Brattleboro Reformer Clears The Air Over Court Plea by "Angel Guy"

Feb 26, 2015 Update:

Remember, 261 days after I plead guilty, the NHDOT replaced on both bridges the wooden walkways costing some $31,000... 

I wonder what the prosecutor or judge would have did to me if they knew this job was being contemplated or complete...that is why this was so unfair. 

All the cards weren't one the table...just a selective disclosure of the facts favoring I am a bad guy.

***Hmm, March 26, 2015: I am free to begin protesting again. I put away my halo under my bed. Don't tell Joanne! 

Maybe the Reformer is smarter than I thought...the below entry is dated March 25, 2013. I wrote this entry is March 25, 2014. This shows you why thought it worth getting arrested for: 

NH DOT Inspection of Hinsdale's Rt 119 bridge

March 25, 2015: 

They have exhausted me today...I will fill in the rest of the story tomorrow.

The players.

Tom D’Errico Executive Editor, Web Master.

Dominic Poli- reporter

My court date was March 26...the plea. Within days of that, on a very cold sunny winter day, I rode over to the Brattleboro Reformer office on my bicycle. I requested to speak to Mr. D'Errico. I told him the police complaints and the Reformers reporting about my arrest was basically a travesty of justice. I told him you own me a follow up story seeing how I made a plea deal on just a misdemeanor class B, while the Hinsdale Police made charges of a felony and a host of other serous charges. He asked me a few questions, told me to make a follow up e-mail to remind him. I thought to myself, fuck you, if write can’t write down a note and follow up on it... He is a arrogant SOB.

Everything about getting this bridge replaced in time before a disaster was predicated on his newspapers coverage of the bridge. This situation is as much his newspaper’s fault as the NHDOT.

I remember the first time I was up in his office conference room. I brought my 10 pound bag of bridge rust chips he spoke about in this article. I picked a the biggest chunk of rust, tried handing it to him saying feel how heavy this chip is. He wouldn’t touch it. I asked him to get a reporter to take a tour with me. I’d show him all the dangerous spots. You could take pictures and put it up in the newspaper. He said he is not a bridge engineer…we wouldn’t know what he were looking at. So we are not doing that.

Right,they are not a lawyer, so the Reformer can't write about the area crime and events in the courts?

Mulligan takes plea deal for bridge damage

By DOMENIC POLI / Reformer Staff

Posted: 03/25/2014 03:00:00 AM EDT0 Comments

KEENE, N.H. -- A Hinsdale man known to many for his public demonstrations around the two bridges linking his town to Vermont accepted a plea deal in 8th Circuit Court District Division in Keene.

Michael J. Mulligan, 60, agreed on Wednesday, Feb. 26, to pay a $1,000 fine, plus a $240 penalty assessment, if he cannot pay $1,253.76 in restitutions within a year for damage he caused to the portion of the Charles Dana Bridge designated for pedestrians. In exchange for pleading guilty to a felony and three misdemeanors, he must also avoid going within 100 feet of that structure or the Anna Hunt Marsh bridge, except for routine travel without stopping, or risk the fine and penalty assessment.

He was charged with reckless conduct, disorderly conduct, and two counts of criminal mischief. Reckless conduct is a felony. He also received a ticket for littering.

According to documents filed by Hinsdale Patrolman Joshua Murray, the arresting officer, Mulligan caused damage to the walkway portion of the bridge by using a crowbar to remove several wooden boards from it, creating a hazard for pedestrians, on July 31, 2013. Murray said Mulligan littered by leaving a white poster board sign reading "NEED NEW BRIDGE" on public property.

"I reached a plea agreement but I don't think justice was done," Mulligan told the Reformer, adding that he did not get enough time in court to discuss the condition of the bridges. He said, however, he made a statement and the judge recognized the problems with maintaining infrastructure in the United States.

Mulligan told the Reformer he removed the boards from the bridge in order to send a message and get the deterioration noticed.

"When I was pulling up them boards, a witness walked by and said, 'What are you doing?' and I said, 'I'm fixing the bridge,'" Mulligan recalled. "And within 12 hours those boards were renailed to the bridge."

He mentioned he considers that witness to be a hero.

After being arrested, Mulligan was released on $5,000 personal recognizance.

Mulligan's arrest occurred one day after he appeared at a public meeting -- hosted by the Federal Highway Administration, the New Hampshire Department of Transportation and the Vermont Agency of Transportation in the Brattleboro Union High School Multipurpose Room -- held to gauge local support for a project to rehabilitate the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges and construct a new one, which would stretch over the nearby railroad tracks in Brattleboro and touch down near the stop light at the former Walmart location.

Mulligan, who brought with him pieces of rust he had chipped off the bridges, said he feels the environmental assessment contained gross inaccuracies and said he fears the bridges are in danger of collapsing. He said the assessment overestimates "by many magnitudes" the bridge's integrity, even though those who put together the assessment consider it "functionally obsolete."

Mulligan, wearing a homemade halo, also referenced movies in which an angel lurks near a bridge before it collapses and said he is that angel for the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges.

He has brought pieces of the rusted bridges into the Reformer to describe what he considers dangerous deterioration.

Domenic Poli can be reached at
dpoli@reformer.com, or 802-254-2311, ext. 277. You can follow him on Twitter @dpoli_reformer. 

Yea, I was pissed. I left a voice recording on the editor's and reporter's phones. Both these guys should be fired over this. Tom is too busy with outside activities to keep appropriate watch over the quality and reputation of the newspaper. I am informing the Reformer I am leaving a log over events about this article on Topix. Here is my first e-mail to the Reformer. 

...Mar 25 at 9:07 AM

dpoli@reformer.com <dpoli@reformer.com>

Mulligan: It’s A Travesty Of Justice 

You need to repair my reputation over a grossly materially inaccurate statement(s) in your newspaper!

My children and wife are actually wondering if I lied to them about my plea...let alone all their friends.

Here begins the sequential entries into Topix mostly submitted on March 26, 2013. You catch on this message board, I am the only one using my real name. Have always been like that. Beginning about 8 am...I am making my case to the Reformer. 

...I plead guilty to one count of a class B criminal mischief misdemeanor. My fine and punishment is congruent with a plea of three class A misdemeanors and a felony.

I am astonished they put the below old comment in the article without the reporter asking me a context about this. This is a obscene misunderstanding how our police and courts system works. None of this by the Reformer was put under a test of swearing under oath and testing whether this was factual information. Like, did you ever see mike using the crow bar...was it the first or second time Mike took up the board? This just came from witness statement and the police complaint ...I got no right to comment about it. Now if that came from direct testimony or the witness reporting it to the newspaper, well that is another story.  I suspect this came from the police chief on background...him giving the reporter inappropriate background information on a up coming court case. Its aims was a smear job to prejudiced the public image of me based on knowingly incomplete information. Where is my rights within the newspaper...it was basically a smear job based on hearsay evidence. I didn't even get to make a context comment to it in the second swipe. Talking about being convicted in the eyes of the public without due process. After I was given an opportunity to explained it to them the reformer agreed to remove it. Where is my due process within the Reformer reporting...I thought I was innocent until proven guilty. Does the Reformer understand the limitations of a police complaint and due process?

"According to documents filed by Hinsdale Patrolman Joshua Murray, the arresting officer, Mulligan caused damage to the walkway portion of the bridge by using a crowbar to remove several wooden boards from it, creating a hazard for pedestrians, on July 31, 2013. Murray said Mulligan littered by leaving a white poster board sign reading "NEED NEW BRIDGE" on public property."

...Just because a newspaper reports it and a police officer’s says it with our form of government...it doesn't make it true. You got to have the proof to back up that statement and cycle it through the courts.

As part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed to remove off the charge, strike off the complaint the part of me using a crow bar or hammer on the bridge. There is nothing remaining on the court record that I used any instruments on the bridge other than my hands. The boards I removed, twice I might add, weren't physically attached to the bridge.

 ...I repeat, I did not plead guilty to any class A misdemeanor or any felony!!!

This statement is inaccurate. It is both bridges. This is where I first realize Dom got the court documents in his hands and he still made this obscene error. It is baffling beyond all hell. 

..."In exchange for pleading guilty to a felony and three misdemeanors, he must also avoid going within 100 feet of that structure or the Anna Hunt Marsh bridge, except for routine travel without stopping, or risk the fine and penalty assessment."

Jesus, they seen the court paperwork! 

I am amazed at their gross misunderstanding of the NH court system. The felony was almost immediately dropped once I got a lawyer.

...Freaking idiots..the case goes over to superior court with a felony. 

There is a huge difference between a class A and B misdemeanor by the way! 

I am explaining what it took out of me to get this article written.

...I  was pushing Tom D and his newspaper to write a rebuttal: 

 message 22 and 23: Made a personal appearance to Tom last Friday April 28....

This is where I documented I called the Reformer. Large parts of the article I thought was good...but on whole, it was intentionally slanderous.  

...I called up Dominic and Tom to tell them how I felt about them slandering me in their newspaper.

Left a voice recording because they are too chicken to talk to me personally. 

Still can't get over Dom had my court documents in his hands and he still got it so wrong.

...“Michael J. Mulligan, 60, agreed on Wednesday, Feb. 26, to pay a $1,000 fine, plus a $240 penalty assessment, if he cannot pay $1,253.76 in restitution within a year for damage he caused to the portion of the Charles Dana Bridge designated for pedestrians.”

I didn’t give them these specific numbers…although I had the documents in my hand during the telephone conversation with Dominic. Once I heard the $1257.76 on the phone, I knew he had court documents in his greasy hands.

This is prima-facie proof they knew I plead to a class B criminal mischief and they put a lie into their newspaper that I plead guilty to the felony and all the class As.

 This is really what happened. 

 ...I plead guilty to fixing a bridge without getting state permission!

This is Dominic's e-mail to me. Notice the time? He still didn't answer my e-mail about the premeditated crow bar. They have a bad history with me with giving as little information as possible...giving me no feed back. So I am going on the offence.

...Re: Mulligan: "It's A Travesty Of Justice"

Domenic Poli
To Me
Today at 1:34 PM

Hello Mike,

I want to offer my sincerest apologies that I misread the court document. My editor has said it was fixed online and we are rerunning the story in tomorrow's paper.

-Dom 

Here is rev 1

UPDATE: Hinsdale man takes plea deal for bridge damage 

By DOMENIC POLI / Reformer Staff 

Posted: 03/25/2014 03:00:00 AM EDT0 Comments | Updated: about 7 hours ago

(Zachary P. Stephens/Brattleboro Reformer) Editor's note: This story has been updated since it was originally published, to correctly reflect the charge Mr Mulligan pleaded to; one misdemeanor count of criminal mischief. 

KEENE, N.H. -- A Hinsdale man known to many for his public demonstrations around the two bridges linking his town to Vermont accepted a plea deal in 8th Circuit Court District Division in Keene. 

Michael J. Mulligan, 60, agreed on Wednesday, Feb. 26, to pay a $1,000 fine, plus a $240 penalty assessment, if he cannot pay $1,253.76 in restitutions within a year for damage he caused to the portion of the Charles Dana Bridge designated for pedestrians. In exchange for pleading guilty to one misdemeanor charge of criminal mischief, he must also avoid going within 100 feet of that structure or the Anna Hunt Marsh bridge, except for routine travel without stopping, or risk the fine and penalty assessment.

He was originally charged with reckless conduct, disorderly conduct, and two counts of criminal mischief. Reckless conduct is a felony. He also received a ticket for littering.

According to documents filed by Hinsdale Patrolman Joshua Murray, the arresting officer, Mulligan caused damage to the walkway portion of the bridge by using a crowbar to remove several wooden boards from it, creating a hazard for pedestrians, on July 31, 2013. Murray said Mulligan littered by leaving a white poster board sign reading "NEED NEW BRIDGE" on public property.

"I reached a plea agreement but I don't think justice was done," Mulligan told the Reformer, adding that he did not get enough time in court to discuss the condition of the bridges. He said, however, he made a statement and the judge recognized the problems with maintaining infrastructure in the United States.

Mulligan told the Reformer he removed the boards from the bridge in order to send a message and get the deterioration noticed.

"When I was pulling up them boards, a witness walked by and said, 'What are you doing?' and I said, 'I'm fixing the bridge,'" Mulligan recalled. "And within 12 hours those boards were renailed to the bridge."

He mentioned he considers that witness to be a hero.

After being arrested, Mulligan was released on $5,000 personal recognizance.

Mulligan's arrest occurred one day after he appeared at a public meeting -- hosted by the Federal Highway Administration, the New Hampshire Department of Transportation and the Vermont Agency of Transportation in the Brattleboro Union High School Multipurpose Room -- held to gauge local support for a project to rehabilitate the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges and construct a new one, which would stretch over the nearby railroad tracks in Brattleboro and touch down near the stop light at the former Walmart location.

Mulligan, who brought with him pieces of rust he had chipped off the bridges, said he feels the environmental assessment contained gross inaccuracies and said he fears the bridges are in danger of collapsing. He said the assessment overestimates "by many magnitudes" the bridge's integrity, even though those who put together the assessment consider it "functionally obsolete."

Mulligan, wearing a homemade halo, also referenced movies in which an angel lurks near a bridge before it collapses and said he is that angel for the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges.

He has brought pieces of the rusted bridges into the Reformer to describe what he considers dangerous deterioration.

Domenic Poli can be reached at dpoli@reformer.com, or 802-254-2311, ext. 277. You can follow him on Twitter @dpoli_reformer.

Maybe a little humor. You never know you can get unless you ask?

...Me
To Dominic Poli

Today at 2:49 PM

Dom,

On the front page tomorrow?

Would you run it with one of my pictures?

Does Tom want to interview me on his radio program about the bridge?

Mike

This is how it went wrong from my side.

...Neither Tom or Dominic have the courtesy to give me a call back after listening to my voice recording today. This is what we are changing on the story and do you have any other concerns with the story. 

Remember Dominic cold call me out of nowhere about the plea agreement many weeks after I went to the Reformer asking them to clear up their story. Dom gave me no professional forewarning, a call about the plea is coming and you will be on the record when we talk. 

I picked up the vibs he wasn’t getting the responses out of me he expected...he was a bit frustrated. He seemed rushed... 

He showed absolutely no curiosity at all...like coming back to me three or four times asking me exactly what charges have you pled too. He thinks he knows everything about the story...the reformer only prints the words of god. Actually they are the gods...they already know the story before it happens 

Then he submitted the story and it simmering in their system for four or five days. No worry from him with a fear of inaccuracy...to give me one more call back to verify the facts of the story.

Hey, but if you want to run an outlet like that... 

That is how a story becomes so inaccurate...a reporter feels he already knows the story before he talks to the witness. He just didn’t have the instinct to dig for the wider truth. He seemed like he knew zero about me and didn't even do a internet search about me and the bridge...I have written extensively about the troubles with the NHDOT.

Just like the Reformer doesn’t have the balls to give me a call...even to make sure they got the story right on the second swipe. 

There are two issues I am not comfortable about, the generic misdemeanor and the god dam premeditated crow bar. I am convinced on the day this occurred...when the police officer wrote up that complaint, he had a incomplete understanding on really what happened on that bridge.

And you know, the Reformer still doesn't have a complete understanding with what went on with this bridge. You always have been printing this story on incomplete understanding and the Reformer is standing on really thin ice. I got a case of severe mistrust with this newspaper and here is why.

...Today at 5:23 PM 

Dom, 

You guys keep spinning this thing into making me worse than I am. Or you won't back out of your spinning.. 

Just why can’t the paper be accurate. I plead guilty to a B misdemeanor. A “A” misdemeanor means I faced a risk of going to jail...where a “B” misdemeanor means I faced no threat of being sentenced with going to jail at all. There is a big difference between misdemeanors...being inaccurate defames my character. 

The words of cops aren’t god. The courts though are mostly. 

“According to documents filed by Hinsdale Patrolman Joshua Murray, the arresting officer, Mulligan caused damage to the walkway portion of the bridge by using a crowbar to remove several wooden boards from it, creating a hazard for pedestrians, on July 31, 2013.” 

I adjudicated this statement through the court, judge and prosecutor. It was found to be materially inaccurate and a false statement. 

You know, I’d got in my possession all the pretrial discovery including the witness statement and name. 

The accurate statement is, I pulled up unattached boards up with my hands...where the nails and screws were rusted off. I pulled up only dangerous loose boards...thus I repaired the walkway. 

In pre trial discovery I got the recent bridge inspection reports where the NHDOT has admitted many loose and unattached boards...where they were negligent and too lazy to re attach them until I cued them. I mean, if your are interested in the truth... 

And the NHDOT renailed more than twice as many boards as I pulled up with my hands... 

It is not my fault you are having problems backing out of your terribly skimpy interview of me. 

Mike

          Domenic Poli

I know the Reformer is looking over this and I know they will never admit it. Just to remind everyone what I was really doing.

The reformer from my the very first contact with me today knew I referenced this blog site. They knew I was logging down the events surrounding their inaccurate article about me. 

I had the Reformer taking the crow bar e-mail out of rev 2 and I am reminding everyone how long it took for a response.

I added this about 9 am and you notice how they never got back to me.

"I plead guilty to one count of a class B criminal mischief misdemeanor. My fine and punishment is in-congruent with a plea of three class A misdemeanors and a felony.

Just because a newspaper reports it and a police officer’s says it with our form of government...it doesn’t make it true. You got to have the proof to back up that statement and cycle it through the courts.

As part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed to remove off the charge, strike off the complaint the part of me using a crow bar or hammer on the bridge. There is nothing remaining on the court record that I used any instruments on the bridge other than my hands. The boards I removed, twice I might add, weren’t physically attached to the bridge." 

Here is the e-mail.

Domenic Poli
To Me

Today at 5:44 PM

I have taken out the part about the crowbar. 

I am waiting for basic communication, yea mike we are still working on the misdemeanor issue. It is a pattern of shoddy communication. This is a form of single minded self and organization protection...crooks communicate like this. I imagine they are doing this disrespect to all members of the community for years who communicated by e-mail about stories. Here again is my take on the big view here.

I asked him about clarifying the misdemeanor issue. Gave them a reason why I think it should be remove. Yet, there is no response about this. 

I just saying this isn't at all professional and open...how can you ever trust working with this newspaper when your nuts are on the line.

I am just saying from the beginning the Reformer never showed any interesting in discussing this bridge or interviewing me. Nothing for three years... 

Once I got arrested they only portrayed me in a very antagonistic point of view...what the police reported about me and the papers interpretation of what the police said. It was nothing about every tale has two sides of the story. Never did they come talk to me about what my point of view was. And as Tom spoke about, I came to them in their office with big chips of rust from the bridge and Tom just blew me off.

Personally I think this paper knows me as a whistleblower and they hate me for it...
They hate me for being a snitch...

I have a lot experience concerning huge events and enormous personal consequences...I held the outcome of my family and many other families in my hands. I also put CEO crooks in jail based only on my observation. So how does a newspaper communicate to tipsters....how does a newspaper communicate when their are enormous consequences around the events.  The Reformer is one of the worst outlets I ever talked too, sadly most of there behavior just like this. For whistle-blowers, they guys are extremely untrustworthy.

I remember the good old days in around 1991 and 1992 when I was slipping the Reformer stolen document from high official in Vermont Yankee. We made all them officials at VY and the NRC jump with terror!

The employees of Vermont Yankee to to joke, "the accurate plant plan of the day was already in the Brattleboro Reformer a day before it was posted at the plant". 

I am just a nut case and I know it.

But I am just the nut at the foot of the bridge wearing a halo!

So really, all I've been doing for the last few year is investigating and interviewing the Brattleboro Reformer.

You know, like a reporter's instinct when something doesn't fit. I don't know what isn't Kosher yet…but here is one more swipe at it. So let me get this straight mike, you plead guilty to:“reckless conduct, disorderly conduct, and two counts of criminal mischief. Reckless conduct is a felony. He also received a ticket for littering.”

That would have got me to say, I plead guilty to the one class B criminal mischief. And you idiots, I never was convicted of littering with a “Build New Bridge” sign on public property. It was a utterly a stupid charge by the police. 

Lots of people off the streets told me they communicated to the Reformer they'd like a story about the bridge in the newspaper.

Lots of people over the years both pro and con wrote and called up the Reformer asking them to write a story about the guy protesting on the Brattleboro bridge. I have no idea they refused to interview me. People stopped on the side of the road or pulled off the road saying they informed the Reformer about wishing a story. 

Why I think loose and unattached boards on a bridge walkway is dangerous...what motivated me into action.

...You see, I think it is evil to have any not attached boards on a bridge 30 feet over a river. You need not have a reason why it is terribly neglectful. My best guess at a accident would be my bike would catch a wobbly board and kick it up into my wheels. It makes me fall off the bike and this breaks my neck. You say how probable is that, further many people would be looking forward to this accident.
How about a few winters ago where the Hinsdale town snow plow machine attempted to plow the snow off walkway. He flipped up one loose board, then a whole set of loose boards. The big machine fell in the hole and almost killed the driver as they almost went in the Connecticut river. 

I am just saying, these loose boards and for very long periods of time, it is a very complex situation. It is very unlikely you can think up all the possibilities with somebody getting hurt over loose boards. There is more opertunities than you think.
Another one we thought about is a big person in a battery operated wheel chair. A board come loose, tips him over. Again his weight causes him to break his neck or suffocate when his head hits a stanchion. 

Just because you can’t think of a threat to human life and limb…it is because you can’t see or think up all the possible scenarios.

Loose public walkway boards should always be considered extremely dangerous because your slice of experience or time observing events or possibilities on a particular walkway is very thin.

Who would ever think a snow machine would plow up loose boards on the bridge nearly throwing a driver into the Connecticut River drink

...You see, I think it is evil to have any not attached boards on a bridge 30 feet over a river. You need not have a reason why it is terribly neglectful. My best guess at a accident would be my bike would catch a wobbly board and kick it up into my wheels. It makes me fall off the bike and this breaks my neck. You say how probable is that, further many people would be looking forward to this accident.

How about a few winters ago where the Hinsdale town snow plow machine attempted to plow the snow off walkway. He flipped up one loose board, then a whole set of loose boards. The big machine fell in the hole and almost killed the driver as they almost went in the Connecticut river.

I am just saying, these loose boards and for very long periods of time, it is a very complex situation. It is very unlikely you can think up all the possibilities with somebody getting hurt over loose boards. There is more opertunities than you think.

Another one we thought about is a big person in a battery operated wheel chair. A board come loose, tips him over. Again his weight causes him to break his neck or suffocate when his head hits a stanchion.

Just because you can’t think of a threat to human life and limb…it is because you can’t see or think up all the possible scenarios.

Loose public walkway boards should always be considered extremely dangerous because your slice of experience or time observing events or possibilities on a particular walkway is very thin.

Who would ever think a snow machine would plow up loose boards on the bridge nearly throwing a driver into the Connecticut River drink

...I mean, I have way more observable experience on the bridge than most people. This gives me cues even I have a extremely thin slice of all observable time on the bridge…much events and opportunities get by my prying eyes.  

How many severe car or vehicle dents or severely bent iron members are there on the bridge…how times have vehicles hit the bridge hard. 

I count 17 severe impacts! There are many tens of thousands unaccountable accidents not reported on these bridges. Unaccountable $100,000s of dollars of damage!c

It is a unseen tax on you! 

I getting back feedback all ready in Hinsdale asking why the Refomerer  ran the story twice. You know Mike, we agree with you about the bridge...why is the reformer talking two shots at you with their hatchet.   

Everyone in Hinsdale thinks the story being run two days in a row…Mike, they are running over you two days in a row with a pavement roller. Once is enough.

I didn’t find it on their internet site yet…have to go out and get a paper. 

I love trying to figure out the big picture and philosophizing about why things happen the way they do. That god dam crow bar issue really bothers me. I am amazed how well my competitors used this phony issue against me...how well it worked. You live and learn!

...Right, bringing a crow bar implies violent premeditation. It didn’t go down like that and the police knew that. But it made a pretty story in the newspaper for the police!

Everything about this including the courts and even my lawyer…it didn't matter what my true motivations were. This is the law of the courts of NH and at the whim of the NH politicians… 

It is a grave Constitutional error… 

I am telling you justice isn't the so called rule-of-law…it is way bigger than that and something almost unquantifiable 

It is something deep in ever human often not even expressed. It is a cousins to forgiveness…you can’t rule or law out justice or forgiveness. It is something that only occurs deep in a human heart and no electron microscope can ever detect its making. it. It just occurs out of nowhere. 

... Well, it’s a attribute of god.

... The newspaper is a incarnation of evil itself. 

...Cause of your not constantly fighting for justice, then you are fighting against justice... 

...For the record…justice is for those who has the power to write down the record of history. Most grave injustices begins and remains in our lives without ever getting written down. All injustices are about powerless peoples' inability to get their record written down in the history of life!

I am trying to live my life as a open book.

So, the reformer hasn't put rev 2 up on any internet site today. I put up the first article and the rev I grabbed from their internet site on TOPIX. Strangely Topix removed them yesterday. 

Playing Games At Palisades for Decades With Primary Coolant Pumps

THE COVER UP

Right, if Palisades nuclear plant was a person. He could cold bloodily shoot somebody dead. If he could remain at large in the community in excess of three years...the rules say nobody could charge him for any crime or NRC violation. All he’s got to do is get away with for three years without being caught. 

 

The agency habitually has the inability to connect the dots. This is a NRC cover up. The NRC only presents the happy ever after story. From the event date of Oct 2011 to the inspection report of Aug 2012, the potential of a severe accident was right around the corner. We could had three seals fails out of four with severe pump impeller or worst damage in 1984...a much worst accident was right around the corner any time operating outside the FSAR and improper quality reactor component parts The accident could begine any time a huge impeller blade sloughs off.

2012 inspection report: Additionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007.  

Why didn’t the agency and the big dog NRR connect the dots between the 1984 and 2011...to disclose to the public that operating these components outside the FSAR could lead to a severe event like 1984? Does the agency get to pick and choose what information it release to make Palisades looks good? Just put the best face on any terrible event Palisades creates for themselves, the Industry and the nation?

So this is the pattern of the agency and Palisades picking the happy land information to release to the public. Putting a grossly inaccurate spin on actual and potential events at these plants. You are intention miscommunicating risk to the public and not demanding a change in behavior according to real risk the community faces with Palisades. 

So in 1984 the plant was ascending up in power to 57% when a broken impeller almost seized up the motor. God know how long the pump was "knowingly" operating contrary to the FSAR and equipment designs in 1984 when stresses threw off a big hunk of impeller blade. The severely unbalanced impeller tore off the cap screws and the two guide pins. The impeller wobbled around inside the pumps casing for many hours with only the remaining guide pins attaching the impeller to the safety.

Additionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007.

Man, I 'd like to be at that plant in 1984. To see that cloud of metal shards, missing cap screws and pieces of casing circulating around in the coolant like sandblasting the fuel pins and steam generators for months. Anyone find the cap screws yet? Didn't a RCP go crazy in the China Syndrome?




****Now I get it...these were on the secondary side...do they report what they find in the primary inlet side?

I'd certainly like to see the coolant activty record and the record of fuel pin failure over these years.

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION REPORT for the 2012 REFUELING OUTAGE, 1R22, EC39067

There are three tubes in SG E-50A that were removed from service preventively in contact with a loose part at the top of the hot leg tubesheet (TSH) in Row 130 Column 61, Row 132 Column 61, and Row 133 Column 62.

These guys are funny...they don't remove the loose part. They aren't interest in what broke?

These tubes had no wear indications from the loose part but were stabilized and removed from service by tube plugging to prevent issues due to wear from the loose part in the future.

 

So the worst accident I see is a LOCA through the failure of the pump mechanical seals and the destruction of the pump casing. The largest size hole of the Reactor Coolant Pump Loop pipe.

These guys are operating way out of their stated risk analysis and this is a cover-up of it. The secrecy and lying creates this opportunity.

Hell, it is probably not illegal to tell the public the probability of an accident is this to their face, then to conspire to operate these plants at a much higher accident risk level behind the scenes. It is just probably illegal just to tell the truth.

I am saying, if Palisades is the model for honesty and integrity throughout the NRC and the Nuclear industry, then a accident of infinite consequences could be right around the corner.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

January 15, 1985

Information Notice No. 85-03:   SEPARATION OF PRIMARY REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHAFT AND IMPELLER

Addressees:

All pressurized water power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP).

Purpose:

This information notice is provided to alert recipients of an event  involving primary reactor coolant pump impeller separation from the pump  shaft. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to  preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description:

On September 16, 1984, the Palisades Nuclear Plant had been operating for approximately three days in the process of initial power ascension following a refueling outage...

IR2012003: The research concluded that the cause of the failures is fatigue-related effects from the operation of the pumps in conditions beyond the maximum flow rates and below the minimum net positive suction head recommendations as described in the UFSAR and other design documentation. These conditions are present when operating only one or two PCPs during reduced temperatures and pressures (typically during startup and shutdown activities.

...The plant was at approximately 57 percent power. At 3:45 a.m. (EDT), reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal cavity pressures indicated that the first (lower) and second (middle) seals had failed simultaneously, and an orderly shutdown was commenced. At 5:20 a.m., the third (upper) seal failed. The reactor was taken off-line and, at approximately the same time, the pump vibration level reached the "danger" level (10 mils). The pump was then secured. In the 3-hour period prior to securing the pump, the electric current to the pump had increased by approximately 10 to 15 percent.

Inspection Report 2012003 references this 1984 event. Why didn't the NRC disclose in the 2012003 this severe seal and pump damage was a possibility till the replacement? Were they prettying up the engineering certainty-uncertainty? Did the Offices of Research and Nuclear Reactor Regulation in 2011 till the next outage consider the 1984 event as a possible acceptable and a safe outcome to the 2012 outage? Without question, the NRC considers the mysterious 1984 event as a sentinel issue...a cornerstone.

(2012003: "The licensee identified impeller cracking had been observed at Palisades on several occasions since 1984, when the pumps had been removed for inspection and refurbishment/replacement. Additionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007")

During the event, the flow in the loop driven by the affected pump remained normal. During the examination to determine the extent of the seal failure and to evaluate required repair, major damage to pump components was discovered. The bolts and guide pins that secure the impeller to the shaft had been severely damaged. Unexpected wear on the pump impeller/shaft assembly and pump internals was found. The impeller is normally fastened to the shaft by eight cap screws and four guide pins. However, when the pump was examined, all eight cap screws and two of the four guide pins were found broken. The impeller had been kept in rotation by the two guide pins that had remained intact. Stationary pump parts showed unexpected wear in 360 degrees of arc; rotating pump parts showed wear in 180 degrees of arc.

It is amazing. The NRC has allowed this plant simultaneously for decades to run outside the FSAR and with poor quality impellers.

The RCP at Palisades is a Byron Jackson 850 rpm, single stage, centrifugal pump 1 with a 42-inch diameter impeller and a 4,000-hp Allis-Chalmers motor. The pump has four seal stages with controlled bleed off (and no seal injection) for cooling. Because an impeller was damaged during 1983 by an apparently unrelated failure, another impeller and pump shaft assembly was installed as a unit in February 1984.(Come on, the 1983, 1984 and 2011 event were all related and caused by the same issue. Running this system not according to the FSAR and causing damaging vibrations and fatigue.) Procedures prescribed by the pump manufacturer were, followed for the installation of the impeller/shaft assembly; however, no manufacturer's representative was present when the installation took place. This assembly had been stored horizontally in the plant store room for approximately 12 years after it had been used in the 1972 time-frame during initial hot functional testing. It is this impeller/shaft assembly that failed on September 16, 1984, after the pump had accumulated approximately 1,300 hours running time before the event.

(Did you catch between the official notification and the update this shifted from a single impeller issue into a common cause issue...from the utility's fault to a manufacturer issue effecting many impellers.)

The analysis of the failure of the eight cap screws and the two guide pins indicated that failures resulted from fatigue and impact loading. The two out of four guide pins that did not fail were bent, which caused the pump shaft to be forced upward and the impeller to be forced downward. No bolt corrosion was found. Although a sheared RCP shaft occurred at Surry 1 in November 1973 as a result of a manufacturing defect, the event described here is the first involving the potential separation of a primary coolant pump impeller from its shaft.

Discussion:

Events leading to the pump impeller/shaft failure cannot be precisely determined; however, examinations of the cap screws indicate that abnormal stress caused them to fail. It is believed that the pump impeller/shaft assembly caused the abnormal cap screw stresses that ultimately led to the failure. It is now believed that the improper torquing of the pump screws was the root cause.

The event and the above conclusion regarding the cause of the failure raise three issues which should be emphasized. (1) Disassembly and reassembly of primary reactor coolant pumps is an operation which should be done in a rigorous manner employing manufacturer's recommendations and proper procedures. (2) The nearly simultaneous failure of the two seal stages is indicative of the seal package under abnormal stress. This stress, concurrent with high pump vibration is indicative of possible severe pump damage. Operator response to these indications led to the pump being shut down before the final two guide pins failed, thus, preventing a more severe event. This action was a prudent response to the situation. (3) Although the event described here is apparently isolated, it demonstrates the credibility of a pump failure event which could lead to a rapid flow decrease transient of the type expected with a sheared shaft event. Most PWRs have a licensing basis analysis for that event or the similar seized rotor event. These analyses generally assume an automatic response of the plant's reactor protection system which generates a reactor trip as a result of low reactor coolant flow.

IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-03, SUPPLEMENT 1: SEPARATION OF PRIMARY REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHAFT AND IMPELLER

IE Information Notice 85-03 described an event at the Palisades Nuclear Plant involving the separation of the primary reactor coolant pump impeller from the pump shaft during operation. That notice stated that electric current to the pump increased by approximately 10 to 15 percent in the 3-hour period prior to securing the pump. Subsequent information received from the licensee indicates this current increase did not occur.

The postulated cause of the Palisades' cap screw failure was fatigue about brought by preload on the bolts insufficient to resist cyclic loading. This is believed to have been caused by the poor surface condition of the cap screw threads. This condition resulted in the specified torque values not being sufficient to properly preload the cap screws that join the impeller to the shaft in 1971. This situation suggests two points that should be stressed. First, the failure described in IN 85-03 was not caused by improper disassembly and reassembly of the reactor coolant pump; rather, the problem apparently occurred during initial assembly. Second, the cause of under tightening of the cap screws was the poor (rough) surface condition of the screw threads themselves. Thus, use of the torque to measure axial bolt loading was, in this case, misleading.

See, between the OE and NRC information, it is all unreliable crap information. Nothing agrees!

OE13604, Palisades, Byron Jackson/Flowserve: Three cracks were found in a primary

coolant pump impeller that was removed for refurbishment during the 2001 refueling

outage. The three cracks were similar in nature; each started on a separate impeller vane at

the suction side of the vane tip near the hub and then transverses in the vane in a linear

fashion. Prior to the removal of the pump, the pump exhibited no symptoms that would

indicate the presents of the cracks.

***The root cause concluded that a combination of increased residual stresses, caused by a lack

of the proper post weld heat treatment at the manufacturing facility, and high stress risers,

due to poor fabrication practices, allowed the stresses associated with the starting and

stopping of the pump to initiate fatigue-type cracks on the impeller vanes.

Based on Flowserve's evaluation, the cracks initiate perpendicular to the vane leading edge

and completely penetrate the vane. Most of the cracks have propagated back into the vane

and appear to self-arrest in the thicker vane cross-section. In a few cases the crack

propagated in a semi-circular direction. In one case the semi-circular section was lost from

the impeller. A piece approximately 3" by 6" was found in the reactor vessel. No evidence

of ISCC attack has been observed. The problem was caused by lack of post weld heat

treatment for repairs that were made during post manufacturing.

The stuck piece of impeller in the core today: "The metal is 5 inches by 12 inches long".

A means for external monitoring and detection of this condition does not exist. Impeller

cracking can only be determined by removal of the impeller from the pump, chemical

decontamination, and inspection by visual and liquid penetrate examination techniques. The

cracks are not detectable without removal of the oxide layer from the impeller by chemical

decontamination.

Flowserve recommends that pump impellers in excess of 175,000 hours of service (-20

years of running service) be removed and inspected for cracking to preclude in-service

failure. However, they have found cracking as early as 13 years. Davis-Besse has replaced

all four reactor coolant pump rotating elements in 1986 as due to issues with the RCP shaft

cracking. Preliminary estimate of the operation time for these impellers is estimate at

-103,000 hours (-12 years).

Review of the Acceptance Data Package for the 4 rotating elements that were installed in

1986. Tle Data Packages shows that all 4 impellers had weld repairs performed without

post-heat treatment. It is preferred that the currently install impellers should be refurbish

due to less starts on these than the current spares.

NRC Chairperson Mcfarland Speaking To Me Under The Table

This secret message in a bottle and now Magwood is out.

Unquestionably Chairman Macfarland was sending me and the industry a message. Now I am left to only read the tea leaves. Maybe you ain’t getting that huge impeller fragment out of the Palisade's core...but we will give you Magwood.

I just think this means, with a nice pat on the head, the highest echelon of the NRC and beyond are hearing your message...now just shut up and go away.

I just want some level of power, control and transparency...but I don't need ultimate control of anything. 

Originally posted on 2/11/2014

Me

Dear Chairperson McFarland, If you really believed this from your recent speech… “As we continue to strive for effective, credible regulation, and assist other regulators in upholding these values

To Chairman@nrc.gov

Today at 2:43 PM

Dear Chairperson McFarland,

If you really believed this from your recent speech…

“As we continue to strive for effective, credible regulation, and assist other regulators in upholding these values, our commitment to continuous learning is critical. I believe that when we demonstrate that our decisions reflect the best available information, and when we demonstrate openness to external interlocutors, it enhances public confidence. This is an objective I’ve embraced since my tenure at NRC began, and I continue to believe in its importance.”

…you’d help me gain much better transparency in my upcoming Palisades 2.206. The 2.206 processes for an outsider are a travesty and circus. It is designed for an outsider to fail most of the time because of a lack of evidence. It should be a firing or disciplinary offence if a NRC employee ever misleads a petitioner or to withheld information from inside this process. You’d make a licensee answerable to my questions or severe consequences.

How about all petitioners’ activities and the whole process be recorded and put on your NRC internet site?

There is a tremendous difference in power between me and the NRC/licensee...while you guys have almost unlimited god like powers to withhold information based on unseen justifications. I remain utterly powerless and have no rights of transparency within this process. But I do have the right to get my letter in the NRC documents, and of course, I get a shot for you to transcribe my words by a telephone bridge to many NRC employees. I have to admit there is substantial power in this for a petitioner.

If you really believed what you wrote, you would help me overhaul the NRC’s 2.206 process. You would think this current system is a tremendous injustice to a petitioner, the community and mostly to the USA.

The agency should also provide me with a senior experience NRC executive...where his job is to serve a petitioner. Her job is to help me with this NRC process...explain to me in a high level position way what is going on with my issue and figure out how to get the information I need ...she is to be tasked with being my inside the NRC advocator. She would be like my special NRC lawyer...

I honestly think this would make the industry more stronger and resilient...

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

16033368320

 ...Reply, Reply All or Forward | More

CHAIRMAN ResourceThis is to acknowledge receipt of your communication to the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Thank you for your input. Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

To Me

Today at 3:59 PM

This is to acknowledge receipt of your communication to the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Thank you for your input.

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Is NRC commissioner chairperson Allison M. Macfarlane sending me a message in her most recent speech? 

'Continued Learning: The Best Defense against an Uncertain Future'

"The NRC staff’s work has focused on better positioning the reactor fleet to respond to future “unknown unknowns”." The below is my latest petition to the NRC concerning the Palisades nuclear plants.

‘Palisades 2.206 PCP Broken Impeller: Emergency Request to Stay Shutdown’

My quote:

“Engineers make sense out of the apparent available evidence...I worry about the unknown unknowns. Donald Rumsfeld: ‘Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don't know”.”

McFarland’s speech:

We’re focusing our energies and resources on the most safety-significant issues and re-aligning our efforts when appropriate to ensure we’re operating in the most effective and efficient manner possible. 

I believe there are four safety zones: emergent, safety insignificant, safety significant and the event.

The history of accidents and events in the nuclear industry informs us a flaw emerges, it is detectable and we ignore it for a prolong period of time. The flaw picks up enormous inertia, then shoots though safety insignificant and safety significant zone not seeable into the beginning of the accident. Most of the big events in the industry became observably emergent and safety insignificant…then shoots though the unobservable into the safety significant zone and on to the accident realm.

Scientific wise, you would have to say all accidents emerges and it is always seen in the safety significant zone…but the study or accidents and safety teaches us this accident prevention philosophy (most) is patently falsifiable! Davis Besse is a clear example of that. Safety significance is a economic and profit realm...it has nothing to do with safety. It is more a political or business profit centric philosophy or ideology.

So knowing all safety significant events is a terribly insufficient barrier with preventing all accidents… missing safety insignificance defects are more deadly that missing safety significant flaws and the consequences are worst.

NRC Acknowledgment of Palisades 2.206

Me

To Chairman@nrc.gov

Mar 11

Dear Chairperson McFarland,

If you really believed this from your recent speech…

“As we continue to strive for effective, credible regulation, and assist other regulators in upholding these values, our commitment to continuous learning is critical. I believe that when we demonstrate that our decisions reflect the best available information, and when we demonstrate openness to external interlocutors, it enhances public confidence. This is an objective I’ve embraced since my tenure at NRC began, and I continue to believe in its importance. 

 

…you’d help me gain much better transparency in my upcoming Palisades 2.206. The 2.206 processes for an outsider are a travesty and circus. It is designed for an outsider to fail most of the time because of a lack of evidence. It should be a firing or disciplinary offence if a NRC employee ever misleads a petitioner or to withheld information from inside this process. You’d make a licensee answerable to my questions or severe consequences.
 

How about all petitioners’ activities and the whole process be recorded and put on your NRC internet site?

There is a tremendous difference in power between me and the NRC/licensee...while you guys have almost unlimited god like powers to withhold information based on unseen justifications. I remain utterly powerless and have no rights of transparency within this process. But I do have the right to get my letter in the NRC documents, and of course, I get a shot for you to transcribe my words by a telephone bridge to many NRC employees. I have to admit there is substantial power in this for a petitioner.
 

If you really believed what you wrote, you would help me overhaul the NRC’s 2.206 process. You would think this current system is a tremendous injustice to a petitioner, the community and mostly to the USA.

The agency should also provide me with a senior experience NRC executive...where his job is to serve a petitioner. Her job is to help me with this NRC process...explain to me in a high level position way what is going on with my issue and figure out how to get the information I need ...she is to be tasked with being my inside the NRC advocator. She would be like my special NRC lawyer...

I honestly think this would make the industry more stronger and resilient...

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

Steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

They offer me no evidence or proof it safe...all you got is officials looking a paperwork and they saying its is safe. How much experience to they have with this...how many impeller pieces have been stuck between the skirt and vessel.

 Palisades 2.206 Petition - OEDO-14-00145 - MF3608

Mr. Mulligan, I have been assigned as the Petition Manager for the 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.206 petition, you submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on March 5, 2014, regar

To Me

Today at 1:33 PM

Mr. Mulligan,

I have been assigned as the Petition Manager for the 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.206 petition, you submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on March 5, 2014, regarding your concerns about various issues related to equipment failures and operations at Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades). You also expressed concerns with NRC inspection activities and the NRC’s reactor oversight process.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process – the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff’s guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests can be found in NRC Management Directive 8.11, which is publicly available.

Because you specifically requested in your letter that the NRC take different enforcement actions as described in your petition, including your request for immediate actions to prevent the Palisades plant from restarting (i.e., Items #6 and #10 in your letter), your request was referred to the 2.206 process. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process; the latter which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

On March 14, 2014, your request for immediate action to prevent Palisades restart was reviewed by the members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), staff from Region III, and the NRC resident inspectors at Palisades. After thorough review and discussions, the PRB reached a general consensus that there were no safety significant concerns to prevent the plant from restarting as scheduled.

The NRC has reviewed the licensee’s evaluation of the impeller piece fragment within the reactor vessel and concluded that it does not pose a threat to the reactor and other plant components. Additionally, the licensee replaced all of the 45 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) housings prior to plant startup. Please see NRC ADAMS document ML14073A612.

Based on the review of the licensee’s evaluation related to the stuck impeller piece and replacement of all CRDM housings during the refueling outage, there were no safety significant concerns to prevent the plant from restarting as scheduled. Your request for the immediate action of shutdown of Palisades and other Entergy Plants did not have the adequate bases.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 (which I have attached for your reference), you have the opportunity to address the NRC PRB to further discuss your petition, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, or by telephone conference.

Please advise me by March 25, 2014, and confirm your agreement with NRC’s processing of your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via telephone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If I do not hear from you by March 25, 2014, the PRB will meet internally to make an initial recommendation, after which we will offer you a second opportunity to address the PRB prior to our issuing a letter accepting or rejecting the petition.

Thank you,

Mahesh (Mac) Chawla

Petition Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR/DORL/LPL3-1

Phone: 301-415-8371

An NRC Commissioner's Safety Razzmatazz

March 19,2014

Barack, Harry, Ed and I have been working on this for a while. We just couldn't swallow that stupid speech below. I was charged with breaking the ice on the upcoming job change.

***And so says the Pilgrim plant spokesman today. Layers of redundant system can always paper over horrendous behavior. Redundancy is designed to minimized horrible behaior....indeed they invented fake safety systems as a justification to minimize to outsider the bad behavior of a plant.

McMahon said, “The layers upon layers of redundant safety systems at Pilgrim are among the many reasons why the safety of Pilgrim remains at a high level” and said the plant is working on improving its safety systems after recent downgrades

Things are going to change...

US NRC commissioner Magwood to depart for OECD Nuclear Energy Agency

Washington (Platts)--19Mar2014/103 pm EDT/1703 GMT

William Magwood is leaving the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to become director general of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency in September, NRC spokesman Eliot Brenner said Wednesday.

Originally posted on March 13, 2014.

Bottom line, safety is what the congressional campaign coffers says it mean. It is nothing about science and engineering...

 
Basically, safety is an acceptable accident up to and including a Fukushima accident...

An accident where no radiation hurts anyone, but the accident causes great harm to the USA...

It is the safety philosophical rationalization that we have so many redundant safety systems that nothing matters anymore. Controlling licencee behavior doesn't matter anymore because we are so safe. 

Basically, campaign contributions makes the nuclear industry one of the untouchables!

Yet, we got another governor requesting the NRC to shutdown another nuclear plant (Pilgrim) because increasingly the NRC is found to be untrustworthy and dishonest...


March 12, 2014

CONTACT: Office of Public Affairs, 301-415-8200

“The Seven Pillars of the Nuclear Safety Future”

William D. Magwood, IV, Commissioner

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

March 12, 2014 It has been another eventful year at the NRC. Since RIC 2013, the Commission has instructed staff to develop a new rule to consider vent filtering strategies and assure contaminate integrity during severe accidents and agreed on a draft rule to risk-inform low-level waste disposal. We have launched an enhanced policy statement regarding our relationships with tribal governments and responded comprehensively to court decisions related to high-level waste.

In the past year, I have walked on the basemat rebar for the first new nuclear power plant to be built in the United States in a generation. I have also borne witness in a control room as the first U.S. nuclear power plant to be closed for purely financial reasons was powered down for the last time.

In the past year, I have addressed members of Japan’s Diet, the Premier of Taiwan, and Ministers in Indonesia to espouse the principles of safety culture and regulatory independence. I have met with scores if not hundreds of young engineers to highlight the awesome personal responsibility each and every one of them has as a member of the nuclear community.

It has been another busy year for all of us at the NRC - but it is only one of many since the Energy Reorganization Act was enacted 40 years ago this coming October. But as varied as our activities have been over the 12 months, they all converge upon a single, clear concept—that the NRC exists to assure nuclear safety.

Nuclear safety is why the NRC was created. Out of the great accomplishments and great controversies of our predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the NRC was formed to provide a clarity of voice, a singularity of purpose, and an existential focus on nuclear safety—or, to be more precise, to assure that “the utilization or production of special nuclear material will be in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.”

This phase appears in section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the legislation that provides the core of our authorities. The Atomic Energy Act, as far-reaching and comprehensive as it is, is a haiku in comparison to the enormous bills manufactured by Congress today. While a creature from the depths of the Cold War, the provisions of the AEA remain the subject of active discussion and—despite many amendments over the decades—its foundational principles remain in effect. 

But how we interpret and apply those principles has evolved considerable since the Act became effective 60 years ago this coming August. How the broad authorities bestowed by the AEA in the era of Eisenhower and the “Say Hey Kid” are made manifest in the age of Obama and “Sid the Kid” reflects many other laws passed by Congress, many court decisions, and decades of regulatory experience and precedent.

The NRC is built upon thousands of experiences reflected in guidance and procedure. This is reflected in the inculcated culture of the organization, the evolving work practice of generations of staff, and the decisions made by the thirty-three people who have served as NRC Commissioners. The result is not simply a regulatory framework, but a collected wisdom.

In the Book of Proverbs, it is written that “"Wisdom hath built her house; she hath hewn out her seven pillars." Our house is based upon pillars of wisdom that reflect what we have learned and what we continue to learn. Our regulatory framework rests on the pillars hewn out over decades. But this wisdom is not static and it has never been. Our understanding evolves with experience and the ongoing commerce in ideas. Thus, while we must apply our current foundations to prepare for the future, our greatest challenge is to allow those pillars to shift without bringing the entire regulatory edifice to the ground.

Among the pillars that support the NRC’s overall framework, is the understanding that narrow purpose has it is own power. Part of the reason that NRC was created was to address public concerns about the scope and power of the Atomic Energy Commission. While the NRC’s role and powers are bounded by walls and barriers established over decades, the resulting framework, though it serves us very well, is complex even to those of us who live with it every day. For the public, it can be opaque and downright confusing.

For example, when the average person learns that a radioactive material called “tritium” is leaking from a nuclear plant into the groundwater, it is likely she would expect the NRC to take quick action to stop it and punish those responsible. Instead, she learns at a public meeting that NRC is a safety regulator, not an environmental regulator. Further, the NRC says the leak is not an indication of a problem with the plant’s safety systems and scientific analyses shows that it poses no hazard to public health. Therefore, NRC has no basis for action.

In other cases, members of the public ask NRC to weigh-in regarding one technology or the other—fuel cycle technologies, storage systems, and some question whether NRC should allow a utility to build a nuclear power plant at all if, for example, wind power is a viable option. In such interactions, the bright line we at NRC see between our role as a safety regulator and decisions related to national energy policy can appear murky and inexplicable to people outside the agency.

These limitations sometimes appear frustrating—even to many people inside the agency—but they serve an important principle. Vince Lombardi once said that “success demands singleness of purpose.” We take action only when it is relevant to our imperative to protect human health. We leave to Congress the decision whether to restrict or encourage a particular technology—as it has done, for example, with regard to the use of HEU for medical isotope production. Our singleness of purpose focuses our regulatory scope and it separates regulatory decisions from policy decisions.

Ironically, the most intense consternation is sometimes found in the attribute for which NRC is perhaps most widely admired around the world–our rigorous, disciplined process for making regulatory decisions.

When a proposal is made to change our requirements, we first consider whether that change is needed to ensure the adequate protection of public health and safety or to assure accord with the common defense and security. This has occurred in the past, such as when NRC responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

But these developments are, thankfully, quite rare and unusual. It is far more common that proposed changes do not address matters that challenge our “adequate protection” threshold. Instead, it is far more common that such changes provide more incremental benefits. If a proposed change is not in response to an issue of adequate protection or does not raise unaddressed concerns of common defense and security, NRC then engages in a “backfit” analysis to determine whether the resources required to implement the change can be justified by the safety benefits it provides. We do this as quantitatively as practical, but there is considerable judgment and debate involved in this process as well. We saw this very recently as the Commission considered a staff proposal regarding the filtering of containment vents.

Clearly, there are many observers who feel quite strongly that matters like these should not be decided by a cost-benefit analysis. Few other countries apply such an approach, and it has been argued that backfit analyses place the financial interests of industry over the safety of the public. In my view, this is an uninformed opinion.

The organizational and legal traditions in the United States are very different from those of our friends overseas. In many countries, for example, nuclear power plants are directly or indirectly owned or otherwise controlled by national governments. U.S. nuclear power plants are almost entirely the privately-held assets of commercial companies. In our legal tradition, private companies have rights that are in many cases similar to those of individuals. Commercial companies have an expectation that requirements will not be imposed upon them without good cause and due process. Our disciplined approach supports this tradition.

But more to the point, a disciplined approach allows us to focus both NRC and licensee resources on the issues of safety significance. When everything is significant, nothing is significant. Management attention, engineering talent, and, yes, financial resources can be spread too thin and too ineffectually. When this occurs, safety is not enhanced, it is weakened. Our quantitative, disciplined approach reflects this understanding.

I am not sympathetic to the concern I’ve heard from some people that the Backfit Rule makes it too hard to put new requirements in place. It should be hard. It forces us to question ourselves about what is truly needed for safety and avoid taking steps just because they may be popular or politic. At the end of the day, if there is a matter that appears to be needed for safety but doesn’t survive a cost-benefit analysis, the Commission has the authority to use its judgment to impose any requirements it finds necessary. The order issued in 2012 to enhance the instrumentation in spent fuel pools serves as a good and recent example.

The Commission structure itself is a vital pillar of our safety infrastructure. I’m sure some people hate it—five people not under the direct thrall of the usual Executive Branch structure.

Independent at inconvenient times. Sometimes a bit deliberate. Occasionally in disagreement with the staff. Occasionally in disagreement with itself.

But as I’ve noted in the past, the Commission structure, which involves intensive, informed debates among five individuals with very different backgrounds—for example university professors, nuclear submarine commanders, Congressional staff, the occasional sage—provides an excellent mechanism to reflect society’s evolving view as to what constitutes adequate protection. After four years in the center of this process, I think it is a far better approach to making important, complex decisions than leaving these matters to a single political appointee.

Nevertheless, I’m sure there are many who think we get it wrong. Since I’ve been on the Commission, we have had vigorous debates about worker dose standards, containment vent filtering, and most recently spent fuel pool safety. It is rare that everyone is satisfied with judgments on such contentious issues. But the process we apply is a disciplined one that assures consideration and evaluation of all the relevant information available to us. And, I should say, it is my opinion that in every case, we have reached an appropriate result that is protective of public safety and security.

All that said, we are not perfect. Humility is, even for sages, a core attribute of a good nuclear safety culture. As such, we must be able to change and revise our most fundamental pillars should experience, knowledge, or the availability of new methods, tools, or technologies compel us to do so. Ignoring the call for fundamental change is as bad as leaping to change for the sake of change or the vicissitudes of fashion.

As a regulatory organization, we value stability. And our licensees value stability and predictability. Yet one the most important pillars of NRC’s success to date has been our ability to evolve. SALP gave way to the ROP. Part 50 yielded to Part 52. It is my belief that the next major step in our evolution is the adoption of a strategy based upon risk-informed, site-specific regulation.

If we’ve learned nothing else over the years, it is that each nuclear power plant is a unique creature. In the United States, in particular, most plants are unique in design. They have wide variances in operating history and in the modifications incorporated over the years. As my colleague, Commissioner Apostolakis stated earlier, “risk contributors are plant specific, even for sister units.”

Moreover, American manifest destiny has bestowed upon us a country with swamps and deserts, plains and mountains, forests and tropics,

and we have nuclear power plants in most of these environments. Each site has unique characteristics and hazards that must be understood and addressed by plant design and operation.

The NRC staff does a good job of recognizing the different issues and features of each plant as it seeks to implement our regulations. But the fact exists that the agency issues and prioritizes regulatory actions on an industry-wide basis. It is not quite “one size fits all,” but it is a close relative. We have taken diminutive steps toward site-specific prioritization, for example in implementing seismic and flooding reassessments. Staff has prioritized plants in groups to be reviewed over the come months. This approach allows the NRC to prioritize the plants facing the most challenging seismic and flooding issues and enables us to apply our resources in a logical and effective fashion.
But this barely scratches the surface of the benefits that can be obtained by designing the regulatory agenda on a plant-by-plant basis based, to the extent practical, upon a quantitative understanding of risk. Adopting such an approach would allow the resources at each plant to be focused on the safety issues of highest significance for that plant and get them done more quickly and more efficiently.

Clearly, making this change will be difficult. It will require enhanced PRA tools and models and it will require research to develop the facts and data to support those models. It will require a shift in mindset in both the industry and NRC that embraces more fully probabilistic approaches. It will also require a willingness to make the up-front investments in order to realize long-term benefits.

However, it is vital that we never lose the perspective that plant operators are responsible for safety—not the NRC. There is no legislation that states it, but operators must take the principal responsibility for the safety of their plants. This understanding informs all we do as the regulator and the regulated.

A licensed operator recently asked me an interesting question: “Would nuclear power plants be operated safely if NRC did not exist?”

This is the question we should all ask. The answer should be ‘yes” but I doubt that anyone here today would give this reply without hesitation. Just as the plants differ, so do the companies that own and operate them. Some are, quite frankly, stronger than others. If this were not the case, we would not have and need an INPO.

That is not to suggest that any operator would, left to its own devices, run a plant in an irresponsible manner. But without a regulator, what additional pressure would plant managers feel from boards and financial staffs? Would maintenance cycles be stretched? Would training be cut back? What would be the “safety goal” for each plant? How much risk would be acceptable?

The reality is, quite clearly, that industry needs the NRC. Where would public confidence be without a strong regulator? NRC provides a common expectation for safety across the country that all operators understand they must meet. This provides a coherent standard by which decisions regarding plant operations and investment can be measured.

But this yardstick should not become a shepherd’s crook and plant managers should not be pushed into the role of sheep led about by the NRC staff. We must not create an environment in which plant decisions are made—or not made—with solely compliance in mind rather than plant safety. When owners refuse make safety-beneficial investments in a plant unless NRC requires them, we have all failed. When plant managers forego the installation of equipment that they believe would increase the safety of their plants because the NRC staff gives little or no credit for the installation, we all need to take a long look in the mirror. Are these the outcomes we expect and want? For my part, I don’t think that they are.

Think about the practices that have evolved over the decades and the cultures we have established—both good and bad. For many of the people who regulate and operate plants today, the current balance between regulator and licensee is viewed in the context of the 35 years since the Three Mile Island accident. They have the perspective born of experience to know how to draw the lines and how they have shifted over time. 

With a new generation gaining prominence in both the industry and the NRC, the experience of the past is fragmenting into snippets of history and legend. I am very proud of the important role the Federal government in general and the NRC in particular have played in supporting nuclear technology education in the United States. What we have accomplished has helped prepare us for the changing of the guard and assured that the most important pillar of our nuclear safety infrastructure—highly trained people—will remain strong for many years to come. That is a success story.

But this new generation of engineers and scientists, as quick and bright as they are, lack the experience of the days when dozens of new plants came on line and plant transients were all too common. The experience of those who managed NRC and the industry through those times is fading from the scene, never to be replaced. Even with NRC’s excellent training programs, this is a reality that cannot be evaded.

However, these young people will also bring new ideas, new energy, and new approaches as they grow into positions of increasing responsibility. Even now, in plants across the country and in the halls of the NRC, this new generation pushes us into the future. I imagine they are sometimes frustrated by the structures and practices of the ruling generation. As T.E. Lawrence wrote in his memoir Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph, “Youth could win, but had not learned to keep, and was pitiably weak against age.” But I say to them, be patient. Your time is coming soon and the responsibility for nuclear safety will pass to you all too quickly. Your challenge is to be ready to accept the responsibility when that time comes.

One of the greatest aspects of the RIC is the participation of so many of our friends and colleagues from around the world. Welcome to all of you and thank you for attending this year’s conference. Your presence today is no longer a luxury or a convenience. It is a vital necessity.

I’ve often reflected on that moment, during the signing of the Declaration of Independence when Benjamin Franklin famously remarked “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.” This comment applies to many things in life, but even Franklin could never have forecast how well it applies to a group like the 3100 people in this hall today.

Nuclear power is a global undertaking and we are in this together. We are married to each other. We are held hostage by each other. We are each other’s best friends and worst enemies. We are at once buyers and suppliers. We are teachers one day and students the next. The relationships and cooperation we share are part of the modern foundation of nuclear safety in all of our countries. We must seek to expand and extend them.

Thus with the engagement with our colleagues across the globe; our focused mission and disciplined processes; our Commission structure; and our ability to change when change is required, we will go forward. By reinforcing the understanding that operators—not regulators—are responsible for safety and by continuing our investment in the next generation, the pillars are in place to assure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will continue its impressive success and be prepared for the unknown challenges that the future will bring.

When the Atomic Energy Act became law 60 years ago, no one could have imagined the breadth and diversity of nuclear power and nuclear regulation as it exists across the world today. Our challenge is to find a way to make that diversity a strength from which to build a brighter, safer future for the publics we all serve.