Junk Safety Culture at Hope Creek.

This is caused by poorly designed instrumentation and inadequately trained employees. You catch all the unnecessary scrams and transients at this extremely important three plant resource.

It has to be looked at as contextual with all the other issues at the facility!!!

Reactor Scram Due to Invalid RRCS Actuation

On September 28, 2015, at 20:46, with the Hope Creek reactor operating at 100% power, a human error during surveillance testing resulted in the actuation of the Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS), and subsequently, an automatic reactor scram on a valid low water level signal. At the time of the transient, a surveillance test of division 1 of the RRCS system was in progress. The test simulates a high reactor pressure signal. Plant data show the signal was entered in both channels of division 1 of the RRCS system. The resulting system actuation caused a trip of both Reactor Recirculation Pumps, and the actuation of the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) function of the RRCS system. As a result of these two actuations, reactor power lowered, causing reactor water level to lower to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip set point of +12.5 inches. The RPS initiated an automatic reactor scram. Reactor operators recovered water level to within the desired band using the feedwater system. Reactor pressure was maintained using turbine bypass valves discharging to the main condenser.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is that the technician made an error in the performance of the surveillance test. The error was most likely caused by pressing the incorrect key on the common keyboard for the panel (placing the wrong channel in test). Based on a review of plant data (alarms and indications) and surveillance test simulation on the RRCS training simulator, it was concluded that the technician most likely recognized the unexpected conditions and attempted to correct his error. The technician did not understand that the pressure test signal had sealed in on the incorrect channel. When faced with an unexpected condition, the technician did not stop and seek supervisory guidance .. When the test signal was subsequently entered into the correct channel, the RRCS system actuation resulted. When the cause analysis determined that the cause was associated with a human error, and also determined the most probable error sequence, technician response to further questions could not be obtained, because the technician who was involved had resigned.

Hope Creek's Junk SRV's Pressure setpoint Inaccuracies

Hope Creeks Junk SRVs: Addicted to Normalization of Deviance

Update 1/16 

This excerpt is from a recent letter to me by the NRC's Mr Bower concerning Hope Creek. Is he trying to minimized the extent of the problems with Hope Creeks SRV problems or scrupulously telling us the complete story. Anyone nuclear whether nuclear employees or the NRC should be "sticklers for the details". Why was Mr Bowers Chief, Projects Branch 3, so inaccurate to me? I bet you he went to a spectacular college? Hope Creek over the years have habitually violated their "mechanical stresses on the torus and torus attached piping" (MAPI value). 

NRC official Mr. Bower: "In addition, the increase in mechanical stresses on the torus and torus attached piping due to the higher lift setpoints remained within code acceptable limits."

For some some reason Hope Creek only put a few years worth of "mechanical stresses on the torus and torus attached piping" limits in their LERS. So the red highlighted data below is the times Hope Creek's violated or challenged the "MAPI values"(mechanical stresses on the torus and torus attached piping). Does not disclosing the MAPA values constitutes a cover-up.  

First posting below

**So the last three setpoint inaccuracies LERs had 21 failures. Supposedly they tested 42 valves (3X14). It could be less as they don't often test all fourteen SRVs per outage or report. Get it, 50% failure rate over maybe six years. The tolerable legal failure is 3 over six years. This was all under the plus or minus 3% regime. What failure rate would it be at plus or minus 1%?    

LER 0000-003

*F 3.1% Ion-implanted disc
K 7.8% Disc not implanted

LER 2001-007-00

(psig) (psig) (psig)
F013P 1216 1120 1087 -1153 8.6
F013H 1169 1108 1075 - 1141 5.5
F013D 1182 1130 1096 - 1163 4.6

LER 2003-003-00

(Again erratic testing documentation. There is no more "notes" on seat leakage?) 

(psig) (psig) (psig)
*F013A* 1190 1130 1096 -1163 +5.3 

F013D** 1196 1130 1096 -1163 +5.8
F013E** 1187 1130 1096 -1163 +5
*F013G** 1204 1120 1086 -1154 +7.5 

F013J** 1165 1120 1086 -1154 +4
F013K** 1142 1108 1075 -1141 +3.1
F013L** 1191 1120 1086 -1154 +6.3
F013M* 1150 1108 1075 -1141 +3.8 

* These valves failed due to seat leakage
** These valves failed due to corrosion bonding/sticking of the pilot disc

LER 2004-009-00

(psig) (psig) (psig)
*F013A 1192 1130 1096 -1163 5.5% 

F013B 1171 1130 1096 -1163 3.6%
F013C 1207 1130 1096-1163 6.8%
F013D 1184 1130 1096 -1163 4.8%
*F013F 1156 1108 1075-1141 4.3%

LER 2006-03-00

(psig) (psig) (psig) 

*F013A 1166 1130 1096-1163 3.2%  

F013C 1166 1130 1096-1163 3.2% 

F013K 1144 1108 1075-1141 3.2% 

***This LER below is when they began publishing a value(MAPI value) on the SRV piping stresses (LIMIT). The accident is SRV pipe break between the vessel and torus. It is a very dangerous kind or LOCA or pipe break. They could very quickly heat up primarily containment threating electrical cables and vessel level instrumentations.
Licensee Event Report 2009-002-01

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual Limit* 

*F013A 1195 1130 1096-1163 5.80% 3.00%  

F013C 1203 1130 1096-1163 6.50% 21.80% 

*F013F 1163 1108 1075-1141 5.00% 5.50%  

F013G 1156 1120 1087-1153 3.20% 8.70% 

F013K 1212 1108 1075-1141 9.40% 22.40% 

F013L 1170 1120 1087-1153 4.50% 16.30%

Licensee Event Report 2010-002-01

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual Limit' 

*F013A 1177 1130 1096-1163 4.20% 3.00% 

F013C 1186 1130 1096-1163 5.00% 21.80% 

*F013G 1199 1120 1087-1153 7.10% 8.70%  

F013K 1172 1108 1075-1141 5.80% 22.40 

%F013L 1192 1120 1087-1153 6.40% 16.30%F013P 1157 1120 1087-1153 3.30% 27.4%

Licensee Event Report 2012-004-01

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual Limit  

F013B 1169 1130 1096-1163 3.50% 39.4% 

*F013F 1193 1108 1075-1141 7.70% 5.5%  

F013H 1157 1108 1075-1141 4.40% 37.7% 

F013K 1202 1108 1075-1141 8.50% 22.40%

F013L 1193 1120 1087-1153 6.50% 16.30% 

F013P 1185 1120 1087 -1153 5.80% 27.4% 

(They are really erratic documenting this testing. So now this MAPI value is discontinued(LIMIT))without explanation 

Licensee Event Report 2013-007-00

So the established MAPI value limit on F013A is 3.0% on 2009-002-01 and 2010-002-01 on this LER ,but has no explanation. 

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual

*** F013A 1170 1130 1096-1163 3.5%  

F013D 1192 1130 1096-1163 5.5% 

F013F 1178 1108 1075-1141 6.3% 

F013K 1149 1108 1075-1141 3.7% 

F013L 1175 1120 1087-1153 4.9%

 Licensee Event Report 2015-004-01

The established "MAPI value" on FO13F in is past LERs (LER 2009-002-01) is 5.0% and in this LER they are in violation on F013F with  setpoint accuracy  of 11.90%. So they are in violation in this LER on setpoint accuracy and SRV piping stress values on F013F. 

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual 

F013C 1216 1130 1096.1 -1163.9 7.61% 

***F013F 1240 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 11.90% 

*F013G 1208 1120 1086.4 - 1153.6 7.86%F013H 1148 1108 1074.8-1141.2 3.60%
F013J 1161 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 3.66%
F013K 1161 1108 107 4.8 -1141.2 4.80%
F013 L 1165 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.00%
F013 M 1207 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 8.90%
F013P 1221 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 9.00%
F013R 1169 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.38% 

Special Inspection in 2015 Didn't Fix a Thing at Crap Plant River Bend

I got a special inspection over reactor vessel level control during a scram in 2015 (the mike mulligan River Bend special inspection) special inspection. The problem is they didn't do any scram testing and all the corrective action didn't take effect for many years. ( well, Christmas scram in 2014) (They need to purposely scram a few times with everyone on high alert to watch the plant's and staffs response. Then devise a scheme to fix it fast. Just like initial plant operational testing...)

"During the scram, level 8 occurred immediately"

So here we go again after a special inspection effectively nothing is fixed. Vessel level is just banging around...reactor vessel goes up and down like a mad man and tripping the feed pumps.

Lightning is not suppose to trip a nuclear plant. Did something crap out in their switchyard (fail) during a lightning strike.

When do they become a Pilgrim with too many scams...enhanced inspections because they are banging the whole plant around like level?

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51644
Facility: RIVER BEND Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: DANIEL PIPKIN HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 01/09/2016 Notification Time: 07:04 [ET] Event Date: 01/09/2016 Event Time: 02:37 [CST] Last Update Date: 01/09/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON MAIN STEAM ISOLATION DUE TO ELECTRICAL FAULT "On 1/9/16 at 0237 [CST], River Bend Station sustained a reactor scram during a lightning storm. An electrical transient occurred resulting in a full main steam isolation [MSIV] (Group 6) and a Division II Balance of Plant isolation signal. During the scram, level 8 occurred immediately which tripped the feed pumps. A level 3 signal occurred also during the scram. Subsequent level 3 was received three times due to isolated vessel level control. The plant was stabilized and all spurious isolation signals reset, then the MSIVs were restored. The plant is now stable in Mode 3 and plant walkdowns are occurring to assess the transient." During the scram, all rods inserted into the core. The plant was initially cooled down using safety relief valves. Offsite power is available and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.

Hope Creeks Junk SRVs: Addicted to Normalization of Deviance

Work in progress.

Hope Creek's Junk SRV's Pressure setpoint Inaccuracies

 

Big picture my analysis goes like this. I have been studying this for many years. The NRC won’t disclose what is driving this because it will threaten a tremendous amount of grid electricity across many plants. The industry got themselves backed into a corner. Just think about it, why would these modern corporations tolerate this? These SRVs threatens blowing a lot money, unproductively eating up a lot of resources…another industry would just clear off the decks with bringing on modern equipment. They just get rid of their unproductive headaches and risk. So obviously they are stuck with the SRVs until permanent shutdown. Target Rock and Areva can’t provide SRVs to the USA because of the financial risk with getting blamed with their valves causing a meltdown. They could get sued over many tens of billions of dollars of damages. So where is the governmental insurance if one of their valves caused enormous financial damages? This just might be the result of Fukushima. Remember overheated SRVs, components like valve rubber seals and electrical cable caused the valves to get stuck stuck shut. This primarily caused the meltdown and release of radioactivity. The footprint of Fukushima would have been drastically smaller if the valves were opened. I wonder who supplied the SRVs to Fukushima?

Behind Hope Creek’s SRV problems is they can’t get any legitimate corporation to produce and supply SRVs to these old BWRs. The Corporations are stuck using bailing wire and duct tape (Chinese parts) to keep their SRV operable until permanent shutdown. That is the cover-up.        

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

December 31, 2015

Mr. Michael Mulligan

P.O. Box 161

Hinsdale, NH 03451

Dear Mr. Mulligan:

I am replying to your calls and emails with Richard Barkley of my staff in November 2015. At that time, you expressed concerns with the as-found test results over the last several years of the two-stage Target Rock safety relief valves (SRVs) installed at Hope Creek. As Mr. Barkley discussed with you, the NRC has been aware of this problem for some time as documented in prior NRC resident inspection reports (e.g., see integrated inspection report 50-354/2013-005). PSEG has reported these issues in LERs for Hope Creek in 2012, 2013 and 2015, and

(Note: the indented material is my add on...this isn't on their letter to me.)

LER 2015-004-01

total of ten of the 14 SRV pilot stage assemblies had setpoint drift outside of the required TS 3.4.2.1 tolerance values of +/-3% of nominal value.

as-found' test results for the ten SRVs not meeting the TS requirements are as follows:

Valve ID As Found TS Lift Setting Acceptable Band % Difference

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual

F013C 1216 1130 1096.1 -1163.9 7.61%

F013F 1240 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 11.90%

F013G 1208 1120 1086.4 - 1153.6 7.86%

F013H 1148 1108 1074.8-1141.2 3.60%

F013J 1161 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 3.66%

F013K 1161 1108 107 4.8 -1141.2 4.80%

F013 L 1165 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.00%

F013 M 1207 1108 1074.8 -1141.2 8.90%

F013P 1221 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 9.00%

F013R 1169 1120 1086.4 -1153.6 4.38%

LER 2013-007-00

A total of five of the 14 SRV pilot stage assemblies had setpoint drift outside of the required TS 3.4.2.1 tolerance values of +/-3% of nominal value. On November 4, 2013, HCGS received a report documenting the failure of SRV 'L.' On November 22, 2013, HCGS received a second report documenting the failures of SRVs 'A', 'D', 'F', and 'K.'  

Valve ID As Found TS Lift Setting Acceptable Band % Difference
(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual
F013A 1170 1130 1096-1163 3.5%
F013D 1192 1130 1096-1163 5.5%
F013F 1178 1108 1075-1141 6.3%
F013K 1149 1108 1075-1141 3.7%
F013L 1175 1120 1087-1153 4.9%

LER 2013-005-00

The cause of the failure of solenoid valve (S/N 481) was determined to be a manufacturer's assembly error. The external vendor found that the anti-rotation pin that secures the adjustable plunger was not installed. Without the pin, the plunger was allowed to rotate and unthread until contacting the internal stop, which prevented the solenoid from picking up when energized. The solenoid coil was in good condition; there was no indication of an internal short. The SOV was reassembled with the plunger re-threaded in place. With the valve body installed back on the solenoid, the SOV could be operated. HCGS determined from the results of the failure analysis that the failure of this SOV occurred at some point during the operating cycle.

LER 2012-004-01

A total of six of the 14 SRV pilot valves experienced setpoint drift outside of the TS 3.4.2.1 limit.

Five of the six SRVs were within the maximum allowable percent increase (MAPI) value. The SRV-F was the only SRV that did not meet the MAPI value. A Technical Evaluation assessed whether the stresses imposed by the increased lift setpoint would have been below the ASME Section III, Appendix F value for failure. The results of the Technical Evaluation are being communicated in this supplemental LER. 

(psig) (psig) (psig) Actual Limit
F013B 1169 1130 1096-1163 3.50% 39.4%
F013F 1193 1108 1075-1141 7.70% 5.5%
F013H 1157 1108 1075-1141 4.40% 37.7%
F013K 1202 1108 1075-1141 8.50% 22.40%
F013L 1193 1120 1087-1153 6.50% 16.30%
F013P 1185 1120 1087 -1153 5.80% 27.4%

following several refueling outages prior to that time. During the resident inspectors’ closeout inspections of the LERs issued by Hope Creek for the as-found setpoint drift of the SRVs, it was noted that PSEG engineering evaluations determined that the reactor vessel overpressure protection was not affected by the SRV pilot valve setpoint drift. Thus the SRVs were capable of performing their design safety function even with the setpoint drift noted. In addition, the increase in mechanical stresses on the torus and torus attached piping due to the higher lift setpoints remained within code acceptable limits. These LER closeouts and the inspectors’ independent assessment of the safety significance of these events were documented in NRC integrated inspection reports 2012-005 and 2014-003.

The issue of setpoint drift as well as the reliability for Target Rock two and three stage safety relief valves installed in Boiling Water Reactors has been of concern to the NRC for many years, and was the subject of Generic Safety Issue B-55, “Improved Reliability of Target Rock Safety Relief Valves.” The resolution of that GSI was published in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2000-012, a copy of which is available on the NRC

Right, Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-012 is severely obsolete... information at least sixteen year old. Why can't they keep up to industry problems. Where is there a new report on these problems. The stellite and platinum information is also old old information too. The facts are, after putting stellite and platinum in plant, the condition only worsened. All these NRC officials are professional word smiths and highly educated. Why is the agency intentionally fuzzing up the picture they are giving us.

 

website. As noted in that RIS, several actions were taken by the BWR Owners Group and individual BWR licensees to improve the performance of Target Rock SRVs. These actions included: (1) the installation of ion beam implanted platinum or Stellite 21 pilot valve disks, and (2) the installation of additional pressure actuation switches. These changes, coupled with an expanded acceptance range (from +/- 1% to +/- 3%) for SRV setpoint as-found values, have significantly reduced the number of SRV asfound setpoints being outside the specified Technical Specification limit. However, as noted in NRC Information Notice 2006-024 (ML062910111), during offsite vendor testing following refueling outages, SRVs continue to be found with lift setpoints outside the tolerances required by the Technical Specifications for Hope Creek and a number of other BWRs.

In the particular case of Hope Creek, PSEG has taken steps to improve SRV performance, specifically the installation of ion beam implanted platinum or Stellite 21 pilot valve disks, but with limited success to date. PSEG’s prior long-term plan to address setpoint drift was to install SRVs from a foreign vendor that had demonstrated better setpoint performance over time.

Unfortunately, that vendor was not able to meet the performance specifications set by PSEG and that plan was abandoned. PSEG then proposed replacing their two-stage Target Rock SRVs with three-stage Target Rock SRVs due to the three-stage valve performance history of less setpoint drift over time. That plan was suspended shortly before the last refueling outage when another plant in the industry experienced performance issues with the opening of their three stage SRVs and subsequent failure to promptly reclose. Going forward, the NRC plans to continue monitoring and independent oversight of the performance of Hope Creek’s SRVs consistent with the NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).

We appreciate your concerns in this matter and recognize that the setpoint drift experienced by the SRVs at Hope Creek continues to recur in spite of prior corrective actions by PSEG. Consistent with ROP guidance and the safety significance of the issue, the NRC will continue to focus inspection resources on this issue to ensure effective, long-term corrective actions are taken by PSEG. Should you have any further questions in this matter, please contact Richard Barkley of my staff at (610) 337-5328.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Fred L. Bower, III, Chief,

Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Cooper and Fort Calhoun potential flooding?

updated 01/05/2016

 


The weather and flooding is so odd for this time of year with the blockbuster El Nino, they should put the Cooper and Fort Calhoun on a flooding emergency footing. Basically assume plant flooding is going to occur beginning before summer 2016.

NRC Keeping an Eye on Water Levels along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers

Victor Dricks
Senior Public Affairs Officer, Region IV

Heavy rains and subsequent flooding across America’s heartland are being carefully watched by the NRC and the operators of nuclear power plants located along the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, although none of the plants are expected to be adversely affected.

Flooding is one of the many natural hazards that nuclear power plants must be prepared for. As a condition of their operating license, every nuclear power plant must demonstrate the ability to withstand extreme flooding and shut down safely if necessary – requirements that have been updated and strengthened following the Fukushima accident in 2011.

According to the National Weather Service, the threat of significant flooding is expected to persist for another two weeks in parts of Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana – all states with operating nuclear power plants. Each of these plants has emergency diesel generators that can supply backup power for key safety systems if off-site power is lost. And all plants have robust designs with redundancy in key components housed in buildings with watertight doors.

In Nebraska, water levels are high along the Missouri River in the vicinity of Fort Calhoun and Cooper Nuclear Station, but not high enough to require any mitigating actions by plant operators.

In Missouri, the Callaway plant is not expected to be affected by any of the heavy rains and flooding that have plagued other parts of the state.

Arkansas Nuclear One, in Russellville, has not been affected by heavy rains and no impact is predicted. But some local roads that lead to evacuation routes were flooded, prompting local law enforcement officials to post detour signs.

At Grand Gulf in Mississippi, levels on the Mississippi River continue to rise, with a crest expected on January 15. The projected river levels, however, are not expected to have any effect on site operations.

At River Bend in Louisiana, the situation is similar. There, the Mississippi River level is expected to peak on January 18, at a level that will not affect site operations. Further downstream, levels on the Mississippi River near the Waterford nuclear plant are expected to crest at a level two feet below where the operator would need to take some actions at the site.  

Two feet is not a lot of wiggle room...

Richard Smith, the Acting Chief of Region IV’s Response Coordination Branch, said his staff is getting periodic updates from the National Weather Service on conditions that might affect any of the region’s nuclear plants. Additionally, the NRC is relying on its resident inspectors, who live in the communities near the plants where they work each day, to independently verify that precautionary flooding procedures taken by plant operators are being properly implemented.

“We’re following events closely here in the Region,” Smith said, “and if anything changes significantly our on-site inspectors will be able to confirm that the operators are taking appropriate protective actions.”

Reposted from 12/30/2015

These plants are on the Missouri River in the vicinity of the Omaha Nebraska. There is no threat of flooding in this area at the present time. The great midwest 1993 flood everyone speaks  about and the great flood in 2011 at Fort Calhoun developed in the early spring and summer. This late 2016 flooding is coming from a gigantic El Nino event. Most of the flooding at Fort Calhoun in 2011 basically came from precipitation in upper Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming and surrounding. Most of the flooding today seems to be focused 400 miles southeast at St Louis Missouri.

Based on this gigantic and still developing El Nino, we'd be in trouble if the extreme precipitation area blossoms out and moves North of Omaha. 

Who knows what late spring and summer 2016 will look like. In Hinsdale NH it has been extremely warm and snowless until  Dec 28. We got less than 2 inches so far. 

    

Waterford's Systemic Falsification of Documents Again

Updated 1/2/2016:

Think of the tough shape Entergy-Louisiana was last year at this time of the year. River Bend just had a complicated scam on Christmas morning in 2014. A whistleblower (me) was going into action later getting a special inspection over poor reactor water level control. Then a month later on Jan 21, 2015 another whistleblower comes to light  at Waterford leading to the widespread falsification of documentation over fire watches.

So they most have had issues with having adequate engineered fire protection, that is the reason for the fire watches. Then on top of poor engineering fire protection they have widespread falsification of the fire watches.
 
I am irritated I can't put the whole informant inspection report on the internet. Its in a form that is not capable...write protected.
 
I don't like Alternate Disputes Resolution (ADM) program. It allows these guys to go behind closed door. It delays outsiders knowledge with what is going on for years.
 
Typically a violation level depends how risk full the event is.  They look at all the people and equipment that was degraded then come up with a calculation with the probability of the accident within just the specific event they are looking at. This calculation is basically a black box nobody understand least the outsiders. They count just a fraction of the actual risk.
 
See, I see this as systemic falsification of documentation. We have no idea now if the plant is configured or aligned as per plant licensing and within all NRC regulation. Just don't trust them to tell the trust and cold bloodily lying to us. The worst case of this is all the safety systems are turned off and their is nothing but poor quality equipment throughout the plant. It is a very dangerous accident. When you find a plant in this condition you punish them severely, so other won't go down they wrong path.
 
You notice how they keep the unbelievably valuable shift supervisor or highest boss at the plant away from fire watch issue.  It is his job to make sure the plant stays safe...he makes sure the plant always comports to all plant licensing, corporate rules and NRC rules. He has a tremendous amount of authority to get this job done. You get it, all the senior licensed leadership is implicated in a cover-up and lacking integrity.  They all need to get fire. They all had access to uncovered this issue when this started. You wipe out the senior on shift licenses leadership, then you can't operate the plant. This is why the on shift senior management is extremely valuable and why the NRC protects these guys through the political system. Integrity issues, cover-up and widespread falsification issues are the weak link is safety in these nuclear plant and these extraordinarily complex machines and bureaucracy.  
 
Further, according to the NRC, it is extremely hard to accuse senior management with cover-up, integrity and falsification issues. Basically three perfect proof's of falsification and cover-up isn't enough to get some banned from the industry. You need the crook to admit they falsified something, any stupid excuse is acceptable...basically there is very little legal controls with enforcing ethical behavior.
 
Everyone knows these fire watch employees are low paid, poorly trained and generally come from the bottom dregs of our society. Competent management would assume these guys need to be continuously scrutinized. They pay contractors to provide these fire watch employees. It is not like these are plant employees. So senior management sets up a wall in this system, they can't read the credibility of these fire watch employees. Sometimes these jobs are for loser senior management children and relatives...basically do nothing jobs.
 
You can do a lookup on temporary fire watches in the nuclear industry. There is NRC findings and violations all over the industry with temporary fire watches gun decking their rounds. It is a extraordinary mind numbing boring and menial job for losers. The industry has a lot of information about these temporary fire watch jobs...these jobs with their loser temportary employees are highly susceptible to fire watch rounds gun decking across the board. It happened many times at nuclear power plant. A senior plant manager should be extraordinarily specious these temp garbage jobs and poor quality employees...if his job is out to protect the reputation of his companies.
 
A properly engineered fire protection system constantly undated with new tech) with their instrumentation is a lot more reliable than mortal humans.  

Original post
 
Here is the inspection report.

Basically it took a whistleblower to bring this to light.

 Waterford IR 2015011

This is no surprise to me?

So why is this plant even running. They should be shut down for at least 6 months to a year.

The systemic discovery of nuclear plant staff credibility issues should be automatically called a red finding...

Waterford 3 contractors falsified inspection records

Faked fire inspection records for 10 months, NRC says

Anna Thibodeaux
3 hours ago                                                                                                                                                

A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) investigation found contractors at Entergy Waterford 3 nuclear power plant in Killona failed to perform fire inspections and falsified records for at least 10 months to show the inspections occurred. 

The NRC says it even found documentation showing a contract worker admitted to sleeping instead of performing an inspection, but records showed it had been done.
On Tuesday (Dec. 22), Entergy spokeswoman Leanna Weaver said Entergy Nuclear is acting on these violations. 

“Although we cannot discuss specific measures taken with individuals beyond the NRC’s release, we can say all involved have faced disciplinary action,” Weaver said. “It is important to note that Entergy identified these issues, notified regulators, fully investigated the issue and took the appropriate actions.”   

The NRC’s Dec. 14 letter to Michael Chisum, site vice president of Entergy Operations in Killona, states its 15-month investigation found Entergy’s contract workers who do the inspections and an Entergy Operations supervisor “deliberately failed to identify and take corrective actions upon being provided with information of suspected wrongdoing by contract fire watch individuals.” 

Entergy identified the company that provided the fire watch workers as GCA Contractors. 

The NRC has given Entergy the option to meet with the federal agency or seek an alternative dispute resolution to discuss corrective actions before it decides enforcement penalties. 

Weaver said Entergy is “not able to respond publicly about our decision on how to address the violations.” 

But she added, “Entergy Nuclear does not tolerate this form of behavior among employees or contractors in any way, and we have robust systems and processes in place to prevent and uncover inaccuracies, whether intentional or not, in documentation. Trust, honesty and integrity are among the key platforms to which all our employees must commit and adhere to.” 

According to the NRC investigation conducted Feb. 3, 2014 to May 19 with contract and licensee personnel, investigators found a manager with the contracting firm that provided the fire inspection workers had “deliberately provided incomplete and inaccurate information to an access authorization reviewing official regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of a contract fire watch individual.” 

Investigators also found instances of seven contract workers who “deliberately failed to conduct compensatory hourly fire watches, as required by site procedure, and falsified fire watch tour logs by initialing that fire watches were performed with knowledge that watches had not been performed.” 

A fire watch or inspection requires each area or room be assessed to ensure fire doesn’t occur in parts of the large nuclear plant building housing equipment operating the nuclear reactor. The NRC requires the inspections, a fire watch log and record of any fire hazards, as well as requires  record of any adverse condition that have been identified. 

The letter also states NRC found “one Entergy Operations Inc. supervisor deliberately failed to identify and take corrective actions upon being provided with information of suspected wrongdoing by contract fire watch individuals.” On Jan. 21, 2014, the NRC says it received information indicating an issue with the fire inspections. 

Additional information was  received that “a Waterford Steam Electric Station security officer questioned fire watch personnel about the absence of a door alarm that is usually received on a security door when rounds are conducted. The security officer’s concern led to the licensee reviewing card reader information for the rounds, which identified numerous instances of the fire watch tours not being conducted; although the surveillance records indicated that the tours had been completed.” 

Seven days later, the Office of Investigations initiated an investigation to determine if fire protection personnel had willfully falsified surveillance records. 

The investigation was aimed at determining if personnel - contract and company - had deliberately falsified fire watch records and if management was part of this effort.Completed on May 19, the investigation indicated three employees “acknowledged the standard for falsification and admitted to falsifying the records,” according to the NRC. 

Another three inspection individuals denied wrongdoing, but door alarm records verified missed inspections by these same three people. 

NRC also maintains Entergy Operations personnel failed to implement fire protection procedures. 

“Seven fire watch personnel failed to conduct numerous observations and inspections of various fire areas to assess for indications of fires,” states the NRC letter to Entergy.A company superviser “admitted that the condition was not properly documented and addressed when the concern was brought to his attention.

Relevant Generial Nuclear Industry Comment

A couple weeks ago you asked me for my opinion of root of plant problems, and I mention plant management and greed.

It dawned on me of another problem

With all the top down decision making, 10 + 10 = 100, just sign here or else,

I am thinking a lot of good technical people are probably not projecting working at the same place for 40 years and retiring.  Having good people stay for 40 years gives a lot of continuity and tribal knowledge, lessons learned etc.

If they are all planning an exit strategy, they do not care.  No need for attention to detail and accountability.  They will be gone and someone else will have to pick up the pieces.

So management comes around wanting you to sign this 10 + 10 = 100, sure, no problem.  I am planning on leaving in a month to a new job, it will take 3 months before anyone realizes the 100 is wrong.

Accountability and responsibility

The FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant Spirit

Remember Fitz was heading into a strike before the shutdown announcement.

When A Strike is a Possibility at a Plant 

Nov 4, 2015 

"Unionized workers at the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Oswego, N.Y. recently voted to accept a new contract days before the current pact was to expire. The union representing operations, maintenance and radiation protection staff and Entergy, the company that owns the plant, reached a new four-year agreement."

Entergy's Four Platforms 

Eric Wilczynski:

"The Companies Four Platforms uses buzz words like Trust, Honesty, FAIRNESS, and Integrity. Let me reiterate Trust, Honesty, FAIRNESS, and Integrity. Prove to me that these or more than just words on a motivational poster, prove to me these are words in which you live and lead by." 

The thing is,CEO Denault is more held hostage to the system as the mechanical knuckle draggers.  

I'll bet you have the reason why the plant is closing is Entergy feels they are losing control of their bottom half employees.

Go Union! Vermont Yankee and Pilgrim are heading into the sun without a whimper.

FitzPatrick nuclear worker tells well-paid Entergy CEO: Show us 'fairness'

Entergy Corp. CEO Leo Denault met with workers Friday at the FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Scriba. During a question-and-answer session, one worker implored Denault to show "good corporate citizenship'' in his treatment of plant employees whose lives will be disrupted when the plant closes. (Stephen D. Cannerelli )

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By Tim Knauss | tknauss@syracuse.com The Post-Standard
Email the author | Follow on Twitter
on December 21, 2015 at 10:50 AM, updated December 21, 2015 at 11:48 AM

FitzPatrick nuclear plant

• FitzPatrick nuclear worker tells well-paid Entergy CEO: Show us 'fairness'
• NY needs to level the playing field for carbon-free energy (Commentary)
• Upstate New York's nuclear plants support 25,000 jobs, industry consultant says
• Entergy owned Indian Point power plant forced to shut down after power loss
• Why Entergy won't bet on Cuomo plan to keep FitzPatrick nuke open

All Stories 

SCRIBA, N.Y. – When the CEO of Entergy Corp. visited FitzPatrick nuclear plant Friday to talk with 600 employees about closing the facility, one of the workers drew attention to the executive's hefty compensation while asking him to be fair to the rank-and-file. 

Eric Wilczynski, a veteran employee, got a raucous standing ovation after he delivered a speech imploring Leo Denault to "show good corporate citizenship'' in his treatment of workers who will lose jobs at the plant, according to people who attended the all-hands staff meeting. 

During a question-and-answer session, Wilczynski, a chief mechanical maintenance technician who has worked at FitzPatrick for 25 years, rose from his seat and walked to the front of the room to stand next to Denault. 

Wilczynski noted that Denault, who earned $11.8 million in salary and other compensation last year, has a golden parachute that provides him a handsome retirement should his employment end. But FitzPatrick union workers who will be forced out when the plant closes will suffer a hit to their pensions if they transfer to any but one of the other Entergy nuclear plants, because of a technicality in the union contract. 

Wilczynski asked Denault to amend Entergy's policy for FitzPatrick workers. 

"Prove to the families that our compensation, pensions, and futures are as secure as yours,'' he said. 

Denault shook his hand after the speech and thanked him for raising the issue, Wilczynski said. His fellow plant workers stood and applauded. Throughout the day, they showered him with congratulatory texts and emails. 

In addition to the pension issue, Wilczynski asked Denault the question that has plagued FitzPatrick employees since September, when the company first hinted that the plant might close. What, Wilczynski demanded, would it have taken to keep FitzPatrick open? 

Denault declined to answer that question, employees said. Entergy officials have consistently said their talks with New York state officials about the possibility of keeping FitzPatrick open were confidential. Denault did say Friday that the state's proposed "clean energy standard'' did not include a promise of financial subsidies specifically for FitzPatrick. 

Here is the text of Wilczynski's speech. His employee ID number has been deleted for security reasons. 

Leo, 

I am employee ID . . . . I know my name and face is irrelevant in the big scheme of things within the corporate paradigm. As much as I dislike or not agree with the decision made to close down FitzPatrick, this is not why I stand before you here today. I will not question how or why that decision was reached, nor the manner in which you chose to battle our state. You have told New York State politicians to "stop trying" because obviously Entergy has. 

I am here to hopefully provide you with awareness and possible solutions. I know that if I am going to present a problem I need to also include some options for resolution.
In 2014 you were reported to make 11.8 million dollars in salary, option awards, stocks, and incentive plan compensations. All of which are "significantly more" than the average public executive. Out of 16,000 public executives, you are ranked in the top 1 percentile in total annual compensation. To put this in perspective, you make $1,349.00 an hour. At my base rate I would have to work 121 years to make what you earn in one year. 

Don't get me wrong; what you're paid is no concern of mine. It is rather impressive in the way you negotiated your "golden parachute," setting up for retirement and securities for you, your family, and their families to follow. It is obvious you know and value the importance of a retirement and pension plan.

I am one of many members of the Entergy team who has worked to successfully execute your mission and vision to earn you your millions. I am asking you to put the same rigor into our retirement and pension plans by allowing them to carry with us to whatever Entergy site we are relocated to. 

When the announcement was made that FitzPatrick would not refuel, we were informed that Entergy would do everything in their power to place employees within the fleet, should we elect to stay within the company. However, here is the

Yea, everyone will have a job with Entergy if they want one according to our policy is the public relation theme. The rulesy game. Then you look up the rules and almost nobody gets a job. Who the hell wants these guys with a attitude like Wilczynski?

"PROBLEM": Based on current company policy, the only Entergy site which will allow pension credits for bargaining unit employees to be carried over is Indian Point. As we all know, the future of Indian Point is questionable, at best. This is a significant limiting factor in the placement for union workers, which represent a large part of the company's workforce. 

As I stated earlier, we here at Fitzpatrick do not bring problems to the table without offering viable solutions: 

Solution 1: Allowing retirement and pension plans to carry with us to whatever Entergy site we are relocated to. 

Solution 2: Entergy owns TLG Services Inc. (a decommissioning company). Assuming they are going to be the

***I do know some rather young people are hanging around moving fuel at Vermont Yankee until retirement.  

company to do our decommissioning, give our employees and their earned pensions the opportunity to stay here with their families and transfer over to TLG. 

The Companies Four Platforms uses buzz words like Trust, Honesty, FAIRNESS, and Integrity. Let me reiterate Trust, Honesty, FAIRNESS, and Integrity. Prove to me that these or more than just words on a motivational poster, prove to me these are words in which you live and lead by. 

You are in a leadership position as chairman of the board and CEO of Entergy. The words "Leadership" and "Leader" are not always synonymous with one another; show us that's not the case here. 

You have many resources at your disposal, and are in a position to influence and approve our pensions, and allow our credited service years to carry over to the other Entergy sites. 

I am employee ID . . . My name is Eric Wilczynski, a member of the Fitzpatrick family since 1992. You now have a name to put with the face. Prove to us we are more than an employee with an ID number. Prove to the families that our compensation, pensions, and futures are as secure as yours. Mr. Denault, we have proven to you our commitment in over 11.8 million ways. 

In closure I have two questions for you, Mr. Denault: 

Question 1: I'm asking you, given the current situation, will you embrace good corporate citizenship by putting the same rigor into our retirement and pension plans, allowing them to carry with us to whatever Entergy site we are relocated to. 

Question 2: It's my understanding that more money was put on the table through the Clean Energy (Standard) that would've DIRECTLY helped the Fitzpatrick plant, and Entergy turned it down. Why? And, what EXACTLY was needed by Entergy to keep this plant open? 

NY Governor Cuomo Sends Message to Nuclear Industry

Right, then the recent across the board 30% cuts in budgets throughout the nation's nuclear plants initiated by the Nuclear Energy Institute.

Believe me, Pilgrim is teetering on the precipice. A few more events at Pilgrim will drive Massachusetts's Governor into being a Republican Governor Cuomo.

You all ought to be wringing your hands over what the NRC finds in the next set of special inspections in 2016...   

Governor Orders Probe of Safety Protocols at Indian Point

Rick Pezzullo | Dec 22, 2015 | 

Governor Andrew Cuomo last week directed the state Public Service Commission to launch a full investigation into the operations and safety protocols at the Indian Point nuclear facility in Buchanan following the unexpected shutdown of Indian Point Unit 3 on December 14. 

In his December 16 letter to PSC Chairwoman Audrey Zibelman, Cuomo pointed out there has been 13 unplanned shutdowns at Indian Point since June 2012 and an additional four planned but unanticipated shutdowns. 

“This simply is unacceptable. New Yorkers deserve better from Indian Point’s owners,” stated Cuomo, who has been a long proponent of Entergy not receiving the go-ahead from the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission to operate the plants for another 20 years after its current 30-year license expires this year. 

“These unplanned outages are intolerable and stand to support our contention that this facility and its aging infrastructure is at the end of its useful life,” Cuomo stated. “New York State will not sit idly by while the NRC and Entergy drag out the federal relicensing proceedings. While these facilities continue to operate beyond their license date, we have an obligation to ensure that they are properly maintained and that timely investments in critical infrastructure are neither delayed nor deferred.” 

In his request to Zibelman, Cuomo called on the PSC to specifically examine the capital and maintenance budgets at the plants and their potential impact on the recent outages and how the outages can affect the long-term continued safe operations of Indian Point. 

Cuomo asked Zibelman to present the PSC’s findings by February 15. 

In the meantime, Entergy has received permission to continue operating Indian Point while the NRC reviews its relicensing application, a process that is expected to linger into 2017.

Russia: What A Nuclear Accident Looks Likes With No Faith In Government

Japan will be susceptible to this kind of panic for decades...

It’s basically a four eight unit site. Two Four are early 1970s vintage plants and the other two four are under construction. The first reactor at this site built is scheduled for permanent shutdown in 2016. 

This is the worldwide flaw of nuclear power: Everyone is permanently anchored to first built or first generation plants and nobody can afford to shut them down.

I don't think there has been a meltdown here yet...but this is Russia. If Finland starts complaining about radiation problems them we are in trouble.  

• RUSSIANS took iodine and caused traffic jams as they rushed to leave the proximity of a Chernobyl-style power station on the Gulf of Finland amid fears officials were covering up a radioactive leak. 

• The panic followed the emergence of pictures showing a cloud of vapour pouring from Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, some 50 miles from St Petersburg. 

• Radio Svoboda reported that in the wake of the incident on Friday locals in Sosnovy Bor started withdrawing money from their credit cards. 

• One local said: "Everyone got very worried and rushed to get iodine."

• Bodrov called for medical checks for staff at the power plant.

• One woman - an employee of the station - was taken to the hospital with high blood pressure attack.  

• The incident led to a shut down of the second power unit at the station.

Russians flee Chernobyl-style plant over fears of radioactive leak 

RUSSIANS took iodine and caused traffic jams as they rushed to leave the proximity of a Chernobyl-style power station on the Gulf of Finland amid fears officials were covering up a radioactive leak.

By Will Stewart

PUBLISHED: 17:01, Mon, Dec 21, 2015 | UPDATED: 17:42, Mon, Dec 21, 2015

The panic followed the emergence of pictures showing a cloud of vapour pouring from Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, some 50 miles from St Petersburg.

The authorities insisted that the was no radioactive leakage after a "defect" which caused a steam emission from the turbine section of the station - the most westerly in Russia - but people did not believe the "no danger" claim.

Radio Svoboda reported that in the wake of the incident on Friday locals in Sosnovy Bor started withdrawing money from their credit cards.

They said locals were in panic mode despite statements from officials that the radiation level was normal.

People had more trust in the ecologists who prepared their own statement.

They confirmed the radiation level in Sosnovy Bor was normal but said wind carried the stream away from the city towards the Gulf of Finland.

They said that didn't mean the stream was not radioactive.

One local said: "Everyone got very worried and rushed to get iodine."

This is seen as a protection against radiation poisoning.

There were traffic jams as residents left the area and headed for St Petersburg.

Oleg Bodrov, chairman of "Green Wolrd" ecological group said people were right not to trust denials from the authorities, with many people recalling that Soviet officials turned a blind eye to the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe in 1986.

He said: "They know well that the officials' first task is to say all is normal but not to report about danger, even if there is one.

"All those who understand a bit about nuclear energy know that it was an attempt to mistake the wish for the reality.

"In this reactor the water turns into vapour which goes to the turbine.

"And this vapour is surely radioactive.

"This time we were lucky, the reactor was immediately stopped, but some vapour still appeared and because the turbine was stopped it had to go somewhere.

"It was expelled via the tubes.

"Fortunately, the wind had an unusual direction for this region - it was south-south-east and the vapour has gone to the Finnish Gulf, towards Vyborg town."

This was also in the direction of Finland.

Bodrov called for medical checks for staff at the power plant.

Interfax reported that a special commission was working at the nuclear station aiming to find out the reasons for the emission One woman - an employee of the station - was taken to the hospital with high blood pressure attack.

The incident led to a shut down of the second power unit at the station.

After the reactor shutdown "the steam leak significantly dropped", reported nuclear.ru website.

An area of 40 square metres was "completely isolated".

Plant manager Vladimir Pereguda said: "The situation at the plant is calm. There are no reasons for evacuation of the plant personnel and residents of Sosnovy Bor."

He said the reactor had been halted "in a subcritical state".

The reactor was being cooled "in order to correct a defect".

Readings at the plant in the days after the incident show safe levels of radiation.

The plant was completed in 1973, and had an expected 30 year life cycle.

It suffered shutdowns or safety alerts in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011

.