Millstone NRC Security Inspection Report: Documents One or More Findings Greater Than Very Low

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Millstone Power Station may face possible enforcement action after inspection

Published January 13. 2015 1:28PM

Updated January 13. 2015 1:33PM

By Judy Benson

Publication: theday.com

Waterford – The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has notified officials at the Millstone Power Station that the plant faces possible enforcement action after a Nov. 24 inspection uncovered two findings related to security requirements, one preliminarily determined to be higher than very low safety significance, and the other of “very low” significance.
NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said today that the agency has asked Millstone owner Dominion Resources to participate in a conference to discuss the findings. It plans to issue a final determination on the findings within 90 days.
In a letter to David Heacock, president and chief nuclear officer of Dominion, the NRC said that “one or more of the findings are also apparent violations of NRC requirements and are being considered for escalated enforcement action.” The NRC may determine that additional inspections, regulatory actions and oversight of the plant is warranted, the letter said.
Sheehan said the deficiencies were “promptly corrected or interim compensatory measures put in place” as soon as they were found by the inspectors.
Ken Holt, spokesman for Millstone, confirmed that the security issue has been “addressed and corrected.” The company has agreed to participate in the conference with the NRC, he said.
Both he and Sheehan said they could not comment further because the inspection involved security systems and procedures, which are protected from public disclosure.

You think this security violation is just a coincidence with recent past violations on the inability of them trouble shooting and fixing the TDAFP for years and them yanking out the switch yard transmission system slots safety circuit without NRC permission leading to a two plant LOOP.  

Bottom line, why can't they publicly disclose one, two, three or ten security violation without this secrecy veil over it??? 

Are they protecting these plants against terrorist, or are they protecting licencees from the public? 

"The attached report documents one or more findings that have preliminarily been determined to have greater than very low security significance...regulatory actions and oversight."

I think the NRC is allowing hidden and not corrected security violation...covering up systematic weakness with the licencees in managing security. You get it, if they immediately disclosed all security violation or maybe after a delay of a few weeks or months, that would force them to completely fix it in this time frame. As it now stands, the NRC could/does secretly allow them months or years to fix it without the public knowledge. This is basically nuclear plant security deregulation dressed up as withholding nuclear plant security information to protect against telegraphing security vulnerability to terrorist.

There is a much greater danger here. It is the government hiding security vulnerabilities from the public in order to protect the licencees from spending a few more pennies for the proper security. Say in a crisis, maybe in a terrorist event at a nuclear plant, we find the plant's security stance was a lot less than was advertised in the licencees and government happy-land PR to the people for profits. The greatest national security vulnerability for all of us is we lose faith in government in a widespread national security crisis.           

I think we would all be much more safe if all security violations were reported to the public. Post 9/11 and specifically the 2008 sleeping guards at Peach Bottom, the NRC and licencees were thinking the media and whistle-blowers were talking advantage of our national insecurity with  9/11 terrorism and issues with nuclear plant security problems. They were drumming up insufficient security stories and this threatening the Nuclear Renaissance. Instead of beefing up the bad actor licencees, they decided in the greater good of us all security events would no longer be reported publicly.  

This just goes to the power of the licencees over the real public good and I think it is corruption. 

January 5, 2015
Mr. David Heacock
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Dominion Resources
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRC SECURITY
INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2014201 AND 05000423/2014201
PRELIMINARY GREATER-THAN-GREEN FINDING 

Dear Mr. Heacock: 

On November 24, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a security inspection at your Millstone Power Station (MPS), Units 2 and 3 and the inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Scace and other members of your staff.

Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The attached report documents one or more findings that have preliminarily been determined to have greater than very low security significance that may require additional inspections, regulatory actions and oversight. 

Each finding was assessed based on the best available information, using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process for Power Reactors. The deficiencies were promptly corrected or compensated for, and the plant was in compliance with applicable
physical protection and security requirements within the scope of this inspection before the inspectors left the area. The NRC will inform you in writing when the final significance has been determined.

One or more findings are also apparent violations of NRC requirements and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC’s Enforcement Policy, which appears on the NRC’s Web site at:
http://nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.



The enclosure transmitted herewith contains Safeg

Millstone's and the NRC's management has been Negligent!

The NRC has a habit of disclosing troubling information about a plant, sometimes many years after the event...they wait until the crisis is over and well settled. I think this basically is the agency's strategy of sugar coating event... basically giving us false and incomplete information when the situation is on going to protect the plant. Then dishing out the bad news months after the crisis is complete. The agency knows that the bad news more sticks to a bad actor with a on going crisis than it released months after the situation.
The inspection staff is nothing but whore for Dominion.

"(Jan 11) And Raymond McKinley, an NRC official who oversees inspectors at Millstone and two other plants, wrote in a December 2013 email that Millstone considered asking for a one-time change in guidelines "to buy some time" to fix a problem."

We think this more has to do with mismanagement with Region I...they don't know how to sent a strong signal to the top of the corporation demanding a immediate turnaround with a sinking ship. Pilgrim Reflects this also with their many shutdowns and we are waiting on the inspection on this. So the NRC's polities are dysfunctional with emergent on problems...The agency just doesn't have a big enough hammer to get the attention of upper management.  

It should be noted with North Anna that was extremely unprofessional...their large fuel damage accident. So if you ask me what is going on here, NRC management is Region 1 and Dominions management with nuclear is declining together. 

Millstone: UFSAR Safety Valves not fixed because of "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges". 

My above article indicates Millstones had severely declining right under the eyes of the NRC for many years and the NRC just hasn't been enforcing their regulations and tech specs on Dominion. 

The recent switch yard LOOP and they yanking out a important protective circuit without permission and the NRC not catching them on it indicates the profound weakness of the NRC and Dominion?

Feds privately rap Millstone over response to pump problem 

By Associated Press Published: January 11, 2015, 11:37 am

HARTFORD, Conn. (AP) — As Connecticut’s nuclear plant struggled for months last year to fix a critical water pump, federal regulators expressed concern among themselves that the Millstone Power Station was slow to grasp the scope of the issue and make corrections, according to internal emails. 

The auxiliary pump, which cools the reactor in emergencies if offsite power and diesel generators fail, did not operate properly during tests in November and December 2013 and again in January 2014 before the problem was fixed. In February, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission sent a team for a closer inspection and, six months later, issued a finding of low to moderate safety problems. 

The handling of the issue also raised alarms at the local Nuclear Energy Advisory Council, which questioned Millstone officials last September about the repeated problems. 

“What concerned us the most is that it seemed out of character,” said John Sheehan, chairman of the council that oversees Connecticut nuclear power plant issues. “In previous years they were very alert to problems and correcting them. They seemed to miss this time.” 

Stephen Scace, Millstone’s site vice president, wrote to Sheehan on Nov. 10 and said there is “room to improve” how it identifies and evaluates problems. 

Ken Holt, Millstone’s spokesman, told The Associated Press the owners of the plant have revamped their approach to trouble-shooting following its work with federal regulators. 

“If it’s not immediately obvious why it’s not working, we put a team to work on it,” he said. 

Millstone, which is owned by Richmond, Virginia-based Dominion Resources Inc., operates two reactors in Waterford and generally supplies half of all power in Connecticut and 12 percent of New England’s. 

Privately, NRC inspectors voiced concern of Millstone’s handling of the problem, according to emails obtained by The Associated Press in a public records request. 

Brian Haagensen, a resident inspector at the plant, wrote to NRC colleagues on Aug. 28, 2014, that Millstone missed opportunities over several months before the problem was identified in January 2014. He said plant officials were wrong to insist that the faulty bearing was the only pump problem.

The NRC seen the developing problems for many years and they never appositely response...mainly budget and inappropriate priorities.  I mean, the inspectors and their bosses seen it coming, but I doubt higher management understood what it means. Bottom line, the agency is engineered to be reactive.  

November 8, 2013: NRCINTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2013004 AND 05000423/2013004 AND NOTICEOF VIOLATION AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT NO.07200047/2013001

(2013004)"The valves were initially scheduled to be restored to full qualification during refueling outage (RFO), 3RFO12, in October 2008, but the repairs were deferred to 3RFO13 due to maintenance schedule conflicts. Subsequently, repairs were not completed in 3RFO13, 3RFO14, or 3RFO15 due to scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges."

“I believe we make it clear that the incorrect bearing was only a small part of a much larger problem,” he wrote, citing Millstone’s failure to determine that an incorrect bearing had been installed sooner.
He pointed to a violation cited by the NRC that said Millstone should have identified sooner that an incorrect bearing had been installed in the pump. “While it was ultimately identified in January 2014, there were opportunities to identify it beginning in August 2013,” the inspection team wrote.
And Raymond McKinley, an NRC official who oversees inspectors at Millstone and two other plants, wrote in a December 2013 email that Millstone considered asking for a one-time change in guidelines “to buy some time” to fix a problem.
“No indication that they believe there is a problem, but I am sure they have heard enough questions and want to put the issue to bed,” he said.
Josephine Ambrosini, an NRC senior inspector, said in a May 7, 2014, email that the “earliest indications” of a problem with the pump were evident in the spring of 2013. Millstone took a long time to address the concerns, she said.
Sheehan, chairman of the local advisory council, told the AP its members were worried that problems in the 1990s when Northeast Utilities operated Millstone — such as safety issues and whistleblower complaints — were at risk of recurring. Dominion purchased Millstone in 2001.
“We were concerned it was the start of what happened in the 1990s when NU ran the plant, that their strict culture was starting to break down,” he said. “We wanted to catch it before it catches you.”

An Example Of The Enormus Influence With The Electric Utilities In The USA

This goes to the example with how powerful and well connected the large utilities are. They are a enormous influence in our political system.

Typically the Democratic governors in NH are moderate Republicans!

Utility giant among top sponsors of Hassan’s inaugural ball

By KATHLEEN RONAYNE

Associated Press

Saturday, January 10, 2015
(Published in print: Saturday, January 10, 2015)

Utility giant Public Service of New Hampshire and a law firm that lobbies heavily at the State House are the top donors to Democratic Gov. Maggie Hassan’s inaugural committee.

PSNH and Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell each gave $25,000, according to a list provided by the committee. Hassan is holding inaugural balls in Manchester today and in the North Country next week.

Fifty-eight businesses, law firms, political committees and individuals donated at least $1,000 to rank as sponsors. Tickets for the public cost $200 for today’s ball and $100 for the Jan. 16 event.

Hassan’s inauguration activities have promoted New Hampshire products, and her inaugural balls will feature a Franconia band. Donations to the committee can be spent on inaugural events and governor’s office activities such as the governor’s Easter egg hunt, committee spokesman Aaron Jacobs said.

Albany International Corp., a textile manufacturer in Rochester, gave $15,000 for the title of Gold Sponsor.

The New Hampshire Automobile Dealers Association, Beacon Capital Partners, AT&T, Liberty Lane Service Company, NextEra Energy, Ocean Properties, Waste Management Inc. and businessman Shawn O’Connor each gave $10,000.

Law firms Rath, Youth and Pignatelli, and Demers and Blaisdell – which both lobby for a long list of clients in Concord – and Liberty Utilities each gave $5,000. Other $5,000 donors were: AstraZeneca, Centene Corporation, Comcast, the Constitution Pipeline, Fidelity, Holloway Auto, Liberty Mutual, New Hampshire Distributors, Pfizer, PhRMA, Pier People, Pierce Atwood, Pike Industries, Wal-Mart, Xerox and law firm McLane, Graf, Raulerson and Middleton.

PSNH has proposed the $1.4 billion Northern Pass project, a 187-mile electrical transmission line that would carry 1,200 megawatts of electricity to power-hungry southern New England markets. Supporters say the line will help hold down energy costs. Opponents say the project would mar the scenic beauty of the state, hurting tourism and property values.

Hassan’s spokesman, William Hinkle, said she remains opposed to a mostly overhead power line and believes that the company must investigate burying more of the line.

“Many groups and individuals have contributed to the Governor’s inauguration, and the Governor is thankful for all of those who have committed to supporting the State of New Hampshire and the institution of the Governor’s Office,” Hinkle said in a statement.

Obama Has Moved NRC to the Right...Upcoming Massive Deregulation and Down Sizing the NRC.

It sure looks like Obama anticipated his lost of the senate...thus drastically reducing regulations. He is pulling a president Clinton, angling favoritism to the nuke industry as he lost popularity.  

The deal with over regulation is when a plant gets into big troubles and it become public...as self protection with not earlier doing their job, they come back with new rules. If the NRC could anticipate problems and strongly interact with a plant to change their bad behaviors before the event...then you wouldn't need half the rules they got. 

I can't think of one time in accident and a drastic decline in plant and corporate performance...there wasn't a prolong period of decline that the agency didn't act on before the plant got into a accident. These things give plenty of warning. 

This follows similar political cycles with the NRC. The mad dog Republicans take over the Presidency, congress or all, there becomes a drastic reductions of regulations and oversight of the NRC in their cycle. When the Democrats get similar levels of power, they claw back minimal amounts of regulations and increased oversight. We have had declining levels of transparency,regulations and oversight for many decades...the public really see little with what is going on in a nuclear power plant.


As a tactic to destroy the Nuclear industry, maybe it is better to get the commissioners into pro nuclear profile and then they will destroy themselves with giving the utilities what they want.  

New US NRC chairman says structure, safety, regulation among priorities for 2015

Washington (Platts)--9Jan2015/447 pm EST/2147 GMT

In the 33 years he served on the staff of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Stephen Burns says, he never imagined he would be appointed to the commission, let alone become its chairman. 

Nonetheless, Burns was sworn in January 1 as the agency's 16th chairman, replacing Allison Macfarlane, who resigned to become a professor at George Washington University.
Burns discussed some of his near-term priorities for NRC in an interview Wednesday. He noted that he is "still in the process of getting reacclimated and learning the ropes" at the agency, which he left in April 2012 to serve as head of the legal affairs section in the secretariat at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency, based in Paris. 

Burns has held a variety of positions at NRC, most recently as general counsel from 2009 to 2012. 

Burns said he is "trying to reach out to the other commissioners and talk about what's on their minds." A closed commission meeting will be held the week of January 12 "to kick around organizational issues and make sure I get their feedback on how I can be most effective in terms of helping them and helping the commission itself move forward," he said. 

Some of his priorities for the coming year will include reviewing NRC's organizational structure to assess "how we're configured" and to consider whether the agency is "right-sized." 

Continuing oversight of safety enhancements being made at nuclear power plants in response to lessons learned from the 2011 accident at Fukushima I in Japan will also require a good deal of time and attention, he said. 

Burns also noted the importance of reviewing NRC's approach to regulation of power reactors undergoing decommissioning. On December 30, the commission unanimously approved staff's proposal to undertake a rulemaking on the matter. Currently, reactors in decommissioning must request exemptions from operating reactor regulations in areas such as security and emergency planning on a case-by-case basis. Staff will consider whether a better approach can be developed. 

Burns said he has "heard a lot from the hill [Congress] and industry about whether it's time to really look at how we structure the decommissioning process." The new rulemaking will look at the decommissioning exemption process now being used, to see if it is "the right fit under the circumstances," he said. 

EFFECTS OF REGULATION 

Asked if he believed the US nuclear power industry is overregulated, Burns said, "Some are going to say they're overregulated, and some are going to say we're underregulated."
NRC staff is considering how the agency's decision-making process can address the so-called cumulative effects of regulation, Burns said.

"This is not only an issue for the nuclear industry; it's an issue in regulation generally," he said, noting that the White House Office of Management and Budget has also been looking at ways to address those effects 

"Our ultimate responsibility is public health and safety, and common defense and security," he said. "Understanding that ultimately that's our mission, I think it is also incumbent on us to look at those criticisms" alleging overregulation. 

The US Government Accountability Office said in a report last month that NRC does not always follow its own guidance when developing cost-benefit analyses of proposed regulations and suggested ways those analyses could be improved. Burns said he will read the report and consider its recommendations. 

"That's something we need to take a serious look at," he said. 

Burns said that "ultimately, questions of in terms of the economics [of nuclear power] are not issues the NRC can solve. I think we have to keep focused on the public health and safety, the safety and security mission of the agency. But we have to listen to the questions that come about the impact of regulation and ensure that we're doing a good job of understanding what those impacts are when those questions are raised." 

WORKING WITH CONGRESS 

Asked about criticisms by some members of Congress that NRC was withholding some information needed to oversee the agency, Burn said, "I want to make sure I understand what some of those issues are, because ... coming back in, I'm not sure I have a full appreciation of where some of the controversies have been." 

Burns said that, "for the most part, Congress has got a lot of authority or power in terms of the information it should be able to get from the agency. And there is a general obligation for the agency to provide information to Congress. I think there are some areas -- and I think those are relatively few -- where there may be some, you know, controversy or some push and pull with respect to certain types of documents or information. I think we should try to minimize that. 

Burns said he would seek "to make sure I understand what those issues are and try to work through them." He said he would emphasize "establishing good rapport with our oversight committees, with their members. That's what I'm trying to do in terms of reaching out."

"I don't think I can envision a perfect world of no conflicts, but I think we do our best to minimize" such conflicts, he said

Pilgrim's Astonishing Number Of LOOPs: NRC's Historical Record Of LOOPs in Nuclear Industry.

Loss of Offsite Power Initiating Event Historical Data (1980-2014) Here is the NRC's list of all LOOPs since 1980. They missed a lot of LOOPS of the 1970s. The two plant Millstone, once a three plant facility...has a total of 10 LOOPs.  Most astonishing is the one plant facility Pilgrim having 19 LOOPs. In a recent talk with a high NRC official, he says risk perspectives predicts a plant on average has one LOOP ever 100 years.  LOOPs are very dangerous accidents!!!! One thing to be happy about, there certainly is a lot less LOOPs in recent years.

NRC’s Safety Culture Trait Talk: Raising a Safety Concern

Bottom line, how your managers answers your safety concerns wholly depends on the difference of power between you and your boss. Generally how the hierarchy works, is the bottom line management filters out the troubling concerns of lower level employee to their managers. How the lower mangers get promoted is if they protect their bosses. To tell you the truth, confidentially and anonymity gives you the weakest hand against the powerful. I wonder why the NRC portrays this in your weakest hand...doing the bidding of the nuclear industry.

Safety Culture trait Talk: Environment For Raising Safety Concerns

Safety Culture trait Talk: Environment For Raising Safety Concerns

What Is The Definition Of Environment For Raising Concerns?

The NRC’s SCPS defines Environment for Raising Concerns as maintaining a safety-conscious work environment where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination.

Why Is This Trait Important?

Fostering an environment for raising concerns is an important attribute of a positive nuclear safety culture. Organizations should have a work environment where employees are encouraged to raise safety concerns and where those concerns are reviewed promptly, given the proper priority based on their potential safety significance, and appropriately resolved, with timely feedback to the originator of the concerns and to other employees as appropriate.

Employees should feel free to raise safety concerns to their management without fear of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination. The organization must not take adverse actions, such as retaliation and discrimination, against employees who have raised concerns, because it is unacceptable and potentially unlawful. When allegations of discrimination or retaliation arise, the appropriate level of management must be involved to review the facts, evaluate or reconsider the action, and, where warranted, remedy the matter. In addition to the hardship caused to the individual employee, the perception by fellow workers that raising concerns has resulted in retaliation can generate a chilling effect that may discourage other workers from raising concerns. Any reluctance on the part of employees to raise concerns can be detrimental to nuclear safety.

The organization should clearly identify the processes that employees may use to raise concerns, such as discussing issues with their supervisor or filing deficiency reports for problem identification and resolution. However, it is important to recognize that some employees may not always be comfortable raising concerns through the normal channels, such as with their immediate supervisor. From a safety perspective, no method of raising potential safety concerns should be discouraged. Therefore, the organization should focus on achieving and maintaining an environment where employees feel free to raise their concerns directly to their supervisors, as well as ensuring that alternate means of raising and addressing concerns are accessible, credible, and effective. These alternative approaches may include an “open-door” policy that allows the employee to bring a concern to a higher-level manager, an ombudsman program, or an employee concerns program.

An organization that reinforces an environment for raising concerns typically has well-developed systems for prioritizing problems and directing resources, effective communications for openly sharing information and analyzing the root causes of identified problems, and management that promotes employee confidence in raising and resolving concerns.

I am surprised the NRC’s tack on safety concern for everyone isn't “ transparency” and your safety concerns would be “guaranteed by the government to be “put in an non erasability in-house log or outside log”. To even think the NRC is talking anonymity and confidentiality says the government is powerless to stop safety concern intimidation. The NRC fears and knows there is widespread retaliations going on ...or a widespread fear of retaliation by lots of employee. All your bosses and executives (licensees and NRC) should be big enough to handle a safety concern on a totally open venue. A byproduct with watching this kind of full throated conflict in an open venue is the outsiders gains irreplaceable trust and respect of the Nuclear industry.

The NRC’s Adams document system is a credible and trustworthy log type vehicle. There are other forms of electronic and internet public logs. A newspaper or other news media is another form of a log. The limitation with the NRC internet Adams is it is under the control of the NRC. You have to be aware when your information is under your total control or when other powers control your message. But the NRC will let you put what you need on there.

Course, there is always your own blog. From my days, it is just amazing how much more miraculous inter-connectivity we have. With less inter-connectivity, means a smaller group of people wholly get to control your message.

Here is another thumb rule, those you trust and love the most will hurt you the quickest and deepest.  

Transparency is the tool that equalizes power and influence between the powerless and the powerful. It puts you on a fair playing field.

You won’t get much credit for this way…but I would put your information on a type of a log. I put my e-mail and phone number on the top of my blog for this reason. If you just want to get the problem fixed…just throw me some documents and information about your safety concern. I’d put it up on my blog without any connection to you. I promise you I’ll get your concerns written down on an agency process like the NRC Allegation Process or on the 2.206 process. I have connections with many NRC officials and high OIG officials. I promise I’ll get your concerns written down in your plants licensing docket. You just might get the NRC to make a response to your concern. I would be certain high NRC and licensee officials would carefully read your complaints or concerns. If they don’t respond to your concern and then fix it…when the shit eventually the fans they will pay a price. This is the power of transparency. The idea here, this stuff is really powerful; is to get the problem written down before the deterioration evident or before event or accident occurs. These officials know, pre-knowledge of a upcoming event or accident can be devastationally transformational to the organizations.

(steamshovel2002@yahoo.com, cell 1-603-209-4206) 

If I was an engineer, licensed operator or some other invaluable technical person…I want people to listen and respect what I say. I worked too hard to get to this position for you not to hear my opinions. I’d be working to raise my reputation and amplify my voice. I’d establish a relationship with the NRC. If you are working in a plant and are a technical person, the NRC will treat you with super professional respect. I wouldn’t get talking to my supervisor on the bigger safety concerns…I write up and submit a public 10 CFR 2.206. This forces the agency into a process, you would talk to in a meeting to maybe 10 to 15 officials…it would all get into the public record. The agency and your licensee will treat you with the utmost respect…they would allow you to paw over all their internal documents to support your assertions. The NRC would be required to answer you. Chances are they wouldn’t support your concerns, the NRC officials hardly ever support a full 2.206 to anyone…but everyone would see a facet of your character. You would develop a reputation in the plant unlike anyone else. I am convinced this would protect you from retaliation.

I would caution you it would have to be a legitimate safety concerns or at least cover new safety territory not discussed before. Like I said, even if denied, they would all fear your problem could show up in a future incident or accident. Then you hit a gold mine.

The best place to raise a safety concern is in a Catholic confessional booth with a priest. You get that don’t you, all the licensee and NRC is promising you, is the right to “raise”a safety concern to your supervisor. Nobody is talking about a fair and objective process to adjudicate your safety concern based on nuclear professionalism and following all the policies, rules and procedures in the plant and within the NRC. At best the NRC is promising you a confessional booth with a priest.

Nuclear Power Too Pricey?

Jan 7

So they are double dipping on corporate welfare. What would you do if somebody paid off all your morgage. You'd borrow agaisnt value of your house like hell getting all the grown up toys you only dreamed of and paying for your kids college eduation. I think most nuclear plant do the same. Why not pick a boat load of bonds based on the value of the plant and property? I think they done that.

January 07, 2015

 

Playing chicken with Illinois' electric rates won't improve the climate

By: PETER BRADFORD

The recent demand by Illinois' nuclear power plant owner, Exelon, for a breathtaking $580 million per year in rate increases to keep running its plants raises serious questions as to wise ways to fight climate change and assure energy security. Illinois customers have paid dearly to bail these same reactors out of past economic peril. They should understand that bailing them out a second time will be more expensive and less effective than charging for the emissions that cause climate change.

When Illinois turned power generation from a monopoly to a competitive industry in the 1990s, the nuclear plants seemed too costly to compete effectively. Illinois legislators and regulators included measures assuring that customers, rather than investors, would bear the risk that reactor costs could not be recovered under competition.

Consequently, the nuclear units needed only to recover their relatively low operating costs through competition to be profitable. For a decade, the reactors did so well that many in the industry trumpeted them as “cash cows” producing cheap electricity in an expensive marketplace.

Good-bye to all that. Nuclear economics have gotten so shaky that yesterday's cash cows are said to be today's vulture bait.

The U.S. nuclear industry has benefited immensely from government expenditure ever since the Manhattan Project gifted it with reactors, fuel enrichment and trained personnel. It also has the advantages of a limit on liability for accidents and the unique governmental commitment (as yet unfulfilled) to take its most radioactive wastes.

The $580 million in rate increases sought by Exelon amounts to several hundred dollars per customer, much of it paid in the electric bill, some of it in the cost of other goods and services.

THE RIGHT ANSWER

The price of putting carbon into the skies must reflect the reality of climate change.

This reform will raise the price paid for the natural gas-fired power that has undermined nuclear profitability. Nuclear profits will increase, but so will those of all other low-carbon measures, especially energy efficiency and renewable energy. The lowest-cost measures will win out. They may include the existing reactors, but—given the lower costs of energy efficiency and some renewables—they may not.

Targeting subsidies to reactors instead of taxing carbon may well pay too much for too little climate improvement. The claim that nuclear reactors provide unrewarded reliability benefits does not reflect the reality of today's power markets, which are capable of providing round-the-clock electricity in other ways. As to jobs and property taxes, paying higher-than-necessary electric rates merely transfers jobs and taxes from electricity-consuming companies and other power producers to nuclear power plant sites. This will not improve Illinois' economy.

Closing many nuclear plants abruptly is not in the climate's best interest, but neither is lobbying-induced subsidy panic in Springfield or Washington. Charging to use the sky as a carbon sink protects the environment while preserving reliable power markets. That's the reform worth enacting.

articlePara

Peter Bradford is an adjunct professor at Vermont Law School, former commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and former chair of New York's and Maine's utility commissions.

 

Do you believe these guys...I believe nothing they say is true. Nobody enforces truth-telling in our electric sector.

Is this relevant for the nuclear industry also: 

(WSJ Jan 6)American oil and gas companies have gone heavily into debt during the energy boom, increasing their borrowings by 55% since 2010, to almost $200 billion.

Their need to service that debt helps explain why U.S. producers plan to continue pumping oil even as crude trades for less than $50 a barrel, down 55% since last June. 

The fuel cost of a nuclear power plant is very small. $400 million dollars is cheap for the purchase price of a large power plant. Most older nuclear power plants should have payed off their new construction mortgage. Basically a older nuclear power plant just pays for upkeep and fuel. Electricity should be very cheap coming out of these guys...pure profits.

So Vermont Yankee and Ginna were once owned by local or state corporations until about 2003….Central Vermont Public Service and Rochester Gas and Electric. These companies were more directly controlled by the state legislators and the state grid authorities. The state officials were more directly in communication with the plant official.  Is this a flaw in the model with selling nuclear power plants to far flung mega corporate owners…the local politicians were getting the same cut as before and they became more mistrusting of distant corporate owners? I know it was the state who would not take a long term contract from Entergy.

Course, CVPS might have dumped VY in order to get taken over by  Gaz Metro.

I believe if we subsidized these poor boy nuclear plants, most of the money would get sucked into utilities bureaucracy and onto the politicians...very little of it will translated into pouring monies into upgrading these ancient plants. Later as the utilities waste this subsidization, there just go back to the trough begging for a increase of the subsidization. Then everyone who is a  losers in competition will want to copy the nuclear industry model. 

They are plowing savings from fracking into their stock price...not into cheaper rates for the consumers and businesses.

The Utilities sector surprised many by posting the best price performance in the market in 2014. Electric utility companies were a particularly strong subset of the sector, posting an average gain of 31% during the course of the year.

Below is a table showing which stocks in the group are the most undervalued:

click to enlarge)
Source: QuantifiedAlpha.com

I got an idea, this is getting just too complicated. Lets just pay anyone who produces electricity for the grid $100 per megawatt-hour. This is what our electric systems would looks like without a credible referee and totally dysfunctional government. And you know most of well off and powerful will be paying a lot less for electricity than the middle class and poor. A dysfunctional system like this always forces the poor and powerless to subsidized the electricity and utilities for the rich.    

Believe me, in recent times we lost the word of competition in the electricity industry. Mostly is is all collusion with all the players to jack of the price of electricity. So I think the mega utility model is failing...basically they are sucking the blood out of the ratepayers and our nuclear system to bolster the failing  model of our electricity system and the utilities. This is only going increase as the average age of the nuclear plants increase.  

Do you remember the days when you had to pay long distance charges on you phone bill? Now it is a standard rate if you talk locally or to California. Long distance charges are a thing of the past. I think this stagnant and brain dead electric system model is the reason why electricity doesn't serve us more efficiently like our telephone and cell phone system. These rich and powerful utilities and like minded colluded together and basically got our political system captured...they no longer serve the interest of the country. But there are some drawbacks phone systems. We no longer have telephone booths. Everyone now has cell phones and many young people don't have primary home telephone lines. Why isn't the electric system like that. 

What if the coal, natural gas and green electricity blackmailed us like the utilities are doing now with the nuclear plant systems. i think we could invent a much more efficient and inexpensive nuclear system...but the forces blocking this now are the ones making money hand over fist and who gain enormus status over this frozen system. i get it, they mostly destroyed the positive image with the nuclear industry in the last three decades.  

Once the utilities serve the greater interest of our nation, our families and societies...serve a greater cause than themselves such as bulwark against the savages from afar lands. Now they primarily serve these modern mega corporation structures, their rich executives, CEOs and mostly serve these monstrous Frankenstein institutional players.  Basically our electric system of years back was in a socialist model...their purpose was to reliable serve society and the greater cause of increasing modernity and as "the" model to the rest of the world as the USA was the best country on the planet. In years back, electrification was the worldwide model of development and modernity...justice for us all tracked the development of electric system. Now all we are is financial clerks and we serve these monstrous soulless corporations without hearts. Remember when the world trembled at our greatness, the business class served a much smaller role there, we were the image to the world you can't go wrong if you model and develop your country like the USA. 

I telling folks most of the big utilities are a libertarian and the anarchy type models. They rather destroy us in their independence, than belong to something great...instead of being just a piece of something great. They hate everything the USA stands for...mostly they hate national centralized codes and standards. They are out to destroy democracy and truth telling. They will push out any false image to throw your opinion towards their direction...they will make sure they secretly obscure the facts so you won't know what direction you are heading. Most of these CEOs want to be dictators...they want their own standards and morality. They want deeply in their hearts to make the USA and the world severe their selfish ideals and causes. King and gods over the lands with their own special ethics and morality...I telling you, they want to own your souls.

So here we are with most of us being so disfranchised we don't vote or pay attention to government...we never had such a pervasive media news presence and they being so shallowly corporatized. The default with most of us, we want to pay to feel better (booze, drugs, status, entertainment). We don't got the guts like our forefathers, to make a world that would inspire all of us with its beauty! 

It is like with our modern interconnectivity (cell phones, computers, internet among others), we collective chose not to use any of it because we are afraid of change and the future. We should be ashamed of yourself!         

New York reactor's survival tests support for pricey nuclear

By Naureen S. Malik and Jim Polson, Bloomberg NewsBloomberg

NEW YORK — Exelon Corp., the biggest U.S. owner of nuclear reactors, needs to almost double power prices to keep a New York plant running in a move that promises to show just how far regulators will go to keep uneconomic plants operating.

After recording losses that exceeded $100 million from 2011 to 2013, Exelon will need to charge about 83 percent more than wholesale prices to earn a profit at its Ginna plant, based on company cost estimates. State regulators have set a Jan. 15 deadline for a new power contract that's rich enough to keep the Rochester-area plant running.

Last month, Entergy Corp. shut Vermont's only operating reactor citing low power prices. Ginna is one of 10 other nuclear plants that can't compete in current markets, Moody's Investors Service said in November. Retiring the reactors, which account for 10 percent of the nation's nuclear output, would undercut a push to produce power without greenhouse gases as renewables such as wind and solar are just emerging.
"Ginna nuclear power plant is an important asset in the state's generation fleet," Patricia Acampora, a commissioner for New York's Public Service Commission, said at a Nov. 23 meeting. "It's important, reliable, carbon-free energy."

Exelon acquired the plant when it bought Constellation Energy Group Inc. in 2012. Constellation paid Rochester Gas & Electric $401 million for the plant in 2004 and agreed to sell power back to its former owner at $44 a megawatt-hour for 10 years. The average wholesale power price in the Rochester area was $38.83 a megawatt-hour during the past five years, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Power prices have dropped as booming natural gas production from shale cut costs for competing power stations that burn the fossil fuel.

"The two game changers have been the shale gas and the distortive effect of subsidies" for renewable energy projects like wind, said Joseph Dominguez, Exelon's senior vice president for governmental and regulatory affairs and public policy. "Those things really started to seriously impact the economics of plants probably around 2010."

Exelon won regulatory approval in November to begin talks with Rochester Gas on a new contract with the utility, which is owned by Iberdrola and serves about 371,000 homes and businesses in nine counties.
Exelon isn't alone in its struggle with at-risk plants. Four U.S. nuclear reactors were shut in 2013 because they weren't profitable or needed repairs that owners decided were too costly. Entergy's Vermont Yankee was closed after it failed to find a buyer. The company blamed "artificially low" power prices for the shutdown.

A single-unit reactor like Ginna needs as much as $71 a megawatt-hour to earn an 11 percent return and $56 to $64 to break even, based on 2016 forecasts, Exelon said.

The average Rochester Gas customer probably will pay an additional $18 more a month to keep Ginna operating, based on figures provided by Exelon in its state filing, said Tim Judson, executive director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Institute. The group estimated the operating costs for the Alliance for a Green Economy, an antinuclear group.

"Ginna will likely request a contract approximately $80 million a year greater than the market cost of electricity," said Jessica Azulay, program director of the Syracuse, New York- based Alliance, in a filing. "This is an extraordinary amount of money to be demanded of ratepayers to prop up a private company that has become uncompetitive in the market."

The 581-megawatt Ginna nuclear reactor produces power without heat-trapping carbon dioxide. Closing it "presents potentially serious reliability problems for New York," the Independent System Operator, which runs the state power grid, said in a filing.

Retiring nuclear stations that produce power without greenhouse gases would undercut President Barack Obama's plan to cut emissions. The United States and China, the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters, last month pledged to reduce climate pollution in an effort to curb global warming.

Other plants at risk of closing include Exelon's Clinton station in Illinois, Entergy Corp.'s Pilgrim station in Massachusetts and FirstEnergy Corp.'s Davis-Besse plant in Ohio, according to Moody's. All three are single reactors, where costs can be higher than at multi-unit plants.

In Ohio, state regulators are considering FirstEnergy's proposal for 15 years of customer subsidies to keep the 908- megawatt Davis-Besse reactor and some coal-burning plants in service.

"Markets have not, and are not, providing sufficient revenues to ensure continued operations of the plants," Donald Moul, a vice president for commodity operations at FirstEnergy, said in Aug. 4 testimony. While prices eventually will rise, "the plants may not survive long enough to see the higher prices."

Illinois legislators in May ordered agencies to propose "market-based solutions" that would keep Exelon's nuclear plants open in the state. The company expects to hold off any retirement decisions until May 2015, awaiting any new laws, Chief Executive Officer Christopher Crane said Oct. 29.

A new power contract to keep Ginna open would be an "interim measure" to meet reliability needs, Paul Elsberg, a spokesman for Exelon, said in an e-mail. It would also maintain 700 jobs as Exelon seeks "longer-term, market-based solutions for its nuclear fleet," he said.

Other power generators in New York, including NRG Energy Inc. and Entergy, owner of the Indian Point nuclear plant, oppose the premium contract, saying competitors should be allowed to offer alternatives to Ginna. Options include adding power plants or power lines from existing plants to supply the Rochester area, NRG said in a filing.

"For what Exelon is asking to keep Ginna running, we could replace this plant with lower cost sustainable energy, like efficiency, like wind and like solar," said Judson, whose group opposes nuclear energy.
Rochester Gas is reviewing six alternatives, said Daniel Hucko, a spokesman for Iberdrola, declining to identify the proposals.

"It's about reliability," Hucko said in an emailed response to questions. "We will work in the best interests of our customers with considerations of cost at the forefront while recognizing the importance of continued network reliability and reaching reasonable terms for all parties."

Arkansas Nuclear One LER : Non Conservative Peak Cladding Temperature Limit

Honestly, how could you ever trust these guys again with nuclear fuel Computer codes? This is a generic issues happening on many other plants. If the NRC made it illegal to make a mistake of this type, it would have never happen. At the bottom of it all, they depended on a computer code to come to with the fuel thermal performance. You can't trust engineering computer codes?     

The five criteria for ECCS are to prevent peak fuel cladding temperature from exceeding 2200°F, prevent more than 17% oxidation of the fuel cladding, prevent more than 1% of the maximum theoretical hydrogen generation due the zircalloy metal-water reaction, maintain a coolable geometry, and allow for long-term cooling. ^[5] ECCS systems accomplish this by maintaining reactor pressure vessel (RPV) cooling water level, or if that is impossible, by directly flooding the core with coolant.

Did Entergy update the "stator drop accident" and "potential flooding: (yellow finding) risk estimation?

If this industry was really conservation, in the first hint of "fuel thermal performance" issues they should have " put in in this limit in 2009: "2 kilowatt / foot reduction in the MOL LHRs".

I honestly think if we approach the peak cladding temperature and any of the other core fuel limits, we are going to be in for a surprise...it will do the bad stuff much sooner and harder than the what we think. This corruption could damage us much more than the core meltdown!    

Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 1 05000313 2014 -- 002 -- 00

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
This report is submitted pursuant to the 30 day Special Report requirement of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii). The guidance provided in NURGEG 1022, Revision 3, allows the reporting under 10 CFR 50.73 and 10 CFR 50.46 to be combined.

On November 25, 2014, AREVA NP Inc. notified Entergy Operations, Inc. of a deficiency in the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) Emergency Core Cooling System evaluation model. When the deficiency is accounted for, the Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Peak Clad Temperature was estimated to exceed 2200°F and the absolute value of the deficiency is greater than the requirement of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii). Exceeding 2200°F resulted in ANO-1 making an 8-hour NRC notification on November 25, 2014. See Event Notification EN 50641. The purpose of this report is to provide the information required by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii). 

The current Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Evaluation Model (EM) for Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) plants uses the fuel performance code TACO3. The identified deficiency is in the thermal conductivity model in this computer code. The deficiency is that the code does not adequately represent the reduction in fuel thermal conductivity with burnup. This issue was discussed in the NRC Information Notice (IN) 2009-23 “Nuclear Fuel Thermal Conductivity Degradation”. Recent comparisons of the fuel temperatures from this code with fuel temperatures from the code GALILEO (a code that has an adequate fuel thermal conductivity model) indicate that the TACO3 code thermal conductivity model may lead to an under prediction of the Peak Clad Temperature (PCT) during a LOCA.

TACO3 does not model the thermal conductivity degradation (TCD) with burnup explicitly but has adjustments to the methodology and increases in the LOCA fuel temperature inputs. These
adjustments were intended to compensate for the non-conservative thermal conductivity model in TACO3. 

The continued use of this code was previously evaluated by AREVA in 2009 following the NRC issuance of Information Notice 2009-23. In 2009, it was concluded that sufficient conservatisms in both code predictions and LOCA methodology compensated for a lack of TCD models based, in part, on comparisons to an early version of the code GALILEO. However this conclusion has been invalidated based on recent GALILEO LOCA initialization studies.

Based on these new Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA) initializations, it is concluded that the LOCA EM that uses TACO3 must be modified by application of additional fuel temperature uncertainty to account for the effects of TCD based on COPERNIC2, a code that models TCD adequately. 

An evaluation was performed by applying the EM change to a Lower-Loop LBLOCA model with an axial power shaped peaked at core elevation 2.506-feet (ft) with a middle-of-life (MOL) burnup condition. For the representative plant, the 95/95 volume-average fuel temperature from the limiting PCT case was increased by 230°F. The results of the evaluation show that the original limiting MOL case cladding temperatures at the core elevation of 2.506 ft were increased by 481°F for the ruptured node and 288°F for the unruptured node. The results of this evaluation can be generically applied to all B&W plants. These ruptured and unruptured node cladding temperature deltas were applied to the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) full spectrum of MOL cases and led to an increase in limiting PCT of 388°F. An evaluation of the cladding temperatures at end-of-life (EOL) has confirmed that the MOL results were limiting. Also it is noted that the cladding temperatures at beginning-of-life (BOL) remain unaffected by TCD. This LBLOCA EM model change results in a significant increase to the
calculated PCT. When applying the estimated PCT increases with the revised EM approach, the limiting PCT was estimated to be 2396°F, which is in excess of 2200°F.

In order to reduce the PCT to less than 2200°F, AREVA recommended linear heat rate (LHR) limit reductions on October 21, 2014, and suggested that it was prudent to administratively implement any changes as a compensatory measure. The compensatory measures recommended a 2 kilowatt / foot reduction in the MOL LHRs. Imposition of the compensatory measures reduces the evaluated PCT to be equal to the PCT prior to the EM correction and thus less than 2200°F. As a precautionary measure pending the completed analysis, ANO-1 implemented the compensatory measures on October 20, 2014. 

The local oxidation and whole core hydrogen also remain well within the 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criteria for the LBLOCA scenarios. With the MOL LHR limit reduction, the core geometry remains amenable to cooling and acceptable long-term cooling is unaffected by these changes.

The impact of the EM correction and compensatory measure is summarized in Table 1 for LBLOCA and in Table 2 for Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA). The SBLOCA analyses are not sensitive to the initial fuel temperatures and thus the estimated impact on the SBLOCA peak cladding temperature is zero.

This deficiency will be corrected in a future LOCA analyses on an NRC agreed upon schedule.

Heroin Problem In Hinsdale, NH

Hinsdale woman re-arrested in connection with burglary

By Domenic Poli
dpoli@reformer.com @dpoli_reformer on Twitter

Posted: 01/01/2015 08:11:26 PM EST | Updated: about 24 hours ago

HINSDALE, N.H. >> An undercover operation by the Hinsdale Police Department this week led to the arrest of a woman allegedly linked to a previous crime.

Cassy Short, 24, of Hinsdale, was arrested for disposing of stolen property on Wednesday after the police conducted an operation to purchase an item taken from a Northfield Road residence in November. The Chesterfield Police assisted in the operation.

Short was arraigned before the 8th Circuit Court Keene District on the new charge and was ordered held on $10,000 cash bail. Her vehicle was seized pending a search warrant application.

According to Hinsdale Police Chief Todd Faulkner, his department on Nov. 5 started an investigation regarding a burglary at 221 Northfield Road. On Nov. 19, Short was arrested for conspiracy to commit burglary as a result of the investigation. She was arraigned in November and was out on bail at the time of this new alleged offense.

Faulkner told the Reformer he coordinated the rendezvous with Short and had an individual he didn't want to name act as an interested buyer. He said uniformed officers made the arrest after the transaction was finished and Chesterfield officers assisted because Faulkner had no way of knowing how many people would be involved in the transaction.

Drug addiction is a growing problem in the area and Faulkner said it is often at the core of burglaries and similar crimes

Waterford Plant: Are NRC Component Design Bases Inspections Sufficient (CDBI)

The fundamental question is... why didn't Entergy pick this up on their own years ago and why didn't the NRC pick it up on their CDBI inspections.

I count two CDBI inspections at Waterford for a total of 13 violations. Should't violations be going down at time goes on?

IR 2007-007 violations 8

IR 2011007 violations 5 

Palisades issues with the CDBI:

Are your “nads” safe: Seeing the Big Picture with the NRC and Palisades in One Design Inspection Report?

 

Basically they couldn't see if the fan was working. Waterford's response to NRC. TMI came about because, they monitored if the valve was energized or not, not if  the actual position of the valve. The valve indication said it was close, while the valve actually was open. This is a very similar event as TMI.

A root cause analysis was completed under CR-WF3-2013-2530 that identified the root cause as "the importance of monitoring EDG Exhaust fan differential pressure was not previously recognized."

Basically the problem with risk perspectives, these complex calculations are littered with assumptions deep within complex technical talk that outsiders can't understand. Most NRC officials can't explain risk perspectives to the public. These assumption most times are not carefully vetted and their is very little independence verification of this.  

Reference Documents:

LER 2013-005-00

December 30, 2014: WATERFORD SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2014011

January 30, 2014: WATERFORD INSPECTION  REPORT 05000382/2013008; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

At this time, the licensee noticed that the malfunction of the exhaust fan was due to a separation of the fan hub assembly from the hub sleeve, which effectively separated the fan from the fan motor.

The licensee conducted an apparent cause evaluation and determined that the most likely cause of the failure was due to a failure mode that was inadvertently introduced when maintenance personnel reworked the fan hub to sleeve connection in 1999. Specifically, on March 17, 1999, during a train B emergency diesel generator fan operational surveillance run, the fan motor tripped on overcurrent. The licensee investigated the condition and determined that the motor windings failed to operate. The licensee removed the fan hub assembly and installed a new motor to the fan. During the subsequent electrical bump test for the new motor, the technicians noted that the fan operated in the reverse direction because the licensee wired the leads for the motor in the opposite direction. The licensee determined that the reverse torque on the fan hub was sufficient to cause the fan hub spanner nut to back off its threads and allow the hub to drop down off the hub sleeve. This damaged the hub sleeve threads and spanner nuts. At that time, the licensee reworked the hub sleeve threads and developed Engineering Evaluation, ER-W3-1999-0301-00, Revision 0, to add four more set screws  to reduce the likelihood of future events with the spanner nut backing off the sleeve. These design field changes reduced the allowable stress of the fan hub to sleeve connection and increased the loading on the hub sleeve threads, respectively.

4:  SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2013008; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Nothing wrong with the blades

The licensee’s operability evaluation determined that the most likely cause for the elevated room temperature was due to a change in the minimum setting of the variable pitch blade controller that may have occurred during previous maintenance activities. The variable pitch blade controller is actually a Hydramotor. The Hydramotor uses an internal positive displacement pump to provide hydraulic pressure that operates a piston that in turn changes the pitch of the fan blade. The Hydramotor controller adjusts the blade pitch to a minimum position when the emergency diesel generator starts to allow air flow through the room. The licensee indicated that the controller probably did not move to its minimum position. The licensee generated a work request to perform more troubleshooting on the variable pitch settings for the fan.

Additionally, the inspectors noted that the Final Safety Analysis Report stated, in part, that the control room operator was provided with safety-related indication on the operation of each exhaust fan. The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not provide this safety-related indication for the operation of the exhaust fan. Specifically, the inspectors noticed that the computer records on April 25 and May 20, 2013, showed that the train B emergency diesel generator exhaust fan LO FLOW computer point indicated abnormal flow for the duration of both operational runs. This low flow indicator is available for the exhaust fans on the plant monitoring computer in the control room. However, this indication is not routinely monitored during emergency diesel operational tests. The low flow indicator is a non-safety-related pressure switch that measures a differential pressure across the exhaust fan. The set point for the switch is 1 inch water gage (inwg) that reads “LO” in response to the fan blade not rotating at the same speed as the fan motor and reads “NT LO” when operating properly. Local indication for this pressure switch is available near the exhaust fan actuator outside the train B emergency diesel generator room on a different elevation. A review of the surveillance procedures identified that each contained acceptance criteria that must be satisfied to constitute satisfactory performance of the surveillance. However, the procedures did not include the exhaust fan differential pressure local indication nor refer to the plant monitoring computer point as an acceptance criterion to demonstrate the operability of the emergency diesel generator ventilation exhaust fan assembly. The inspectors determined that the licensee performed the same operational surveillance on the train B emergency diesel generator using Procedure OP-903-068 on May 20, 2103. The train B emergency diesel generator surveillance results were found to be acceptable and the exhaust fan was considered to be operable. However, a review of the low flow indicator computer point showed the same LO FLOW condition as indicated during the operational surveillance run on April 25, 2103. As a result, the inspectors concluded that the train B emergency diesel generator exhaust fan failed sometime after the start of train B emergency diesel generator operational run on April 25, 2013.

The t/2 exposure period between April 22 and April 25, 2013, was 1.5 days.

The analyst assumed that, even if the severe accident guidelines were not yet entered, operators would take the action to promptly start and load the temporary diesels if Manually Start Temporary Diesel Generators needed. The emergency diesel generators would auto-start and load. Conversely, operators would need to manually start and load the temporary diesel generators. Operators believed that they could successfully start, parallel and load the temporary diesels in 30 minutes. The licensee determined that core damage would take at least 60 minutes assuming a station blackout with the concurrent failure of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Operators therefore would have sufficient time, but not extra time. The task did not appear overly complex and operators had adequate procedures to guide their actions. Operators receive just-in-time training prior to staging the temporary diesels, but not all operators receive hands-on training with the units.

Two 1500 kW emergency diesel generators were installed in parallel to support the train B emergency loads. Procedures limited the temporary diesel generator power load to 1750 kW (approximately 875 kW per emergency diesel generator). The safety-related emergency diesel generator provides over 4400 kW of power.