group that promotes renewable enery, Georgia Power was asked to respond to Hufstetler’s comments. The utility’s response is presented in full later in this article.

But Hufstetler’s also strongly criticized the way the utility would be making profit from the project’s cost overruns.

Originally – in August 2008, it was estimated that Plant Vogtle reactors 3 and 4 would cost $14.3 billion and would begin commercial operations in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Now it is estimated that that the two reactors will cost $25.2 billion with the first reactor due to go into service in late 2021 and the second one scheduled to be operational in 2022.

Sen. Hufstetler said that because of the cost overruns, Southern Co.’s profit is now estimated to go from $7.4 billion to $12.6 billion – a difference of $5.2 billion.

“I don’t think Southern Co. should make additional profit just because of cost overruns,” Hufstetler said.

When asked if he would be seeking new legislation to limit the utility’s profit on the project, Hufstetler responded that he’s looking at options.

“We can still examine the profit (issue),” he said. “There are a lot of things that have happened that we can’t change. (But) we can look at the additional profit going forward. We can revisit the profit.”

Also, Hufstetler said the state can “make sure we put incentives in the right place” when considering future energy investments.

Specifically, Hufstetler pointed to the comparable costs of different energy sources.

Currently, he said the cost per kilowatt hour for nuclear energy will be 13 cents, compared to 4.4 cents for solar energy.

“We are putting a unit on line that’s going to be three times that cost (of solar),” he said.

He went on to say that nuclear represents 10 percent of our power resources in Georgia, but it will account for 20 percent of the cost of power.

“If our rates are going up and other states are going down, we will lose our competitive advantage,” Hufstetler said. “It’s a tough issue. We do need to look at the consumers in Georgia and protect them…

New FBI Mark Felt/Deepthroad Movie

There is a lot of shocking similarities between the Nixon and Trump Times. But I think Trump can play the game a lot better than Nixon.

Washington Post reporter trying to get the big picture from Mark on Watergate. There is so much chaos in the Whitehouse and contradictory public statement. I don't understand it.

Mark, "chaos is control"...   

Dead Ender Junk Pilgrim: More Safety Relief Valves Problems

Supplement to Potential lnoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A

Is this a grade I or II valve and its component?

Generally a grade II is a commercial grade. A grade I is a full nuclear safety grade valve. They have been putting grade II as a result of  secret deregulation...

Yep, this is a update from  the first one on April 2017. We really don't know all of the recent secret failures or degradation with these components. Just like this guy, nobody outside the plant knew this guy was leaking. You really can't ascertain how unreliable these are. Are the walking dead plants allowed secret deregulations.

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: (04-2017) 0313112020
~ ... ,.,"~ Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. l i\ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry . • ! ~ .f" (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. ..... .~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects .
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means htti;1://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3!J used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER .PAGE Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 1 OF4
4. TITLE Supplement to Potential lnoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
SEQUENTIAL
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A NUMBER NO. 05000 N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 24 2017 2017 - 007 01 12 20 2017 N/A 05000 N/A
9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
N
D 20.2201(b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) D 20.2201(d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) D 20.2203(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(4) D so.73(a)(2)(iii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) D 73.71(a)(4) D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) D so.36(c)(2) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) D 73.71(a)(s) 0 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) D so.46(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) D 73.77(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) D 73.77(a)(2)(i) D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) ~ OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRG Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
LICENSEE CONTACT
11
LEPHONE NUMBER {Include Area Code) !Mr. Everett P. Perkins, Jr.- Regulatory Assurance Manager 1508-830-8323 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX B SB RV T020 y
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ~ NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On April 24, 2017, during Refueling Outage 21 while performing testing on the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Safety/Relief Valves, a high resistance was measured across the solenoid pilot valve coil of SV203-3A. !This solenoid pilot valve was replaced during Refueling Outage 21. After the solenoid pilot valve was removed it was transported to an offsite vendor for additional testing.
rrhis LER supplement is being submitted to provide the NRC with additional information. PNPS continued to follow the testing performed by our offsite vendor and now has additional information to provide the NRC.
PNPS stated at the time that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and also, potentially reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat arid mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, additional information provided by our offsite vendor and an engineering evaluation, support the conclusion that there was never a loss of safety ~unction regarding SV203-3A. Therefore, this event was not reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) nor under 10 CFR 50. 73 (a)(2)(v)(B) or (D).
rrhis event posed no threat to public health and safety.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015)
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
u.s_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for cqmpleting this form http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITYNAME 2 DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
NARRATIVE BACKGROUND
05000-293
YEAR
2017
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 007
REV NO.
- 01
The 2-stage pilot operated safety relief valve consists of two principle assemblies: a pilot valve section (top works) and the main valve section. The pilot valve section (first stage) is the pressure sensing and control element and the main valve (second stage) provides the pressure relief function. The first stage consists of a pilot-stabilizer disc assembly. The pilot is the pressure sensing member to which the stabilizer disc movement is coupled. Though not mechanically connected, a light spring keeps the stabilizer in contact with the pilot. A pilot preload spring permits set point adjustment of the valve and provides pilot seating force. The solenoid-operated pilot valve controls the pneumatic pressure applied to a diaphragm actuator which controls the relief valve directly. An accumulator is included with the control equipment for each relief valve to store pneumatic energy for relief valve operation. The second or main stage consists essentially of a large piston which includes the main valve disc, the main valve chamber, and a preload spring.
PNPS has four safety relief valves. Each of the four relief valves is equipped with an accumulator and check valve arrangement. These accumulators are provided to assure that the valves can be held open following failure of the nitrogen supply to the accumulators, and are sized to contain sufficient nitrogen for a minimum of 20 valve operations for each safety relief valve. Bottled gas can be used to manually recharge the accumulators associated with two safety relief valves. This capability was installed to address a potential loss of normal nitrogen supply to the accumulators which was identified during seismic reviews.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On April 24, 2017, while performing testing on the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) safety relief valves a high resistance was measured across the solenoid valve coil circuit of SV203-3A.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The degradation mechanism has been determined to be the solenoid pilot valve coil with high electrical resistance. Per input from our offsite vendor, corrosion of the SV203-3A crimp connections inside the coil created the high resistance indicated by a 9 VDC multimeter.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Removed and replaced solenoid pilot valve assembly for SV203-3A.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015) Page 2 of 4
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
. . "t"'i;, ...... "/
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nureqs/staff/sr1022/r3l)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITYNAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE OFFSITE VENDOR
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
-007
REV NO.
- 01
After performing multiple tests including destructive examinations of the SV203-3A solenoid valve coil the offsite vendor provided the following conclusions: Degradation of SV203-3A was limited to corrosion at the copper crimp connectors used to attach coil lead wires to the coil winding wire; the construction of the crimp connectors in SV203-3A included an insulating PVC sleeve material; although installation of the coil winding wires in the SV203-3A crimp connectors are inconsistent with industry practices, the coil winding wires were securely joined to the stranded lead wires at the stranded lead wire end of the crimp; the PVC sleeve material on the SV203-3A crimp connectors likely released chlorine, resulting in corrosion of the crimp connectors and wires; corrosion of the SV203-3A crimp connections created .the high resistance indicated by a 9 VDC multimeter prior to application of higher voltage; application of voltage as low as 30 VDC was sufficient to overcome the corrosion product layer allowing the SV203-3A valve to actuate with no nitrogen pressure applied to the inlet port; application of higher voltages up to and including 125 VDC during electrical testing disturbed the corrosion layer sufficiently to allow a 9 VDC powered multimeter to measure SV203-3A coil resistance values representative of actual service conditions with respect to voltage. The valve operated as intended throughout the electrical testing despite the corrosion product accumulation on the crimp connectors; and subsequent to electrical testing, coil resistance values remained within acceptable limits.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
There are no consequences to the general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety and radiological safety from this event. The original concern was that there was a potential inoperability of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) which provides a means to rapidly depressurize the primary system to a pressure where low-pressure systems can provide makeup for core cooling in the event of a small or medium break Loss of Coolant Accident. An Engineering evaluation determined that the safety relief valve was fully operable at all times and rem~ined available and capable of performing its intended safety function.
The engineering evaluation that was performed concluded that this event did not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure. (Reference NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Section 2.2, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Safety System Functional Failures, Clarifying Notes, Engineering Analyses.) As such, this event will not be reported in the NRC Performance Indicator for Safety System Functional Failures since an engineering evaluation was performed which determined that the system was capable of performing its safety function.
No actions to reduce the frequency or consequence are necessary.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015) Page 3 of 4
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
~'11.IU.!lr.,,,, l i -:.t ; ~ ...... ..,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D
APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc:gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
REPORT ABILITY
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 007
REV NO.
- 01
PNPS believed at the time of the event that it was reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and also, potentially reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, additional information provided by our offsite vendor and an engineering evaluation, support the conclusion that there was never a loss of safety function regarding SV203-3A. Therefore, this event was not reportable under 1 O 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) nor under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(B) cir (D).
PREVIOUS EVENTS
LER 2015-002-00, Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Determined to be Inoperable. Following Evaluation
LER 2013-002-00 and -01, SRV-38 Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift
LER 2011-007-00, Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage
REFERENCES
CR-PNP-2017-5067
CR-PNP-2017-5386
CR-PNP-2017-6183

The Southern Co And Vogtle Nuclear Plants.

Since the Ga PSC OK'd the continuation of Vogtle, the Southern Co stock price has been in steep decline. Is it the new tax laws or what?

Hinsdale NH: The Mike Mulligan Memorial Bridge

I created the political energy that got this bridge. I creatively protested at this bridge for years leading to a chain of events ending in this. Picturing up this bridge, the disgusting underside of the bridge.

Do you know the similarity between the Titanic and the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges? All the iron beams and plating are held together by 1920's rivets. There is not a weld in the structural parts of the bridge. The Titanic was constructed in 1909 and the two Bridges were constructed around 1921. I wonder how many other bridges are held together rivets?    

Hinsdale officials seek to spur economic development with zoning changes

By Liora Engel-Smith Sentinel Staff 


HINSDALE — With a new bridge in the works that will make the town more accessible from Interstate 91, town officials are proposing zoning changes they hope would spur economic development.

The changes would affect Brattleboro Road (Route 119), which runs from just west of the town’s center, and then north along the Connecticut River before crossing the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges into Brattleboro.

The N.H. Department of Transportation plans to replace those bridges with a single-span structure to the south beginning in 2019.

Meanwhile, Hinsdale officials hope to bring the proposed zoning changes to the voters at the March town meeting.

The public will have an opportunity to comment on the zoning changes at a Jan. 16 hearing at 6:30 p.m. at Hinsdale Town Hall.

The town’s planning board will present a proposal that would zone smaller commercial lots near homes along Brattleboro Road as appropriate for outfits such as restaurants, gas stations or childcare facilities. Larger parcels that aren’t near homes would be zoned to allow light-industrial businesses, such as auto body shops and warehouses.

The affected properties — about 100 of them, according to the public notice posted in The Sentinel — are already zoned for commercial uses, but ordinances don’t specify what types of commercial activities are permissible. The new proposal would clarify the uses, increasing zoning transparency, Michael J. “Mike” Darcy, vice chairman of the board of selectmen and ex-officio member of the planning board, said.

Darcy said the new bridge could bring more traffic into Hinsdale, potentially creating fertile ground for new businesses along Route 119. Unlike the existing bridges, the new bridge will be wider, enabling more truck traffic.

“(It) will create the potential for more traffic, and part of that traffic can be the 18-wheelers that can carry the goods that can feed (the growth of) a retail store,” he said.

The zoning proposal, which has been in the works since spring 2017, would make the town “as development and business-friendly as it can be,” he said

“Our hope is that the clarification will make it easier for a property owner to promote their land to a developer, that it will actually create more appeal for developers,” he said.

The new bridge between Brattleboro and Hinsdale will replace two older bridges, which were built in 1920 and underwent rehabilitation in 1988.

In September 2017, the N.H. Department of Transportation presented a preliminary construction plan. Its staff will hold a public hearing about the bridge project on Jan. 18 at 7 p.m. at Hinsdale Town Hall. Construction will likely conclude in 2021 or 2022, Kathryn M. Lynch, Hinsdale’s community development coordinator, said.

“With the bridge coming, (the planning board) wanted to prepare for business to come to town,” she said.

Also along Brattleboro Road are several parcels of land owned by the state of New Hampshire. These parcels would be zoned for rural and agricultural uses, Darcy said.

“It’s one of those back burner things,” he said. “It existed, and it’s been a (question of) how do we use this (land) the best that we can. I think it was a strong exercise for the planning board to really delve into something and understand what our zoning is and how it works.”

Is River Bend Going Power Nuts Like Grand Gulf

Least ANO looks good?

Jan 8 0%
Jan 7 66%
Jan 6 100%

Opening Almost All Off Shore Drilling

 Bout time!!!

Junk Plant Pilgrim Crashes In A Blizzard, Again

Update Jan 12

The experts and NRC knows I set up the NRC to be more interested Pilgrim's SRV problems and the massive Pilgrim downgrade. I wonder why I never get credit for my activities?

More on the Safety Relief Valves.  


***Waiting for the event report.

Here it is. What I am looking for.

1) Did they isolate from the main condenser, did the MSIVs go shut?

2) Any troubles from the safety relief valves?

3) Was it a clean shutdown or scram, did they have lots of equipment or employee problems.

Really, history proves this plant isn't designed for the winter weather?

The event report.

Having the switchyard breaker trip is grossly incompetent. But they kept the MSIVs open. It makes the scram really easy and doesn't challenge equipment as much. Is a easy scram good or bad? On the bad side, you don't get a wider view with the condition of the equipment? But on the big picture, they done good with the scram.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53147
Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD	Notification Date: 01/04/2018 Notification Time: 17:57 [ET] Event Date: 01/04/2018 Event Time: 14:10 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/04/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO) MICHAEL F. KING (NRR) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	81	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM "On January 4, 2018, at 1410 hours EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent power and steady state conditions, the winter storm across the Northeast caused the loss of offsite 345 kV Line 342. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent and a procedurally required manual reactor scram was initiated. All control rods fully inserted. "As a result of the reactor scram, indicated reactor water level decreased, as expected, to less than +12 inches resulting in automatic actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System, and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System. "Reactor Water Level was restored to the normal operating band. The Primary Containment Isolation Systems have been reset. The Reactor Protection System signal has been reset. "Following the reactor scram, the non-safety related Control Rod Drive Pump "B" tripped on low suction pressure. Control Rod Drive Pump "A" was placed in service. All other systems operated as expected, in accordance with design. "This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - "RPS Actuation" and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - "Specified System Actuation." "This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The main steam isolation valves are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser. Offsite power is still available from 345kV line 355. As a contingency, emergency diesel generators are running and powering safety busses per licensee procedure. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The licensee will be notifying the town of Plymouth as part of their local notifications. The licensee will be issuing a press release.

   

Northern Nuke Industry Doing Astonishingly Well In Frigid Weather So Far

:)

NE Grid Is Huffing And Puffing Over Our Historic Cold

Prices are around $240?

Vogtle: Not Appropriate Engineers Working At Vogtle

Update 

Is The Same Going On In Vogtle, as in VC Summer?

I got a NRC investigation on same issue...

Anti-nuclear group files complaint over construction drawings for Vogtle project in Georgia

Dec 14, 2017

By Andrew Brown abrown@postandcourier.com

COLUMBIA — Just like South Carolina, a complaint has been filed in Georgia over Westinghouse's decision not to use licensed engineers to oversee and approve the designs for two unfinished nuclear reactors. 

Nuclear Watch South, an anti-nuclear group, filed a formal complaint with the Georgia Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors earlier this week, as state regulators continue to discuss whether construction on two reactors at Plant Vogtle near Augusta should be finished. 

The group asked the state regulatory board to determine whether Westinghouse and Georgia Power violated state law by allowing construction drawings for the reactors at Vogtle to be used without being vetted and signed by professional engineers...

Junk Plant Cooper Is Mightily Troubled

What do they call these kinds of problems (configuration}. It is as clear as a bell, the NRC doesn't give these plants enough incentives to clean up their problems quickly.

It looks like a severe deterioration of both organizations...  

Licensee Event Report 2017-001-01

Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow Valves Out of Position Results in Loss of Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On February 5, 2017, during a quarterly sealed valve log audit, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Valves RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were discovered sealed closed. Normal configuration for these valves is sealed opened. Consequently, Operations declared RHR pumps A and C Inoperable at 0756 hours and entered Technical Specifications (TS} Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

Subsequently, the operating crew opened RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, independently verified the position of the valves and applied seals to the valves. As such, RHR pumps A and C were declared Operable at 1041 hours on February 5, 2017, and TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A were exited.

The root cause is Operations Department standards related to Operator Human Performance and Configuration Control are inadequate and do not meet industry expectations. Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators completed training focused on Standards and Expectations related to attention to detail and configuration control. To prevent recurrence, expectations will be established and institutionalized for Operations Leadership to reinforce consistent application of operator fundamentals and to identify and correct performance gaps for the operating crews.

BACKGROUND

The safety objective of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system [EIIS:BO] is to provide core cooling, in conjunction with other Emergency Core Cooling Systems, and to provide containment cooling as required during abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents. The RHR system consists of two heat exchangers [EIIS:HX], four main system pumps [EIIS:P] in two divisions, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation.

The motor-operated minimum flow valves automatically provide the necessary flow through the pump in order to prevent pump overheating. The manual isolation valves for the motor-operated minimum flow valves, RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, are normally configured open and sealed.

RHR pumps A and C provide RHR Loop A safety functions associated with Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) and Containment Cooling. These pumps also provide RHR Loop A Shutdown Cooling (SDC) function during outage conditions. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 29, 2016, during Refueling Outage 29 (RE29), RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were closed and danger tagged in accordance with a clearance order to support the RHR Loop A Maintenance Window.

On October 7, 2016, the danger tags for RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were released and the clearance order directed that both valves be restored to their normal configuration. The danger tags were removed and seals applied to the valves. However, the valves were not opened before placing the seals. Second verification incorrectly verified that the valves were sealed open, when they were sealed closed.

A quarterly sealed valve log audit was performed on November 29, 2016, and the seals were verified to be intact. The audit required only that the seals be verified, the audit did not require the valve configuration be checked.

On February 5, 2017, during a quarterly sealed valve log audit, it was discovered that RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were sealed closed. Consequently, Operations declared RHR pumps A and C Inoperable at 0756 hours and entered Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

03/14/17 - Condition Report written to document incorrectly installed seals on two service water valves (SW-V-105 and SW-V-124) that occurred in late February 2017. 01/30/17 - Fuse was installed incorrectly. I 01/10/17- Incorrect bulb installation caused light for Local Power Range Monitor downscale to remain on. I

01/14/17-Augmented Off-Gas +34 Glycol pump/compressor switches found in an incorrect position.

LER 2016-009-00- On December 7, 2016, a Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan was removed from service due to human error resulting in a loss of safety function.

12/02/16 - Setpoints verified on the Normal Range Kaman instead of the High Range Kaman.

11/21/16 - Incorrect log entry resulted in missed surveillance.

10/15/16 - Relay was found not reset.

10/03/16 - Control Rod Drive high cooling water differential pressure was noticed while making preparations to hang tags. Upon investigation, it was noticed that 75 Hydraulic Control Units (HCUs) were isolated, which left 62 in service for cooling. This is contrary to a precaution statement in a procedure which requires 70 HCUs to be in service.

09/30/16 - A CNS Operator and an Entergy Operator entered the steam tunnel to hang tags and inadvertently severed and extracted tubing being used for Local Leak Rate Testing.

09/28/16 - While performing rounds, the on watch non-licensed plant Operator adjusted air load pressure to the specifications in their logs, not per the procedure for the current plant condition. This caused Control Room indicators to show a lower Reactor Pressure Vessel level than actual. LER 2014-001-00 - On January 6, 2014, a differential pressure transient occurred in the reactor building due to a non-licensed plant Operator inadvertently opening the wrong drain valve while hanging tags.

NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)

Nuclear Plant: Deep Cold Spell Going On

I be looking at power history all over the USA to see how reliable they are during the deep cold???

Doing well so far!!!