Entergy's Waterford Nuclear Plant: Junk Diesel Generators

Regular testing of the diesel generators leading to electrical components failing in both. God only knows how many components will failed under the stress of a big accident. 

This is where we are heading and the NRC knows it. We are going to have LOOP at a nuclear plant and both DGs are going to trip on junk Chinese untraceable electrical components. They don't even tell us when this components were put in? 

I telling you, our nuclear industry is having big troubles with non traceable junk Chinese mechanical and electrical components getting into our nuclear plants.      

Both Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable 

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2015-007-00

On August 26, 2015, both Emergency Diesel Generators at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3) were declared inoperable, causing entry into Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 action f.

On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, EDG [DG] 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential [87]. TS 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. were entered. EDG 'A' was being run in accordance with OP-903-115, "Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test," Section 7.4, "24 hr EDG ‘A’ Run with Subsequent Diesel Start" to satisfy TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.2.e.6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b.(1) which requires the demonstration of Operability of the remaining Operable EDG to preclude common mode failure of the remaining EDG. At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1.f. (restore one of the inoperable EDGs to Operable status within 2 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the following 6 hours) was entered due to the EDG ‘B’ room exhaust fan [FAN] not starting when the diesel engine was started. Troubleshooting determined that the EDG ‘B’ room exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) [DMP] not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f. was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' room exhaust fan. The station remained in TS 3.8.1.1.b. and d. with EDG ‘A’ remaining inoperable.

The amount of time that both EDGs were inoperable was 2 hours and 20 minutes. During this time, a brief was conducted and preparations for a plant shutdown were completed. Prior to exceeding the allowed outage time, EDG 'B' damper HVR-501B was failed open and the room exhaust fan started.

EDG ‘A’ Generator Differential

EDG 'A' was being run in accordance with OP-903-115, "Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test," Section 7.4, "24 hr EDG ‘A’ Run with Subsequent Diesel Start" to satisfy TS SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.6. The EDG function of supplying standby electrical power on receipt of a “test” or “emergency” command signal are different in that during an Emergency Mode start of the EDG, all Test Mode trips and alarms are bypassed with the exception of overspeed and generator differential.

The direct cause for EDG ‘A’ tripping on GENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL was the internal shorting of EG ECT2316 C TRANSF, NB8 Current Transformer, due to insulation failure.

The EG ECT2316 C TRANSF is a Westinghouse type KIR-60 current transformer style 7524A01G16 with serial number 28218571. There are no lot or date codes printed on the current transformer or its nameplate. The current transformer is only energized when EDG ‘A’ is supplying the 3A bus.

A vendor performed a failure analysis of the failed EG ECT2316 C TRANSF, current transformer and issued a failure analysis report dated October 9, 2015. The report concluded that the failure was due to a manufacturing defect. Specifically, there were voids found in the insulation and the thickness of the insulation material around the fault area appeared reduced when compared to the other areas of the current transformer. It is believed that the thinner insulation in combination with voids increased the electrical stresses causing the insulation to break down. This eventually resulted in a fault. The insulation breakdown and resultant fault created a ground condition on the Diesel Generator bus.

10 CFR 21 IDENTIFICATION 

On October 9, 2015, Waterford 3 received information from the external evaluation concerning the Generator Differential Current Transformer. The evaluation concluded that a manufacturing defect internal to the current transformer was the cause of the failure. On October 22, 2015, engineering evaluation determined the manufacturing defect could create a substantial safety hazard, as defined in 10 CFR 21, and provided the site vice president information of the defect the same day. Additional information identified in the report is as follows: Constructor - Westinghouse Type KIR-60 current transformer, style 7524A01G16, serial number 28218571; Defect and safety hazard - There were voids found in the insulation, and the thickness of the insulation material around the fault area appeared reduced when compared to the other areas of the current transformer. There is only one transformer of this type remaining installed in the plant. Scheduled replacement is no later than November 15, 2015.

EDG ‘B’ HVR 501B failure

On August 26, 2015, EDG 'B' was started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b.(1) which requires the demonstration of Operability of the remaining Operable EDG to preclude common mode failure of the remaining EDG. At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1.f. (restore one of the inoperable EDG's to Operable status within 2 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the following 6 hours) was entered due to the room exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started. Troubleshooting determined that the EDG ‘B’ room exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. The solenoid on HVR-501B was replaced and tested satisfactorily. The solenoid was inspected on site both externally and internally and it was determined that there was mechanical wear on the inside of the solenoid, the air inlet valve plug was bound up inside the solenoid coil, and that the solenoid coil itself appeared to be good. Photographs of the condition were sent to an offsite vendor who concluded that rapid cycling of the solenoid valve might be the cause of the excessive wear and damage to the components...

These guys had some big LER recently. Obviously this is a direct offshoot of my "Mike Mulligan River Bend special inspection. Basically a inability to control reactor water level over long periods of time. This is identical to River Bends problems. It is really sickening...   

Licensee Event Report (LER)2015-004-01, Emergency Feedwater System Flow Oscillations and LER 2015-005-01, Manual Reactor Trip due to Low Steam Generator Levels Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)

The safety function of the EFW system is to provide sufficient supply of cooling water to one or both SGs for the removal of decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] in response to any event causing low SG level coincident with the absence of a low pressure trip.

INITIAL CONDITIONS 

On June 3, 2015, Waterford 3 was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power. There were no structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

The manual reactor [RCT] trip due to low SG levels is reported in LER-WF3-2015-0005.

EVENT DESCRIPTION At 1704 on June 3, 2015, Waterford 3 experienced a loss of the “A” Main Feedwater Pump. At 1705, the reactor was manually tripped when SG levels were continuing to lower. At 1707, an EFAS [JE] was automatically actuated to both SGs as SG level decreased. Flow initially stabilized at 250 gpm with the Primary Flow Control Valves (PFCVs) [FCV] providing flow and the BFCVs [FCV] closed. Both SG levels continued to decrease and the EFW [BA] control logic shifted the operation of the BFCVs to flow control mode to maintain flow to each SG. EFW flow stabilized and then SG levels began recovering. At 1709, the EFW AB pump [P] reached rated speed and EFW header discharge pressure increased. Shortly afterward, wide, frequent fluctuations in EFW flow were observed which was not in accordance with the expected system response.

Operations personnel observed that the controller [FIK] outputs for both BFCVs were oscillating frequently and widely. Both PFCVs operated correctly in automatic (the controller outputs remained steady and the valves remained in their fixed position). To prevent further oscillations, both BFCV controllers were taken to manual and then closed at 1715. The oscillations stopped concurrent with taking the valves to manual control. Operations personnel cycled both BFCVs in manual with no further flow oscillations noted. After confirming that they could control both BFCVs in manual, the operators closed the PFCVs. EFW flow to the SGs was controlled by operation of both BFCVs in manual for the remainder of the event, until EFW was secured. 

The EFW flow control logic [JB] and both BFCVs were declared INOPERABLE due to the FCV oscillation and actions per TS 3.3.2.b and 3.7.1.2.d were entered, respectively. The EFW system functioned adequately to fill the SGs and maintain the specified safety function (Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal).

This event and the manual reactor trip were immediately reportable (reference EN # 51116) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Specified System Actuation, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation (scram), respectively. Investigation has revealed that the components comprising the EFW flow control system were not configured to appropriately respond to the changes observed in the system operating parameters. Both EFW BFCVs cycled more than assumed in the nitrogen accumulator [ACC] sizing calculation. The excessive cycling has the potential for exhausting the accumulators prior to their 10 hour analyzed mission time in the event of a loss of Instrument Air (IA) [LD]. These accumulators also supply backup nitrogen to the ADVs. Periodic testing to confirm the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode has not been performed. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this condition has likely existed within three…

CAUSAL FACTORS

A root cause evaluation was completed for this condition. The direct cause of this condition was an instability in the control system setup of the EFW BFCVs that occurred when the valves were operating in the flow control mode. This resulted in the continuous cycling of the EFW BFCVs.

The root cause of this event was that the components comprising the EFW flow control system were not configured to appropriately respond to the changes observed in the system operating parameters.

Analysis has concluded that the unstable behavior seen in the flow control mode is explained if the valve gain or controller gain was improperly selected for both loops. With the gain improperly selected, a perturbation in EFW flow would have caused a feedback effect that would have setup a varying output signal to the FCVs. The analysis eliminated all other potential causes except the following all tied to system gain: 

 Controller proportional gain and reset interval 

 Valve trim (linear) results in greater than desirable flow when the valve is operating close to its seat 

 Valve stroke time set too fast 

 Volume booster setup improper for both valves. 

Follow on corrective actions are assigned to determine the sensitivity of the control system to these parameters and to determine if the potential identified causes may have shifted the system to unstable operation. These actions are also directed to determine

One contributing cause of this event was that there is no periodic testing that confirms the stability of the BFCVs in the automatic flow control mode. No startup test exists where the system was allowed to shift the BFCVs to the flow control mode and control in this mode. Calibration checks of the flow control loops and actuator are periodically performed; however, these tests do not provide sufficient intrusiveness to determine instabilities in system operation in all modes.

A second contributing cause of this event is that previous corrective actions were ineffective at determining the cause of the EFW flow instabilities and confirming the oscillations were corrected. EFW flow oscillations of similar magnitude and frequency were observed following a plant trip on January 21, 2013. There were missed opportunities noted in response to this event that may have led to earlier discovery of the causes.

Entergy spent a lot of money on this violation getting them to downplay it. Basically NRC inspectors walked to the roof and found it before Entergy did.

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2014-004-02 Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)

During a walkdown of the Emergency Diesel Generator Feed Tank A and B vent lines on October 22, 2014, an NRC Component Design Basis Inspection inspector identified corrosion on the Emergency Diesel Generator Feed Tank A and B vent lines where the vent lines pass through the roof. A visual inspection was performed and revealed that the corrosion had created through wall holes that could allow water into both the train A and B Emergency Diesel Generator Feed Tanks.

Follow up analysis has determined that some rainfall amount less than the postulated Probable Maximum Precipitation event could have resulted in water intrusion into the Emergency Diesel Generator A and B Feed Tanks that exceeds the 0.1 percent water content allowed by the vendor technical manual. This could have potentially affected the operability of both the A and B Train Emergency Diesel Generator Feed Tanks and subsequently both trains of the Emergency Diesel Generators. It is unknown how long this corrosion has existed. Compensatory measures were put in place to prevent water ingress should a large rainfall event occur.

Junk plant operators and maintenance people. The operators inspect that room at least every 8 hours. They didn't find filter housing on the floor in two days. They should have tested their assertion of operability in trying to start up DG without the filter housing attached? 

Just saying over a few years...these guys got a amazing record of unreliability with their DGs!!!! Amazing record...

Licensee Event Report (LER)2014-002-00 Inadequate Tightening of Starting Air Filter Housing results in Inoperable Train A Emergency Diesel Generator During an operator tour of the train A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room on March 1,2014 at approximately 12:39, it was discovered that the filter housing cover on the EDG A Starting Air Filter had unfastened from its base and was lying on the floor. The last successful start of the EDG A that demonstrated its capability to meet its safety function was on February 27, 2014 at 11:33 and it is postulated that the cover became unfastened during that run. Therefore, EDG was potentially inoperable for 2 days as a result of this condition. Since the condition was unknown at the time, the Technical Specifications required test of EDG B was not performed within 8 hours and the requirement to demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. circuits at least once per 8 hours or to be in Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours was not performed. The cause was insufficient tightening of the filter housing cover during maintenance on April 8, 2013. The insufficient tightening had not been preventing the EDG A’s ability to start within the required times prior to its becoming unfastened. EDG A was returned to OPERABLE condition by refastening the filter housing cover to its base. The other filter housings on EDG A and EDG B were verified to be properly fastened. An evaluation is being conducted to determine if a torque requirement is necessary for the filter housing covers…

Basically been inop since poor maintenance in 1999. They had a data point in the computer for low DG room ventilation flow, but nobody looked at it. No direct alarm on the control room annunciators. It is poor plant design like the emergency feedwater supply. Another big issue with the NRC.

So long term emergency feedwater supply to the steam generator (core cooling and the long term unreliable of the diesel generators...it is a bad mix. 

What else are they hiding on us? 

Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable Due To Room Exhaust Fan Failure Waterford 3 declared Emergency Diesel Generator B (EDG-B) inoperable on May 22, 2013 due to inability to maintain room temperature within design limits. Subsequent trouble shooting revealed that the variable pitch room exhaust fan had failed due to separation of the fan hub from the hub sleeve. Examination of recent operating data showed that the first evidence of fan failure had been during a surveillance test the previous month. An apparent cause evaluation determined the probable cause of the failure to be the result of repairs made during a previous (1999) fan motor replacement. These repairs caused additional stresses on the fan hub components which eventually resulted in fan hub separation from the hub sleeve. On 4/25/2013, hydramotor replacement retesting was completed by satisfactorily operating EDG-B per OP-903-068. A later review of trends indicated the fan LO FLOW computer point (PMC point D60417) was indicating abnormal (LO) for the duration of this run; the LO FLOW condition had not occurred prior to this 4/25/2013 run.The LO FLOW PMC point does not alarm in the control room and was not detected by Operations or Engineering at this time. This point is for long term trending and is not necessarily monitored during each EDG run. Computer trends indicated the fan motor current was approximately 64 amps and ambient temperature was approximately 60 deg. F.

 

Japan Systemic Corruption Inc

Toshiba Headquarters in Tokyo. 

Honestly, how can you trust Westinghouse and Toshiba? Toshiba owns Westinghouse?   

And Mitsubishi did the San Onofre steam generators.    Then they melted down three nuclear plants at Fukushima?  Construction scandal expands in Japan, shaking trust on architecture safety TOKYO, Nov. 2 (Xinhua) -- A construction scandal triggered by a tilting condominium in Yokohama further widens, as more cases of data fabrication in construction involving the company Asahi Kasei Construction Materials were found across Japan, shaking residents' trust on architecture safety.  The company, a subsidiary of chemical and materials science giant Asahi Kasei Corp., has been examining the 3,040 piling operations it conducted nationwide over the past decade since the scandal broke out.  According to local media, about 300 out of the 3,040 piling work projects conducted by the company were suspected to have been built with falsified data, and more than 10 people might have been involved in the falsification.  At a news conference held on Monday, Asahi Kasei Corp. said falsified data were found on 19 of the 41 projects handled by the male employee responsible for the tilting building in Yokohama, and "multiple people" were engaged in similar falsifications.  The firm declined to announce the exact number of the persons involved as the investigation is still under way.  The scandal broke out last month when a condominium building in Yokohama, southwest of Tokyo, was found to be tilting.  An investigation showed that about eight of the 70 concrete foundation piles supporting the apartment complex were not driven deep enough into the bedrock. Asahi Kasei Construction Materials, the company responsible for the piling work, said a male employee responsible for gathering data on the foundation construction forged the readings that determine whether piles have reached the load-bearing layer, as well as the amounts of cement poured to keep them in place.  In a hearing held by the firm, the employee admitted to falsifying the data by copying data of other piling work reports because he lost some of the documents that recorded the correct data and was unable to record accurate data for some other documents due to equipment malfunctions.  More cases of similar nature were found in the next few days by investigations held independently by municipalities and other entities.  The buildings involved include public condos and school buildings in Hokkaido, Tokyo and Yokohama.  In those later-found cases, the persons responsible for the piling work were not the one for the tilting building in Yokohama, causing widespread concerns over the safety of all projects done by the company.  "It is an extremely grave problem that different workers were falsifying data in projects in different regions. We think the firm had problems with its project management system all across the organization," said Keiichi Ishii, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, at a news conference last week. "We plan to thoroughly investigate the company's piling work and its internal mechanism for checking projects, as well as its compliance with laws, " said the minister.  The ministry carried out an on-site inspection into the Asahi Kasei subsidiary Monday afternoon in accordance with the construction business law.  Harumi Takahashi, governor of Hokkaido where at least four buildings were found with falsified data, also expressed his displeasure at the company by calling it "very unreliable", local media reported.  For ordinary home owners, although the local governments said there seemed to be no safety problems at the buildings involved in the scandal aside from the tilting condo in Yokohama, concerns over safety of their homes are spreading among them.  "What's going to happen when an earthquake occurs?" said a resident of a problematic building in Hokkaido.  Asahi Kasei is currently discussing compensation with the Yokohama condo residents. The firm is also expected to submit to the government a comprehensive report on the 3,040 cases on Nov. 13. As concerns are spreading, the central government is considering expanding its probe to look into work by construction companies other than Asahi Kasei Construction Materials.

FitzPatrick: What The Death Rattles Of A Dying Nuke Plant Looks Like

Doesn't Pilgrim with their Safety Relief Valves and Fitzpatrick with their Leaking main condenser look similar? 

Then they recently did the expensive main condenser retube job. What a waste of money?

This severely challenges Entergy's credibility on managing their Enterprise under changing times. Didn't Exelon's CEO Row admit he never seen the natural gas fracking miracle coming? How do these electric utilities CEOs make many tens of million dollars a year being so stupid?

Maybe Entergy can turn Fitzpatrick's new titanium main condenser tubes into radiation titanium gonad (testicles)protection shields for Palisades. (insider joke). The new titanium tubes are just a year old?  

(2014)"During the outage, workers will replace 184 fuel assemblies in the reactor and perform various maintenance activities, tests and inspections on plant equipment. Other major work includes a complete retube of the plant’s main condenser. The plant’s existing condenser tubes constructed of admiralty brass will be replaced with titanium tubes designed to be resistant to silt and other abrasive sediments found in Lake Ontario. 

The new condenser tube material was selected for its long-life expectancy and resistance to environmental erosion and corrosion conditions. The life span for the retubed condenser is projected to exceed the station’s extended period of operation. In 2008 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved FitzPatrick’s renewed operating license allowing the station to operate an additional 20 years beyond the original license, to 2034. 

“Significant capital investments are scheduled during this refueling outage that will contribute to FitzPatrick’s continued safe and reliable operations,” said Larry Coyle, site vice president and top Entergy official at FitzPatrick. “The FitzPatrick team has worked hard since our last refueling outage and the employees take pride in our commitment to safety first and foremost at all times.”

I got to give Entergy credit with the Pilgrim plant. They didn't purchase expensive top of the line SRVs. The replaced their dangerous and defective 3 stage SRVs with cheap obsolete, dangerous and defective 2 stage SRVs they had in the plant in 2009. I got to give Entergy credit, they are not going to waste money like they did at Fitzpatrick?   

FitzPatrick nuclear plant put off repairs, now plagued by water leaks

SCRIBA, N.Y. - An aging cooling system at the FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County is springing leaks so often that plant operators had to reduce power 11 times during the first three months of 2014 so that workers could plug the leaks.

FitzPatrick's condenser, which circulates Lake Ontario water for cooling, leaks far more any other U.S. plant, in part because FitzPatrick operators failed to repair the aging equipment, according to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

View full sizeThe rate of unplanned power reductions at FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County has fallen off the chart established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to monitor that indicator of plant performance. The number of unplanned power changes per 7,000 hours of operation is one measure of plant stability.NRC 

Now the leaks cause FitzPatrick to reduce power so often that the NRC keeps the plant under heightened oversight.

Nuclear regulators say the leaky condenser does not pose a major safety issue, and the leaks are expected to be resolved by a major repair during a refueling outage later this year.

But in a report issued Monday the NRC also criticized plant owner Entergy Corp. for not doing a better job of anticipating problems with the condenser tubes and getting them fixed before now.

The condenser at FitzPatrick was last replaced in 1995, and the metal tubes within the condenser have an expected lifespan of 15 years, NRC officials said.

"Entergy had earlier opportunities to recognize the degradation of the main condenser tubes and to act to address that,'' said Neil Sheehan, of the NRC, in an email. "There were condition reports internal to the plant in 2007 and 2009 that indicated the condenser was nearing its end of life.''

At this point, frequent plugging of the leaks is a "reasonable" tactic until the condenser can be overhauled during a refueling outage this fall, NRC officials said.

If a nuclear plant reduces power unexpectedly more than six times in 7,000 hours of operation, the NRC puts the plant under heightened oversight. FitzPatrick has been in that category since January 2013, and its unplanned power change rate recently plummeted to 18.4 per 7,000 hours.

On 15 other performance indicators measured by the NRC, FitzPatrick has good ratings.

An independent nuclear safety watchdog, David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the leaks pose no immediate threat absent other equipment failures, but they represent an "amazingly steep declining safety trend.''

Entergy officials continue to make safety their first concern, said Mark Sullivan, speaking for the company.

"The safety and security of FitzPatrick remains our top priority,'' Sullivan wrote in an email. "We applaud the team for the outstanding job they do every day in striving for excellence. We are proud of the way the Fitz team faces challenges and produces outstanding results.''

The condenser is a large metal box positioned beneath the nuclear plant's generating turbine. Steam that drives the turbine then passes through the condenser, where it is cooled and returned to a liquid state by water from Lake Ontario, which circulates in thousands of small metal tubes.

Silt and other abrasive sediments from the lake wear away at the inside of the tubes and can eventually cause leaks, said Sullivan, of Entergy. The most recent leak was May 4.

To find a leak and fix it, operators must reduce the plant's power output, typically by 50 percent. That cuts what the plant can earn from power sales.

Last year, Entergy officials openly expressed concern about the financial health of FitzPatrick, saying New York state's wholesale energy market did not allow the plant to earn enough revenue. Some Wall Street analysts said FitzPatrick was among a handful of plants at risk of closing for financial reasons. The company's fortunes have improved since then.

Thanks to high winter electric prices, Entergy Wholesale Commodities, the subsidiary that owns FitzPatrick and five other nukes, earned $444 million before taxes during the first quarter of 2014, compared with $194 million the year before.

Nuclear critics started drawing attention to FitzPatrick's condenser problem last year.
Lochbaum, a former nuclear plant engineer who now works for the Union of Concerned Scientists, filed a petition in July 2013 asking the NRC to order Entergy to make the repairs this year. Otherwise, he argued, the company might delay the repair. The NRC has yet to rule on that request.

At the time Lochbaum filed his petition, FitzPatrick had experienced 16 condenser tube leaks in a little more than two years, compared with just 12 during that time at all other U.S. nuclear plants.

"Troubling is the recent trend that strongly suggests the bad situation at FitzPatrick is getting worse,'' Lochbaum wrote in the 2013 petition. "FitzPatrick reported three condenser tube events in 2011, nine in 2012, and four during the first three months of 2013."

Contacted by email Friday, Lochbaum said the 11 events during the first quarter of 2014 represented an "amazingly steep'' decline in safety performance.

"Babe Ruth's home run record was beaten,'' Lochbaum wrote. "Lou Gehrig's continuous game record was beaten. Dan Marino's touchdown pass in a season record was beaten. Entergy's condenser tube leak event record will never be broken, even if some company wanted to try."

The condenser is the normal "heat sink'' for energy produced by the reactor core. If the condenser is unavailable, steam produced by the reactor core flows through pipes down into a large water well called the torus and gets cooled there, Lochbaum said. Other emergency systems cool the water inside the torus to allow it to continue to function as an energy sponge.

An unreliable condenser only becomes a safety issue if the backup systems fail also, Lochbaum said. That's what happened at the Fukushima meltdown in Japan. But allowing the condenser to deteriorate creates a "pre-existing impairment,'' Lochbaum said.

"If the luck runs out and the pre-existing impairment factors into a nuclear accident, it'll be hard for Entergy and the NRC to claim they took all reasonable measures to avoid it,'' he wrote

Entergy: Fitzpatrick Shutting Down Years Before Pilgrim (end of 2016)

Entergy to close FitzPatrick nuclear plant in Oswego County

SCRIBA, N.Y. – Entergy Corp. plans to shut down its money-losing FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Oswego County after the reactor runs out of fuel next year.

Entergy officials called a meeting of employees today to announce that the company will not install more enriched uranium fuel rods next September, which would be required to continue operating the facility beyond the end of 2016.

Barring some unexpected intervention by state officials, the 850-megawatt facility will shut down in late 2016 and begin laying off its 615 employees.  

Oswego County officials have been dreading the loss of FitzPatrick's $74 million annual payroll and its $17.3 million in yearly property tax payments. All told, FitzPatrick's operation is thought to support $500 million or more in local economic activity.

We recognize the consequences of the shutdown for our employees and the surrounding community and pledge to do our best to support both during this transition.'' said Leo Denault, CEO of Entergy, in a prepared statement. "As a company, we
are committed to ensuring the well-being of our employees, and appreciate their continued dedication to making safe, clean, secure and reliable operations a top priority,"

New York energy officials will review the impact of FitzPatrick's loss on the regional power grid. If they decide the shutdown should be delayed, they could order utility ratepayers to subsidize the plant temporarily, but only until replacement power sources are found.

Members of Gov. Andrew Cuomo's administration have been in private discussions with Entergy for months, apparently seeking a compromise that would keep FitzPatrick open. Many observers suspect the talks centered around Entergy's profitable Indian Point nuclear plant in Westchester County. Cuomo has fought Entergy's application for a 20-year extension of Indian Point's operating license.

Entergy has previously announced the closings of two New England nuclear plants that lose money, and FitzPatrick fits the same mold.

Pilgrim Diesel Generator; Example of "Are minds drifting at Pilgrim"?

This is my example of the NRC is managing the decline of Pilgrim. This should have been a lot bigger violation.

Personally I think this comes from all the hard starts these DGs have undergone in recent years in "Loss of Offsite Power" accidents. They are wearing them out. I predicted next LOOP, both DGs started up needing to supply the plant, one would fail on premature wear.  

***Any little corrupt trick to get onto the other side of the surveillance-"Entergy staff determined that the X-107B EDG had been and remained operable because the volume of fluid that had been discharged would not have produced a hydraulic lock on cylinder 9L and therefore would not have prevented the engine from starting. Entergy staff exited TS 3.5.F at 2:30 AM.

General incompetence-"In discussions with the inspectors, Entergy staff stated that the condition did not render the EDG inoperable, but that they were entering voluntary LCOs for the purpose of investigation and troubleshooting only."

***Bet you for months they have been adding water to the expansion tank. Have they been getting low level alarms when operating. They log filling the expansion tank...this is first thing the inspectors should have done is get the long term trend on filling the expansion and fill tanks.   

***From identification of the issue through correction of the problem by replacement of the 9L cylinder head, Pilgrim staff maintained that the condition had not caused the X-107B EDG to be inoperable.

***"Entergy staff stated that their EDGs were capable of operating with one cylinder removed from service; however, were unable to provide the inspectors with any design documents or engineering calculations showing that the EDGs would be capable of supplying design basis loads under such conditions."

***"Entergy procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 9, states that, for an immediate operability determination, “if a piece of information material to the determination is missing or unconfirmed, and cannot reasonably be expected to support a determination that the SSC [structure, system, or component] is OPERABLE, the SM (shift manager) should declare the SSC INOPERABLE.”


I still think Entergy massaged this into a non cited violation from a required shutdown...

August 11, 2015

SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED 

INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2015002

Pg 17

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 – 6 samples)

Description. On March 18, 2015, at 2:15 AM, operators entered TS 3.5.F, “Minimum Low Pressure Cooling and Diesel Generator Availability,” to perform pre-startup checks of the X-107B EDG in accordance with procedure 8.9.1, “Emergency Diesel Generator and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance,” Revision 129. TS 3.5.F provides a 72 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) that can be extended to 14 days provided that all low pressure core and containment cooling systems, and the SBO diesel generator are determined to be operable. When the engine was rolled over with air to verify that no fluid was present in any of the cylinders, engine coolant was instead observed to spray out of the open cylinder test cock on cylinder 9L. Entergy staff estimated that approximately six ounces of fluid was discharged. This issue was entered into the CAP as CR-2015-02109. Entergy staff determined that the X-107B EDG had been and remained operable because the volume of fluid that had been discharged would not have produced a hydraulic lock on cylinder 9L and therefore would not have prevented the engine from starting. Entergy staff exited TS 3.5.F at 2:30 AM. 

On March 18, 2015, at 9:16 AM, Entergy staff determined that an inspection of cylinder 9L should be performed, and entered TS 3.5.F. Initial troubleshooting was inconclusive as to where the leak was coming from, leading Entergy staff to exit TS 3.5.F and prepare additional troubleshooting plans. At 4:00 PM, Entergy staff entered TS 3.5.F to continue troubleshooting and perform additional inspections of the cylinder head. The scope of this activity subsequently expanded to include replacement of the associated cylinder head. In discussions with the inspectors, Entergy staff stated that the condition did not render the EDG inoperable, but that they were entering voluntary LCOs for the purpose of investigation and troubleshooting only. Entergy staff performed surveillance procedure 8.9.16.1, “Manually Start and Load Blackout Diesel via the Shutdown Transformer,” Revision 48, at 5:40 PM, to extend the TS 3.5.F allowed outage time to 14 days. Testing of the replaced head showed the source of the leakage to have been from the area of the cylinder exhaust valves. Entergy’s immediate corrective actions included replacement of the X-107B EDG 9L cylinder head and sending out the damaged cylinder head for analysis by a vendor. The completion of the analysis by the vendor is being tracked by CR-2015-2109. Entergy staff exited TS 3.5.F following successful post maintenance testing at 6:11 AM on March 21, 2015. From identification of the issue through correction of the problem by replacement of the 9L cylinder head, Pilgrim staff maintained that the condition had not caused the X-107B EDG to be inoperable. Entergy staff stated that their EDGs were capable of operating with one cylinder removed from service; however, were unable to provide the inspectors with any design documents or engineering calculations showing that the EDGs would be capable of supplying design basis loads under such conditions.

The inspectors reviewed CR-2015-02109 and the associated apparent cause evaluation (ACE). While the inspectors agreed that the as-found condition would not have prevented the X-107B EDG from starting, they did not conclude that the EDG remained operable. Although the source of the engine coolant leak was unknown at the time of discovery, it could reasonably have been due to a crack in the cylinder head. Such a leak would have the possibility of worsening during engine operation. Although hydraulic locking of the cylinder would not be a realistic concern during engine operation, increased engine coolant leakage into the cylinder would result in water intrusion into the crankcase and lubricating oil sump, which would eventually cause the engine to fail to operable after engine coolant had been identified in cylinder 9L.

Entergy procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 9, states that, for an immediate operability determination, “if a piece of information material to the determination is missing or unconfirmed, and cannot reasonably be expected to support a determination that the SSC [structure, system, or component] is OPERABLE, the SM (shift manager) should declare the SSC INOPERABLE.” In this case, at the time of discovery, although the cause of the leak had not been established, it could reasonably have been due to a crack in the cylinder head. For the reasons discussed above, it could be concluded that this condition would not support a determination that the X-107B EDG remained operable. Additionally, an operability determination example presented in Attachment 9.1, “Operability Classification Guide,” of this procedure indicates that an EDG that cannot run for the duration assumed in the current licensing basis should be considered inoperable. SDBD-61, “Design Basis Document for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG),” states, “The ‘mission time’ for the design basis Loss-of-Coolant- Accident (LOCA) is 30 days for the long term containment cooling analysis, as described in TDBD100 “Design Basis Document for Design Basis Accidents, Transients and

Special Events (DBATS).” Therefore, the inspectors further concluded that Pilgrim staff also should reasonably have concluded that the X-107B EDG should have been declared inoperable after engine coolant had been identified in cylinder 9L.

TS 3.5.F, “Minimum Low Pressure Cooling and Diesel Generator Availability,” provides a 72 hour allowed outage time for one EDG, provided the remaining EDG is demonstrated to be operable per TS SR 4.5.F.1. TS SR 4.5.F.1 requires that, within 24 hours, a determination be made that the operable EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause failure, or that the monthly TS-required surveillance test be performed for the operable EDG, and that, within 1 hour and every 8 hours thereafter, correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability for each offsite circuit be verified. If these requirements cannot be met, TS 3.5.F further requires that the reactor be placed in cold shutdown within 24 hours. Since Entergy staff did not declare the X-107B EDG inoperable as a result of the engine coolant leakage issue, but instead entered what Entergy staff considered to be voluntary LCOs for the purpose of investigation, only the portion of TS SR 4.5.F.1 for offsite breaker verification was performed. Therefore, the inspectors additionally concluded that Entergy staff’s failure to perform the required determination that the operable EDG was not inoperable due to common cause failure constituted a violation of TS 3.5.F.

The TS-required monthly surveillance test was satisfactorily completed on the X-107A EDG on April 2, 2015, approximately two weeks after the X-107B EDG 9L cylinder head coolant leakage event. While this did not eliminate the TS violation discussed above, it did demonstrate that, from a risk perspective, the X-107A EDG had been capable of performing its design safety function during that period.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that Entergy’s inadequate operability determination of the X-107B EDG after engine coolant was found in one of the cylinders, and resultant failure to determine that the X-107A EDG was not inoperable due to a common cause failure, or to perform the complete TS-specified EDG monthly surveillance test, within 24 hours in accordance with TS SR 4.5.F.1, was a performance deficiency that was within Entergy’s ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Entergy staff inadequately determined that the X-107B EDG was operable, which resulted in the operability of the X-107A EDG not being verified, either through determination that it was not inoperable due to a common cause failure or performing TS SR 4.5.F.1 in its entirety. 

In accordance with IMC 0609.04, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,” the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.

This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Conservative Bias, because Entergy staff did not use decision making practices that emphasized prudent choices over those that are simply allowed. Specifically, Entergy staff’s operability determination for the X-107B EDG was based on the conclusion that the as found condition would not have caused the engine to be inoperable because it would not have created a hydraulic lock; they did not consider that the condition would likely worsen during EDG operation, nor did their operability determination consider EDG mission time [H.14]. 

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” states, in part, that “activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings… and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.” Procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 9, states, in part, that “if a piece of information material to the determination is missing or unconfirmed, and cannot reasonably be expected to support a determination that the SSC [structure, system, or component] is OPERABLE, the SM (shift manager) should declare the SSC INOPERABLE.” Also, during any period when one EDG is inoperable, TS 3.5.F allows continued reactor operation during the succeeding 72 hours, provided that the remaining EDG is demonstrated to be operable in accordance with TS SR 4.5.F.1. TS SR 4.5.F.1 requires that, within 24 hours, a determination be made that the operable EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause failure, or that the monthly surveillance test be performed on the operable EDG in accordance with TS SR 4.9.A.1.a, and that, within 1 hour and once every 8 hours thereafter, correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability for each offsite circuit be verified. If this requirement cannot be met, then the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

Contrary to the above, on March 18, 2015, Entergy staff performed an inadequate operability determination of the X-107B EDG following indications of engine coolant leakage in cylinder 9L, the X-107A EDG was not demonstrated to be operable in accordance with TS SR 4.5.F.1, in that a determination that the X-107A EDG was not inoperable due to a common cause failure was not made, nor was the monthly surveillance test performed on the X-107A EDG in accordance with TS SR 4.9.A.1.a. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy staff entered this issue into their CAP as CR-2015-2109, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000293/2015002-02, Inadequate Operability Determination for the X-107B EDG Results in TS Violation)

Pilgrim: I Am Startled In A Good Way With The Honesty Today

Well, the NRC is going to report it all in a inspection report anyways.

"Plant Struggles To Maintain Its Aging Plant"

Pilgrim plant workers aim for a safe shutdown

By David Abel Globe Staff  October 31, 2015

PLYMOUTH — Behind the barbed-wire fences and heavily armed guards protecting the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Steve Verrochi and his department heads huddled around a long table to review the daily report of potential safety concerns at one of the nation’s most troubled nuclear plants. 

A component of the security system had been declared “unreliable” and an “unexpected alarm” had gone off in the plant’s control room. Some fans at the huge plant had failed, and a radiation monitor required repairs after being struck by lightning. There were leaky seals, malfunctioning gauges, corroding pipes, and a computer that ceased providing real-time data about reactor power.

***And the maintenance workers were falling behind on their repairs. 

“We need to get back on track,” Verrochi, the plant’s general manager, told his staff at that recent morning meeting, as a Globe reporter looked on. “The last couple of weeks we’ve been off the mark.”  

This month, Entergy Corp. announced that it will shutter the money-losing plant no later than June 2019. Plant officials, as well as federal regulators, insist that Pilgrim remains safe, even as company officials say the plant is losing about $40 million a year, and that they expect to pay tens of millions of dollars to comply with new federal inspections. But antinuclear activists argue that the plant is unsafe and fear that Entergy will now scrimp on safety to save cash.

 

Maintenance at the 43-year-old plant has received increased scrutiny since the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission downgraded Pilgrim’s safety ranking in September, designating the plant as having one of the nation’s three least-safe reactors.

The meeting in a white-walled conference room of the operations building reflected the risks of continuing to run a 43-year-old plant, which will start the decades-long task of decommissioning after it closes.

‘There’s a lot of obsolete stuff out there. We do a lot of repairs.’ 

John Ohrenberger, who oversees maintenance staff at plant 

During the visit, the plant’s attention to safety and security concerns was evident nearly everywhere throughout the sprawling facility along Cape Cod Bay. 

Guards in black fatigues, who carry assault rifles and handguns, patrol the property and keep a close watch from scores of cameras and bulletproof towers. They regularly train for terrorist attacks and store weapons in gun lockers and armored vehicles, while local and federal law enforcement officials patrol the waters beyond the rocky sea wall off the coast. 

Visitors must pass through a gantlet of security before nearing sensitive areas, including massive concrete barriers to protect against truck bombs, steel turnstile doors that require handprints to open, and X-ray machines that examine the contents of bags and others that check for explosive residue.  

Inside, posters exhort employees to mind their ALARA, the ubiquitous acronym reminding them to reduce their radiation exposure to “as low as reasonably achievable.” 

Others remind them that “every millirem counts” and “we are all responsible for radiation protection.”

Craig F. Walker/Globe Staff 

A spent fuel pool contains thousands of fuel assemblies.

The average US resident is exposed to about 620 millirem of radiation a year, according to the regulatory commission; Pilgrim allows its employees near radiation until they absorb 1,200 millirem. If there’s a major emergency, plant officials allow them to be exposed to as much as 20,000 millirem. 

 

High doses of radiation can cause cancer, but the regulatory commission says on its website that “there are no data to establish a firm link between cancer and doses below about 10,000 millirem.” 

Employees who work in the containment area at Pilgrim are required to wear devices that track their radiation

John Ohrenberger, who oversees 95 employees who do maintenance at the plant, said he used to get about 1,200 millirem of radiation a year as a nuclear mechanic. He wasn’t concerned about the routine radiation exposure, even as his staff’s workload has risen to address the plant’s aging systems. 

***“There’s a lot of obsolete stuff out there,” he said. “We do a lot of repairs.” 

Those jobs include working inside the drywell that houses the reactor, where hundreds of highly radioactive fuel rods generate steam that turns the plant’s turbines to create electricity. 

Plant officials use equipment to suck nitrogen out of the air before the workers open the steel hatch to enter the steamy drywell, which is where Tom Wonsey found himself last January when one of four critical safety valves failed. 

***The nuclear mechanic was part of a team that spent about 30 hours wearing special anticontamination suits, using wrenches to replace the bulky valve, which weighs more than 1,000 pounds and helps cool the reactor when it powers down. That failure, following previous safety valve problems, led the regulatory commission to downgrade the plant’s safety rating. 

Yet the prolonged proximity to the reactor didn’t faze Wonsey, who estimates he has been exposed to about 1,000 millirem of radiation this year. “I’ve never seen anything to be concerned about the plant’s safety,” he said between jobs at the plant.

Craig F. Walker/Globe Staff 

David Noyes of Entergy walked past dry cask storage units last week during a tour of the Pilgrim nuclear plant.

Plant officials showed the redundant systems they would use to prevent a calamity, including water pumps and diesel generators stored in multiple locations, well above sea level. They would be used in the event the plant lost power to cool the reactor, as occurred in Japan after a tsunami in 2011 ravaged the Fukushima nuclear plant. 

While Entergy has invested millions of dollars in safety upgrades to comply with new federal regulations triggered by Fukushima, some longtime employees acknowledge they can only prepare for what they can foresee. 

“When Fukushima happened, it took everyone aback,” said Paul Smith, a staff engineer who has worked at Pilgrim

***

since 1968. “It taught us we don’t know everything. It also taught us modesty.” 

In the coming years, as the plant enters the decommissioning process, its employees will still have dangerous work to do. They’ll have to transfer 3,162 highly radioactive fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool to massive casks, a delicate, expensive task that will leave them indefinitely on a large concrete pad beside the reactor building. 

Helping ensure that the plant complies with federal safety regulations is Erin Carfang, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s senior resident inspector at Pilgrim. 

She said she goes wherever she wants at the plant and has issued multiple violations to Pilgrim, including the one earlier this year that led the regulatory commission to downgrade its safety rating. 

***If the plant becomes unsafe, Carfang said, she wouldn’t hesitate to recommend it be closed before 2019. She has young children and lives near the plant, she added.
“We believe there is an adequate safety margin for the plant to continue operating,” she said in her office. “We have a vested interest in keeping it safe.” 

So why didn't the NRC listen to me in my 2013 petition on the SRVs? I had everything in my 2013 petition the NRC later discovered in their 2015 SRV inspection report and violation finding.  

At the recent morning meeting, the 27-page report the group reviewed showed that the plant’s staff had already been exposed to nearly 97 percent of the radiation that Pilgrim officials had set as a goal for the year. 

Verrochi also heard reports from maintenance, engineering, security, and other departments about concerns both big and small. 

***Verrochi worried that “mental distractions” could lead to “severe consequences.” 

“It’s all about being deliberate,” he reminded the staff. “If you find yourself in a situation where your mind drifts, it’s time to readjust.” 

Verrochi discussed how to “finish strong in 2019” and gently reprimanded the staff for being three minutes late to the meeting, which prompted the department heads to flash a thumbs-down sign in unison. 

Then he praised the staff for their alertness and “excellent job” responding to a leak in the control room, prompting a thumbs-up from the staff. 

“Be deliberate and act with integrity,” he told them before adjourning the meeting.