Wolf Creek: Is This What Got Both NRC Inspectors Booted Off The Property?

Update Aug 26

Now the NRC pops out saying they could not substantiate intimidation. It seems like the intimidating chilling atmosphere come from a Quality Assurance "non employee" and this OI guy comes as a Quality Assurance "employee"?    

August 21 , 2015

Adam C. Heflin, President and

Chief Executive Officer

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

P.O. Box 411

Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: CLOSURE OF INVESTIGATION (01 4-2014-019)

Dear Mr. Heflin:

This refers to an investigation conducted by the NRC's Office of Investigations regarding activities at Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The Office of Investigations initiated the investigation to determine whether a quality assurance specialist at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Burlington, Kansas, was the subject of discrimination for raising safety concerns regarding a design change modification package. 

Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, the allegation that a quality assurance specialist employed by the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station was the subject of discrimination for raising safety concerns regarding a design change modification package was not substantiated. The NRC plans no further action related to the discrimination aspect of this allegation and considers this investigation closed.

You should note that final NRC documents may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act subject to redaction of information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Requests under the Freedom of Information Act should be made in accordance with 10 CFR 9.23, Requests for Records. Information is accessible from the NRC's website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-request.html#how.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,'' a copy of this letter will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Docket: 50-482

License: NPF-42

Sincerely,

7Jt<L ( (_ l4y

Michael C. Hay, Team Leader

Allegations Coordination and Enforcement

Both coming from new reactors? They seem light? What do you see?

My bad, the resident has no history of new reactors?  

Resident,

Thomas joined the NRC’s Region IV office in Arlington, Texas, in 2013 as a project engineer in the Resident Inspector Development Program. Previously he worked for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration overseeing facility and infrastructure upgrade projects. Thomas holds a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from Southern University at Baton Rouge and a master’s degree in business administration from Our Lady of the Lake University in San Antonio. He is a registered professional engineer in the state of Texas.

The senior resident,

Dodson joined the NRC in 2007 as an engineer in the Office of New Reactors in Rockville, Md., as part of the Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program. Most recently he was a Resident Inspector at the Ginna nuclear power plant outside Rochester, N.Y. Prior to that, he was the temporary Resident and Senior Resident Inspector at Fitzpatrick and Hope Creek stations. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in mechanical and aerospace engineering and a bachelor’s degree in religious studies from the University of Missouri.

More likely both NRC inspector got fired from Wolf Creek because they ignored the concerns of the discriminated employee?   

Maybe both NRC inspectors resigned from Wolf Creek over NRC upper management not backing the on-scene inspectors. They asked for a immediate reassignment on protest...

What does this mean...what does it buy them this is so important? 

"gain margin for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI)" 

Have the inspectors been nit-picking the plant?

See how pathetically weak the NRC. It took a complaint by a contractor to OSHA to get the NRC off their ass over intimidation issues with the extremely important Quality Assurance Group?  

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT LETTER FORWOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION (REPORT 0500482/2014001)

The NRC also issued a Chilling Effect Letter (CEL) (ML13233A208) to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation on August 19, 2013. The CEL was issued because the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had issued a finding of discrimination for raising safety concerns against a former employee of an engineering contractor employed by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, and due to the NRC identifying that a chilled work environment existed within your facility’s Quality Assurance Group.

The idea the agency can't immediately eradicate a sense of intimidation within a week of discovery again shows how pathetically weak the agency. This has been going on since Aug 2013 and they have made such pathetic progress.

The forces the "be" has turned the agency into a cheap absolution process.     

April 7, 2015 

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – NRC CHILLING EFFECT LETTER FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2015008

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. The inspection focused on the station’s progress in addressing safety culture issues related to the NRC Chilling Effect Letter dated August 19, 2013, (ML13233A208). The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

*However, the team identified that some general work environment issues associated with supervisory styles and trust in management remain within the QA, Security and HP departments.

*Although the focus group interviews indicated that some QA personnel stated that they were not sure if they were ready to fully trust licensee management, the licensee has made reasonable progress in addressing the SCWE in the QA department.

*However, prior to receiving the CEL, the QA organization had had an internal policy that QA personnel could only initiate CRs following approval by their supervisor or manager. 

Between problems in Pilgrim's LOOP last year with their Diesel Generator FLEX-SBO air compressor and this...I think all FLEX systems are junk. The NRC is just not enforcing good standards with the flex gear. It is for show systems...

The SBO and Flex crap...

August 6, 2015

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2015002

Description. In mid-2012, the licensee decided to add station blackout (SBO) diesel generators in order to gain margin for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI). The SBO diesel generators were originally expected to be completed during the spring 2013 Refueling Outage, however construction fell behind schedule. In April 2013, the licensee opted to finish the SBO diesel generator installation online. The licensee acknowledged that it could not energize a safety related bus from the SBO diesel generators at power without rendering the bus inoperable, and that testing to fully demonstrate capability could not be performed until the spring 2014 mid-cycle outage. In August 2013, the licensee announced their plans to revise the station Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and, by extension, the MSPI to include credit for the SBO diesel generator system effective October 1, 2013. The inspectors expressed concerns that it was not appropriate to take the credit for the equipment without performing all testing necessary to verify the equipment’s capability to perform its required function. The licensee documented the testing of each of the components under Work Order 12- 354257-205. The disposition credited the load bank testing of the engines, the successful racking of the breakers, and the continuity checks of the associated cables as sufficient to have high confidence that the equipment would perform its required function. The licensee declared the system operational on September 26, 2013 and the revised MSPI PRA inputs were submitted to the NRC to be effective for the 4th quarter performance indicator data.

On April 25, 2014, the licensee attempted testing on the NB01 train A Class 1E 4kV bus to show the safety related bus could be powered by the SBO diesel generators. While attempting to load the bus from the SBO diesel generators, feeder breaker PB0508 opened unexpectedly, which de-energized NB01. Troubleshooting identified the cause of PB0508 opening was due to incorrect wiring of a current transformer inside the NB0114 breaker cubicle. An extent of condition also identified the same wiring performed incorrectly inside NB0214 breaker cubicle on the NB02 train B Class 1E 4kV bus. Neither safety related 4kV bus could have been powered from the SBO diesel generators for the time the system was credited as being functional, from September 26, 2013, to April 25, 2014. The wiring was corrected and the test was performed satisfactorily prior to restarting the reactor.

The licensee wrote Condition Report 83370 and performed an apparent cause evaluation. The licensee found that Design Change Package 14117 removed the existing current transformers (CT) and wiring in the NB0114 and NB0214 cabinets, because the existing CTs did not have the correct turns ratio required by the new design. When installing new CTs, the licensee found that they would not fit as designed. The licensee stopped work on the new CT installation but continued work on the wiring installation. The licensee decided to re-orient the CTs so that they would fit into the NB0114 and NB0214 cabinets. Wiring drawing WIP E-009-00132-W08-A-1 was revised, but the terminations that were already completed on terminal block “N” inside the cabinet were not changed to match the drawing.

When the modification completed the current transformers were installed per revision 2

of the drawing, and the wiring was installed per revision 1. This went unnoticed because the work was performed under separate sub-work orders. After the work was completed, the instrument meter relay team tested the cabling from terminal block N to the SBO diesel generators, but they did not test the cabling from terminal block N to the current transformers because it was not specified in the work order. If it had been, this wiring error could have been detected even without a full functional system test.

Wolf Creek: NRC Cleaning House?

You don't see this very often with getting both a new senior resident inspector and a new resident inspector at the same. What is going on at Wolf Creek?  Usually they alternate replacing the residents. I don't think it is safe, both these guys being replaced at the same time. 

Aug 17, 2015

NRC Names New Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has selected Fabian Thomas as the new Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station located in Burlington, Kan.

“Fabian Thomas’ experience, training, and commitment to safety will help the NRC in its mission to protect people and the environment by ensuring the safe operation of Wolf Creek,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas. 

Thomas joined the NRC’s Region IV office in Arlington, Texas, in 2013 as a project engineer in the Resident Inspector Development Program. Previously he worked for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration overseeing facility and infrastructure upgrade projects. Thomas holds a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from Southern University at Baton Rouge and a master’s degree in business administration from Our Lady of the Lake University in San Antonio. He is a registered professional engineer in the state of Texas. 

Each U.S. commercial nuclear power plant has at least two Resident Inspectors. Thomas joins Senior Resident Inspector Doug Dodson at the site. They serve as the agency’s eyes and ears at the facility, conducting inspections, monitoring significant work projects, and interacting with plant workers and the public.


The Wlf Creek Resident Inspectors can be reached at 620-364-8653.


Aug 17, 2015

NRC Names New Senior Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has selected Douglas Dodson as the new Senior Resident Inspector at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station located in Burlington, Kan.

“Douglas Dodson's technical experience and regulatory perspective will assist the NRC in carrying out its mission of protecting people and the environment and ensuring the safe operation of Wolf Creek,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas. 

Dodson joined the NRC in 2007 as an engineer in the Office of New Reactors in Rockville, Md., as part of the Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program. Most recently he was a Resident Inspector at the Ginna nuclear power plant outside Rochester, N.Y. Prior to that, he was the temporary Resident and Senior Resident Inspector at Fitzpatrick and Hope Creek stations. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in mechanical and aerospace engineering and a bachelor’s degree in religious studies from the University of Missouri. 

Each U.S. commercial nuclear power plant has at least two Resident Inspectors. Dodson joins Resident Inspector Fabian Thomas at the site. They serve as the agency’s eyes and ears at the facility, conducting inspections, monitoring significant work projects, and interacting with plant workers and the public. 

The Wolf Creek resident inspectors can be reached at 620-364-8653.

 

Grand Gulf Got Reactor Vessel Control Problem also

Kind of sneaky way they did this...

 

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION –NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2015002

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV, non-cited violation with three examples for the licensee’s failure to update the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR

50.71(e). Specifically, the licensee failed to update the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 15.2.2.2.2.1, “Generator Load Rejection with Bypass,” to appropriately reflect the anticipated plant response to a full load reject after the completion of the extended power uprate (EPU). Additionally, the inspectors determined that the licensee did not adequately describe the EPU changes in the UFSAR Chapters 11 (Radioactive Waste Management) and 12 (Radiation Protection) and submit an update to the NRC.

Description. Entergy Procedure EN-LI-113-01, “Updated Final Safety Analysis Change Process,” Revision 1, describes that the Entergy fleet process for maintaining the UFSAR is consistent with NEI 98-03, “Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports.” Paragraph 5.3.1 [2] of EN-LI-113-01 requires that “the UFSAR shall be updated to include all Safety Analyses and evaluations performed by or on behalf of Entergy to support approved license amendments, or to support conclusions that changes did not require a license amendment per 10 CFR 50.59…” This expectation is consistent with NEI 98-03 Revision 1, which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.181, “Content of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report in Accordance with Title 10 CFR 50.71(e).” Additionally, NEI 98-03 requires that the UFSAR be updated annually or within six months after each refueling outage, which was not completed in the three examples described above.

 

 

 

 

 

Tip: Might Be Implicated in River Bends Breaker Problems?



                                UNITED STATES
                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                    OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
                          WASHINGTON, D.C.  20555

                              December 15, 1989


Information Notice No. 89-45, SUPPLEMENT 2:  METALCLAD, LOW-VOLTAGE
                                                POWER CIRCUIT BREAKERS
                                                REFURBISHED WITH
                                                SUBSTANDARD PARTS

Addressees:

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.

Purpose:

This information notice supplement is being provided to alert addressees to
the problem of potentially defective General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse
(W) metalclad, low-voltage power circuit breakers and associated equipment
supplied to nuclear power plants by the Satin American Corporation (SA) and
its affiliate, Circuit Breaker Systems, Incorporated, both of Shelton,
Connecticut, or by any of SA's representatives.  Of particular concern are
GE EC-type, electromechanical, overcurrent trip devices, in safety-related
applications, or available for use in such applications, supplied by these
organizations.

It is expected that recipients will review this information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to
avoid similar problems.  However, suggestions contained in this notice do
not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

NRC Information Notice (IN) No. 89-45 discussed a General Electric (GE) type
AKF-2-25 metalclad, low-voltage power circuit breaker (field discharge
configuration) supplied to the Quad Cities nuclear power plant by SA that
was found to have been built or refurbished with nonstandard and substandard
parts.

Supplement 1 to IN 89-45 discussed the NRC's findings on GE EC-type trip
devices from follow-up inspections at utilities that had procured circuit
breakers and related electrical equipment such as trip devices from SA.  As
discussed in detail in the supplement, the NRC found EC-type trip devices
supplied by SA that were refurbished with nonstandard and possibly
substandard parts, or old, used parts, in nonstandard combinations using
questionable fabrication methods.  Some of these devices had failed in
service or testing. 

Additional tests were conducted by utility personnel and were observed by
representatives of the original manufacturer and the NRC.  In these tests,
the devices

8912110177
.
                                                    IN 89-45, Supplement 2
                                                    December 15, 1989
                                                    Page 2 of 3


exhibited inconsistent performance including some test failures. 
Subsequently, the NRC obtained more of these SA-supplied trip units and had
them tested and examined at the GE Apparatus Service Facility in Atlanta,
Georgia.  This facility is currently the sole original equipment
manufacturer of EC-type trip devices.  The results of this testing were also
unsatisfactory, with virtually all the devices tested exhibiting
out-of-specification operation of one or more of their functions in some
portion of their design operating ranges.  The devices were not adjustable
such that they would operate within tolerance at all points within their
nameplate-identified characteristic curves, and some of them failed to
perform one or more of their trip functions entirely.  Post-testing
examination of these devices confirmed that they were rebuilt with used
parts, in incorrect combinations.  Some of the parts were so degraded with
age that they were no longer suitable for use, and some of the
unsatisfactory test results were directly attributable to the discrepancies
in the conditions found.  Some of the fabrication methods used could
contribute to erratic operation and failure.  Such latent defects would not
be readily detectable during routine inspection and testing and could render
the affected circuit breakers unreliable during normal operation due to
spurious tripping and lack of overcurrent protection.

The SA facility in Shelton, Connecticut, suffered major damage in a fire in
July 1989.  The resultant destruction of records may make it difficult or
impossible for SA's customers to audit the company and obtain the
information necessary to assure that previously purchased equipment was in
full compliance with the applicable specifications and purchase order
requirements.

In order to assess the scope of the problem with regard to GE EC-type trip
devices, all nuclear utilities were contacted by the Nuclear Management and
Resources Council (NUMARC) at the request of the NRC to determine which
utilities had purchased low-voltage electrical switchgear or related
equipment from SA that was used or available for use in safety-related
applications.  Information thus obtained indicated that about 40 utilities
had purchased equipment of the types in question in the last 5 or 6 years,
much of which was purchased as commercial grade equipment and was used in or
available for use in nonsafety-related applications only.  Of the NUMARC
respondents, several utilities initially reported that they had GE AK-type
circuit breakers containing EC-type over-current trip devices supplied by SA
which were possibly used in safety-related applications.  These utilities
subsequently contacted the NRC. 

All licensees thus far identified that have GE EC-type trip devices
installed in safety-related circuit breakers have committed to acceptable
courses of action to replace the suspect trip devices or to consult with GE
in reviewing and determining the suitability of the trip devices for
continued use.

As a result of the NRC's continuing inspections of the types of equipment in
question at licensed facilities, the NRC has identified additional
SA-supplied equipment that may be defective.  NRC inspections of SA-supplied
Westinghouse low-voltage switchgear at several plants, including type DB-25
and DS-416 circuit breakers at the Cooper Nuclear Station and the Zion
Nuclear Power Station respectively, have identified apparent irregularities
when compared to the original equipment.  Specifically, apparent differences
in pole shaft and spring-pin configuration, wiring type, frame finish, and
nameplates were observed..

                                                    IN 89-45, Supplement 2
                                                    December 15, 1989
                                                    Page 3 of 3


It is possible, therefore, that this and other equipment supplied by SA may
not be suitable for service without additional operability reviews in
consultation with the original equipment manufacturer.

The NRC is interested in obtaining information on circuit breakers and
related pieces of equipment that have been found with deficiencies such as
those described in IN 89-45, Supplement 1 thereto, and this supplement. 
Documentation, in as much detail as practicable, of any such deficiencies
noted, especially in recent procurements and in cases of possible improper
servicing or refurbishment, is important.  Licensees may communicate
information of this type by telephone to the technical contacts listed
belw.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response.  If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.




                              Charles E. Rossi, Director
                              Division of Operational Events Assessment
                              Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical Contacts:  S. D. Alexander, NRR
                    (301) 492-0995

                    U. Potapovs, NRR
                    (301) 492-0984

Salem Nuke Plant Is Heading For A Big Event Because Of Maintenance Budget Cutbacks?

Updated Aug 8:

LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK TWP. — The Salem 2 nuclear reactor has returned to service after a brief shutdown, a company official said. 

According to Joe Delmar, spokesman for the plant's operator, PSEG Nuclear, the unit began sending electricity back out over the regional power grid at 7:39 a.m. Sunday.
Salem 2 automatically shut down at 3:39 p.m. Wednesday because of an electrical circuit failure on one of the four reactor coolant pumps. 

When any of those four pumps — which circulate cooling water around the reactor vessel — fails, it automatically causes the reactor to trip off-line. 

Workers traced that pump circuit failure to an electrical issue with a drain pump which removes condensed water off of the turbine on the non-nuclear side of the plant.
The drain pump tripped and a relay switch did not function properly causing the electrical circuit failure on the one reactor coolant pump...

Updated on Aug 6:

Is it a electrical problem, detector or a frozen reactor coolant pump or motor? 

***Salem reactor shut down by electrical problem

Jeff Montgomery, The News Journal 8:26 a.m. EDT August 6, 2015 

An unexplained circuit breaker closing triggered an automatic shutdown of the Salem Unit 2 reactor (left dome-shaped structure of two at right) Wednesday afternoon. The incident is under investigation, with not restart time reported The plant was reported as holding in a temperature and pressure mode below “critical” nuclear reaction operations. 

An electrical malfunction triggered an automatic shutdown of the Salem Unit 2 reactor Wednesday afternoon, with the cause still under investigation. 

PSEG Nuclear spokesman Joe Delmar said the system had been online for 387 consecutive days before the shutdown at 3:39 p.m. Wednesday. 

A Nuclear Regulatory Commission report said a circuit breaker on a part of the system that supplies one of the reactor’s coolant pumps shut off after a surge indication. All safety systems operated as expected, with Salem’s reactor remaining in a stable mode.

 *** NRC daily report: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW REACTOR COOLANT FLOW 

"This 4-hour and 8-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 had an unplanned automatic reactor trip. The trip occurred because the 2H 4kV infeed breaker tripped on over current protection which deenergized the 2H 4kV group bus resulting in a reactor trip on reactor coolant flow due to the loss of the 21 reactor coolant pump [RCP]. The 21 RCP remains unavailable. The cause of the over current protection trip on the 2H 4kV infeed breaker is unknown at this time.

Posted originally on 7/31/2015

How come the NRC never discloses why the licencees reduced the maintenance?

This facility has two plants three plants(Hope Creek and 2 Salem plants)...these guys could have upwards of 10 30 million components and parts. A small change in maintenance philosophy can and does lead to a runaway component breakdown uncontrollable by the licencees. It demoralizes the staff.

Why didn't the NRC pickup this change in maintenance frequency and write up a NRC report on it before the breaker failure? Why isn't the NRC anticipatory instead of reactionary?

Just saying, on my River Bend special inspection, there has been a widespread breakdown in GE Magne-Blast breaker reliability over maintenance issues. I am sure is is not limited to breaker (Salem), but a global maintenance financial issue across the whole plant and across whole fleets of plants.

Just as the NRC expressed it in the finding concerning broad "Equipment Reliability" and entry into LCOs...an increasing trend in equipment failures outside the breaker failure. How bad is this going to get?

Broken bolts found in all of PSEG Nuclear's Salem 2 reactor cooling pumps LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK TWP.  

PSEG Nuclear has now found broken-off bolt pieces inside all four of the huge pumps which help cool the nuclear reactor at its Salem 2 plant, officials said.

Errant bolt heads have been found in the bottom of the reactor coolant pumps and even at the bottom of the reactor core itself, settled under the nuclear fuel rods.

And some of the bolt heads that have broken off have not yet been accounted for, federal regulators confirmed Tuesday.

The bolts secure parts known as turning vanes on the inside of the pump. The vanes direct water out of the pump into the reactor where it circulates to cool the core.

We seen this a last year with their poor maintenance on the Reactor coolant pumps with nut/bolts breaking off and entering the coolant. It cost them a tremendous amount of money with the plant staying off the line. I am just saying with penny pinching, it takes a delay time for the equipment failure to show up. Then when the plant is reflooded with monies for the proper maintenance, it takes a long time to fix the degraded parts and do all the proper maintenance with equipment failures still occurring. 

This kind of licencee behavior puts the community at risk...

July 28, 2015

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 –INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2015002 AND 05000311/2015002

*Equipment Reliability

The inspectors identified that an increasing trend of equipment failures was having an apparent impact on the ability of PSEG to meet station CAP goals. Specifically, the inspectors noted that there has been a steady increase in the number of unplanned LCOs (that exceeded station goals) and CAP evaluation products, as well as CAP evaluation products and actions that fell below station goals for quality and timeliness.

PSEG has identified an adverse trend in equipment deficiencies, as evident by the following notifications captured in CAP, dating back to September of 2014.

*Annual Sample: 12 Safety Injection Pump Breaker Failure to Close

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of PSEG’s evaluations and corrective actions associated with notification 20660365 and ACE 70168725 for an August 27, 2014 failure of the 12 SI pump breaker to close on demand while attempting to refill the 14 SI accumulator. The limiting conditions for operations could not be met as provided in the associated action requirements, because the system had no operable SI pumps available due to the 11 SI pump being out of service for routine maintenance. PSEG realigned, tested, and returned the 11 SI pump into service, then transitioned into TS

LCO 3.5.2.b for meeting the action statement of having one SI pump available. PSEG performed an ACE and determined the most probable cause of the failure was due to the lack of lubrication inside the breaker close latch roller. The apparent cause was determined to be not proactively addressing timely overhauls of the breakers.

The inspectors assessed PSEG’s problem identification threshold, problem analysis, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of PSEG's corrective actions to determine whether PSEG was appropriately identifying,

characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of PSEG's corrective action program and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action” and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.”

Findings and Observations

The inspectors concluded that PSEG took appropriate actions to identify the cause of the August 27, 2014, 12 SI pump breaker failure. The inspectors determined that the breaker failure was due to inadequate overhaul intervals of the 4kV breakers.

During review of the 12 SI pump breaker trip event, the inspectors noted that the breaker’s recent operating history had, in effect, changed its classification under PSEG’s ER-AA-1001, “Component Classification,” Revision 2. Specifically, the breaker had originally been classified as a critical, low duty cycle, mild environment component. However, inspectors noted that a high duty cycle was defined, in part, as one where the component is cycled frequently (i.e. greater than two times per week). From late 2014, the 14 accumulator had been experiencing leakage. From that time through the first half of 2015, the frequency at which the 12 SI pump was started to refill the accumulator steadily rose. In the few months leading up the failure, the number of accumulator fills with the 12 SI pump increased until its usage was three times a week for the two weeks prior to the failure. Essentially, PSEG had changed the breaker’s classification by changing its operational frequency to compensate for accumulator leakage. A review

of PSEG’s maintenance template for the same breaker as a high duty cycle component was the same as that for a low cycle breaker. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that this issue was minor. However, they also concluded that PSEG missed this as an opportunity to identify a change in the circumstances surrounding the breaker’s operation. PSEG captured this in their CAP as notification 20664925.

Introduction. A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings,” was identified because PSEG did not establish an appropriate interval to overhaul 4kV GE Magne-Blast breakers. As a result, the safety-related breakers for the 12 safety injection pump and 11 CCW pump were operated beyond the industry recommended overhaul interval and subsequently failed.

Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was that PSEG did not establish an appropriate interval to overhaul the 4kV GE Magne-Blast breakers. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, PSEG did not consider industry recommendations nor develop a basis when establishing 4kV GE Magne-Blast breaker overhaul intervals, which resulted in failure of the 12 SI pump and 11 CCW pump breakers. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, “Initial Characterization of Findings,” and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A,

Entergy Missed Earnings Estimates By A Wide Margin ( down 4%)

Entergy's CEO: 

"...Average Northeast power prices for the second quarter were more than 40% below last year’s levels. Moreover, forward power prices continue their decline following an average of more than 6% for our plants in the Northeast since the end of March this year. These low prices are coupled with the market structure that does not reflect the value of nuclear power. Congress continues to indicate its concern about the specific market structure challenges. On July 8, the Chairs of the Senate and House committees and subcommittees responsible for energy and power Senator Murkowski and congressmen Upton and Whitefield communicated this concern in a letter to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chairman, Norman Bay. In the letter, the committee chairs raised concerns about organized wholesale electricity markets, including the impacts certain market rules were having on reliable base load plants, including nuclear plants and ultimately on consumers. Entergy shares these concerns and we are encouraged by FERC’s willingness to consider these issues. We are also hopeful that FERC will take subsequent action as soon as it can..."

So not having Vermont Yankee running has cost Entergy a lot of money this quarter? 

"The decline was due to lower wholesale power prices and less of nuclear generation. Closure of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station last year also played a role in pulling down this segment’s results."

Stock price down by over 4% at 2:30 pm today? 

Entergy Q2 Earnings & Revenues Miss Estimates, Down Y/Y- Analyst Blog 

By Zacks Equity Research 2 hours ago 

Entergy Corporation ETR reported second-quarter 2015 operational earnings of 83 cents per share, widely missing the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $1.13 by 26.5%.

The reported number also declined 25.2% from $1.11 per share in the year-ago period. The downside was due to bleak performance at all its three segments. 

Revenues

Entergy’s second-quarter operating revenues of $2,713.2 million also fell short of the Zacks Consensus Estimate by 7.9%. Revenues declined 9.5% from $2,996.7 million in the prior year.

Operational Results

Entergy’s total operating expenses declined 8.1% year over year to $2,335.8 million primarily due to lower input costs.

Operating income for the second quarter also dropped nearly 17% to $377.4 million.

Entergy recorded $159.8 million of interest expenses in the quarter compared with $155.8 million incurred last year.

Segment Results

Utility: The segment’s quarterly operating revenues were $2,273.9 million compared with $2,409.4 million in second-quarter 2014. The downside was due to a 0.2% and 1.5% respective decline in commercial and industrial sales.

Entergy Wholesale Commodities (EWC): Entergy Wholesale Commodities' operating revenues were $439.3 million for the second quarter. In the corresponding quarter last year, revenues were $587.3 million. The decline was due to lower wholesale power prices and less of nuclear generation. Closure of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station last year also played a role in pulling down this segment’s results.

Financial Condition

As of Jun 30, 2015, cash and cash equivalents were $910.4 million compared with $1,422 million as of Dec 31, 2014.

Long-term debt as of Jun 30, 2015 was $12.1 billion compared with $12.5 billion as of Dec 31, 2014.

In the second quarter of 2015, cash from operating activates was $727.4 million, down from $761.4 million in the year-ago quarter.

Guidance

Entergy affirmed its 2015 earnings guidance in the range of $5.10–$5.90 per share on an operational basis.

Kind Of Boring Nuclear Industry 2015 Summer So Far?

What the hell?

Judiciary Panel Indicts Former Tepco Executives

Judiciary panel indicts former Tepco executives Kana Inagaki in Tokyo

©AP

A Japanese civilian judiciary panel has forced prosecutors to indict three former executives of Tokyo Electric Power, in what would be the first criminal charges brought against officials in relation to the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

In a statement, an independent review panel of 11 lay people accused the former Tepco officials for failing to take any “effective measures” and “turning a blind eye” to the possibility of an earthquake triggering a serious nuclear accident.

Citizens’ groups welcomed the decision after prosecutors twice decided not to indict the three former Tepco officials. The review panel overruled the prosecutor’s decision on Friday.

“We feel like we’ve finally gotten this far,” said Ruiko Muto, an anti-nuclear activist who represents a group of about 15,000 residents and citizens who had filed criminal complaints with prosecutors against senior Tepco officials.

“We hope that the criminal trial will uncover the truth behind the accident and that justice will be delivered,” Ms Muto said.

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in northeastern Japan suffered a number of explosions and partial meltdown following an earthquake and tsunami hit the country in March 2011. It was the worst nuclear incident since Chernobyl in 1986. Tens of thousands of people have yet to be allowed home.

The three senior managers who will stand trial are former chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, 75, and former executives Sakae Muto, 65, and Ichiro Takekuro, 69.

In the statement, the panel accused the officials of prioritising on economic arguments over safety, saying they “had a responsibility to prepare for the remote possibility of an accident occurring from a tsunami.”

“If proper action had been taken, it would have been sufficiently possible to prevent this critical and brutal accident from occurring,” it concluded.

Tepco declined to comment on the judiciary panel’s decision. But the utility said it would continue to make efforts to strengthen the safety of its nuclear plants.

While it is rare for a civilian judiciary panel to overrule decisions made by prosecutors, legal experts say it is unlikely a trial would lead to a guilty verdict.

In 2010, a review panel of 11 lay people selected by lottery similarly overruled the prosecutor’s decision not to indict Japanese politician Ichiro Ozawa in a political funding scandal. But two year later, a Tokyo court found Mr Ozawa not guilty, clearing him of charges due to lack of sufficient evidence.

NEISO: Low Wholesale Electric Prices In June?

So far this summer the wholesale electric prices spikes have remained rather mild. Price spikes have been amazingly docile this summer...

Why, because the politicians are breathing down their throats? 

Wholesale electricity prices and demand in New England

Wednesday, July 15, 2015 at 2:20PM

Wholesale power and natural gas prices set new records in June, dropping to lowest monthly levels in 12 years

Mild weather, low demand, and the lowest average natural gas price since 2003 brought June’s wholesale power price to under $20 per megawatt-hour, by far the lowest monthly price in the 12 years New England has had competitive power markets in their current form. June’s average real-time electric energy price of $19.61/MWh was nearly half the June 2014 average price of $37.92/MWh and nearly 23% lower than the previous record-low average monthly price of $25.39/MWh, recorded during March 2012.

Matthew White, chief economist at ISO New England, said the explanation for such low power prices is simple. “It’s supply and demand. With June’s mild weather, demand for natural gas and electricity were both low, and the pipeline capacity was available to deliver a plentiful supply of exceptionally low-priced natural gas to generators in New England. Seasonal demand for natural gas has abated, and New England is able to access that low-cost supply because we aren’t seeing winter’s recurring pipeline constraints.

“But the swing in prices over just five months, going from the third-highest power price during February to the lowest in June, underscores the price volatility attributable to pipeline infrastructure constraints,” White added. “During February’s record cold, demand for natural gas was so high that the pipelines into New England—which haven’t expanded at the same pace as natural gas demand growth—were running at or near capacity. When natural gas demand is so high and the supply available to generators is limited, the price for natural gas delivered to New England rises dramatically—and so does the price for the electricity made from it.”

During February, the average wholesale price of power was $126.70/MWh, while the average price of natural gas was $17.27 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) **, the fourth-highest monthly level since 2003.
The US Energy Information Administration noted in its July 9, 2015, Natural Gas Weekly Update, entitled “Northeastern trading points set record low prices”, that natural gas prices at the Algonquin delivery point in Boston fell to an historic daily low of $1.19/MMBtu on June 5 before breaking that record with new daily low of 82 cents on July 2.
June highlights:

• Lowest average wholesale electric energy price since March 2003
  • June 2015: $19.61 per megawatt-hour (MWh)*
  • March 2012: $25.39/MWh
  • April 2012: $25.41/MWh
  • April 2015: $25.88/MWh
  • May 2015: $26.12/MWh

• Lowest average monthly natural gas price since March 2003
  • June 2015: $1.68/MMBtu
  • May 2015: $1.85/MMBtu
  • April 2012: $2.39/MMBtu
  • May 2012: $2.63/MMBtu
  • August 2014: $2.64/MMBtu

• Second-lowest energy consumption during any June since 2003
  • June 2009: 9,960 gigawatt-hours (GWh)
  • June 2015: 10,146 GWh
  • June 2002: 10,317 GWh

• Third-lowest average June temperature since 2003
  • June 2009: 63.1° Fahrenheit
  • June 2003: 65.1° F
  • June 2015: 65.2° F

Drivers of Wholesale Electricity Prices

In general, the two main drivers of wholesale electricity prices in New England are the cost of fuel used to produce electricity and consumer demand.

Power Plant Fuel: Fuel is typically one of the major input costs in producing electricity. Natural gas is the predominant fuel in New England, used to generate nearly half of the power produced in the region, and natural gas-fired power plants usually set the price of wholesale electricity in the region. As a result, average wholesale electricity prices are closely linked to natural gas prices.

The average natural gas price during June dropped to $1.68/MMBtu at the Algonquin pipeline delivery point in Massachusetts, a decline of nearly 60% from the $4.07/MMBtu natural gas average price during June a year ago. The June 2015 price was also nearly 10% lower than the May 2015 average price of $1.85/MMBtu, which briefly held the record for the lowest monthly average natural gas price in New England since 2003.

Electricity Demand: Demand is driven primarily by weather as well as economic factors. The average temperature was 65.2° Fahrenheit in New England, the third-lowest June temperature recorded region-wide since 2003, while the dewpoint, a measure of humidity, came in at 54.2°, about the same as the 54.5° in June 2014. The mild weather and the effects of energy-efficiency measures dropped energy usage to 10,146 GWh, the third-lowest level of energy consumption during any June since 2003, and about 2.5% lower  than consumption during June 2014 when the average temperature was about 67.8°F. The impact of weather is reflected in heating and cooling degree days***. During June, the region saw 26.2 cooling degree days (CDD), a slight decline from  the 27.5 CDD recorded during June 2014.

Peak demand for the month hit 20,895 MW on June 23 during the hour from 3 to 4 p.m.,  when the average temperature in New England was 84°F and the dewpoint was 69°. The June 2015 peak was down 1.7% from the June 2014 peak of 21,263 MW, set during the hour from 4 to 5 p.m. on June 30 when the temperature was 85°F and the dewpoint was 61°. The all-time peak demand in New England was 28,130 MW, recorded during an August 2006 heat wave, when the temperature was 94°F and the dewpoint was 74°. Peak demand is driven by weather, which drives the use of heating and air conditioning equipment. Air conditioning use is far more widespread than electric heating in New England, so weather tends to have a relatively greater impact on the summer peak than the winter peak.

Fuel Mix: The mix of resources used in any given time period depends on price and availability, as well as unit commitments made to ensure system stability. Natural gas-fired and nuclear power plants produced most of the 9,176 GWh of electric energy generated within New England during June, at 47% and 31%, respectively. Hydroelectric resources in New England generated 10%. Renewable resources generated 8% of the energy produced within New England, including 5.6% from wood and refuse, 1.4% from wind and 0.5% from solar resources. Coal units generated 0.05% and oil-fired resources produced 0.02% of the energy generated within New England. Dual-fuel units, which generally are capable of burning natural gas or oil and typically use the less expensive fuel, generated about 4%. The region also received net imports of about 1,124 GWh of electricity from neighboring regions.

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June 2015 and Percent Change from June 2014 and May 2015	June 2015	Change from June 2014	Change from May 2015
Average Real-Time Electricity Price ($/megawatt-hour**)	$19.61	-48.3%	-24.9%
Average Natural Gas Price ($/MMBtu***)	$1.68	-58.7%	-9.4%
Peak Demand	20,895 MW	-1.7%	+7.1%
Total Electricity Use	10,146 GWh	-2.46%	+4.5%
Weather-Normalized Use****	10,456 GWh	-2.7%	+9.9%

  * One megawatt (MW) of electricity can serve about 1,000 average homes in New England. A megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity can serve about 1,000 homes for one hour. One gigawatt-hour (GWh) can serve about 1 million homes for one hour. ** A British thermal unit (Btu) is used to describe the heat value of fuels, providing a uniform standard for comparing different fuels. One million British thermal units are shown as MMBtu. *** A degree day is a measure of heating or cooling. A zero degree day occurs when no heating or cooling is required; as temperatures drop, more heating days are recorded, when temperatures rise, more cooling days are recorded. The base point for measuring degree days is 65 degrees; each degree of a day’s mean temperature that is above 65 degrees is counted as one cooling degree day. A day’s mean temperature of 90 degrees equals 25 cooling degree days.  **** Weather-normalized demand indicates how much electricity would have been consumed if the weather had been the same as the average weather over the last 20 years

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River Bend Talking Points to Region IV Alligations

RIVER BEND STATION – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2015009; PRELIMINARY WHITE FIND

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2015/07/river-bend-talking-points-to-region-iv.html

River Bend Talking Points to Region IV Allegations

Reactor high level: Issues of not putting corrective action program. Hiding issues from NRC.  A fleet wide tactic with Entergy.

Request a reset of River Bends simulator and simulator fidelity of all Entergy simulator?

“During power ascension following startup, RFP B did not start. The licensee re-racked its associated circuit breaker and successfully started RFP B.”

“The team identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c)(1), “Plant-Referenced Simulators,” for the licensee’s failure to maintain the simulator so it would demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond.”

Pilgrim simulator problems and River Bend within a months of each other only discovered in a troublesome plant trip?

Another work around tripping MFP to control level because of leaking FRVs…

*“On several occasions, the team noted that the licensee chose the expedient solution rather than complete an evaluation to determine that corrective actions resolved the deficient condition.”

“Other examples included the licensee’s choice to have operations personnel rack in and out breakers (MFP), and have maintenance personnel manually operate a limit switch, on the makeup and start logic for the RFP C minimum flow valve, when the RFP did not start.”

NRC widely allow a plant to spin out of control in a complex system, eventually leads to a ANO event (dropped stator and flooding problems).

“Only four minutes elapsed from the time of the scram until the time the Level 8 (high) reactor water level isolation signal was reached. Consequently, operations personnel did not have sufficient time to gain control and stabilize reactor vessel level in the required band.”

“However, operations personnel stated that the plant did not respond in a manner consistent with their simulator training.”

*However, operations personnel stated that the plant did not respond in a manner consistent with their simulator training.”

*It looks like operations works for everyone else instead of everyone else working for operations.” Engineering centric instead of operations centric.”  

HB Robinson breaker event:  “The team identified that the licensee’s maintenance programs for Division I, II, III, and non-safety 4160 V and 13.8 kV breakers installed in the plant may not meet the standards recommended by the vendor, corporate, or Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines.”

Why so many issues with faulty cards: SFRV in manual and RPS?

The operations staff is amazingly adaptive with not approved work-arounds and degraded components.

If looks to me the staff went to the SFRV because the FRVs were grossly leaking…

“In reviewing the feedwater system data from the December 24, 2014, scram, the licensee estimated 500,000 lbm/hr leaked past the closed FRVs. This represents approximately 3 percent of the full-power feedwater flow and significantly exceeds the design specification for leakage of 135,000-150,000 lbm/hr.

The licensee identified excessive leakage past the FRVs during testing in 1986. At the time of inspection, the licensee could not produce any corrective actions taken to identify or correct leakage past the FRVs. Further, the licensee had not quantified the amount of leakage past the FRVs prior to the December 24, 2014, event and NRC Special Inspection.”

So why isn’t this A COVER-UP: “The team reviewed the history of Level 8 (high) RFP trips and noted that similar issues of concern were raised by the NRC in 2012. Specifically, a Supplemental Inspection, performed in 2012, for a White performance indicator associated with reactor scrams with complications documented the failure to recognize a Level 8 (high) trip as an adverse condition and enter it into the corrective action program. This non-cited violation was documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2012012.”

“The team identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c)(1), “Plant- Referenced Simulators,” for the licensee’s failure to maintain the simulator so it would demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond. As of January 30, 2015, the licensee failed to maintain the simulator consistent with actual plant response for normal and transient conditions related to feedwater flows, alarm response, and behavior of the SFRV controller. As a result, operations personnel were challenged in their control of the plant during a reactor scram that occurred on

December 25, 2014.”

“During an investigation into the report at the OSRC (Onsite Safety Review Committee) for the SCRAM on December 25, 2014, that feed regulating valve leakage (FRV) contributed to the Level 8 received reactor vessel, it was determined by analysis that there is sufficient evidence that leakage by the Feedwater Regulating Valves presents a significant challenge to Operations during a scram event.”

Is a single issue, or is it really an intentional or a inability to keep the simulator accurate?  

Work arounds:

• Work Order WO-RBS-00404323: RFP B supply breaker repetitive failures to close potentially reduces the number of feedwater pumps available to operations personnel during a transient following reactor pressure vessel water Level 8 (high). Operations personnel would rack out and then rack the breaker back in until the breaker would function properly. This work order was initiated on February 3, 2015, following discussions with the NRC inspection team.

how long did this go on?

• Work Order WO-RBS-00396449: RFP C minimum flow valve does not stroke fully open which prevents starting the C feed pump. Maintenance personnel would manually operate a limit switch on the valve to make up the start logic for the RFP. This work order was initiated on October 10, 2014.

• Work Order WO-RBS-00346642: leakage past FRVs when closed complicated post-scram reactor water level control. Operations personnel proceduralized the closure of the main feedwater isolation valves to stop the effect of the leakage.

This work order was initiated on March 27, 2013.