November 19, 2013
Macfarlane Reaffirms NRC Commitment to Safety; Cautions Industry about Budget Impact on Agency
ATLANTA – Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Allison Macfarlane Tuesday acknowledged to nuclear executives that both the NRC and the industry face economic challenges but cautioned that a diligent commitment to nuclear power plant safe and secure operation of must remain paramount.
“Clearly, these are demanding economic times for all of us. But in the face of uncertainty we must continue to demonstrate together that plant safety and security aren’t, and never will be, in jeopardy,” Macfarlane told the CEO conference of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, an industry organization that focuses on improving nuclear safety.
Macfarlane also said the recent government shutdown created a backlog of non-emergency licensing work and delayed important projects such as the Waste Confidence rule work and post-Fukushima actions.
She added that, “while the recent lapse in federal appropriations is the most recent and most problematic external financial challenge we’ve faced, it is not the only one. For the past year we’ve had to readjust our work in response to required sequestration cuts and unabated continuing resolutions. We’re now facing the possibility of another year of sequestration at even more austere funding levels. … The combination of well-grounded immediate priorities and constrained and unpredictable annual budgeting means that important long-term focused work simply isn’t going to get done.”
“In some cases, it could mean additional delays – in others it means certain activities may be temporarily suspended. … The commission recognizes this, and we’re working to ensure that we continue to have the ability to do as much as we can with the resources we have.”
In her remarks Macfarlane also highlighted:
• Appreciation for INPO’s emphasis on the link between strong plant management and consistent plant performance, and for the industry’s work to implement lessons learned from the Fukushima accident.
• Overall nuclear power plants continued to perform well, but there are a few trends of concern attributable to systemic issues, such as maintenance practices for aging equipment.
• The Commission this week decided how the agency will proceed on the Yucca Mountain issue.
• The NRC has received “valuable input” from a variety of perspectives at public meetings on the Waste Confidence issue.
• The agency is monitoring domestic and international concerns about counterfeit and fraudulent parts and challenged both industry and the NRC staff to “maintain a shared commitment to vigilant vendor inspection.”
• The NRC has “worked closely with industry and Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on an integrated [emergency] response program for nuclear power plants. In the past year in particular, closer cooperation between industry and the various government entities has yielded good results and the program is advancing.”
• Operators of plants undergoing decommissioning should “engage with the public and be transparent about decision-making.”
• All facility operators “should be more proactive in engaging interested parties in their communities. I think there’s a clear linkage between continued, productive dialogue and the establishment of mutual trust in a particular community.”
Nov 15, 2013
So the Japanese’s nuclear safety myth is their industry’s PR
people educating or teaching the general population nuclear power is safer than
it really was. This whole deal allowed the collusion between the politicians,
regulators and nuclear industry. The whole deal is a system that enables the
nuclear industry to hide information from the public and the activist.
It is so undemocratic at its core. It also is a
system to intimidated the good nuclear employees to not disclose and fix
troubling problems...which bolstered the status and profits of the higher ups.
Basically the USA "risk perspectives" is a undecipherable safety analysis and code words
to insiders and outsider alike. It is mostly used to get the officials to
repeat over and over again the plants are safe, safe, safe. I called it the "nothing ever matters
"rationalization and we know it undermines the good employees in the industry.
If you look at risk perspectives carefully, it is a system designed to not discuss
ongoing problems in the industry, and get problems fixed. We are spinning
safety as much as the Japanese.
You need agency actions that changes plant's bad behaviors...not agency actions that just harmlessly bureaucratizes poor practices
and unsafe behavior. Sticking a corporation in the corner for five minutes just doesn't change their behavior. I think we got host
of troubling plants out there who have been enabled by the mentality of “nothing ever
matters” risk perspectives. And we have entered a historic tough economic environment
and the “nothing ever matters” risk perspectives wouldn’t protect the nuclear
industry in our new reality.
I see the degrading economics and poor maintenance as tremendously
increasing the complexity of the operators environment. They are juggling too
many balls. We are going to have an accident and it is going to look like all the
employees are all crazy. It will really be we put these guys in a too complex environment
without enough economic support.
So our USA risk perspectives and the Japanese’s nuclear
safety myth and regulatory capture are the same thing. The inability of the NRC
to ask the fundamental question of, how is the Japanese’s safety myth the same
as our risk perspectives is an indication we are in the Japanese
mentality before Fukushima.
The last and most important safety barrier is an active and engaged political
system...they are constantly testing if the nuclear industry’s activities are
making sense. If things go south, they
know how to go in there and knock heads together in order to get a change of behavior out
of the regulator and the industry. Do you think our political system has this
competence today?
"I think that the Fukushima accident provided a clear example of the importance of an independent, well-funded regulator as a critical foundation for any nuclear program, regardless of its size or scope. In the initial months, an independent commission of high-level officials appointed by the Japanese Diet took a hard look at the potential causes of the accident. The Kurokawa Commission, as it was known, released a candid report that concluded that the accident was“manmade,” a result in part of “regulatory capture,” in which the industry had too great an influence over the regulator. The report also coined the phrase“nuclear safety myth” to characterize an unfortunate overconfidence that low-probability, high-risk events would simply not occur."
Prepared Remarks of NRC Chairman Allison M. Macfarlane
American Nuclear Society
Winter Meeting
Monday, November 11, 2013 –
Washington, DC
Good
afternoon. It’s a pleasure to be here today to reflect on what lies ahead for
nuclear safety in the next quarter century. I’m honored to join this esteemed
group of panelists and I’m looking forward to our discussion. Today, I’d like
to offer my thoughts on the events and lessons that have shaped our current
perspectives on nuclear safety and on how best to keep a bright spotlight on
safety in the years ahead.
The
annual ANS Winter Meeting always brings together a diverse audience, including
students from a number of disciplines. Many of you are engaged in research and
in generating knowledge that might advance the use of nuclear technologies for
global benefit in the coming years. As a scientist, I know well the excitement
and sense of fulfillment that comes from knowing that your contributions are
adding to human understanding of the world around us.
This
is a significant time for all of us in the nuclear field. Next month marks 60
years since President Eisenhower delivered his iconic “Atoms for Peace” speech
at the United Nations. In the decades that have followed, there have been
substantial advances in energy, medicine, and industry as a result of nuclear
technology.
We’re
now at a juncture where further expansion of civilian nuclear power to
non-nuclear countries is poised to occur. As the nuclear power landscape
changes, the international community must remain vigilant to protect against
potential hazards and malicious uses posed by nuclear technology without
effective regulation. Use of nuclear power requires a strong regulatory regime
to ensure that the power of the atom is put to beneficial use and to protect
against misuse and/or complacency that opens the door to unacceptable risk of
potentially devastating consequences.
Fukushima’s Ongoing Lessons
The
Fukushima-Daiichi accident nearly three years ago challenged us to revisit
established assumptions and regulatory priorities. As the accident unfolded, it
became clear that we should consider the possibility of multiple units at the
same facility experiencing an accident. We also realized that in some cases, we
may not have sufficiently addressed the threats that some natural disasters
could pose.
As the international community began to come
together in the ensuing months, it was affirming to see that we were reaching
similar technical conclusions about where safety enhancements were necessary.
As a result, despite the diversity of nuclear power programs worldwide in terms
of size, scope, design, and
other factors, we’ve been able to collaborate closely and benefit from one
another’s experiences.
Our work to address
lessons learned from the accident continues. We’re reassessing our licensees’
ability to mitigate seismic and flooding events and requiring them to ensure
adequate emergency response training and communication to cope with prolonged
accident conditions. They’re strategically placing backup equipment on-site to
help maintain reactor cooling in the event of a loss of power. We’ve also
required enhanced instrumentation to better measure the water level in spent
fuel pools. While many of these activities are well on their way to completion,
we’ll need to address some items through rulemaking at our agency. This can be
time-consuming, but provides the benefit of codifying lessons we’ve learned
with opportunities for public participation throughout the rulemaking process.
Worldwide Nuclear Energy
Pursuits
The Fukushima
accident halted the course of future nuclear energy development in some
countries, but others are moving ahead with their plans, including some new
players. The community of countries operating or developing nuclear power
programs is becoming more diverse. Some of these are developed countries that
have an interest in diversifying their energy portfolios. Others are still
grappling with developing basic infrastructure. It’s possible that new
developments in small modular reactor technology in future years may further
broaden the range of countries seeking to pursue nuclear power.
In some respects, the
prospect of initiating a new nuclear power program from the ground up could be
seen as a positive opportunity. These “newcomer” countries have a chance to
reflect on the decades of lessons others have learned – sometimes the hard way.
They can establish a competent, well-funded regulator; promote a healthy safety
culture; consider the ultimate disposal of nuclear waste before any is
generated; and communicate clearly with the public on each new step in the
process. I think that the possibilities, at least in a philosophical sense,
appear broad and encouraging.
But of course, I note
that there are often competing external pressures contributing to the desire to
establish a civilian nuclear power program. There are urgent economic and
energy needs. There’s political prestige. There’s the consideration of a
country’s sovereign right to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
And, in rare cases, there’s a desire among some to leverage the technology for
geopolitical purposes by pursuing a nuclear weapons program. We’ve seen these
factors contribute to the establishment of high-level policies that put nuclear
power programs on a fast track. From a regulatory standpoint, however, a strong
focus on nuclear safety and security should be the ultimate objective. I
believe there’s a need to balance the right to possess nuclear technology with
the responsibilities that come with it. Nuclear safety is a global obligation –
there cannot be a vibrant nuclear power industry without a global commitment to
safety. And an essential component of that commitment is the presence of a
strong, independent regulatory body.
Why a Strong Regulator?
The role of the nuclear regulator has
evolved and expanded over time – the United States is no exception. The
creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1974 was the result of a
pivotal realization that regulation of an industry would never be sufficiently
effective if it was linked
organizationally to
the promotion of that industry. But I would be remiss if I oversimplified this
point. Establishing an effective, independent regulatory structure is not a
one-step process, nor does it remain static. The NRC has continued to hone its
independent regulatory model in the 35-plus years since our agency was
established. On a global level, the NRC and our counterparts in other countries
routinely engage in discussions about what regulatory independence means, and
there’s not always universal agreement about its definition.
It’s clear that a
regulator’s organizational independence will vary depending on the overall
political structure of the country – and since there’s no fixed model for the
latter, it’s impossible to have a one-size-fits-all approach to nuclear
regulation. But while our experiences may differ, one resounding lesson is that
safety must transcend all else. To be effective, a regulator must be
independent of any political, economic, or other policy interest whose outside
influence could coerce the regulatory body to make decisions that aren’t in
safety’s best interest. The regulator must have sufficient, sustainable funding
to ensure that it can effectively do its job and attract the best and the
brightest. I believe that, for a regulator to have the trust and support of the
public, it must be committed to openness and transparency – providing
information about its work in terms the public can understand, and affording
the public opportunities for input into its processes. Finally, the independent
status of the regulator must have support from government leaders – nuclear
safety must factor into national decision-making.
I think that the
Fukushima accident provided a clear example of the importance of an
independent, well-funded regulator as a critical foundation for any nuclear
program, regardless of its size or scope. In the initial months, an independent
commission of high-level officials appointed by the Japanese Diet took a hard
look at the potential causes of the accident. The Kurokawa Commission, as it
was known, released a candid report that concluded that the accident was
“manmade,” a result in part of “regulatory capture,” in which the industry had
too great an influence over the regulator. The report also coined the phrase
“nuclear safety myth” to characterize an unfortunate overconfidence that
low-probability, high-risk events would simply not occur.
Obviously, the
Fukushima accident has prompted all of us, even the most developed countries
with the most well-established programs, to reassess how we do things and see
where enhancements may be necessary. It’s clear that any type of nuclear
accident anywhere in the world has global consequences. The response to this
accident plainly demonstrates the need for a continued global commitment to
preventing future incidents.
You may have seen
media coverage over the past year about counterfeit and fraudulent parts making
their way into nuclear construction sites, or of greater concern, being
discovered at operating reactors. This concern is not unique to the nuclear
industry, and general advances in technology have prompted new worries about
hard-to-spot fake computer chips and circuit boards. Today’s nuclear industry
relies on a global supply chain, and new reactors being designed and
constructed around the world have all digital operating systems. Taken
together, these factors clearly point to the need for a global regulatory
commitment to rigorous quality control, irrespective of a problem’s country of
origin. It is unwise, and potentially dangerous, for a country to embark on
nuclear construction without a vigilant vendor inspection program.
There’s also been discussion about a
“build-own-operate” model for new nuclear power plants in countries without
established nuclear programs. The objective would be to rely on vendors and
contractors from an experienced nuclear power country to handle all aspects of
the new country’s
program, from the
construction to the day-to-day operation, and even the regulation. In some
cases, this model presupposes virtually no indigenous nuclear engineering
capability or regulatory structure. I believe this would be problematic for
several reasons.
First, it would make
the host country fully reliant on foreign inspectors to maintain the plant,
identify safety concerns, and quickly address them. In a worst-case scenario, I
find it worrisome to consider a sovereign country counting on a foreign entity,
potentially thousands of miles away, to oversee the response to a nuclear
accident. Second, as an open, transparent regulator, the NRC regularly
communicates with other federal, state, and local government agencies, interest
groups, the media, and members of the public. This communication happens on a
routine basis – not just in the event of an incident. If a country chooses to
place its nuclear program in the hands of a foreign regulator, that country
would relinquish its ability to ensure that it is adequately informing its own
citizens about that program.
Regulators also have
an important role to play in upholding non-proliferation commitments.
Regulatory controls on nuclear materials help ensure that these materials are
kept out of the hands of malicious actors and ensure safeguards measures are
enforced. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was carefully crafted to create
a balance between the right to develop nuclear technology and the
responsibility to safeguard this technology to ensure its exclusively peaceful
use. The regulator is integral to the efforts to uphold this balance by
establishing clear requirements for the safe and secure use of the technology.
Effective regulatory requirements demonstrate a country’s commitment to
peaceful use, which, in my view, should facilitate access to the technology,
rather than being perceived as a bureaucratic obstacle.
A regulator’s
non-proliferation role extends to any country that uses nuclear materials for
any reason, even if the country never intends to establish a civilian nuclear
power program. A robust regulatory infrastructure is necessary to ensure safety
and security in authorizing these materials to move from place to place and
overseeing their storage and use once at their destinations. There’s also an
economic benefit – these types of controls actually enhance efficiency of
movement of these materials across the marketplace by ensuring a clear
destination, thereby minimizing delays.
Putting it into Practice
The NRC is working
continuously to put these regulatory ideals into practice. At home, we have a
rigorous safety and security oversight program. Our resident inspectors are a
daily presence at our licensed facilities, helping to ensure that identified
issues are promptly addressed. I should note that, during our recent government
shutdown, all of these inspectors remained on the job. We take more than 1,000
licensing actions each year, all publicly available, following
well-established, well-documented procedures. We work closely with the 37
Agreement States, which regulate tens of thousands of nuclear materials
licensees throughout the country to ensure that our collective approach is
effective. We license all imports and exports of civilian nuclear materials.
We’re committed to openness and transparency, and our processes provide
documented opportunities for public involvement. While I believe there’s always
room for improvement, we’re certainly practicing the kind of competent,
independent regulation that we advocate.
The NRC is also engaged internationally,
both bilaterally and with multilateral organizations like the International
Atomic Energy Agency. We work closely with our regulatory counterparts to
address safety and
security issues of mutual interest. We also provide assistance to countries
with new or small nuclear programs. We share insights about establishing a
sound regulatory infrastructure, offer workshops on the development of laws and
regulations, and participate in international peer review missions assessing
the health of regulatory bodies. With effective use of these principles in our
domestic program, we’re proud to demonstrate credible leadership in this area.
We also played a
critical role in strengthening implementation of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, or CNS, following the Fukushima accident. The U.S. Government, with the
NRC in a leadership role, joined other countries in successfully advocating for
stronger language about the importance of regulatory independence in the
Convention’s guidance documents. These documents provide a roadmap for
countries to report how they’re meeting their obligations under the Convention.
Thanks to these enhanced guidance documents, countries will be asked to offer
specific information about their regulatory structure at the upcoming Review
Meeting next spring. All countries’ reports, including ours, will be peer
reviewed with the intent of identifying areas for improvement. These upcoming
exchanges will give us valuable input to consider.
I just mentioned the
NRC’s collaboration with other U.S. Government agencies in the CNS context. We
also work with our interagency colleagues to provide support and offer
regulatory assistance for countries considering U.S. technology. It’s important
for me to emphasize that the NRC doesn’t promote nuclear energy. However, it’s
become clear that the expertise we can offer in the way of design review and
certification, construction oversight and quality assurance checks, and other
related areas is of interest to countries considering nuclear power. From a
purely regulatory standpoint, we believe this type of focused collaboration
contributes positively toward advancing our collective goal of strengthening
nuclear safety and security worldwide.
Keeping the Momentum Going
Reflecting once again
on the theme of today’s discussions, it’s safe to say that all aspects of
nuclear energy – from how it’s generated to how it’s regulated – have changed
considerably since the technology’s initial introduction. Today’s approach to
nuclear regulation is naturally defined by our experiences. We’ve sought to
identify, share, and advance good practices, and we’ve used the less positive
moments as opportunities to learn and do better. This is an ongoing process.
Growing and changing over time is healthy for any organization.
But as we move
forward, ready to embrace the lessons of the decades to come, it is imperative
that we continue to shine that bright spotlight on safety. Nuclear regulation,
like the nuclear industry and most everything in our time, is a global effort –
and safety and security are shared responsibilities. The Fukushima accident
reinforced this reality in a tragic way, but it didn’t introduce it. A global
commitment to effective, independent nuclear regulation is an absolute must if
we are to prevent future accidents and guard against malicious use of nuclear
materials.
The NRC is leading by example. Our
regulatory oversight of our licensees is rigorous, independent and open. Our
export controls facilitate the safe and secure movement of nuclear materials in
and out of the United States, and give us assurance that materials will be
properly protected upon reaching their destinations. Our international assistance work enables us to
share lessons from our domestic regulatory program to benefit others – whether
they are countries pursuing nuclear power for the first time or
seeking to strengthen their oversight of facilities already in operation. I’m
proud to lead our agency at this critical time.
It’s not possible or
appropriate for me to predict where the industry will be in the year 2038 or
beyond. We may be looking at how new technological advances, like small modular
reactors, have brought nuclear power to regions that could not previously have
considered it. We may be reflecting on how the medical isotope production market
has changed. We’ll have new construction lessons to consider from all over the
world, and decommissioning approaches to contrast as other plants shut down.
For those of you who will be the stewards of nuclear regulation and the nuclear
industry in the coming decades, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of
maintaining the momentum on safety. Whatever the future brings, I believe that
one thing is certain. If the nuclear industry is going to be operating
effectively at any size – if it’s going to inspire confidence and public trust
– then we must keep our focus on safety.
It’s an honor for me to have the
opportunity to participate in this important conference, and look forward to
hearing from the other panelists and to our discussion. Thank you.
