Dead Ender Junk Plant Fitzpatrick: Ut-Oh from 85% to 70%?

update 8/9

The watchdogs also say the announcement comes while FitzPatrick is not at full power due to an electrical issue and oil spill that shut it down in June. "Nuclear Regulatory Commission told watchdogs that the issue was the plant’s Condensate Booster Pump C, which is experiencing vibrations and preventing the plant from operating at full power," their release says.

70% till end of life. Can’t you imagine all the steam and water leaks now in this poorly maintained plant.

Should these utilities swiftly shut down these dead-ender facilities for the good of the industry? Is dragging this on for years at a time good for the reputation of the rest of the industry.

WIPP and Los Alamos

So high political protection at los Alamos created the $1 billion dollars damage and delayed vital rad waste shipments to the Waste Isolation Plant Pilot Project(WIPP). The whole deal makes sense now.   

Los Alamos: Secret Colony, Hidden Truths: A Whistleblower’s Diary By Chuck Montaño

Reviewed by KAY MATTHEWS
Anyone who has read the daily New Mexico press over the last 20 years knows who Chuck Montaño is. This Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) employee, activist, organizer, and whistleblower is now an author as well. His book, Los Alamos: Secret Colony, Hidden Truths: A Whistleblower’s Diary, is a blow by blow account of Montano’s tenure at LANL, and, as you can discern from the book’s title, an indictment of the mismanagement, discrimination, and retaliation he experienced, and witnessed, while there.
When Chuck was first writing his book a few years ago he gave me his media file—an extensive collection of newspaper articles and documents he’d kept to help him write his book—to look through for possible contributions to the Southwest Archives at the University of New Mexico. Even though I’ve covered issues at LANL since the early 2000s for La Jicarita, I was shocked at the sheer number of articles, mostly in the Santa Fe New Mexican and Albuquerque Journal, dealing with one controversy after another at the Lab. Chuck quotes from many of these articles in his book to substantiate his story, even an acknowledgement of the many problems there from Pete Domenici, head cheerleader for the Lab throughout most of his career:
“I have found myself increasingly defending the laboratory for failures of basic management . . . and security. While critics have carped, I have worked to ensure that none of the attacks harmed the laboratory, but that effort has come at great cost. Today, in Washington Los Alamos’ reputation as a crown jewel of science is being eclipsed by a reputation as being both dysfunctional and untouchable.” (“A Nuclear Lab’s Cowboy Culture,” Los Angeles Times, July 25, 2004)
Chuck was born and raised in Santa Fe and actually worked occasionally in White Rock, the LANL suburb community, with his dad, who was a mason. He went to college, got an accounting degree, and worked as a bank auditor before getting a job at LANL, with the help of an old college friend who was already working there. While Chuck’s way into the Lab was aided by the guidance of another worker, not management, one of the conditions he complains of in the book is that “LANL managers there were known for playing favorites with friends and relatives.” The nepotism involved in these kinds of hiring’s often discriminated against the Hispano community of the Española Valley, as most of the managers at the Lab were Anglo and often from out of state. Chuck failed several times to get promotions with many years of seniority: in the early 1980s, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) determined there was systemic bias in LANL employment practices, but the ruling did little to effect change.
While Chuck’s first job with the Lab was measuring materials that contained “Special Nuclear Material,” he spent most of his career in various accounting and auditing positions. As such he quickly learned that “Laboratory managers routinely ignored what auditors reported. Because of this, serious security and financial lapses occurred that otherwise could have been averted . . . and ended up costing the taxpayers lots of money.” One of the most tragic situations that arose from this was the case of Wen Ho Lee. Lee, a Taiwanese scientist, was accused of leaking design information on a warhead to the Chinese, largely based on the fact that he had copied files from his work computer to his personal computer for safe keeping, which was common practice at the Lab, despite warnings from auditors. More on the Wen Ho Lee case later...

Approaching Blog Historical Page View Monthly Record

Is this bad? I am 300 page views away from beating my all-time monthly record.

It is a tiny tiny tiny viewership blog.

My prior monthly historic record page views were 3552. It is now 3789. What the hell? My total historic page views is 94,000. 

Page views today so far is 580.

Thanks everyone!

Junk forbs Magazine Rag, Nuke plant Droughts and Capacity Factor.

As we sit here, Salem 1 and 2 has been off the grid for weeks and months because of dysfunctional maintenance philosophy. Unit 2 is at 15% power today caused by a undiscoverable intermittent generator short and unit 1 is down for baffle bolt troubles. Why does Forbs fail to cover that? The conservatives are just showing you the pretty and incomplete picture to support a profit agenda. The system on all sides are only showing their self interested and profit centered prettified version of life. Artificially jacking up the electric prices is not really bad for these guys.

One forgets the great upper Midwest drought of a few years back. Basically plant's power levels was limited in the heart of a drought and heat emergency. The plants didn't spend enough money during plant designs for adequate heat sink cooling capacity. I framed it as Illinois's grid isn't designed for the developing climate during the past crisis. For Illinois to support the grid in the last Illinois drought, they had to massively jack up nuke plant discharge cooling water temps of their rivers and streams. This damaged the environment. The electric prices went through the roof in the crisis. Pilgrim and Millstone down power in summer heatwaves in recent times are a examples of this.  

Generally across the nation in response to higher heat sink temperatures (droughts and summer heat waves) in recent years many plants have reduce safety by getting the NRC to up the cooling water temperature limits for cooling the plant and safety systems. There has been no real testing at the plants on how the systems will respond in the new upper temp limits with the heat sinks and the worst design accidents. It is just paper whipping...not transparent computer modeling... the new limits with not bringing in bigger pumps and piping. 

America's Heat Wave No Sweat For Nuclear Power

James Conca ,  

This week, like much of July, a heat wave is cooking America with extreme temperatures, affecting energy production as well as causing fires and water shortages, sucking electricity like crazy to power the cooling necessary to avoid discomfort and even death. According to the National Weather Service, 122 million Americans are under heat alerts.

Fortunately, nuclear power hasn’t minded, scoring record capacity factors of 96% and up with no increase in price. Other energy sources do not fare so well.

It’s all about diversity. Whether in biology, in culture, in training, or in technology, when conditions change a system survives if there is sufficient diversity to adapt. Otherwise it dies. This is no less true for electricity production. Having a diverse group of energy systems is key to a society surviving changes in demographics and changes in government, geological processes and natural disasters, disruption in supplies from war, or extreme weather changes.

This concept is in full display this month as this heat wave continues to sweep across America. Just like during the polar vortex, when nuclear stepped up to relieve natural gas and coal when they failed to deliver on the demand, nuclear also performs wonderfully during extreme weather at the other end of the thermometer…

Mike Mulligan’s Flicker Photostream

Mike Mulligan’s Flicker Photostream

Flickriver

As everyone in the area knowns, my pictures of the dangerous "William Street Bridge" forced Vermont to replace the bridge. The pictures are the only evidence left of the old bridge and my hard work.

http://www.flickriver.com/photos/24901589@N07/popular-interesting/

 My bridge rebuild projects

1)      Turner Falls, Main Road, Gill bridge-major overhaul completed

2)      I 91 William Street Bridge-new replacement bridge 75% complete

3)      Hinsdale NH-Brattleboro Vt Route 119 bridges-NH funded project awaiting digging dirt.

Dead Ender Junk Plant Clinton: Special Rules And Regulation For Dead Ender Plants

Update 7/28

Had a discussion with the resident and senior resident for about 45 minutes on this today. The NRC said they generally agree with my philosophy concerning this event. He said a recent inspection report had 14 violations. It must be the upcoming once because I went over the last 4 or 5 inspection reports not seeing it. NRC said this event is under investigation, we can't disclose much. I told them the theme with this discussion was having reduced oversight for a dead-ender plants. The NRC said they and Clinton are Midwesterners, they take pride in the work.  
The NRC says the containment sumps showed no sign of leaking until the shutdown began. I explained I couldn't understanding the magnitude of the current leakage while shutdown and it not showing up as containment leakage during normal operations considering more energy a much higher temperature and pressure. They assured me it wasn't leaking during the cycle. So the leaks began sometime during the shutdown process. I began/opened up the conversation saying I believe the two flex hose leaks were caused by new main steam line vibrations. 

***I believe the NRC inspectors on them saying no leakage during the last cycle. But it doesn't seem plausible with two flex hoses mysterious beginning to leak at the same time during the shutdown on a long term corrosion cracking leak as Clinton stated in the LER. It is like the chances

 "The cause of this event was IGSCC."

of winning the billion dollar lottery. To get there with the leaks beginning in the shutdown process, with simultaneous flex hose instrumentation leaks in completely different giant main steam lines, indicates there was some simultaneous large abnormal shaking of all main steam lines during the shutdown. A slug of water, a big valve slamming shut or something going down in all the steam lines.***

I thought I had them with not doing any inspections on the two flex hoses not replaced. The NRC SAID Clinton did UT and dye penetrant testing on the not replaced flex hoses. I still thought it not conservative with replacing all four (or more) flex hoses as a precautionary measure.       

To my Russian friends: This is how the USA does nuclear power in a democracy. Its not perfect. 

 
05000461

The issues I got it

1) Special interpretation of regulatory oversight for dead ender plants

2) This leak could obscure more safety related leaks.

3) There could be incipient cracks in the A and D instrument line?

4) They could be treating all the safety like this.

5) I suspect this is cause be a recent increase in Main Steam Line vibrations.  

***This guys got one year of life left in them.***

• Exelon Announces Early Retirement of Clinton and Quad Cities Nuclear Plants

Company begins taking steps to shut down plants

• Scheduled for shutdown June 2017.

This looks a lot like the same leak just prior to the 2007 shutdown event. What didn't they make a drywell inspection in the lead up to the outage? This is insanity posing this as a shutdown event. It is a falsification and misleading to the public. The is a at power event and much more energy behind the leak. The pressures and temperature driving the leak(s) would be much larger.    

MSL 'B' had water leaking slowly in a thin, steady stream. 

MSL 'C' had water dripping out slowly, less than 5 dpm.

Main Steam Line Flexible Hose lntergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking Identified During Refueling Outage

Licensee Event Report 2016-007-00

On May 17, 2016 with the plant in Mode 4 during Refueling Outage C1R16 personnel entered the drywell to perform a system walkdown. At 0945 CDT water was identified leaking from flexible hoses located at the inner elbows of main steam line (MSL) B and MSL C. It was determined that the leakage was from the flexible hoses associated with the MSL flow instrumentation. The degraded flexible hose on MSL B was previously replaced in 2008 and on MSL C in 2007. An analysis determined the failure mechanism of the degraded flexible hoses as lntergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC). Main Steam Line C flexible hose had previously failed in 2007 due to IGSCC. Corrective actions taken for that event did not prevent a recurrence of the condition identified during C1R16. The leaking flexible main steam line hoses and the remaining flexible hoses on the MS Ls B and C were replaced during C1R16. The remaining inner elbow flexible hoses on MS Ls A and D have been scheduled for replacement during the next refueling outage C1R17. This condition is reportable under 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), as a condition that resulted in the condition of the

nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded.

***There were no safety consequences associated with this condition. This event is reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) for the condition of the nuclear power plant including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded. A plant shutdown was not required since the plant was in Mode 4 during refueling outage C1 R16. 

***CAUSE OF EVENT 

IGSCC resulted in the failed flexible hose discovered during the C1R16 walkdown. The root cause evaluation tor this event determined that the corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the condition identified June 18,

They are repeating the failed to eliminate and significantly reduce the factors in this new LER

*2007 (LER 2007-003) failed to eliminate or significantly reduce below threshold any of the three factors required for IGSCC to exist (susceptible material, tensile stresses, and aggressive environment).

***CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 

The leaking flexible main steam line hoses and the remaining flexible hoses on the MSLs Band C were replaced during C1R16. The remaining inner elbow flexible hoses on

Why didn't they proactivity replace the A and D flex hoses? Where is the testing like UT proving the flex instruments hoses don't have any incipient cracks.

MSLs A and D have been scheduled tor replacement during the next refueling outage C1 R17. A design modification is planned to eliminate or significantly reduce at least one of the three factors required for IGSCC (susceptible material, tensile stress, or corrosive environment) to below the threshold where IGSSC can be initiated. 

PREVIOUS SIMILAR OCCURENCES

LER 2007-003-00: IGSCC Causes Pressure Boundary Leak and Reactor Shutdown

On June 18, 2007, Operations performed a plant shutdown at 1241 hours to assess indications of a drywell steam leak and repair the leak. On June 19 at 0635, Maintenance personnel entered the drywell and found pressure boundary leakage on a one-inch diameter ASME Section Ill Class II stainless steel braided flexible hose assembly on the 'C' Main Steam Line flow elbow low-pressure instrumentation tap. Operators entered the actions of Technical Specification 3.4.5, which required a plant shutdown due to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage. The cause of this event was IGSCC. Flexible hose assemblies installed in IGSCC susceptible locations were replaced. Susceptible flexible hose assemblies that were not currently in service were cut out and the lines were capped. Preventive maintenance was established to periodically replace susceptible flexible hose assemblies installed in IGSCC susceptible locations.

 All the drywell conditions of leaking instrumentation flex hoses seen in 2007 weren't seen in 2016? Come on.

LER 2007-003-00

"Operators checked the MSL guard pipe temperatures and Reactor Recirculation [AD] seal [SEAL] parameters and found them unchanged. The DW head temperature increased from 200 degrees Fahrenheit (F) to 211 degrees F. The DW pressure rate of change also increased. At 0520 hours, the DW floor drain inleakage was 0.3 gallons per minute (gpm) and slowly trending up. These conditions were indicative of a possible high energy leak in the drywell.

Operators entered the Abnormal Release of Airborne Radioactivity and the Reactor Coolant Leakage emergency operating procedures.

At 0800 hours, the unidentified leakage was less than the Technical Specification (TS) limits of 5 gpm (0.7 gpm) for unidentified leakage, of 30 gpm (2.7 gpm) for total leakage averaged over the previous 24 hour period, and of 2 gpm increase in identified leakage in the previous 24 hours (went from 0.09 to 0.6 gpm) in Model1.

Operators continued to monitor the steam leak indications, and at 1241 hours, Operators made a decision to perform a plant shut down starting at 2000 hours in order to access the DW to identify the source of the steam leak and make repairs. The shutdown process started at 2011 hours.

On June 19, at about 0635 hours, with the plant in Mode 2 (Startup/Hot Standby) and reactor power at about 1 percent, Maintenance personnel entered the DW and identified the source of the steam leak was a one inch diameter ASME Section III Class 11 stainless steel braided, flexible hose assembly [PSX] on the "C" Main Steam Line flow elbow low-pressure instrumentation tap. Leakage from this source is classified as pressure boundary leakage; therefore, operators entered the actions of Technical Specification 3.4.5 that require the plant be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours. Operators fully inserted all control rods by 1103 hours on June 19."

Junk Plant Salem/ Hope: impairing PEG and Exelon's Bottom line.

Increasingly the most troubled large facility in the USA. As it stands now, the unbelievably cheap grid prices driven down by natural gas is the cloud hanging over these utilities. 

This facility isn't profitable with that. The big factor with PEG bottom line is the gap between cheap natural gas electric prices and the increasing electric prices to the consumers and businesses. The system is so corrupt. Grid wholesale electric prices have basically collapsed this summer. The consumer electric prices are increasing...they don't see the good news shown by the wholesale electric prices. The cheap wholesale electric prices are bailing out the green, coal and nuclear power sectors. The users of electricity don't have the power to make their electric price comport to the drop in wholesale prices.

You get it, the turbine generator intermittent short isn't factored into PEG's bottom line. Think about the loss of production in recent years symbolized by the loose coolant loose pump bolts problem, the generator short they can't find and the baffle bolts? These are poor maintenance issues...     

Public Service Enterprise (PEG): Earnings Preview for Q2

July 25, 2016, 11:44:00 AM EDT By Zacks Equity Research, Zacks.com  

Public Service Enterprise Group Inc .

Public Service Enterprise Group PEG 46.60 -0.22 (-0.47%)

is expected to release second-quarter 2016 financial results on Jul 29. Last quarter, this diversified utility came out with a positive earnings surprise of 7.27%. Let's see how things are shaping up at the company prior to this announcement.

Factors to Consider

The unexpected extension of a refueling outage at its Salem 1 nuclear power plant in the second quarter will result in lower-than-expected electricity production. This could also have an adverse impact on the company's top line.

However, economic conditions have continued to improve in Public Service Enterprise's service territory, which is going to have a positive impact on earnings this quarter.

Weather too will play an important role during the second quarter. With temperatures in the second quarter marginally higher than normal, it might also have a positive impact on demand.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Junk Plant Salem 2: Pitiful Series of Shutdowns and Primary Leaks

Update 27

progress 14%?

update 7/26

I am certainly confused about this article.

"After being restarted at 11:36 p.m. Thursday, the reactor had to be taken off line again at 11:07 p.m., Sunday,"

It sounds like towards the end of last week, they did a quick plant dump and reload. It might have reached 60% and tripped. It looks like the plant restarted Monday or something. Now still stuck in the same generator bp region of 12%. All that up, down and scram stuff last week for nothing. 

It sounds like we are heading towards a prolong outage.

I hope you see this erratic power operation wasn't emediately report by the licensee and NRC. It questions how much more they can hide.    

N.J. nuclear plant shut down for 4th time in past month

By Bill Gallo Jr. | For NJ.com Today's Sunbeam
Email the author | Follow on Twitter
on July 25, 2016 at 7:22 PM, updated July 25, 2016 at 7:23 PM

2 shares

LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK TWP. — The Salem 2 nuclear plant has been shut down for the fourth time this month because of a problem with its main generator.

After being restarted at 11:36 p.m. Thursday, the reactor had to be taken off line again at 11:07 p.m., Sunday, according to Joe Delmar, spokesman for the plant's operator, PSEG Nuclear.

Workers are troubleshooting the problem, Delmar said on Monday afternoon.

The latest shutdown came after an alert from a generator protection system indicated that there was an electrical fault.

The string of plant shutdowns began on June 28 when the main generator protection system activated and the plant was automatically taken off line.

Salem 2 was restarted July 3 and then went off line again on July 4 when another issue was discovered.

On-line again on July 11, the plant was only producing electricity for about seven hours when it was shut down when the generator protection system indicated a problem.

The reactor was restarted and began sending out electricity over the regional power grid Thursday at 11:36 p.m.

One Sunday at 11:07 p.m. once again there was an indication there was a problem in with the generator and Salem 2 was taken off-line.

Each time, operators thought they had solved what was causing the generator protection systems to send out warnings.

Delmar had no estimate when the plant would be brought back online.

Salem 2 is one of three reactors operated by PSEG Nuclear at its Artificial Island generating complex in Lower Alloways Creek township.

Salem 1 is currently shut down for replacement of damaged bolts in the reactor core. Hope Creek, the third reactor  is operating at full power.

The three reactors in Salem County comprise the second-largest nuclear generating complex in the United States

Dead Ender Fitzpatrick New Inspection Report: Procedures Optional

Going down hill fast?

SUBJECT: JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT – SECURITY
INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2016403

One cross-cutting aspect was assigned to the findings in the area of Human Performance,
Procedure Adherence, because Entergy failed to follow processes, procedures, and work
instructions [H.8]. If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC resident inspector at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

Junk Plant Salem 2 Returns to 14% Power Even With A Boat Load Of Experts.

???

To my Russian Friends

The vast amount of recent interest on my site comes from Russia. Is USA interest pinging to Russia, then onto my blog? It’s all a great mystery to me.

Junk Plant Salem 2, Grand Gulf and Fitzpatrick Power Ascension Program Update

Are we really in the middle of the summer?

The state of nuclear power today.  

 

Tiptoeing up to 100% power hoping they found the turbine ground? They can't survive another mysterious plant scam on a turbine not discoverable intermittent short.

Salem 2  28% power

They will be lucky to get up 100% power before the next outage at this rate.  

Grand Gulf 37% power

Stuck at 83% power until Coumo's billion dollar check clears.  

FitzPatrick 83% power

 

Junk NRC: Worst Case Flooding Beyond the Height of the Turbine Building at Fort Calhoun

The NRC's Criscione Cornicles

Goggle Larry Criscione and flooding to know this guy.

He is NRC to go-to guy on flooding risk.

I doubt anyone outside the NRC would be able to catch this but me. Remember this picture of the plant flooding. This is probably-he talking about the maximum precipitation rate and a dam or cascading dam failure(s)accident. Here is our Fukushima: the flooding level would exceed the level of the Fort Calhoun turbine building elevation. The whole system has been keeping this secret. It is a cover-up.

BWR_My guess is the flooding would exceed the level of the torus in the reactor building. All cooling would be lost to the core like Fukushima very quickly. Offsite and onsite electrical power

PWR-Basically the core would overheat and water would be released out the pressurizer operated relief valves. It would flood into the rad waste building just like TMI and then end up in the river. We would eventually figure out a way to put water in the core, but the cooling water would go out the PORV valves, flooding the radwaster building and leaking into the river. It would be unstoppable for many months and years.   

would be lost. I image the flooding in the reactor building would continue to cool the torus somewhat. Core water would get discharged out the SRVs. The core water would empty and the fuel would melt and catch on fire. So only the upper level of the reactor building would be the available collection area of the explosive hydrogen. The problem is, the reactor building is electrically dead, what would ignite the hydrogen? I still give it a 90% probability of exploding.

This above is the typical BWR analysis. But this is a PWR. Would the PWR play out the same way?  

The meltdown would go on a lot longer than Fukushima's is my guess. If containment failed, where would the giant plume of radiation go? Certainly the melted core would burn through containment. We'd have to figure out a way to cool the core just like Fukushima. The reactor water would overflow the core, exit the reactor building with the flood water, and go down the Missouri river. It would be really high level contamination and radiation. This stuff wouldn't go to sea until New Orleans.

FW: MOU between USACE and ACRS

NRC's Lawrence Criscione:

“I realize that the fact that Fort Calhoun could be flooded to beyond the height of the turbine building is embarrassing to both the NRC and the USACE, but if you lived in Omaha would you not like to know this?”

The below is a picture of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. Can you imagine the contamination fears from just above Omaha to New Orleans? That is a 1000 miles of contaminated river in our heartland and mother river. Think about the towns and city drinking water withdrawals? All the business water withdrawals. Fort Calhoun radiation laden water would flow down the Missouri and Mississippi River onto New Orleans. The Cooper nuclear plant is about 50 miles down river from Fort Calhoun. Would they survive?

This would be a national catastrophe and flip us into a giant national emergency. Can you even imagine the worldwide news media. We'd overthrow our government. 

We would emediately shutdown all nuclear power plants for many years. What would the worldwide ramifications be? Twenty percent of electrical capacity would just disappear. The is a enormous amount of electricity. We wouldn't be able to replace this power for a decade. We couldn't quickly expand the other sources of electricity. The coal deliveries by railroad would overload the rail system. Same for natural gas with the pipelines and new pipelines. We would have exorbenent prices of electricity  and frequent blackouts for a decade. It would drive us into a deep depression for a decade.

We do more damage to the nation shutting off all out nuke plants than the core meltdown. Does our nuclear plant risk analysis take this into consideration? Believe me, there would be no rational thinking in Washington for a decade if there ever was rational thinking in Washington. How would our weak financial and Wall Street respond to the heartlands howling radiative winds?  It would be a stampede or serial cascade accident over many different systems.  

If the system is playing such dangerous games with worst case flooding at Fort Calhoun...you got to know the system must be riddled with similar dangerous games!!!  

My guess is the worldwide financial fallout would be 100 times to 1000 times to 10,000 times worst or more than Fukushima.

Junk NRC: Baffle Bolts Just Discovered In All NRC Executive's Heads

We live in a very volatile political environment. I contend a rather small core damage is just marginally less worst than the worst case core meltdown. Stick this in your risk calculation. Talk to me about the worst case fuel damage here and its societal ramifications to it in our interconnected world? The outsider would term it a nuclear plant meltdown or its precursor to a near big meltdown. There would be a terrible public and political overreaction to this event. It would lead to massive unnecessary overregulation of the nuclear industry. In the extremely shaky financial condition of the nuclear industry indicated by all the recent plant permanent shutdown, I bet you over 75% of the USA nuclear fleet would quickly permanently shutdown (or more).

You are right, there would be very little release of radioactivity outside the plant boundary. How do you think the next Gallop polling on nuclear power approval ratings would look like. It is at historic low levels right now. Would this affect the industry?      

NRC initial conclusion is that susceptible plants do not need to immediately shut down: 

–The consequences of baffle plate detachment during normal operation would be limited to localized fuel damage, detectable by periodic coolant activity monitoring required by the TS 

Look at how these bastards just minimize every threat. Tell me how the detaching of baffle plate would effect the large LOCA. Got any testing proving the benign results of detaching the baffling plates.

–Only certain events (large LOCA, medium LOCA, or seismic events) have the potential to rapidly detach the baffle plate due to baffle-former bolt degradation

–In such an event, the detachment of a baffle plate is not expected to pose a significant challenge to the ability to shutdown the reactor and cool the core

–Initial assessment is that the frequency of such events does not rise to the level of an “imminent safety concern” and does not require any immediate shutdown

Evil Incarnate: USA Using the Fruits of Fukushima to Reduce Safety in USA

This is not a surprise. The terry turbine was almost designed to handle water, concrete and pieces of metal. It is a extremely sturdy design, that why it was chosen.

Basically the theme here with research, is it serving the public good or unethically bolstering corporate profits? 

If we got into the hole like Fukushima...think adaptive intelligence. If the procedure no longer worked for us, we would just wing it. These guys want to extend RICI beyond their initial component design. You would need no written rules or guidance to conservatively operate equipment beyond its design limitation based on the control rooms collective knowledge in a grave emergency. 

The way this plays out is if they can "take credit" for pump operation way beyond the design of the component and current licensing. The RCIC research does no good for the control room operator. We'd piss on the core if there was nothing else available. They are going to flip the extended pump operation into risk calculations. It will turn into the meltdown accident is less frequent across the board. What comes out of risk calculations with be any violation level would be the violation level would smaller and it will justify the plant to operate with more degraded equipment and longer at operation.

Bottom line, with high academic research funded by the US government for nuclear safety, do you want to put your money into making better components for the licensed operators or do you want your money creating the justification for poorer quality equipment and reduced regulations.

I want the RCIC to generate its own control power and make the machine as autonomous as possible from the plant. Basically start and forget it. Place all the control functions in the RCIC room and make the control a remote station. Ditch all the electrical cables except for normal non emergency operation. We could do this with a very small computer circuit or cpu. Maybe bullet proof wifi for the connection to the control room with controlling the machine.

Research based on making a better component for the control room operator or research solely based on extending corporate profits and interest? 

Where do I got this wrong? 

Didn't unit 3 still meltdown with a so called very good operating RCIC? This is crazy talk by the Academics. What does "take credit" for mean?    

Dr. Karen Vierow,

If there is one system that worked very well in Fukushima, it was the RCIC system. We'd like to take credit for the system.

Team conducts ongoing research to evaluate performance of reactor cooling system

Texas A&M

Randy Gauntt, manager of Severe Accident Analysis Dept. 6232

July 21, 2016 by Robert (Chris) Scoggins

Read more at: http://phys.org/news/2016-07-team-ongoing-reactor-cooling.html#jCp

On March 11, 2011, Japan was rocked by an earthquake and tsunami that caused the shutdown of the Fukushima Daiichi plant's active nuclear reactors, disabled all sources powering core cooling systems and caused three of the reactor cores to overheat. The resulting meltdowns caused the release of radioactive material into the surrounding area, a disaster that has spurred investigations and research into the performance of the safety systems installed in these reactors.

Despite the effects of the disaster, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system performed much better than expected within reactor units two and three, operating in unit three up to eight times longer than intended in those conditions. Understanding the cause behind the RCIC system's performance and applying it to U.S. reactors is where Sandia National Laboratories and the Department of Nuclear Engineering's Dr. Karen Vierow come in.

"I'm looking at the system from a couple of viewpoints," Vierow said. "One being, how did it run for so long without power and two, can we take credit for the system in our U.S. reactors to operate for extended times without power? The two times the safety system was called upon, it operated far beyond what we currently take credit for."

Vierow is collaborating with researchers at Sandia National Laboratories on this project, which was initially funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission until Vierow later received a grant from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Vierow's particular research application to discovering the secret of the RCIC System's performance lies in studying the cooling of the system in relation to thermal mixing in the containment. Vierow began to look at the thermal mixing and the condensation of steam in the reactor's suppression chamber to see where the thermal energy is distributed and how it effects the RCIC System.

Junk Nuclear Industry worldwide: Why is Falsification of Documents So Easy

I can't begin to tell you how much resources, money and reputations have been ruin worldwide by the falsification of documents in the nuclear industry. Why is this so easy? Why can't it be detected and eradicated immediately. 

Inaccurate documents are just as bad as falsified documents. Inaccurate documents should be treated identical to falsified documents. There is never any excuse to depend on a incomplete or inaccurate documents in the nuclear industry.  

I can tell you what is going on here, we have terrible degraded the global immunity system that is supposed to catch this when it first immerges. It is basically a no fault system for document falsification and the gross industry's tolerance of inaccurate documents.

It's all profits and paychecks before truth.

I think any component coming from the French Forge should be assumed to be inop.

They way to stop this is to knock heads together. Guys, it is the too big to fail philosophy. Any one plant or giant corporation like Areva is to big too shutdown or fail. The regulatory authorities worldwide have been made to weak to maintain standards, control document falsification and inaccurate documents. The giant nuclear corporations with their enormous power and influence has made government too weak.

You get it, all these guys are angling for the privatization of the regulatory function. It is the independent oversight authorities mostly disconnected from the community. These independent commission are too susceptical for the corporate to install their "yes men" as the heads of the independent commissions.

If we lived in a healthy world, Areva would have been banded from doing any nuclear power plant work worldwide. Right, Mitsubishi is in the same light. Mitsubishi should have gone directly, made a early complaint to the NRC, saying the steam generators are dangerous to the industry. Everyone is in this giant intimidation game and they can't say boo if they want to get a paycheck!!!

***Why is intimidation of employees too easy in the worldwide nuclear industry.*** Why is everyone so insecure?       

 

Steam generator anomalies to extend Fessenheim 2 outage

20 July 2016

A serviceability certificate for one of the three steam generators installed at unit 2 of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant, currently offline for maintenance, has been suspended by the French nuclear safety regulator. A number of anomalies were discovered last month in the steel of the component's lower shell.

Last month, EDF informed the ASN that parts of some steam generators at 18 nuclear power units in France may have anomalies similar to those found in the steel of Flamanville EPR vessel. At Fessenheim 2 this includes the steam generator's lower shells. Steam generators are heat exchangers between the water circulating in the primary circuit - at a temperature of about 350°C and a pressure of 155 bar - and the water in the secondary circuit that supplies steam to the turbines. There are three steam generators in 900 MWe pressurized water reactors, while the larger ones feature four.  

Outages impact production target
EDF yesterday revised its nuclear electricity generation target for 2016 to reflect expected extended outages at some of its plants.

The utility said output last month totalled 28.6 TWh, down 2.1 TWh compared with June 2015. Total output over the first half of 2016 was 205.2 TWh, 5.2 TWh less than in the first half of 2015.

EDF said it needs to demonstrate in the second half this year that "some components, mainly steam generators ... can operate in a fully safe mode". It added, "Taking into account ASN's examination schedule, extensions of part of the outages are expected over the second half of 2016".

As a result, EDF has revised its 2016 nuclear output target down from 408-412 TWh to 395-400 TWh.

An analysis in May of the internal production record for the component "established a divergence from the nuclear pressure equipment manufacturing standards", Areva said. They were forged at Areva's Le Creusot facility in 2008 and the ASN certified the component's conformity to safety standards in 2012.

EDF took Fessenheim 2 offline on 13 June for a scheduled maintenance outage and two days later sent an initial analysis of the detected anomalies to ASN which announced yesterday that it has suspended the test certificate for one of the Fessenheim 2 steam generators as its forging "had not been conducted in accordance with the technical dossier" submitted to it by Areva. These test certificates - issued following multiple inspections and hydraulic testing - are required for commissioning, ASN noted. The regulator added that, had it been aware of this non-compliance, it would not have originally issued the certificate.

ASN has requested Areva submit a file detailing the approach it intends to take in order to demonstrate the steam generator meets regulatory standards.