NRC Chairperson Macfarlane: "The New Normal"

Mike Mulligan Translating Macfarlane's nuclear code words:

"Governments and industry collaborate – both among themselves on a domestic level and with their respective international counterparts – to ensure that lessons learned can be applied broadly to benefit safety and security."

You notice the "peoples of nations" aren't included in their hierarchy of privileged people that stands out "among themselves"...who partake as equals in "electronic media" with this government and the industry's well heeled class of people. As they all are increasingly making the nuclear industry less transparent, especially the great leader the USA, in the ends of protecting themselves from the fallout of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. 

 ...this all transpires against the backdrop of a 24-hour news cycle, in which information is plentiful but not always accurate.

You get it, if you don't have our special class privileged with getting behind the high security fence of a nuclear generating facility, the copious secret information contained within that fence, all outsider never have the privileged to make their own determination with what information is contain within that fence. Thus the gods of "governments" and "nuclear industry" professionalism can always imply the outsiders who challenge them don't have the first hand factual information that the nuclear class professionals have. These gods of nuclearism solely have the power of  the determination with plant events and their relevance. The whole reality the outsiders see is through the self interested income interpretation of the so call nuclear credentialed professionals...basically a extremely insecure cohesive group not below direct lying who are selfishly out to push their ends above everyone else.

They mock all the others as "which information is plentiful but not always accurate" if any story challenges their status of being behind the high security fence of relevance determination in nuclear plant reality. Nobody ever gets to question if the nuclear professionals are putting out inaccurate, selective and contradictory information, which the 24 hour new cycle media parrots, then the professionals then can mock the media as being not much reliably accurate. And Fukushima is the prime example of self protection on a world wide bases...

Honestly, these guys are gods; they solely determined the truth outsiders see of the condition in a runaway plant.

...an appropriate balance between incorporating Fukushima’s lessons into our safety-mission activities and preventing the accident from dominating these activities.

And this "Bud" is for you NEI...this is proof out of the Chairperson's mouth, that all the big buck political contributions from our electric utilities and the other interested are getting translated into NRC inaction in preventing the next organizational meltdown. 

In essence, I’ve just alluded to the "cumulative effects of regulation."

The above means with the nuclear industry's big buck political contributions...you effectively muted the power of the agency and our government. All we (NRC) can do is slowly throw inconsequential nickle and dime regulations at you that just gum up your works. The agency only has the power to slowly gum up your works...but the agency doesn't have the power to change your heart and your behavior...to make you serve our societal and national ends to make all our lives better. Our USA government doesn't have the heart to make our lives better, just to appease the big forces who use contribution to lesson all out lives!

whether your facilities are high performers or are experiencing challenges, I believe it’s equally important for you to engage interested parties in the communities around your plants regarding the plants’ performance, how you’re meeting the NRC’s requirements, and what you may be doing voluntarily in addition to what’s required by the regulator. Transparency and openness are essential to show both the industry’s and the agency’s processes can be trusted to be protective of public health and safety. 

Guys, just keep throwing them those disconnected platitudes to the cheap poorly educated media, it seems to be working. God help us all if public was to demand equal participation and powers as the elite, insecure and educated nulear professiona. You know, we are the only ones can be trusted with self interest altruistic power. We know what you want!

International operating experience informs performance at nuclear power plants in the United States and elsewhere, and is essential in ensuring safe operation of these facilities. 

I get it, we only see events through the industry's happlyland lens. Like, let me see all OEs and assortment of other plant secret documents.

Why don't all you cowards put all your cards on the table associated with Target Rock safety relief valves at Pilgrim nuclear stations and it national ramification.

More than ever, it’s essential for countries contemplating nuclear power to consider all aspects of what a nuclear program entails. This includes having an independent regulator that can make safety-related decisions without undue influence from other governmental or promotional entities, with enough staff to support its activities, and enough financial resources to be sustainable. I believe that it also includes addressing the ultimate disposal of waste as part of the initial licensing process, as well as having sufficient mechanisms in place to communicate transparently with the public.

Yea, that means, efficiently getting out the high security fence sole single lens relevancy interpretations and determinations polluted by the self interest of the industry and agency. It means exactly parroting what we tell you to say in the most efficient communicative way. This is the great USA way...

 I would point to the "Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct," established in 2011, as a good example of industry collaboration in this area. Through these voluntary "Principles," civilian nuclear power plant vendors have committed to share best practices that reinforce and enhance existing codes, standards, and regulations. 

As I mentioned earlier, all industries are dealing with a global supply chain. There are many associated benefits, but there are also risks that must be considered and managed on a routine basis, not just in response to isolated incidents. Counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect parts have found their way into in a variety of products, particularly computer-related equipment. 

This is certainly the classy president Obama way of ending a speech. Ending it with humanizing gut busting and can't catch your breath joke between friends. And "voluntarily principles" is the god speaking in the extremist right wing government hating teabagger Republicans. Wait a minute, let me catch my breath I am laughing so hard.  Mrs. Macfarlane does have a wild sense of humor!

Life after Fukushima: "The New Normal"

Prepared Remarks of NRC Chairman Allison M. Macfarlane

At the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Nuclear Energy Assembly

May 14, 2013 – Washington, D.C.

Good afternoon. I appreciate the introduction and the opportunity to be here to share my thoughts with you today. This morning, you heard Susan Eisenhower reflect on the evolution of "Atoms for Peace" in the 60 years since her grandfather’s speech on the subject. Today, nuclear power operates on a worldwide scale, with a global supply chain and the benefit of international operating experience to inform our work as nuclear regulators and industry’s approach to nuclear safety and security.

Adjusting to life in a globalized world with ever-advancing technology presents any number of new considerations. Increasing reliance on electronic media makes it easier than ever to share operating experience internationally, but also creates potential challenges like cyber security threats. Governments and industry collaborate – both among themselves on a domestic level and with their respective international counterparts – to ensure that lessons learned can be applied broadly to benefit safety and security. And quite unlike President Eisenhower’s time, this all transpires against the backdrop of a 24-hour news cycle, in which information is plentiful but not always accurate.

Over the course of the past two years, we’ve also had to contend with the additional, often dominating influence of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. I’ve had the opportunity to see the damaged reactors first-hand, and meet regularly with my new Japanese counterparts, most recently last week. Japan continues to face an enormous task in addressing on-going issues at the site in a way that fosters public confidence. The lessons learned from this accident should serve to strengthen nuclear safety worldwide. But, beyond that, we must also ensure that we have a plan in place for moving beyond our initial responses. After all the analyses are done and the reports are written, the changes we implement must be appropriate, effective, and sustainable.

As our work to understand the Fukushima accident evolves, and we examine our own approach to nuclear safety, we must strike an appropriate balance between incorporating Fukushima’s lessons into our safety-mission activities and preventing the accident from dominating these activities. The NRC is mindful of this, and we’ve discussed the need for this kind of balance at length with industry during our post-Fukushima interactions. If we continue to isolate Fukushima work in the long term, rather than incorporating it into existing programs and processes, it may appear as though we’re too narrowly focused on a single set of circumstances instead of on safety as a whole. This approach could cause us to overlook important priorities. It’s equally important for both regulators and industry to discuss this issue at an international level to benefit from what others are doing. At the same time, we 2

must consider the impacts of other changes unrelated to Fukushima. As technologies become more complex and involvement of the public becomes more frequent and sophisticated, the challenges placed on nuclear technology continue to evolve. Together, we must define "the new normal."

As we consider what this concept means, we should recognize that in many cases, Fukushima added a new dimension to existing priorities. Above all, the accident brought a renewed emphasis on certain aspects of nuclear safety – particularly for beyond-design-basis events. We need to work together – both domestically and internationally – to reduce the potential for another accident and ensure that our mitigation strategies are robust should an accident occur.

In essence, I’ve just alluded to the "cumulative effects of regulation." This was a subject of discussion long before Fukushima, but has taken on greater visibility in the months since we began our collective efforts to implement lessons learned from the accident. Our objective in addressing Fukushima’s lessons has been to enhance nuclear power plant safety worldwide in a way that will stand the test of time without distracting from other safety or security priorities.

While we continue to pursue these enhancements, we remain focused on the day-to-day safe and secure operation of our licensed facilities. Although the majority of the plants continue to operate safely, those that are currently shut down and under heightened oversight – like SONGS and Fort Calhoun – must address a significant number of questions before the NRC can determine whether they can be operated safely. Absent technically complete and satisfactory information from our licensees, the NRC is not able to reach conclusions about operational safety.

The NRC is working hard to explain these situations to the public in a clear and accessible way. This is a tough assignment when some of the issues are extremely complex with many moving parts. The situation at SONGS is an excellent case in point.

Whether your facilities are high performers or are experiencing challenges, I believe it’s equally important for you to engage interested parties in the communities around your plants regarding the plants’ performance, how you’re meeting the NRC’s requirements, and what you may be doing voluntarily in addition to what’s required by the regulator. Transparency and openness are essential to show both the industry’s and the agency’s processes can be trusted to be protective of public health and safety.

More than ever, nuclear power plant management must be plugged into the needs of its employees and the local community. I continue to maintain that good management goes a long way toward good performance. In any organization, nuclear or otherwise, managers are responsible for establishing both the priorities and the environment in which work is accomplished; managers set expectations and then ensure that employees live up to them. Unfortunately, and I can say this from experience, being a manager too often means being in a seemingly endless stream of meetings that prevents us from spending as much time as we should getting to know our staff and listening to their feedback. I believe good practices in this area should be captured and broadly applied. I’m sure you share my view that it’s essential that nuclear safety remains the highest priority from the newest entry-level employee to the most senior manager. 3

The NRC and industry alike can also derive great benefit from international operating experience. I’m sure you’ve heard me and my colleagues talk on numerous occasions about the benefits the NRC gets from cooperation with our international regulatory counterparts. In the Fukushima context, international cooperation is a key element in ensuring that we’re learning and applying the right lessons. I believe industry should consider international cooperation an essential component of ensuring nuclear safety. I’d note the recent establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding between WANO and the IAEA as another positive step in enhancing these important relationships. There are also some opportunities for government and industry to collaborate internationally for mutual benefit. To that end, the NRC benefitted greatly from INPO’s participation in last summer’s Extraordinary Meeting of Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Vienna.
International operating experience informs performance at nuclear power plants in the United States and elsewhere, and is essential in ensuring safe operation of these facilities. Exchanges with our foreign partners are fruitful in sharing this type of information. For example, I’m sure that as the U.S. industry considers the question of filtered containment venting and other filtration strategies, you will benefit from the collective years of experience other countries have with this technology. One critical aspect of the "new normal" is that public interest in nuclear power, whether positive or negative, remains heightened. Where certain technology is in place in some countries and not others, both the public and our elected leaders are naturally predisposed to make comparisons. I believe that we must ensure that clear and accurate explanations are given for the choices made in establishing and implementing new NRC requirements.

One area of particular interest with respect to international cooperation is that of countries considering nuclear power for the first time. Though some countries have made policy decisions to cease or limit nuclear power operations, many countries are still moving forward with plans to introduce nuclear power into their energy supply mix. The Fukushima accident has brought some new considerations to bear, and placed other considerations in a new light.

Countries considering nuclear power for the first time have an opportunity to assess issues surrounding its use holistically and create their programs with "the new normal" in mind. Reflecting once again on "Atoms for Peace," there’s an important need for balance between the right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses, and the responsibilities that go along with it. Because these programs are new, there’s also an opportunity to get it right the first time – to incorporate past lessons into the establishment of the nuclear safety and security infrastructure and the facility’s design, construction, and operation. The responsibility to operate nuclear power plants safely and securely is at the forefront of the discussion in this post-Fukushima environment, but we must also consider the very important responsibility of ensuring that nuclear material is kept out of the wrong hands. A strong regulator is essential for accomplishing this. Some countries are still developing basic infrastructure while they’re entertaining multiple design bids. Even before the accident two years ago, the NRC was strongly advocating the establishment of an independent, well-funded regulatory infrastructure for any country considering nuclear power. The accident at Fukushima only reinforces the importance of these regulatory criteria.

More than ever, it’s essential for countries contemplating nuclear power to consider all aspects of what a nuclear program entails. This includes having an independent regulator that can make safety-related decisions without undue influence from other governmental or promotional entities, with enough staff to support its activities, and enough financial resources to be sustainable. I believe that it also includes addressing the ultimate disposal of waste as part of the initial licensing process, as well as having sufficient mechanisms in place to communicate transparently with the public. As regulators, the NRC and its international counterparts play an important role in providing assistance to countries with emerging nuclear programs in establishing appropriate laws and regulations and devising strategies for sufficient staffing and resources. It’s also important for national leaders to identify nuclear safety and security as priorities so that the regulator has strong support for its decisions.

But our best efforts in this area won’t be enough without similar collaboration on the industry side. I believe vendors, in particular, have a responsibility to ensure that the appropriate infrastructure is in place in any country that is considering their technologies. Countries should be able to demonstrate that they can not only operate a nuclear power plant, but can do so safely and with a high level of security and independent oversight. I would point to the "Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct," established in 2011, as a good example of industry collaboration in this area. Through these voluntary "Principles," civilian nuclear power plant vendors have committed to share best practices that reinforce and enhance existing codes, standards, and regulations.

As I mentioned earlier, all industries are dealing with a global supply chain. There are many associated benefits, but there are also risks that must be considered and managed on a routine basis, not just in response to isolated incidents. Counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect parts have found their way into in a variety of products, particularly computer-related equipment.

The U.S. nuclear industry does not yet appear to be feeling the acute impacts of these challenges, but several reports of counterfeit and fraudulent items have surfaced abroad. The increased use of digital technology has also led to enhanced concerns about evolving cyber security threats. While there are no requirements compelling vendors to do this kind of due diligence about the countries that are interested in their designs, I think it’s a good practice that makes both business and ethical sense. I believe addressing these challenges can go a long way in further enhancing public trust.

So how should we define "the new normal"? As we know, many of the most safety-significant post-Fukushima actions will be completed by 2016 in the United States. Some longer-term activities will continue into later years. As this work continues, the NRC, for its part, will reabsorb staff who have been devoted to Fukushima work back into our line organizations. Throughout this time, the day-to-day safety and security of our licensed facilities will remain NRC’s top priority. Should new and different challenges arise, we will promptly evaluate our processes and ensure they are adequately addressing these issues. Our resident and regionally-based inspectors will continue to maintain their rigorous oversight over the operating fleet and new plants under construction. The staff will continue to review license renewal and new reactor license applications, and, once we have fully addressed the Waste Confidence issue, we’ll begin issuing final licensing decisions again. We’ll continue to prepare ourselves for potential activities related to new technologies and permanent waste disposal. To a large extent, the priorities we had prior to Fukushima remain unchanged.

However, the commitments we’ve made to learn lessons from the Fukushima accident, and what we’ve accomplished thus far in this area, should appropriately influence each of these other activities. Domestically, our review of the potential of normal earth processes – such as earthquakes and floods – to affect reactors will inform future regulatory decisions. By default, they’ll also inform industry’s operations, future applications, and NRC’s inspections and technical reviews. Internationally, government and industry alike should maintain a commitment to continued cooperation. The exchange 5

of operating experience will continue to yield important lessons learned, not only from Fukushima but from other issues that arise. Industry leaders should evaluate experiences with technologies already in use in other countries as they consider future enhancements to U.S. plants. Taken together, these activities represent a demonstrated commitment to maintaining a high level of nuclear safety and security here and abroad. This commitment is essential in enhancing public confidence in the work we do. Countries considering nuclear power for the first time stand to gain particular benefit from this cooperation.

In the months and years ahead, we should continue to consider "the new normal," and assess the nature of the influence Fukushima will have on our daily work. By incorporating these activities over time into established processes, we’ll ensure the continued applicability of lessons learned, while ensuring that we’re maintaining focus on the highest safety priorities. After all, there’s no going back to the mindsets that existed prior to March 11, 2011.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and would be happy to answer your questions.

Palisades Safety Injection/Fefueling Water Tank Leak

May 26 Sunday:

I am just saying, last year's extended shutdown to repair the SIRW and all the expensive activity to monitor and repair the tank over recent years was a object waste of money. It was a waste of many millions of dollars. I bet you it wastefully consumed 10 to 15 million dollars. Somebody should have been thinking the big picture, are we going to dealing with a host of expensive leaks and inflaming the public and NRC leading to tremendous expenses, or should we bite the bullet and replace whole bottom of the tank when it first appeared? The CEO weaken the future viability of the plant with the maintenance or operational model he used over the  incomplete local repair repeatedly or a one off global repair. Their maintenance or operational philosophic model with the solution to the leaking SIRW tank.

Right, and they needed immediately to come up with a accurate model on degradation mechanism...which always was totally inaccurate based on the prolong saga of the leaking SIRW tank. This is piss poor engineering and it questions if they have adequate and highly educated global engineering resources. Are all their great engineers on leisurely retirement beaches of Florida according to a NRC commissioner.

More disgraceful thing I ever seen, maliciously incompetent, the " new crack leak" came from from a newly installed nozzle strengthening plate they put in last extended SIRW shutdown according to the NRC webinbar last Friday. The great fix didn't last a year.

What CEO in his right mind would waste millions of dollars over a perilous plant...you think he would want to conserve profits with a competent inexpensive fix. What if Entergy always took the most expensive maintenance fix based on their broken corporate financial model... 

I mean, he is not on the plant employees side!

It is not about a tank that was leaking...it is corporate Entergy that is leaking and taking on huge qualities of water.

May 21:

What is unexplainable to me...the leaking tank has been a new phenomena of a few years or so. The oil canning, the flexing of the tank bottom and settling of the sand under the tank bottom has alway been there. So why wasn't there leaks from day one. What new change has set this off in the last ten years or so?

Is this the future for our nation? Increasing disgusting behavior as perceived by all outsiders…while the NRC reporting it"s safe and not safety related? It is normally expected behavior! This is me on 2011:

Feb 22, 2011 2.206?

"We know from the study of the past that there are huge problems spinning unseen right now at Palisades that the NRC doesn't document. It is going to boggle the mine with what the NRC discovers in the next year or two at Palisades, just like the last two year. I say they are going to find bigger and more repetitive problems. "

What would we be thinking about Entergy if a year ago they decided to replace the bottom of the tank? They were a reformed and a trusted comapany:

Palisades to replace water tank bottom

Nuclear plant has been shut down since May 5

Updated: Monday, 20 May 2013, 7:10 PM EDT
Published : Monday, 20 May 2013, 7:02 PM EDT

COVERT TOWNSHIP, Mich. (WOOD) - Palisades nuclear power plant will completely replace the bottom of a leaky 300,000-gallon water tank that has been responsible for several shutdowns since late 2011.

The Covert Township plant most recently shut down on May 5 when a crack in the tank allowed 79 gallons of "slightly radioactive water" to flow in to a pond that feeds directly into Lake Michigan. There was no public health threat. 

Monday, the plant said it would completely replace the tank bottom and reconstitute the tank's subflooring. Plant spokeswoman Lindsay Rose said in a statement that "by replacing the tank bottom, we can return the subflooring to its original condition."
That leaky tank sits right above the plant's main control room. In the past year, it has accounted for one third of the plant's shutdowns:

• June 2012: Water tank leak
• August 2012: Rod housing leak
• November 2012: Steam leak
• November 2012: Valve leak
• February 2013: Tube leak
• May 2013: Water tank leak

The plant has shut down nine times since 2011.
The extensive renovations to the tank will likely take until early summer to finish.
"We are confident this very conservative approach will bring this issue to final resolution," Rose said in the statement. 

The plant will remain offline for the duration of the repairs, Rose told 24 Hour News 8.

So, when does the aluminum transition to the metal of the piping. Why can't it be galvanic corrosion with the concrete?

How Does Contact with Aluminum Affect Concrete?

Question: Does anyone have information on the reaction between aluminum and concrete?

Answer:Forty Broom, former mixer salesman and unofficial historian for THE CONCRETE PRODUCER, tells a story about a drum manufacturer that developed a new mixer drum in the late 1960s. A staff engineer had this great idea of trying to reduce weight by using aluminum. The marketing department was easily hooked on the new product's potential appeal, and a prototype machine was soon made. The unit worked very well for a few days.
But then, after being charged with a full load of concrete at a nearby ready-mix plant, the drum's bottom split at the seam and opened up, practically burying the chassis in fresh concrete.
Unfortunately for that manufacturer, someone didn't ask a question recently posted on Aggregate Research Industries' interactive industry forum page (www.aggregateresearch.com/forum).
The question of the effect of concrete contact with aluminum drew some great responses. One respondent summed it up: "Aluminum and concrete don't mix, either in the plastic or hardened state."
Aluminum reacts with the alkalis (OH) found in portland cement concrete. When these two chemicals are combined, the reaction produces hydrogen gas. This is why, when the reaction occurs in wet concrete, you'll notice tiny bubbles coming to the surface of a slab.
One responder commented, "If you add enough aluminum powder in a full load of concrete, eventually, there'll be enough gas to cause the mix to expand, and eventually the fresh concrete spills out of the drum. For a less dramatic test, take an aluminum chute on a jobsite, and fill it up with concrete. After about 45 minutes, you should see bubbles coming to the top of the concrete."
In most situations, the contact time between aluminum and fresh concrete is relatively short, so it normally doesn't cause a problem. Therefore, you can use an aluminum truck bed to haul concrete for a short duration without any adverse effect, as along as it's cleaned after use.
But serious consequences can arise in situations of long-term contact. First, a significant corrosion of aluminum embedded in concrete can occur. The corrosion can cause expansion of the concrete and subsequent cracking of hardened concrete.
Second, if the aluminum is coupled with any ferrous metals, galvanic corrosion will occur also. In both cases the presence of calcium chloride greatly accelerates the corrosion process.
Even seemingly small amounts of aluminum in concrete can be a problem. One responder offered the example of a jobsite where the contractor had used 10-gauge aluminum wire to tie rebar together. Within nine months the producer was back on the site, trying to explain areas of localized distress with spalling. When the testers chipped into the concrete, they discovered the location of each aluminum tie the crew had used.
Sometimes the reaction created by mixing aluminum with concrete can be a good thing. At least one admixture on the market uses aluminum corrosion to produce expansive cement. The cement paste expands to fill voids.
Connie Field, librarian at the Portland Cement Association (PCA)'s library in Skokie, Ill., provided a good source for information on this topic. Years ago PCA issued two reports on the subject: Corrosion of Aluminum Conduit in Concrete (RX173) and Corrosion of Embedded Material Other Than Reinforcing Steel (RX198). You'll find summaries of these reports at www.portcement.org. You can download an Adobe Acrobat Reader file, or you can contact Connie at cfield@portcement.org.

...My greatest fear is the efford to overcome the defective CRDMs and SIRW will overwhelm the resources of Palisades and cause them to miss more significant issues…the  ever expanding problems at Palisades will overwhelm the NRC and prevent them from seeing other more significant issues at other plants?

...The idea that the problems at Pilgrim, Arkansas one and Palisades will overwealm the resources Entergy...this will cause them to miss or not catch a much more significant problem at another Entergy nuclear plant? 

Will ever expanding problems in Entergy's fleet of nuclear power plants overwealm corporate resources...thus they egnore other other componets of Entergy corporate?  

...The idea that the ever explaining set of problems at our operating nuclear plants will overwhelm the resources of the NRC…this will prevent the agency from seeing the most significant problem developing in the nuclear industry?

So they continued the bs of not conservatively shutting down at Pilgrim like Palisades. The NRC make the case they will never interfere with operation of a nuclear power plant…

You can get away with, these kinds of defects in the primary pressure structure ends up getting so complex; the complexity effectively blinds the plant’s staff and agency. 

Does it make it worst if they played blind or made themselves blind in order to shorten the outage and fatten their profits? They didn't see the defect and take appropriate actions to monitor the defect because this activity would lengthen the outage. They are effectively rope-a-doping the pathetically weak NRC staff.
 

And the NRC doesn't disclose issues like this until the heat of the event is over…it is relegated to a distant nonevent that has no meaning. That is why these things occur over and over again in this "ROUGE" corporation and organization.

You get it, the agency never has comfortable triplicate proof at a operating nuclear power plant of seeing unsafety... because of the inherent barrier, to see the unsafety in operational machinery and devices…they never take action to shutdown a not safe plant. The agency never acts in a way that changes Entergy's corporate behavior.

Right, the stock and bond holders can never see the total risk...ultimately Entergy never faces the total risk from the stockholders and NRC commiserate with the risk and the unethical rewards they take. We never give them a opportunity to change their ways...

And the good people never get to see the total the risk they face until used reactor fuel pieces are detected outside the security fence. 

05000255/2013002The inspectors concluded that the licensee actions following the 2001 leak were not adequate because the appropriate actions to preclude recurrence were within the licensee’s ability to foresee and implement. Specifically, the inspectors concluded that the licensee did not effectively implement corrective actions for the 2001 CRDM housing leak resulting in the 2012 CRDM-24 housing leak.
 Not complying with this LCO could result in continued degradation of the primary coolant pressure boundary.” Further, Action B, associated with this LCO, requires shutdown to Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours for such leakage. The licensee determined the CRDM-24 leakage commenced on or around July 14, 2012, and the plant continued to operate in this condition until August 12, 2012.

May 16: Look at this object NRC crap...its closed. Was the shutdown caused by the defect in the F nozzle?

Concrete-aluminum interaction?

(Closed) Unresolved Item 05000255/2012005-03, Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank Evaluation of Corrosion (This inspection is part of the additional inspections referenced in the Palisades Deviation letter.)

On March 25, 2011, the Palisades Nuclear Plant entered the period of extended operation of the renewed license. On May 18, 2011, leakage from the catacombs area beneath the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank was identified and documented in CR-PLP-2011-02491, "SIRW Tank Leakage." Ultimately the licensee determined the source of the leak was from the tank. Repairs to the tank were attempted during Refueling Outage 1R22; however, on June 12, 2012, the plant was shut down due to leakage from the SIRW tank exceeding operational decision-making issue process trigger point of 31 gallons per day.

During the review of CR-PLP-2012-4451, the inspectors became concerned the associated aging effects of the accumulated water were not properly managed. The inspectors were concerned because the accumulated water beneath the floor of the SIRW tank created an environment that could promote corrosion of the tank floor and nozzles and it did not appear the licensee formally evaluated this condition. The inspectors required more information to determine whether this issue constituted a finding of significance; therefore, the issue was considered unresolved.

Based upon further review during this inspection period, the inspectors noted the licensee conducted magnetic and ultrasonic inspection of the tank floor. (WTF) The licensee concluded there was no measurable degradation. The licensee did identify some degradation of the F-nozzle in the form of dimpling caused by concrete-aluminum interaction. This degradation was evaluated in EC 38547 and PLP-RPT-12-00108 and 38 Enclosure found to be acceptable for continued operation. The licensee implemented a periodic tank inspection task to manage the identified degradation. The inspectors found this to be acceptable. Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in the attachment. This Unresolved Item (URI) is closed.

This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in IP 71152-05

They are entrenched and immersed in a ideology of extreme right wing selfishness and power tripping. This causes them to withhold information to please their bosses. It distroyed the industry...

Dry fuel storage manager at Palisades, Bob VanWagner, said that there were significantly more attendees at this year’s open house than at last year's. VanWagner said that there were a lot of essential questions being asked Tuesday evening, and he was happy to open up a dialogue with the public.

“If we have failed at anything in the industry, it is talking to the public,” VanWagner said. “I’m very pleased with the turnout and the discussions.”

So did they gin up this crooked "full stress analysis" to fly by the NRC and get to the start-up?

“We did not have the core boring capability at that time to replace (the larger nozzles). The reason we thought that was acceptable was because we did a full stress analysis over the entire floor of the tank and the stress analysis came out acceptable, actually it came back with margin,” Mitchell said. 

Remember for Entergy and the NRC, "safety" is really a code word. It is a complex calculation nobody can understand. This is the reason Palisades has been in so much trouble in the last few years.

I consider Upton and the commissioner as show boating for the media and direct support. They didn't really release any new information. Where is the news conference where all the questions could be answered.

So if it was "oil canning' upon the fill and drain operations...why did the crack get worst when the tank level was static for so may months?

Coming out of last SIRW shutdown they immediately had a leak...so how sure are you fixing this crack is the same as has been who has been leaking since last shutdown?

Originally published on 5/5/2013

Fred Upton's statement.

Upton Outraged over Palisades Leak, Demands Plant Remain Offline Until Problem is Completely Resolved Upton intends to visit facility with NRC Commissioner

Washington, DC, May 7 - Congressman Fred Upton, R-St. Joseph, shares the concerns of many with the presence of another tank leak that has again shut down the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant and is calling for the facility to remain offline until the problem is permanently fixed. Upon learning of the leak, Upton, who serves as Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, has been in close contact with both the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC), the independent federal agency charged with overseeing nuclear reactor safety and security, and Entergy Corporation, the New Orleans-based company that owns and operates the Covert Township facility.

“This situation is not acceptable and demands full accountability,” said Upton. “I have been in contact with both the NRC and Entergy and am demanding a permanent solution.”

Upton plans to visit Palisades with a member of the NRC Commission to inspect the recent leak. The NRC is headed by five Commissioners appointed by the President.

“I expect to personally visit the facility with an NRC commissioner in the very near future. When it comes to nuclear energy, safety must always come first, and without that assurance by the NRC, the facility needs to stay offline.

“It is my understanding that the water tank will be emptied by the end of the week with the hope that the cause of the leak can be identified shortly thereafter. Every option must be on the table – including a full replacement of the tank – to ensure that the continuing leak will not occur again.”

I think replacing the tank is effectively permanently shuting down Palisades. It is too expensive considering the mid west grid's price of electricity and the future with fracting uncertainty.   

So we are looking at new kind of ending with a nuclear plant. It goes under a leak a week and serious equipment and risking their employees’ health for years. It gets a terrible reputation in the years of their decline. NRC commissioners and politicians come to the plant a dime a dozen. Finally, an employee death or a too expensive component to fix permanently takes out the plant.

What happens if three or four plants go out like this? The nuclear industry gets the reputation of running plants to a bad death.

ASME is basically a private engineering code organization...guess who owns them...the companies that use their codes. ASME just allows a bad actor to dig a hole deaper.

Michigan Radio

Palisades leak angers CongressmanUpton; new documents show alternative fix for leaky tank

By Lindsey Smith

A powerful voice in Washington is demanding a permanent fix to the leaky water tank at the Palisades Nuclear Plant.

Congressman Fred Upton says he’s “outraged” by the unplanned release of slightly radioactive water into Lake Michigan over the weekend. Regulators say there is no risk to public safety.

Upton chairs the House’s Energy and Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over domestic nuclear regulatory activities.

The plant is in Congressman Upton’s district. Entergy, the company that owns the plant, was one of the top contributors to his election campaign last year.

Upton is demanding accountability and a permanent fix to the tank, which has leaked on and off for at least two years.

In a written statement, Upton says he plans to personally visit the site with a Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner.

“It is my understanding that the water tank will be emptied by the end of the week with the hope that the cause of the leak can be identified shortly thereafter. Every option must be on the table – including a full replacement of the tank – to ensure that the continuing leak will not occur again,” Upton said. 

Requests for an interview were not immediately returned.

New documents show Entergy had asked regulators for an alternative fix for the leaky tank on April 25th. Those documents assumed the leaks had stabilized.

• “The current leak rate is stable without an increasing trend which suggests that the current through wall flaws have self-relieved the initiating stresses, are not growing, and remain well below the calculated allowable flaw length.”

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is investigating why the leak rate went from one gallon per day late last week to 90 gallons a day in one 24-hour period.

In the documents, Entergy requests an alternative fix for the tank“that would add a fiberglass-reinforced vinyl ester liner to the tank bottom and to a portion of the tank wall in lieu of identifying the location of the thru-wallleak(s) and performing code compliant repairs.”

The liner would cover the bottom of the tank and two feet up the interior walls. The company says it plans to install the liner in the fall during a scheduled refueling outage. The plant says a similar liner was installed at a plant in Florida.

• “(The liner) will eliminate tank bottom leakage by forming a leak tight membrane on the tank bottom, isolating leak pathways. It will provide the required containment of the tank contents in lieu of relying on the existing aluminum tank bottom for this function. Further degradation of the welds in the current aluminum boundary is not expected based on ENO's understanding of the cause of the leakage and the repairs that have been performed. If any further weld degradation were to occur, the degradation will not affect the lining since the lining will be a distinct and independent material. While bonded to the surface of the existing tank, the physical properties of the liner will prevent potential future weld degradation, if it were to occur, from propagating into and through the liner.”

You get it, big components had a design requirement to last for 40 years…now the component only has to last ten year. There is no factually bases for this…engineering  proof or prototype testing. So what is the proof this is an effective fix? A failing 1967 ventage tank...

"The duration of the proposed alternative for the tank bottom leakage barrier is through the end of the current fourth 10 year ASME Section XI interval which ends in December 12, 2015."  

This is a cheap design….why not an iron or stainless steel tank, a concrete tank boundary type like the fuel pool tank, maybe lined with SS or aluminum…this is defective design…

I'll bet you its too expensive to replace...

This is about the best explanation with what is wrong with the SIRWT:

The tank was designed and erected in accordancewith ASA 896.1-1967 (also known as United States of America Standard (USAS)896.1-1967).

Leakage from the bottom of the SIRWT has been observed and several unsuccessful attempts have been made to identify the source of the leakage and to perform weld repairs to eliminate the leakage and achieve the required leak free boundary. A root cause evaluation was performed under PNP condition report CR-PLP-2012-04451, "Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank Leak and Subsequent Plant Outage for Tank Repair." The evaluation attributed the tank leakage to flexing of the tank bottom during fill and drain operations. While oil canning (Le., a moderate deformation or buckling of sheet material, particularly common with flat sheet metal surfaces) is common for large flat bottom vertical tanks, flexing of the SIRWT bottom was exacerbated by voids in the sand base, located beneath the tank. The flexing created especially high stresses in the vicinity of the SIRWT nozzles. Repeated flexing resulted in cracking of the nozzle to SIRWT bottom welds. A contributing cause was the design of the nozzle to bottom welds. Specifically, the absence of nozzle reinforcement in the original design contributed to the welds being susceptible to high stress and resultant fatigue related failure of the aluminum material.

So Palisades comes from "canning of a sand bed" and Saint Lucie comes from corrosion…

• This tank is similar to the PNP SIRWT in that it is an above ground welded atmospheric aluminum storage tank on a sand bed, 

• and was determined to be the result of through wall corrosion of the tank bottom plate material.

Obviously, the NRC agrees with the Entergy’s duct tape and bailing philosophy in obsolete plants when an expensive component fails.

The old engineering philosophy with engineering is you rip out the defective tank and build in a reliable tank. Think about all the employee resources and tying up their bureaucracy…it is taking them away from other problems.

Why didn’t they have problems with this tank in the first 35 years…it is not corrosion based problems, it is the tank bottom bellowing and flexing the area around nozzles.

Palisade’s safety Refueling Water tanks 2.206 (rev 1)
May 7:

 The leak rate went from about 1 gallon on Friday to about 90 gallons Saturday, she said, leading to the shutdown.

This is utterly intriguing...its got to on top of the roof. It sounds  like a overfill event?

The water from the leaky tank, which is above the plant's control room, pooled on the roof and then went into rooftop drains and into a water basin on the ground before flowing into Lake Michigan, the NRC reported.

 ...What is utterly startling and unprofessional...is every one of the plant's drains in the turbine and reactor building aren't plugged up and require radioactive testing before sending it the heat sink. Most plants would never trust an open drain to their heat sinks...the potential of unknown radioactive discharge. They have a pluggy thingy...it looks like a rubber ball with a big wing nut attached to it. You turn the wing nut with the rubber ball in the drain...the ball tightly expands into the drain piping. It is just an easy to remove it after testing.

Over the weekend, the water, which leaked from a 300,000-gallon storage tank, went down a drain and into a basin, where what Mitlyng characterized as "an extreme dilution factor" occurred.

One this is certain with these guys, is how they always under-estimated the chance of a unexpected failure.

They have not a clue with the science that holds up and contains the tank...

The truth is they should be saying on April 25...the crack could worsen catastrophically and force an immediate shutdown.

Like the fiberglass bottom is going to work...has it been tested in this in this application.

Or are they just guessing again...

April 25, 2013

SUBJECT: Relief Request Number RR 4-16. Proposed Alternative, Alternate Leak Repair Addition of Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank Bottom Liner, Fourth 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval

Despite these repair and inspection activities, minor leakage has continued. Currently, the leakage is considered acceptable per ASME Code Case N-705. In accordance with this code case, the structural condition of the tank has been evaluated as satisfactory based on  calculated allowable flaw length of 0.73 inches and a critical flaw length of 2.64 inches [Reference 10]. The current leak rate is stable without an increasing trend which suggests that the current through wall flaws have self-relieved the initiating stresses, are not growing, and remain well below the calculated allowable flaw length.

So why 31 gpd on this and 38gpd on the latest shutdown?

April 1, 2012, through June 30, 2012

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2012003

On June 12, 2012, the licensee shut down the plant when an administrative limit of 31 gpd of SIRWT leakage was identified.

I believe this is the forth leak with this tank and you are banging the plant around when you are starting and stoping the plant

Power Reactor	Event Number: 49002
Facility: PALISADES Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] CE NRC Notified By: TODD MULFORD HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Date: 05/05/2013 Notification Time: 01:45 [ET] Event Date: 05/05/2013 Event Time: 01:12 [EDT] Last Update Date: 05/05/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS	Person (Organization): ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	88	Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN - SAFETY INJECTION REFUELING WATER TANK DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LEAK "At 0112 EDT on May 5, 2013, the plant commenced a shutdown due to water leakage from the SIRW (Safety Injection Refueling Water) Tank exceeding the operational decision-making issue process trigger point of 34 gallons per day, causing it [the SIRW] to be declared inoperable and requiring entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 Condition B. LCO 3.5.4 Condition B requires the SIRW Tank to be returned to Operable status within one hour or entry into Condition C which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours. "This event had no impact on the health and / or safety of the public. "The NRC Resident has been notified. "The exact location of the leakage has not been determined at this time. The Plant will be taken to Mode 5." The licensee has been operating with SIRW leakage at a rate of less than 34 gallons per day. The leakage has increased for unknown reasons to a calculated value of approximately 90 gallons per day. See EN #48018 dated 06/12/12 for similar report on a technical specification shutdown for the SIRW tank leakage.

I bet you building vibrations are causing...bending the metal until it leaks.

Can you even imagine the state of nuclear engineering when they can't fix a leaking tank in the first swipe...

Any more leaks on the CRDM...

This reminds me  of the NEW three stage safety relief valves at Entergy-Pilgrim who leaked 8 times this operational period...these guys are just pissing all over the place with their leaking!

SOUTH HAVEN, MI -- The repairs being made to a tank leak at Palisades nuclear power plant are being monitored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

NRC resident inspectors monitored the shutdown of the plant Sunday morning when the leakage from the safety injection/refueling water tank exceeded the limit of 38 gallons a day, NRC officials said in a press release.

The NRC inspectors are closely following the plant's actions to identify the source of the leakage and repair the tank to make sure the plant workers and the public are safe, said Viktoria Mitlyng in the NRC Office of Public Affairs.

Palisades will be returned to service when the inspections and repairs are complete, plant officials say.

So once it was determined it was a continuation of a old leak, why didn't they shutdown. Did they even know what was leaking? So once the leakage rate began trending up, they should have shutdown...

The inspectors observed or reviewed the reactor shutdown and cooldown, outage equipment configuration and risk management, electrical lineups, control and monitoringof decay heat removal, control of containment activities, personnel fatigue management, startup and heatup activities, and identification and resolution of problems associated with the outage. When the tank was refilled following repairs, leakage of approximately 20 gpd was identified from the tank area. This leakage subsequently tapered off and remained relatively low for the balance of the inspection period (approximately 0.05 gpd). NRC inspectors from the site, regional office, and headquarters reviewed the licensee’s evaluation of the tank prior to startup and concluded the plant and tank were safe to allow startup. An NRC-approved ASME Code Case was utilized by the licensee to evaluate the condition of the tank. It is unclear whether the small amounts of water currently collected daily from the vicinity of the tank is rainwater, residual water from maintenance activities, or a small tank leak.

Will Natural Gas Be Better In Florida Than Nukes...

My analysis

1) Natural gas doesn't have a store of energy like the Nukes' with 18 months of fuel on site and coal with 6 months to a year of fuel on site.
 
2) The immature Natural Gas transmission system isn't regulated sufficiently to support electric generation.

3) The Natural Gas industry has a history with being corrupted for decades...







NYT's:"he Natural Gas Trap"...Last year, natural gas provided 52 percent of New England’s electricity, and that share is expected to grow. Gas is generally cheaper than other energy sources, and the lower costs have spurred the retirement of aging coal generators and nuclear reactors.

At Florida Power & Light Company, we’ve reduced our use of oil to produce electricity by 98 percent – from more than 40 million barrels a year in 2001 to less than 1 million in 2012 – through investments in natural gas power. Replacing foreign oil with domestically produced natural gas makes good sense, keeping billions of dollars a year at home.

Investments in fuel-efficient, natural gas-fired energy centers such as the West County Energy Center, one of the largest and cleanest plants of its kind in the U.S., provide clean, reliable power and help keep FPL’s typical residential bills the lowest in the state.

Today, FPL continues to invest in fuel-efficient technologies. Currently, the company is working to modernize its 1960s-era Cape Canaveral, Riviera Beach, and Port Everglades sites, replacing old oil-burning plants with state-of-the-art, natural gas-fired Next Generation Clean Energy Centers that will employ efficient combined-cycle technology to generate electricity. These advanced power plants will be 33 percent more fuel-efficient and 90 percent cleaner than the facilities they replace, effectively paying for themselves over their operational lifetimes with more than $1 billion in net customer savings.
The Southeast Pipeline Project
To fuel new and existing natural gas power plants as the electricity needs of Florida’s residents and businesses grow in the near future, the state will need increased additional natural gas capacity. Florida uses more natural gas than any U.S. state other than Texas, with about 60 percent of the power Floridians use generated by natural gas power plants. However, unlike Texas and many other states, Florida has only minimal natural gas production, no storage capabilities, and the two major natural gas pipelines serving the peninsula are nearing full capacity. To ensure a reliable, U.S.-produced fuel supply for the future, Florida needs a new, third major natural gas pipeline.

EIA:

August 29, 2011

New natural gas pipeline capacity adds service into Florida

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on BENTEK Energy, LLC
Note: Daily natural gas flow data and daily pipeline capacity derived from Florida's Gas Transmission scheduled flow and capacity data from their Pipeline Administrator electronic bulletin board plus Gulfstream Natural Gas System's scheduled flow and capacity data for their Station 100 compressor electronic bulletin board. Pipeline capacity above is approximate. Daily pipeline capacity depends on several factors, such as compressor usage.

---

Since Florida Gas Transmission Company, LLC (FGT) placed its Phase VIII Expansion project in service on April 1, 2011, daily natural gas flows into Florida have exceeded the pre-expanded capacity nearly 50% of the time. Daily scheduled natural gas flows from June 1 through August 29 were over 5% higher than in the same period in 2010, despite temperatures in Florida that were cooler than last summer (cooling degree days were 3% lower this summer compared to 2010). Utilization of natural gas pipelines into Florida has averaged 86% since June 1; in the same time period in 2010, average utilization was 97%.

Over 85% of natural gas consumed in Florida is for electricity generation. In 2010, 55% of the State's electricity was generated with natural gas. The amount of natural gas used for power generation is likely to grow in Florida, as new natural gas-fired electric capacity comes online.

FGT's Phase VIII Expansion project, which included 483.2 miles of new pipeline, compressor upgrades, and compressor additions, increased FGT's design capacity by 0.82 billion cubic feet per day and the peak pipeline capacity into Florida by over 20%.


Updated: 6:01 a.m. Tuesday, Dec. 11, 2012 | Posted: 10:56 a.m. Monday, Dec. 10, 2012

FPL seeks new natural gas pipeline in Florida



View Larger

Lopez, Steve (CMG-WestPalm)

fpl map

By Susan Salisbury

Palm Beach Post Staff Writer

                          

Florida Power & Light Co. has proposed a multibillion-dollar natural gas pipeline that would run from Alabama to Martin County, and is seeking bids from companies interested in building what would become the state’s third major pipeline.

Juno Beach-based FPL, which continues to invest billions in power plants that run on natural gas, plans to issue a formal request for proposals to prospective bidders on Dec. 19, spokesman Mark Bubriski said Monday. The new pipeline is projected to begin operating in 2017.

“This pipeline would be designed to access more domestic on-shore shale gas reserves from all over the country,” Bubriski said.

FPL and other utilities project that the state’s need for electricity will grow, and FPL prefers to meet the demand with natural gas, which is cleaner and more efficient than oil, Bubriski said.

FPL still could build the southern portion of the pipeline from Central Florida to Martin County, Bubriski said.

The move follows the Florida Public Service Commission’s 2009 rejection of a previous FPL pipeline plan. The panel found that FPL did not prove that its proposal to build the pipeline itself was the cheapest way to go and ordered FPL to rebid the project.

In 2009, Florida Gas Transmission Co., LLC, the state’s largest natural gas transmission provider, opposed that project, saying it would impose more costs on FPL customers. The company contended it could continue to provide sufficient natural gas at a lower rate.

Chris Stockton, a spokesman for Gulfstream, the company that owns the state’s other pipeline, said a third pipe into Florida would diversify the supply and enhance the reliability of Florida’s transmission infrastructure.

“We will certainly review the formal RFP once issued and determine our path forward at that time,” Stockton said.

Representatives from Gulfstream and Florida Gas Transmission were among the attendees at Nov. 26 meeting where FPL officials outlined the project to state regulators.

About 60 percent of Florida’s electricity is generated by natural gas, and that is expected to grow. In 2011, Florida burned more than 1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to generate electricity. FPL burns 1.5 billion to 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day.

The proposed line would add a capacity of 400 million more cubic feet per day to the state’s supply, with an increase to 600 million in 2020.

As with any utility infrastructure project, customers will pay for the pipeline’s construction, but not until it enters service in 2017, Bubriski said. It’s not known what the cost per customer will be.

“We will have a much better idea once we go through the RFP process,” Bubriski said. “The pipeline is to help support the high-efficiency natural gas power plants that are saving our customers billions of dollars on fuel.”

Florida Public Counsel J.R. Kelly said FPL’s plans to seek the best price for the project through bids is best for customers.

However, Kelly said he has concerns about a provision in the draft request for proposals that states any company that bids but loses the bid forfeits its right to contest the winning bid.

“We have never seen that in an RFP before,” Kelly said.

Bubriski said the measure is aimed at preventing delays and litigation.

“We are fans of natural gas to the extent it can be coupled with solar power. There is a nice offset,” said Audubon Florida Executive Director Eric Draper.

Draper said the proposed route for the pipeline shows it crossing the Kissimmee River and going through sensitive habitat in Osceola County. However, FPL seems willing to reroute it to avoid that area.

“You have to look at it on the ground level,” Draper said. “We will engage in the process, as we have with some of their transmission lines, and we will look at the impact.”

Levy nuclear plant more costly than a natural gas facility

IVAN PENNTampa Bay Times

Saturday, May 11, 2013 4:30am

    

Times files

Clockwise: Peter Bradford used to be on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He says profits drive nuclear plants. The PSC’s Eduardo Balbis says fluctuating natural gas prices make nuclear a necessary option. Agriculture Commissioner Adam Putnam is a proponent of building nuclear plants, but in the past has ignored the up-front costs. The PSC’s Lisa Edgar has said nuclear plants save “maybe even billions.” R. Alexander “Alex” Glenn says Duke Energy’s plan is an “all of the above” approach to the future.

In the long run, nuclear power is cheap.

This, for many of Florida's top decisionmakers, is the Truth. Lawmakers have cast aside their worship of the free market — which long ago lost trust in building nuclear plants — and skewed state law to favor construction of new reactors.

Lisa Edgar is a believer. As a member of the Public Service Commission, she is one of five votes that green-light new nuclear plants, including Duke Energy’s Levy County project. The law that favors nuclear plants, Edgar said last month, could save Florida consumers "millions and millions, and maybe even billions" of dollars.

State officials repeat the nuclear-saves-money gospel so often, the Tampa Bay Times set out to see if the premise is true. The analysis compared the cost of the Levy nuclear plant to a natural gas facility, using a set of assumptions that, if anything, favors nuclear.

A new truth emerged:

Natural gas would be cheaper. Cheaper by billions of dollars. Cheaper even over 60 years and under any likely scenario.

What building a new nuclear plant does really well, the analysis showed, is fatten a utility's bottom line. Duke Energy would pocket as much as 10 times the profit from the Levy project as it would from a natural gas facility.

And yet, the myth about the Levy plant being cheaper lives on.

• • •

The lifetime cost of a new power plant breaks down into three basic categories: construction, operations/maintenance, and fuel.

The proposed Levy plant can't compete against natural gas on the first two. Nuclear plants are much more expensive to build and to operate and maintain. And the Times found the lower cost of fueling a nuclear plant doesn't come close to making up the difference.

In its analysis, the Times used estimates and assumptions Duke Energy filed with the Public Service Commission last year, including a projected 60-year lifespan for the Levy plant. The analysis included the cost of replacing the gas plant after 30 years, since it would last only about half as long as a nuclear plant.

So, what would it cost to build, operate and fuel Levy and the equivalent natural gas facility for six decades?

Levy nuclear: $13.9 billion

Natural gas: $10.9 billion

The federal government's projections for natural gas prices are lower than Duke Energy's. Plug in those numbers and natural gas' cost advantage widens:

Levy nuclear: $13.9 billion

Natural gas: $8.1 billion

What about the cost of pollution?

Nuclear plants produce no carbon emissions, while natural gas plants do. Right now there is little political will in the United States to tax carbon emissions or force utilities to build natural gas plants that capture carbon. But even accounting for those types of financial penalties, a natural gas facility would be less expensive in the long run than the Levy nuclear project.

The Times analysis included the extra cost of building a natural gas plant that captured 90 percent of the carbon emissions, and taxed the rest at $25 a ton. The results:

Levy nuclear: $13.9 billion

Natural gas: $10.1 billion to $12.6 billion, depending on the cost of fuel.

The Times gave Duke Energy, which bought Progress Energy last year, a written rundown of the data and assumptions used in its analysis. The utility did not dispute the findings. In fact, it also found nuclear to be significantly more expensive than a natural gas facility. That finding is buried in written testimony from a Duke executive, among tens of thousands of documents filed with state regulators.
(The sharp-eyed reader will wonder why the Times analysis finds a total 60-year cost for the Levy plant that is much lower than the oft-cited $24.7 billion figure just to build it. This has to do with how a dollar today is not worth the same as a dollar 60 years from now, and a lot of dense accounting including inflation, depreciation and discounting. An explanation of how the analysis was done accompanies this story.)

1) Natural gas doesn't have a store of energy like the Nukes' with 18 months of fuel on site and coal with 6 months to a year of fuel on site.
 2) The immature natural gas transmission system isn't regulated sufficiently to support electric generation.
 3) The Natural gas industry has a history with being corrupted for decades... 

Duke spokesman Sterling Ivey wrote in a statement that natural gas prices will likely remain volatile and an over-reliance on "any one fuel is unlikely to be a good strategy for producing stable electricity prices or supply over the long term."

"New nuclear generation can provide a valuable long term option against the price volatility of natural gas," Ivey wrote, "and should be a component of Florida's balanced energy portfolio in order to reliably secure Florida's energy future.''

• • •

The assumption that the Levy project will save customers money only holds up if its believers ignore the massive initial price tag of building a nuclear plant, the Times analysis found. The faithful in Tallahassee do just that.

Adam Putnam, who as head of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services is the state's point man on energy matters, told Florida Trend last July that "nuclear in the long haul is the cheapest."

And there’s Edgar, the PSC commissioner, who told a Senate committee last month that the state law that supports the construction of nuclear plants including Levy would save customers millions and maybe billions of dollars “over the course of the project.”

Cindy Muir, a spokeswoman for the PSC, said commissioners would not comment for this article because the Levy project is part of ongoing decisions.

Pro-nuclear groups often frame the debate in a similar way as Edgar and others in Tallahassee. For instance, the CASEnergy Coalition asserted that ". . . once the plants are built, they operate at low production costs for decades.''

Even Duke Energy has made similar claims.

"When our new nuclear reactors are in service, they will generate an estimated savings of more than $1 billion annually for our customers," said former Duke Energy executive Jeff Lyash.

But that's a fantasy world where — poof — a free nuclear reactor magically appears. For the Levy project, the price of poof is $24.7 billion.

That's almost five times more than the original 2006 estimate of about $5 billion. Just in the last year, another $1 billion was added to the price tag. That's all before the plant produces a single kilowatt of power.

Why so high?

Any nuclear plant must hold up to hurricanes and earthquakes, human error and terrorist attacks. It takes expensive technology, tricky engineering, tons of steel and concrete, and inspections and then more inspections. The specters of Three-Mile Island, Chernobyl and the more-recent Fukushima meltdown hang over the entire process.

For Levy, the construction price tag is even higher. Duke Energy is too far behind to bring the plant online sometime in 2016, as it had hoped. So financing charges keep accruing and some reactor components will likely never get used. Regulators also have deferred some costs for years, not wanting to hit customers with too many charges all at once. The delays cause the totals to grow.
The $24.7 billion price tag would make Levy the most expensive nuclear plant ever built. A natural gas facility of comparable output to Levy would cost just $2.5 billion.

Put another way, construction combined with Duke Energy's profit, taxes and bond payments for Levy made up more than two-thirds of the plant's total costs over its 60-year lifespan, according to the Times analysis. The same expenses for the equivalent natural gas facility totaled 13.5 percent.
Even Putnam now acknowledges a need to "manage the extraordinary up front cost" of nuclear.

• • •

Construction costs aren't the only place on the financial ledger where the Truth breaks down. Operating and maintaining the Levy plant also would be far more expensive than for a natural gas facility.

The reason: the workforce. A nuclear plant is more complicated, more specialized, and the consequences of something going wrong are more dire. There are backups to the backups to the backups to the backups. Levy would require about 600 workers to operate — engineers to keep it running, specialists to handle the waste, security to keep it safe.

A natural gas plant employs about 50 people, and they generally aren't paid as well.

Operations and maintenance accounted for about 11 percent of Levy's total cost over 60 years, the Times analysis found. For natural gas, it was about 5 percent.

Levy nuclear: $1.5 billion (of the $13.9 billion total)

Natural gas: $500 million (of the $10.9 billion total)

Nuclear industry officials call this a plus. It creates jobs, they say.

Of course, utility customers would have to pay all those workers.

• • •

Fuel is one place where the Levy nuclear project has a decisive cost advantage over an equivalent natural gas plant. But the mythology about nuclear extends even there.

Take, as an example, Adam Putnam's response to the Times analysis.

''It is my hope," he said, "that our nuclear projects will get back on track because they are long-term, zero-fuel-cost technologies that also have zero emissions.''

He's right about zero emissions. But zero fuel costs?

It's true that the uranium used to fuel a nuclear plant is cheaper than natural gas. But it is by no means free, as the Times analysis shows.

Fuel makes up 12 percent of Levy's total 60-year cost, the Times found. For natural gas, it's 82 percent. So in terms of dollars, the cost of fuel breaks down like this:

Levy nuclear: $1.2 billion

Natural gas: $6.4 billion to $8.9 billion

Another example of the belief that Levy is cheaper: State Public Service Commissioner Eduardo Balbis argued last year that natural gas prices would have to remain below $5 per thousand cubic feet over the next 30 years for a natural gas facility to prove more beneficial than building the Levy County plant.

"If history is any indicator, I would find that to be unlikely," Balbis said last November at a PSC hearing.

Balbis' assertion, the Times found, wasn't even close.

Some quick background: In 2008, its most expensive year, natural gas averaged $9.11, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Today, thanks to America's widespread adoption of a technology commonly known as fracking, the country can tap at least a 100-year supply of natural gas. The price is currently about $4.

Based on projections from Duke Energy and the federal government, the Times' natural gas figures start at a low of $5.63 and through inflation reach a high of $32.10. That's eight times what they are today and far above even the historic highs.

In other words, the price of natural gas could be above $5 for every one of 60 years and the Levy nuclear plant would still be much more expensive.

• • •

So who benefits from the high cost of the Levy project? Here's one way of looking at it.
Duke Energy would pocket $4 billion in today's money over the life of the Levy County nuclear plant.

For a natural gas plant: $369 million.

Why such a big difference? Most simply, utilities make more money on an expensive plant than they do on a less costly one.

In addition, a state law passed in 2006 allows Duke Energy to collect a large chunk of its profit in advance of the nuclear plant coming online, a benefit not offered for building natural gas facilities. Duke already has made $150 million on Levy but has yet to commit to building it.

The Florida Legislature recently passed and sent to the governor a revision to the advance fee law that would slightly reduce Duke Energy' profit on Levy. The Times analysis did not account for that change.

"It's all about profit and not about customer well-being," said Peter Bradford, a former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "That's what's really going on here."

Duke Energy, and many state leaders, have argued that the law is the only way to get nuclear plants built, which helps diversify the state' energy sources.

"We're taking steps to maintain nuclear for the future of our state," R. Alexander "Alex" Glenn, president of Duke's Florida operations told the House energy committee in March. "Right now, we need an 'all of the above' approach."

Diversity in any system is a good thing, "but there's no point in overpaying for it," said Bradford, who approved 21 nuclear plants while a federal regulator. The financial realities of nuclear plants changed long ago, he said.

Including nuclear in an "all of the above" strategy "has become kind of a last refuge of scoundrels," Bradford said. "If we're talking about world hunger we don't talk about an all of the above strategy. We don't say, 'Lets fight world hunger with caviar.' "
Ivan Penn can be reached at (727) 892-2332 or ipenn@tampabay.com.



The Times analysis

Over two months, the Tampa Bay Times compared the long-term costs of the proposed Levy County nuclear project to a natural gas plant. The Times reviewed hundreds of pages of documents from many sources, including Duke Energy, the state Public Service Commission, Office of Public Counsel, the CASEnergy Coalition, the Nuclear Energy Institute, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Here's how the analysis was done:

• The Times used the basic assumptions and projections that Duke Energy Florida (formerly Progress Energy Florida) filed with the state for power plant construction, operations and maintenance, fuel, inflation, taxes and the utility's cut of funds used during construction.

• The analysis assumed a 92 percent capacity factor for the 2,200 megawatt Levy nuclear plant, which is at the high end of the historic range, and an 81 percent capacity factor for the 2,500 megawatt natural gas facility, which is at the low end of capacity when compared to several newly built plants around the country. Both the nuclear and natural gas plants would produce almost exactly the same amount of electricity each year – about 8.87 million megawatts for each of the two units at the nuclear and gas plants.

• A 60-year lifespan was assumed for the Levy nuclear plant. Gas plants generally have a shorter life, so the analysis included the cost of retiring the gas facility after 30 years and building a new one.

• Duke Energy has said that Levy's first nuclear reactor would come online in 2024 and that the second would come online in 2025. The Times used those start dates for the nuclear plant and the natural gas facility.

• The Times used Duke's projected fuel price in 2024 of $7.63 per thousand cubic feet. Based on Duke's projections, the Times then inflated the price to a high of $24.29 at the end of 60 years.

In another part of the analysis, the Times started fuel at the EIA's 2024 estimate of $5.63. Based on EIA's projections, the Times inflated the price to $32.10.

• The Times brought the seven-decade period of the analysis into 2009 dollars, the year Duke Energy began charging customers in advance for the proposed reactors. The accounting calculation, referred to as the Net Present Value, is necessary to get a more accurate comparison of the two types of power plants. This calculation reduced the lifetime cost of the Levy plant to $13.9 billion. The idea is that a dollar is worth more today than in future years. For instance, a loaf of bread 20 years ago would run about $1 whereas today that same loaf would cost $3.

• The analysis used an escalating carbon tax that started at $25 a ton. The cost of a system to capture 90 percent of the natural gas plant's carbon also was added along with a tax on the remaining emissions.

$4B
Duke Energy's profit from  building the Levy nuclear plant

$369M
Duke Energy's profit if it built an equivalent natural gas facility

Levy nuclear plant more costly than a natural gas facility 05/11/13 [Last modified: Saturday, May 11, 2013 3:22pm]

© 2013 Tampa Bay Times