Palisades .206 Petition - OEDO-14-00145; Initial Recommendation (MF3608)

I am happy they answered me in the documents...this is not going to look good if a accident comes out of this.

Palisades .206 Petition - OEDO-14-00145; Initial Recommendation (MF3608)

Mr. Mulligan,

My name is Jennie Rankin. I have been assigned as the new petition manager for your 10 CFR 2.206 petition dated March 5, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14071A006). This petition was supplemented by your address to the Petition Review Board (PRB) on April 8, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A212) and by email dated May 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14142A101). In your petition, you request a number of actions to be taken by the NRC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (the licensee, ENO) for equipment failures at Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP). As the basis for your request, you state that there have been various recent plant events and equipment failures at PNP, such as Primary Coolant Pump (PCP) impeller pieces breaking off and lodging in the reactor vessel, leakage from the safety injection refueling water tank (SIRWT), and flaws in the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDM). I would like to note that during the spring 2014 refueling outage, all of the CRDM housings were replaced with new CRDM housings that incorporated a design change in an effort to eliminate the cause of the cracking. In 2013, ENO replaced most of the SIRWT bottom, along with other repairs to ensure any water leaking from the SIRWT would be captured and collected. No leakage from the SIRWT has been noted since these repairs in 2013. I also would like to express my appreciation for voicing your concerns regarding these matters to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The PRB is comprised of representatives from the following technical divisions within the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation: Component Performance, NDE and Testing Branch and, Vessels and Integrity Branch, within the Division of Engineering; Reactor System Branch, and Nuclear Performance and Code Review Branch within the Division of Safety Systems. The PRB initially met on March 14, 2014. At this meeting, the PRB reviewed your request for immediate action to prevent PNP restart due to a piece of impeller that was lodged between the reactor vessel and the flow skirt. It was determined that there were no safety significant concerns to prevent the plant from restarting as scheduled. Likewise, your request to immediately shutdown PNP until the PCPs are replaced was reviewed and it was determined that there were no safety significant concerns that would require a plant shutdown. This was communicated to you by email dated March 19, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14083A680). The PRB met again on May 19 and July 28, 2014, to discuss your petition, as supplemented, and in accordance with the criteria for review and rejection described in Management Directive (MD) 8.11, “Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions." The PRB determined that the following requests from your petition meet the criteria for review in accordance with MD 8.11:

1. Request for PNP to open every PCP for inspection and clear up all flaws.

2. Request for PNP to replace the PCP’s with a design for their intended duty.

3. Request an Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspection on why there are different analysis criteria for similar PCP events between the NRC regions.

4. Request a ten million dollar fine over these events.

5. Request for PNP to return to yellow or red status, and intensify NRC monitoring of PNP.

I have referred to the OIG those allegations of NRC wrongdoing contained in your petition and in the transcript of when you addressed the PRB on April 8, 2014. I have also forwarded your request for OIG investigation regarding why there are different analysis criteria for similar PCP events between the NRC regions, as stated in item number 3 above.

Your remaining requests do not meet the criteria for review, either because they are not requests for enforcement-related action or because they are issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved and the issues have been resolved. Although many of your requests do not meet the criteria of MD 8.11, the NRC staff appreciates your concerns and the below paragraphs explain why your requests were not accepted into the 2.206 process.

Concerns with NRC staff monitoring of PCP impeller issues

(Issue Nos. 1, 2, 11, 12, 14 of petition dated March 5, 2014)

This issue regarding failure of the PCP impellers resulting in pieces breaking free in the reactor vessel is being tracked by Region III through the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). Region III staff, in addition to the resident inspection staff at PCP, have followed, and will continue to follow up with the licensee regarding the licensee’s corrective actions, in accordance with ROP activities. On August 8, 2012, Region III documented a finding of very-low safety significance and associated non-cited violation for the failure of the licensee to operate the PCPs in accordance with their design operating criteria (ADAMS Accession No. ML12221A340). Region III recently documented their inspection findings in the Palisades Nuclear Plant Integrated Inspection Report dated May 7, 2014 (ML14127A543). The report states the following:

Because the PCP-C impeller was replaced with a new impeller this outage, PCP-B was the only pump that remained in service with a refurbished impeller that was more susceptible to the fatigue-related failures that have been observed.

However, a review of the licensee’s evaluation to justify continued operation of PCP-B with a potentially cracked impeller continues. Additionally, the inspectors continue to review the licensee’s corrective actions to date and going forward to determine whether the licensee plans to eliminate the known susceptibility of impeller pieces breaking off.

In addition to continued monitoring of this issue under the ROP, Region III staff have addressed this issue at the public End-of-Cycle meetings conducted in South Haven, Michigan (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML14192B384 and ML14175A284 for meeting summary and NRC meeting slides). During the public End-of-Cycle meeting, the NRC staff presented a discussion on the reactor vessel foreign material inspection that occurred during the 2014 refueling outage and provided a poster session to answer any additional questions regarding foreign material caused by the failure of the impellers.

In regards to your concerns on why the broken vanes were not reported to the NRC by a Licensee Event Report (LER) or event notification, the requirements for reporting events to the NRC are in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. NUREG-1022, Revision 3, “Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13032A220) contains guidelines that the NRC staff considers acceptable for use in meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. Section 3.0 of NUREG-1022 provides examples and discussion of events that would require event notification or an LER. Region III monitors conformance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 through ROP activities and did not consider the impeller issues at Palisades to warrant notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.

In regards to your concern on plant debris discovered in the primary side of the steam generators, specifically the impact of loose impeller pieces causing potential wear on the steam generator tubes, PNP’s technical specifications (TS) section 5.6.8 requires the licensee to submit a steam generator tube inspection report to the NRC. This report includes the active degradation mechanisms including foreign objects wear (regardless of origin), location and measured sizes of service induced indications, and any corrective actions (e.g., tube plugging) taken in response to the inspection findings. The NRC staff reviews these reports to ensure that the licensee is detecting potential tube degradation. The NRC staff documents their review in a letter to the licensee, which is made publically available in ADAMS.

Concerns with the design and operation of the PCP impellers

(Issue Nos. 7 and 8 of 2.206 petition dated March 5, 2014 and

Issue Nos. 5, 6, and 7 of supplemental email dated May 21, 2014)

You raised the following concerns:

a. Sequencing of the PCP during startup and shutdown conditions.

b. Potential erosion of the coolant piping walls from metal blade particles.

c. Failure of large pieces of the impeller.

The NRC staff notes that the requests regarding the above 3 concerns were not a request for an enforcement action and thus, did not meet the acceptance criteria in accordance to MD 8.11. The NRC staff understands your concerns and notes that these concerns are closely related to two of the accepted requests (Numbers 1 and 2 above), and will take your underlying concerns into consideration during the review of the accepted requests.

Concerns with pieces of broken impeller causing fuel damage

(Issue Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of supplemental email dated May 21, 2014)

Many of your requests stem from your concern that broken pieces of impeller (small metal particles) can ultimately cause fuel damage. As a result of the October 2011 vibration event and the subsequent review of the licensee’s operability determination, the NRC staff studied the following potential issues associated with broken impeller pieces (various sizes):

1. Interactions within the PCP including impeding flow, impact with other vanes, impeding pump coastdown, pressure boundary damage, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) impacts.

2. Passage through a reactor coolant system cold leg including potential impact with a resistance temperature device and pressure boundary damage.

3. Passage / lodging in the reactor vessel (RV) annulus including pressure boundary damage.

4. Behavior after leaving the RV annulus including potential interactions in the lower plenum, blockage of flow channels, fuel cladding damage, and control rod jamming.

5. Effects of a piece moving upstream of the PCP.

The NRC staff concluded there were no significant safety concerns resulting from broken pieces of impeller causing fuel damage due to several factors. Impeller pieces are likely to remain stuck at the flow skirt or at the bottom of the vessel as evidenced by the discovery of previous pieces. Flow conditions are insufficient to elevate larger pieces that may pass through the gap between the flow skirt and vessel wall to the lower core support plate. Should the impeller pieces be small enough to be transported up and through the gaps (a highly unlikely occurrence), the impeller piece would have to become lodged in a position to cause erosion of the fuel cladding. If this occurs, the activity levels in the primary coolant system would increase. Radiation monitoring would detect this increase in PCS levels, and the reactor would be shutdown in accordance with the licensee’s technical specification 3.4.16, “PCS Specific Activity.”

Requests for licensee information

(Issue Nos. 4 and 9 of the 2.206 petition dated March 5, 2014)

In regards to your request for Palisades to disclose internal Entergy reports regarding whether the PCPs were operated outside their design bases, the NRC staff does not require the licensee to disclose internal documents for public inspection as part of the 2.206 process. As part of the inspection process under the ROP, Entergy documents have been, and will continue to be reviewed, and any findings will be documented in the applicable inspection reports which are made publically available.

In regards to your request for Entergy to explain their decision for weld repair of the PCP impellers and details on how other plants have repaired their impellers, the NRC staff notes that this request is not a request for enforcement related action and thus, did not meet the acceptance criteria in accordance to MD 8.11. The NRC staff understands your concern and notes that these concerns are closely related to two of the accepted requests (Number 1 and 3 above). During the process of reviewing accepted request Number 1, the NRC will take your concern into consideration.

In accordance with MD 8.11, you have the opportunity to address the PRB to comment on the initial recommendations, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, or by telephone conference. Please advise me by return email if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via telephone, the NRC staff is available for a conference call at 10 AM ET on September 3, 2014. If I do not hear from you by August 22, 2014, I will move forward to process the acknowledgement letter which will contain our final recommendations for accepting your petition in part.

Thank you,

Jennie Rankin

Jenni Rankin, Project Manager

Plant Licensing Branch III-1

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(301) 415-1530

Westinghouse and Salem Plant Falsified Documents to NRC to Keep Plant Running

INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2014003 AND 05000311/2014003

Description. The inspectors performed an in-depth review of PSEG’s evaluation and corrective actions associated with continued failures of RCP TVBs. The RCPs at Salem Unit 2 are model 93A supplied by Westinghouse. The turning vane is attached to the thermal barrier, internal to the pump, by twenty 1.0 inch diameter bolts fabricated from alloy A286. This material is susceptible to IGSCC as identified by Westinghouse in technical bulletin NSD-TB-94-06-R0, issued on August 11, 1994. Since refueling outage 2R18 in 2011, a total of seventeen TVB heads have been discovered in the reactor coolant system. The issue was originally evaluated during refueling outage 2R18, when two separated bolt heads were identified in April 2011, under order number 70123042 and determined not to have an adverse effect on RCP operations. During refueling outage 2R19, five additional loose TVB heads were found in the reactor coolant system. The licensee again communicated with Westinghouse and evaluated the condition as documented in order 70144776. The evaluation stated that “Dropping of the stationary hydraulic will have no direct impact on the seal assembly, as little or no contact between stationary and rotating parts should occur.” Additionally, during refueling outage 2R20,

Little or no contact...why doesn't the engineering firm westinghouse know for sure? And it is safe.

more loose turning bolt heads were discovered as documented in notification 20647694. The NRC inspector reviewed this notification and previous evaluations and questioned the basis for acceptability of contact between stationary and rotating components.

The licensee conducted additional reviews in coordination with Westinghouse and documented in OTDM S-14-003, that in the event of a failure of the turning vane assembly, it was possible for machining between the rotating and stationary parts to occur. Or so now it is unsafe after after seeing the damage.

Based on this information, the licensee conducted a plant cooldown, defueled the reactor and shipped all four RCPs offsite for inspection and repair at two vendor facilities. These inspections found TVB failures on all four RCPs.

 The NRC considers lying or being intentionally inaccurate to the agency as a safe practice according to risk perspectives.

An unresolved item (URI) was identified because additional NRC review and evaluation is needed to determine if the issue is more than minor and whether the issue of concern constitutes a violation. The inspectors will review PSEG’s evaluation and causal analysis of the as-found condition and the impact on safety components and accident analysis upon its completion. (URI 05000311/2014003-03, Repetitive Failures of Reactor Coolant Pump Turning Vane Bolts)

The Fuel of Crime in Brattleboro is Drugs

I feel we should treat pot simular to alcohol...legalized it.

So Hinsdale is surrounded by bigger towns whose police chiefs think the largest driver of crime is drugs.

What drives crime in Brattleboro?

Acting Police Chief to downtown merchants: Drugs are at the root

By Olga Peters/The Commons

BRATTLEBORO—A recent spate of break-ins and vandalism to Main Street businesses has left some merchants asking what’s behind it all —and how they can be part of the solution.

This below is a Keene Sentinal article a week ago, look at how astonishing similar is the first paragraph in the Sentinal's crime problem as in the Brattleboro's Commons.

"Over the past two months, Keene police have been getting report after report of residential burglaries around the city. The burglaries are all over the map, but many have been concentrated in the Court Street area, according to police records."

“The great majority of our non-violent crimes — and even our violent ones — in Brattleboro are tied to drugs,” Acting Police Chief Michael Fitzgerald told roughly a dozen downtown merchants at their first-Tuesday Building a Better Brattleboro (BaBB) meeting at the River Garden.

The conversation touched on shoplifting, advice for installing alarm systems, “vagrants” sleeping on shop benches, and merchants photographing shoplifters or suspected drug dealers in the hopes of driving them away.

“How do we as a community make it unfriendly for those dealing drugs?” asked BaBB President Donna Simons, who owns A Candle in the Night.

Simons said she asked Fitzgerald’s predecessor, Police Chief Eugene Wrinn, about creating a neighborhood watch.

Keene is just like Brattleboro with crime.

My greatest fear is we are being overrun by anarchist, freestater, libertarians and government haters fleeing the higher population areas.

Authorities see drugs as common thread running through many recent thefts

According to Simons, Wrinn said if people drive the crime from downtown, it will find another neighborhood. Simons said she no longer worries about that.

“There’s a difference between [being] mildly accepting because you feel helpless, and [being] proactive,” she said. “I kind of feel we have to take downtown back.”

The conversation turned its focus to drug-related crimes in Brattleboro and how the town might create a supportive community while discouraging drugs and empowering merchants to protect their interests.

Some audience members spoke of witnessing uncomfortable interactions such as drug deals, pedestrian harassment, and customer intimidation.

A substance abuse counselor said she was intimidated by a group of men who hung around her former office. Clients wouldn’t brave the group to keep appointments, she said.

A man she often tried to avoid once blocked her path and stared her down.

“I’m not a chicken, but I know when I’m outmatched,” she said.

Fitzgerald said he understood that people sometimes fear retaliation over calling the police. Still, he urged the merchants to make contact — even if the only outcome was that the incident would be logged.

He should have said, my police force would move heaven and hell to put behind bars anyone trying to intimidate you from talking to the police.

Fitzgerald explained that intimidating or dangerous behavior constitutes disorderly conduct. “You’re endangering other people by your actions,” he said.

Police can address people blocking the sidewalk or intimidating others, he said.

Although Fitzgerald encouraged merchants to be proactive, he also reminded them to avoid danger. And he reminded them that even drug dealers have constitutional rights.

The Vermont judicial system views drug-related crimes differently than crimes where drugs don’t play a role, said Fitzgerald.

In the state’s mind, if it jails and releases someone addicted to drugs, then the only result is an addict who is clean while in jail, said Fitzgerald. Within a few days, the person will return to using drugs.

“You have to address the addiction,” he said. “It is the drugs that are driving it.”

Fitzgerald acknowledged merchant frustration in watching the person who burgled their store enter a rehab program and not prison.

Laura Lynde of Lynde Motorsports on Flat Street cautioned against creating an “us versus them” situation. If people sense hostility, they’re more likely to respond with hostility, she said.

Instead, she asked, how can each member of this community step up to create a supportive and drug-free environment?

Lynde, formerly of Hartford, Conn., said she adapted to protecting herself against such crimes as carjacking.

In her opinion, drug-related crime in Brattleboro has grown more prevalent. The town essentially is dealing with a drug cartel, she said of an intricate network of dealers and buyers, which other merchants said they have witnessed.

Lynde said she felt Vermont’s approach to drug-related crime— moving offenders to rehabilitation programs rather than prison — is wise.

The root of the problem, she said, is that, “we have a small-town police force dealing with city crime.”

Fitzgerald said he does not support creating an official police photo-sharing system of arrested shoplifters. “Once you pay your debt to society you’re done,” he said.

Fitzgerald also said he did not support loitering ordinances because they are too subjective. People more readily perceive homeless people as loiterers than they would someone wearing a suit and tie.

“And let’s not be too quick to judge people by their appearance,” he added.

Many of the merchants in the audience said that the people in town who are homeless were not behind downtown crime. Nevertheless, customers complain.

Simons said the combination of homelessness, “shady-looking people,” and young transient kids with dogs who sit in downtown doorways create a perfect storm for illegal behavior.

“The word is out that this area is very inviting,” said Orly Munzing, director of the Strolling of the Heifers, speaking of food pantries and other services in town that attract people.

To that, Jacob Alan Roberts, downtown coordinator for BaBB, suggested that one imagine how horrible the town would be if people were going hungry.

“Call more, I can’t emphasize that enough,” said Fitzgerald.“You know when something is fishy.”

Separately, Fitzgerald said that Brattleboro’s drug issue is not simply about law enforcement. He said he supports investing in rehabilitation for those dealing with substance abuse.

When asked if one type of drug use was more prevalent in town, Fitzgerald said he sees “a broad mish-mash.”

“Nothing is off limits,” he said. “That’s what’s concerning.”

BaBB will invite members from social service organizations in town to its September meeting to discuss ways merchants and service organizations might work together to help prevent crime downtown.

Indifferant Hinsdale Police, A Terrble Toll For Hinsdale!

At least they are warning the public...this crap is all around us and people are dropping like flies.

Worcester officials issue advisory after drug deaths

Worcester officials are issuing a public health advisory after at least nine drug overdose deaths there in the past six days.

Police suspect heroin is the problem, either unusually pure or cut with something deadly, but they can’t be sure until toxicology reports are finished.

Police say if the current pace of overdoses, both fatal and non-fatal, continues, there will be 503 this year in the city. Last year, there were 447.

Police Chief Gary Gemme said, “You never know what you’re going to put in your system when you buy narcotics off the street.”

The city’s public health director, Derek Brindisi, said officials are working with local health clinics and addiction treatment providers to spread the word that there’s something especially dangerous about the heroin circulating in Worcester right now.

“We’re in the midst of a public health emergency,” Brindisi said.

Probe into 2012Chesterfield homicide complicated by many rumors and theories

By ALYSSA DANDREA Sentinel Staff

SentinePosted: Tuesday, August 5, 2014

 

Posted: Tuesday, August 5, 2014 12:00 pm

Why did Douglas M. Farr Jr. fatally shoot his friend Mark T. McAuley near a secluded section of old logging roads in Chesterfield in April 2012?

That question is one state investigators probed for more than two years and yet the answer remains a mystery today. The authorities never made an arrest in the case, which was complicated by multiple theories and rumors about what could have happened.

Farr, 32, of Hinsdale told investigators he shot McAuley, 39, also of Hinsdale, on April 14, 2012, in self-defense with his .40-caliber pistol, according to the N.H. Attorney General’s Office.

But that office’s investigators found Farr’s tale of self-defense implausible. Furthermore, some of Farr’s friends and family repeatedly questioned whether he had told them the truth in the days after the shooting.

Those revelations are part of the nearly 1,300-page report on the shooting the N.H. Attorney General’s Office released last week.

The Sentinel filed a Right-to-Know request seeking a copy of the report more than a year ago, after Farr and his fiancee, Erin Breault, 35, of Hinsdale, died in a car crash on Route 12 in Keene. But the office did not conclude its investigation into the homicide until May, and refused to release the report until last week.

Only one witness

McAuley’s body was found one-quarter mile south from the Bradley Road and North Hinsdale Road intersection, police said. He suffered multiple gunshot wounds, according to an autopsy.

The authorities lacked eyewitnesses, including Farr, who in the year between the shooting and his death turned down interviews with police, at the advice of his attorneys.

As The Sentinel’s review of the documents continues, here is some of what else N.H. State Police interviews with key witnesses revealed:

Multiple acquaintances of Farr and McAuley said the two struggled with drug addiction, and speculated whether the shooting was a drug deal gone bad.

Andrew Laffond of Hinsdale, a cousin of Farr’s, told police he believed the shooting was about heroin or drug money owed to Farr. He claimed Farr was addicted to drugs and that someone had given Vicodin to Farr shortly before the shooting.

“I also heard that my cousin said that he was real scared of somebody and that if worse came to worse then he’d have to kill somebody, and that’s what made me really believe that, you know, he could’ve possibly,” Laffond told police during an interview that June.

Farr was married to Heather Burnett of Hinsdale for about five years and had three children with her. She told police Farr was dependent on narcotics, so much so that he stole pills from family members.

She and Breault had a hunch that Farr repeatedly caused injury to himself so that he could keep getting narcotics, according to police interviews. Neither could prove that theory, though.

Burnett said Farr was depressed and had contemplated suicide, but she never thought he would purposefully harm another man. Burnett said she didn’t know McAuley.

Mark LaValley of Brattleboro, an acquaintance of Farr, told police he speculated that Farr shot McAuley and then shot himself in the shoulder. He also indicated a third man was involved in the shooting, but declined to say how he knew that, according to the report.

In addition to contemplating whether the shooting was fueled by drugs, acquaintances and family of Farr shared other theories with police. But because none of them had witnessed the shooting first-hand, they could only speculate.

One rumor was that McAuley hired a private investigator to dig up dirt on Burnett, according to documents in the case file. The theory was that McAuley used the promise of that evidence to lure Farr into the woods. Farr would do anything for his children, acquaintances said, and he could use that evidence against Burnett to seek primary parenting responsibilities for them during a custody battle.

But there was no proof to back up that rumor, according to the report.

Farr’s fiancee, Breault, and mother, Monica Burdette, also alleged Burnett was involved in getting Farr to the Chesterfield woods, but when police asked what proof they had to make those claims, nothing materialized.

Farr’s mother allegedly told Burnett during a phone conversation that someone was after Farr, although she never specified who. The call took place on the day of the shooting, and Burnett recalled Burdette was in hysterics.

Initial reports to police from Burdette and Breault suggest McAuley had used zip ties to strap Farr to a tree before shooting him in the shoulder. Farr also told the women he was able to cut himself free with a knife McAuley dropped, and he then shot McAuley, according to documents.

Farr’s ex-father-in-law, Bradley Burnett, told police he heard two men tied Farr up and that he then escaped, shooting one of them.

A lifelong friend of Farr’s, Leon Dunbar, said the craziest theory he heard was that somebody drove by the shooting scene and saw a Chevrolet Tahoe parked with two men seated inside, holding pit bulls. That story’s relevance to the shooting and its origin was a mystery to him, he told police.

Dunbar said he tried to convince Farr to talk to police to set the story straight, but Farr always said his attorneys, including public defender Caroline L. Smith, advised him not to.

In the report, the Attorney General’s Office redacted some personal identifying information and medical information under exceptions allowed in the Right-to-Know law and through the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. The officials also did not include an interview with a minor, criminal records and certain photographs that would constitute an invasion of privacy, according to a letter dated July 28 from the office.

Hinsdale NH: The Terrible Toll With a Unengaged Police Force and Drug Addiction

???

***Brattleboro, Vermont - June 15, 2009

A 26-year-old Dummerston man is dead after being stabbed in the neck. The incident took place early Monday morning on Elliot Street in downtown Brattleboro. Police have the man in custody who they say is responsible for the murder. According to witnesses, the victim was in the wrong place at the wrong time.

According to court papers, Andrew Sheets, 41, became enraged in downtown Brattleboro early Monday morning after he was robbed of money he was trying to use to buy cocaine. Papers state that Sheets confronted several people about the money including the victim's brother, who was on scene. The victim, David Snow, 26, happened to be out walking his dog and saw the argument. Papers state Snow stepped in between his brother and Sheets. Witnesses told police that Sheets pushed Snow, and then after Snow tried to punch him, Sheets stabbed Snow in the neck fatally wounding him. When police arrived on scene, Sheets still had the knife in his hand and was immediately taken into custody.

"Fifty dollars, somebody get mad cause this kid owes him 50 dollars. It's late at night and they have been drinking," said Jesse Forrett, who knew Snow.

***RUTLAND, Vt. — The trial of a Holyoke man accused of the execution-style slaying of a Vermont woman got underway Monday in U.S. District Court in Rutland.

Frank Caraballo, 31, is charged with fatally shooting Melissa Barratt in the head on July 29, 2011, because he believed Barratt had stolen $10,000 worth of drugs from him, according to Vermont State Police and federal prosecutors.

Authorities say Barratt, 31, was found dead in a wooded area of Dummerston, a rural Windham County town just north of Brattleboro.

Prosecutors' claim they have witnesses, phone statements, recordings and forensic evidence proving Caraballo murdered Barratt, who sold drugs for Caraballo after he left Holyoke to establish a drug-dealing network in southeastern Vermont

 

Looks like she is taking a shot at the ingredients of the spider web shooting. Drug courts are reactionary and under funded. We basically need a voluntary and mandatory jobs and public works program. An incentive program. If nobody else will hire you, we will put you in a job and provide many other services. If you don't show up for work today, then you sleep in jail tonight!

I think there is a large group of listless and hopeless youths and adults in my community...they need to find something productive to do. They have basically given up because nobody has ever found a place for them in our society. These people are basically immature and susceptible to drug and alcohol abuse. Another large component through no fault of these people, they were exposed to horrendous family problems. These crap gets passed on from one generation to the next and the next.

Remember the results of the attorney general investigation revolves around events leading up to the murder on April 14, 2012. I suspect the drug scene in our area has substantially changed since then.
 
We need to know what is going on today.

Sen. Jeanne Shaheen talks VA reform bill and drug treatment

Prescription drug and heroin abuse is another top-of-mind issue for state and local residents these days, and Shaheen took some time to address the problem. 

In New Hampshire, the percentage of residents who report having used heroin at least once in their lifetime has increased from 1.2 percent in 2004-2005 to 3.3 percent in 2010-2011, according to data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health. 

The percentage of New Hampshire residents seeking drug treatment has also risen sharply. In the last 10 years, the percentage of people admitted to state-funded treatment programs rose by 90 percent for heroin use and by 500 percent for prescription opiate abuse. 

The sharpest increase has been between 2012 and 2013, according to a news release from the N.H. Bureau of Drug and Alcohol Services. 

Shaheen said earlier this year, she was startled to hear that drug overdose deaths have surpassed traffic fatalities. 

Via a federal appropriations bill, the senator said she had recently made a request to give more funding to New Hampshire drug courts. 

And she said she hoped more focus would be put on prescription drug use.

“One of the challenges is looking at how we can provide additional education for doctors in terms of prescribing,” she said. 

Shaheen said she and other senators recently introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to reauthorize the National All-Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting program, which provides funding for states to maintain and expand their prescription drug-monitoring programs. 

Ayotte has also taken a stance on prescription drugs, introducing legislation to help reform prescribing practices for pain medication. 

“This is the kind of issue that everyone needs to come together on,” Shaheen said. “We really need an all of the above approach. This is an issue that affects all income levels, all ages.”

 

Ella Nilsen can be reached at enilsen@keenesentinel.com or 352-1234, extension 1409. Follow her on Twitter @ENilsenKS.

 
Facebook Group:

Hinsdale Crime Watch, Police and News

This spring, the authorities concluded Douglas M. Farr Jr., 32, of Hinsdale shot and killed Mark T. McAuley, 39, also of Hinsdale, on April 14, 2012. From the beginning, Farr had admitted to the killing, according to N.H. State Police investigators. Farr claimed to investsgators that he shot McAuley in self-defense.

Why didn't the friends and mother turn these guys into the police?

The overloaded, overwhelmed and resourced starved Attorney General’s and state police investigative office.

The high turnover of Hinsdale police.

The poor communication of the police.

The widespread mistrust of our police department.

The cliques within the town and the interaction with the police department.

Hinsdale is gun and murder central, as with the Spider web shooting and Dustin Curtiss…as there is never a competent police investigation and they never have the 110% proof that the shooter is guilty…so the case never goes to court.

Is the state’s attorney…have they gone too far with the proof level necessary to convict or go to court, so they don’t have the guts to bring it to trial. It is really money based? They need a 99.5% conviction rate.

I am really irked we had a safety threat to the community in a murder case…the police failed get  and warn the community with the message the police have indication there is heavy duty drug use and dealing going on in town…the police want all information on this as possible. 

 Breault and Farr’s mother, Burdette, had speculated in interviews with police that the April 14, 2012, shooting was drug-related. Acquaintances of Farr’s told police Farr had driven McAuley to the North Hinsdale Road area for a drug deal that went bad.

Widespread indications the police doesn’t follow up on complaints and communicate properly to the community.

Widespread indications the police response times in emergencies is erratic.

Need to publicize 911 and police response times.

Indications 911 can’t connect the dots and other problems with communications under an emergency situation.

The Terrible Toll With a Unengaged Police Force

Investigators release long-awaited report about 2012 homicide in Chesterfield

By ALYSSA DANDREA Sentinel Staff
Posted: Friday, August 1, 2014 12:00 pm

SentinelSource.comThe N.H. Attorney General’s Office has released a nearly 1,300-page report detailing the authorities’ probe of a 2012 homicide in Chesterfield.

The report sheds new light on the relationship between the prime suspect and the victim, and includes statements from acquaintances who say they both had struggles with drugs.

This spring, the authorities concluded Douglas M. Farr Jr., 32, of Hinsdale shot and killed Mark T. McAuley, 39, also of Hinsdale, on April 14, 2012. From the beginning, Farr had admitted to the killing, according to N.H. State Police investigators. Farr claimed to investigators that he shot McAuley in self-defense.

McAuley’s body was found one-quarter mile south from the Bradley Road and North Hinsdale Road intersection, according to police.

An autopsy revealed McAuley had been shot multiple times and suffered wounds to his lower back, left underarm, left shoulder, right hip and head, according to documents included in the case file.

The shooting occurred in a secluded network of old logging roads in Chesterfield known as the “spider web.”

The Sentinel filed a Right-to-Know request seeking a copy of the report more than one year ago, after Farr died in a fiery car crash on Keene’s Route 12.

And although the Attorney General’s Office wrapped up its investigation into the fatal shooting in May, The Sentinel just received the documents by mail Thursday.

Farr was never arrested, because of a lack of eyewitnesses and because investigators needed time to probe the relationship between Farr and McAuley, according to the Attorney General’s Office.

But while the investigation continued, Farr and his fiancee, Erin Breault, 35, of Hinsdale, were killed May 3, 2013, when Farr swerved into the oncoming lane of traffic on Route 12 and collided with an oil tanker head-on near the Routes 9-10 interchange in Keene. Both Farr and Breault were pronounced dead at the scene.

Keene police later determined Farr was distracted by his cellphone at the time of the crash.

The authorities considered Breault a material witness in the homicide investigation. She had one child. Farr is survived by his three children from a previous marriage, and was involved in a lengthy court dispute over custody of the children and child support at the time of his death.

In the year between the shooting and Farr’s death, police made multiple, yet unsuccessful, attempts to interview Farr; his attorneys, including public defender Caroline L. Smith, told police he was unavailable, according to the report released Thursday.

Interviews State Police conducted with key witnesses about the homicide, before and after the fatal crash, tell varied and convoluted tales about Farr and McAuley’s relationship, as well as how and why they came to be in the North Hinsdale Road area April 14, 2012.

That morning, Hinsdale police received a phone call from Farr’s mother, Monica Burdette, saying she could not find her son and he was “upset,” according to the authorities.

Shortly before 2:30 p.m., Chesterfield police learned of the shooting through a broken 911 call, in which someone reported that a man had been shot. Within minutes, an officer responded to the area of North Hinsdale Road and met with Farr, who was found in Burdette’s vehicle with Breault and Burdette.

Farr was crying, visibly upset and had a gunshot wound to his shoulder, the authorities said. A .40-caliber pistol belonging to Farr and a loaded magazine were inside the vehicle, according to the AG’s office.

It was then that Farr told police “there was another guy in the woods,” and that he’d shot him, according to a May news release from the Attorney General’s Office.

That brief summary is just a glimpse into what the authorities learned may have happened in the woods off North Hinsdale Road that April day.

Initial reports to police from Burdette and Breault suggest McAuley had used zip ties to strap Farr to a tree before shooting him in the shoulder. Farr also allegedly told the women that he was able to cut himself free with a knife McAuley dropped, and that he shot McAuley with the same gun, which Farr owned.

But investigators told Breault and Burdette there were gaps in the story and that the pieces of the puzzle didn’t add up.

Documents show police found black zip ties in McAuley’s hand and near his body, and that those ties matched the 39 discovered in a small baggie in Farr’s vehicle. J & J Autobody of Troy repossessed Farr’s 2005 Chevrolet Blazer April 23, 2012, because of nonpayment of an automobile loan, and mechanics discovered the zip ties during an inventory of the car.

The Sentinel is continuing to study the 1,297 pages released Thursday by the AG’s office in an effort to provide answers to many looming questions, and to give a glimpse into the information provided by those who knew Farr and McAuley.

The Attorney General’s Office redacted personal identifying information and medical information under exceptions allowed in the Right-to-Know law and through the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. They also did not include an interview with a minor, criminal records and certain photographs that would constitute an invasion of privacy, according to a letter dated Monday from the AG’s office.

State Police conducted several searches during their two-year homicide investigation, to include Farr’s residence; McAuley’s residence; Breault’s vehicle; the vehicle belonging to Farr’s mother; and various cellphones and accompanying records.

Seven months prior to the homicide, Farr was shot by his then-7-year-old son at their Hinsdale home. The authorities have remained quiet about the shooting, but Farr’s fiancee agreed to go on the record April 14, 2012, to police about what she claimed happened.

She described Farr as an avid hunter, who frequented shooting ranges, including a spot near where the homicide occurred.

On that October day, Farr got out one of his rifles to show the boy, Breault told police.

She remembered seeing the boy sitting on the couch as he played with the bullets, but didn’t believe the gun was nearby. But next thing she knew, the boy was pointing it at Farr’s chest.

When he fired it, a bullet tore through Farr’s shoulder, Breault said in that April 2012 interview.

And after that day, Farr’s shoulder never healed due to reoccurring — and somewhat mysterious — infections, she said. He also became addicted to prescription pain medication, specifically Oxycontin and oxycodone.

The couple had experienced difficult times financially, and, in an attempt to bring in money, Farr began dealing in drugs, according to Breault. Meanwhile, his own addiction advanced, she told police.

Breault and Farr’s mother, Burdette, had speculated in interviews with police that the April 14, 2012, shooting was drug-related. Acquaintances of Farr’s told police Farr had driven McAuley to the North Hinsdale Road area for a drug deal that went bad. Multiple witness reports indicate Farr and McAuley were in the same car, owned by Breault.

McAuley and Farr knew each other through mutual friends, and lived just 3 miles apart at the time of the shooting.

McAuley had dated Katherine G. LeVasseur, who told police she had been friends with Farr since grade school and that she and Farr had reconnected about three years prior to the shooting.

Alyssa Dandrea can be reached at 352-1234, extension 1435, or adandrea@keenesentinel.com. Follow her on Twitter @ADandreaKS.

How "Flex" is weakening the nuclear industry

Updated June 9 @ 10pm 

I recently talked to a NRC official about this a month ago. Basically because the flex system isn't safety related, the official said it can't be used to justify operating with more degraded equipment at power. 

He thought if it was safety related...it could justify operating with more degraded equipment...

Seems to be a little more traffic on this article recently...I wanted you to know how the NRC looked at it.

I was wrong...



The impact of FLEX on outage risk: Part 1 (theory)

 http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurethe-impact-of-flex-on-outage-risk-4331405/

You know how they are really using this, they including this flex stuff into PRAs risk perspectives…it justifies more operations with degraded equipment and it reduces the punishment when they violate the laws and procedures. The reframe of, it is not safety related.

It is corrupting the staff on a global scale and it is polluting capacity factor on a amazing scale.

The impact of FLEX on outage risk: Part 1 (theory)

31 July 2014            

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Palo Verde has developed a plan for post-Fukushima modifications following US industry guidance. It found these changes generated extra outage safety and performance benefits. By Mike Powell, Kevin Graham and Jeff Taylor

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Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued order ES-12-049 [1] requiring nuclear plants in the US to implement mitigation strategies to cope with a beyond- design-basis external event.
The event is assumed to result in an extended loss of all AC power and loss of access to the ultimate heat sink for all units on the site, with no expectation of either returning. The initial phase requires installed equipment and on-site resources to be used to maintain or restore cooling capability for the core, containment and spent fuel pool (SFP). The transition phase requires the use of portable onsite equipment to provide sufficient cooling for these functions. The final phase requires the use of offsite resources to sustain these functions indefinitely.
The US commercial nuclear industry, working through the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), developed guidance for flexible and diverse strategies (hereafter referred to as FLEX) that would address the NRC order. NEI 12-06 [2] was developed and discussed with the NRC over several months, and after several drafts and many public meetings, was eventually approved by the NRC as Interim Staff Guidance (JLD- ISG-2012-01) [3] on 29 August 2012. Operating licence holders had to submit an "overall integrated plan" on how they would comply with the NRC order and guidance by 28 February 2013. They were then required to complete full implementation of the order within two refuelling cycles following submittal of their plan, or by 31 December 2016, whichever came first (see also 'Developing the FLEX plan', April 2013, pp. 21-3).
Palo Verde nuclear station is a three-unit site 50 miles west of Phoenix, Arizona, operated by Arizona Public Service Company (APS). All three units are two-loop Combustion Engineering System 80® designs, which are licensed for 60 years and will operate well past 2040. APS must implement the new requirements. Based on the outage schedules, Unit 1 will be the first to achieve full compliance, in the third quarter of 2014, Unit 3 will be compliant in the first quarter of 2015 and Unit 2 will be compliant by third quarter 2015.
APS completed the baseline coping capability in the engineering phase and established conceptual modifications (typical for PWRs) to comply with the FLEX order. To comply with the order and to provide diversity and defence-in-depth, a primary and alternate means of accomplishing each function is needed.
Modifications were made to:

• The auxiliary feedwater system (AFW), to allow for primary and alternate steam generator injection with a FLEX pump (right-hand green line in Figure 1)
• The high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system, to allow for primary and alternate reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup with a FLEX pump (yellow line above). If steam generators are not available (for example during an outage) the HPSI modification also would allow the SG injection FLEX pump to inject into the RCS (purple line)
• Two new seismically-qualified pipes (primary and alternate) discharging into the spent fuel pool for makeup with a FLEX pump (red line above)
• The 480V Class 1E load centres, to install primary and alternate FLEX junction boxes to allow for FLEX generator hookup
• The 4160V Class 1E switchgear, to install primary and alternate FLEX connection (disconnects) to allow for FLEX generator hookup
• A variety of tanks to allow suction and refilling of the condensate storage tank (CST) and the refuelling water tank (RWT).

In accordance with NEI 12-06, the FLEX strategies were designed assuming the reactor is at power, but the diverse and flexible approach to the strategies allows them to be implemented in essentially all plant states. While the FLEX strategies were not specifically designed for outage conditions (with the exception of RCS makeup (orange line above), which was designed to support core cooling during an outage), providing multiple connection points does help provide redundancy when installed plant equipment is out of service during an outage.
During at-power conditions, the portable equipment cannot be credited for recovery during the initial phase of the event (which lasts 36 hours at APS). However, during an outage, the FLEX portable equipment can be pre-deployed as long as it is within the allowed out-of-service time of the equipment as defined in NEI 12-06. This approach has been confirmed by an NRC-approved NEI position paper on the use of FLEX equipment in shutdown modes [4].
Using a combination of the FLEX modifications and the pre-deployment allowance, APS has made significant enhancements to reduce the outage risk profile and outage time. The following is a review of some of these approaches.

Palo Verde approach to managing outage risk

At Palo Verde, outage risk is communicated in terms of risk management action level (RMAL). From NUMARC 93-03 [5], risk management is accomplished by defining action levels and using risk management actions. These actions are specific to a given maintenance activity and vary depending on the magnitude and duration of the risk impact, the nature of the activity and other factors.
RMAL is a risk scale that provides a tool for station management to monitor and manage nuclear risk. By law [6] risk assessment must be performed for maintenance activities prior to performing the task. Having a scale is an excellent way for management to evaluate the risk level of the proposed activity in combination with other maintenance activities by reviewing the schedule and changing it if necessary.
The outage scale (shutdown risk) is a qualitative method based on managing safety functions via defence-in-depth. The latter refers to:

• Providing systems, structures and components to back up shutdown safety functions using redundant, alternate or diverse methods
• Scheduling outage activities in a manner that optimises safety system availability
• Providing administrative controls that support or supplement the above elements.

Determination of the RMAL is based solely on the available mitigating equipment. The shutdown RMAL does not convey relative differences in plant risk due to plant operating state and time after shutdown. For example, the plant risk is greater with all mitigating equipment available at lowered pressuriser level then it is with all mitigating equipment available when pressuriser level is normal. But the defence-in-depth model concludes that both plant operating states have the same number of layers of safety.
The safety function RMAL value is based on N+1 criteria, where "N" is the safety-significant control needed to meet the safety function, and colour-coded as follows:

• Green RMAL: N+2
• Yellow RMAL: N+1
• Orange RMAL: N
• Red: 0 safety function success paths available

Although "N" meets the safety function, it lacks defence-in-depth and is an undesirable risk level, so it constitutes an orange RMAL. The minimum acceptable defence-in-depth is N+1, and this constitutes a yellow RMAL.
As a general philosophy, the Palo Verde expectation is to maintain green RMAL conditions. If a non-green condition cannot be avoided by rescheduling activities, work that affects the risk shall be completed as quickly as possible.