Crazed And Suicidal Submarine US Sailor Kills All Officers In Maneuvering And Takes Over The Fast Attack Nuclear Submarine Off The Coast Of Conn.

Correction

"Maneuvering" is where sailors control the nuclear reactor.
The "Conn" is where sailors control the whole submarine. 

Is it me or what? I see similarities in the attempted suicide story and the collision of the McCain and Fitzgerald. The Navy public relations people pump these negligent senior officers stories up in  faux altruism, triumphalism and extreme heroism stories.

Maneuvering/the Conn is where they steer/dive the boat and firing their sub weapons.      

The think this puff Navy story is a cover-up for the implications of what damage a suicidal sailor could cause with a automatic weapon in the Conn or Maneuvering. 

Can you even imagine how the major news media would play this up?       

Sailor’s suicide attempt prompts heroic response by sub crew

The crew of the submarine North Dakota raced through bad weather to save a shipmate’s life after an unidentified petty officer shot himself in the chest with his military-issued rifle while the vessel was underway, according to Navy officials and a post on the boat’s Facebook page.

Cmdr. Mark Robinson, the boat’s captain, praised his crew in the post for their feverish efforts on Friday to get the sailor back to land.

Corpsmen leapt into action to treat and stabilize the man’s injuries, while radiomen kept communications open in bad weather, allowing trauma doctors to remotely lend assistance, according to the post.

The boat’s navigation and driving teams charted the fastest way back to port and cut through heavy seas on their way to the mouth of the Thames River in New London, Connecticut, where they transferred the sailor to a waiting tug.

“From gunshot to ambulance took about 7 hours,” Robinson said in the post. “We drove up the river in dense fog, in the dark of night, with intense rain and wind. It was the worst weather I’ve ever seen for something like this.”

Other crew members helped in other ways.

Some lashed themselves to the boat’s deck in “Pea Soup” fog around midnight to form a human safety net, blocking the weather for paramedics conducting the transfer, he said.

“Sailors dissembled parts of the ship to set up ways to get the sailor off in a stretcher more comfortably,” Robinson said. “When the sailor was lucid, other crew members held a phone in front of his face to let him watch music videos.”

ome stood exposed in the storm to flash lights and help lead the tugs.

“I can’t truly express the amount of heroism I saw in the last 48 hours,” Robinson said in Tuesday’s post. “As a result, the Sailor is recovering from surgery in a hospital in New Haven with his parents by his side.”

“It was a terrible event,” he said, “but the sailors of (North Dakota) are heroes.”

Mike Mulligan ·

Springfield Technical High School

Let start counting it up within the last few months. Two boomer sailors overdosing on potentially heroin/ concain in and around Kings Bay. Now a sailer trying to commit suiside with his loaded on a fast attack while steaming.

I got a worst senario. How about the crazed sailor taking his rifle (automatic ?) to the Conn and killing the CO and other officer there. He effectively takes over the submarine. Can you just imagine the national news on this???

Mike Mulligan ·

Springfield Technical High School

So, it the submariners are such an extraordinarily brotherly bunch, why didn’t they get help for this guy before he shot himself? Why didn’t his department people know who he was? You got to wonder about the command climate after this. This utterly strange story looks like the navy coverup story…

Oh No, Now ANO Is Down to 81% for two days.

Plus Grand Gulf and River Bend. You keep being at 100% Waterford...

State Sen. Chuck Hufstelte: Vogtle

What is wrong with this picture. The longer they dittle in construction and the more expensive the plant gets, the more profits they make. Way more profits.  

State Sen. Chuck Hufstelter questions financial plan for Plant Vogtle

By Maria Saporta  –  Contributing Writer, Atlanta Business Chronicle

an hour ago

A Georgia state senator is strongly criticizing the financial plan to pay for the two new nuclear power plants at Plant Vogtle.

Speaking at Friday morning’s Sustainable Atlanta Roundtable (SART), State Sen. Chuck Hufstetler (R-Rome), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, openly criticized Senate Bill 31 that passed in 2009 that approved the financial plan for Plant Vogtle. It was called the Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, which permitted the utility to begin recovering the costs of financing the construction of the new nuclear plants from consumers before they came on line.

Pointing out that he wasn’t yet in office when that bill passed (he was elected in 2012), Hufstetler said, “It was probably a mistake to go forward the way it did.”

After the SART meeting, which is organized by Southface, a nonprofit group that promotes renewable enery, Georgia Power was asked to respond to Hufstetler’s comments. The utility’s response is presented in full later in this article.

But Hufstetler’s also strongly criticized the way the utility would be making profit from the project’s cost overruns.

Originally – in August 2008, it was estimated that Plant Vogtle reactors 3 and 4 would cost $14.3 billion and would begin commercial operations in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Now it is estimated that that the two reactors will cost $25.2 billion with the first reactor due to go into service in late 2021 and the second one scheduled to be operational in 2022.

Sen. Hufstetler said that because of the cost overruns, Southern Co.’s profit is now estimated to go from $7.4 billion to $12.6 billion – a difference of $5.2 billion.

“I don’t think Southern Co. should make additional profit just because of cost overruns,” Hufstetler said.

When asked if he would be seeking new legislation to limit the utility’s profit on the project, Hufstetler responded that he’s looking at options.

“We can still examine the profit (issue),” he said. “There are a lot of things that have happened that we can’t change. (But) we can look at the additional profit going forward. We can revisit the profit.”

Also, Hufstetler said the state can “make sure we put incentives in the right place” when considering future energy investments.

Specifically, Hufstetler pointed to the comparable costs of different energy sources.

Currently, he said the cost per kilowatt hour for nuclear energy will be 13 cents, compared to 4.4 cents for solar energy.

“We are putting a unit on line that’s going to be three times that cost (of solar),” he said.

He went on to say that nuclear represents 10 percent of our power resources in Georgia, but it will account for 20 percent of the cost of power.

“If our rates are going up and other states are going down, we will lose our competitive advantage,” Hufstetler said. “It’s a tough issue. We do need to look at the consumers in Georgia and protect them…

New FBI Mark Felt/Deepthroad Movie

There is a lot of shocking similarities between the Nixon and Trump Times. But I think Trump can play the game a lot better than Nixon.

Washington Post reporter trying to get the big picture from Mark on Watergate. There is so much chaos in the Whitehouse and contradictory public statement. I don't understand it.

Mark, "chaos is control"...   

Dead Ender Junk Pilgrim: More Safety Relief Valves Problems

Supplement to Potential lnoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A

Is this a grade I or II valve and its component?

Generally a grade II is a commercial grade. A grade I is a full nuclear safety grade valve. They have been putting grade II as a result of  secret deregulation...

Yep, this is a update from  the first one on April 2017. We really don't know all of the recent secret failures or degradation with these components. Just like this guy, nobody outside the plant knew this guy was leaking. You really can't ascertain how unreliable these are. Are the walking dead plants allowed secret deregulations.

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: (04-2017) 0313112020
~ ... ,.,"~ Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. l i\ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry . • ! ~ .f" (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. ..... .~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects .
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means htti;1://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3!J used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER .PAGE Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 1 OF4
4. TITLE Supplement to Potential lnoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
SEQUENTIAL
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A NUMBER NO. 05000 N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 24 2017 2017 - 007 01 12 20 2017 N/A 05000 N/A
9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
N
D 20.2201(b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) D 20.2201(d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) D 20.2203(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(4) D so.73(a)(2)(iii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) D 73.71(a)(4) D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) D so.36(c)(2) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) D 73.71(a)(s) 0 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) D so.46(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) D 73.77(a)(1) D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) D 73.77(a)(2)(i) D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) ~ OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRG Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
LICENSEE CONTACT
11
LEPHONE NUMBER {Include Area Code) !Mr. Everett P. Perkins, Jr.- Regulatory Assurance Manager 1508-830-8323 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT
MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX B SB RV T020 y
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ~ NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On April 24, 2017, during Refueling Outage 21 while performing testing on the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Safety/Relief Valves, a high resistance was measured across the solenoid pilot valve coil of SV203-3A. !This solenoid pilot valve was replaced during Refueling Outage 21. After the solenoid pilot valve was removed it was transported to an offsite vendor for additional testing.
rrhis LER supplement is being submitted to provide the NRC with additional information. PNPS continued to follow the testing performed by our offsite vendor and now has additional information to provide the NRC.
PNPS stated at the time that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and also, potentially reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat arid mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, additional information provided by our offsite vendor and an engineering evaluation, support the conclusion that there was never a loss of safety ~unction regarding SV203-3A. Therefore, this event was not reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) nor under 10 CFR 50. 73 (a)(2)(v)(B) or (D).
rrhis event posed no threat to public health and safety.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015)
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
u.s_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for cqmpleting this form http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITYNAME 2 DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
NARRATIVE BACKGROUND
05000-293
YEAR
2017
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 007
REV NO.
- 01
The 2-stage pilot operated safety relief valve consists of two principle assemblies: a pilot valve section (top works) and the main valve section. The pilot valve section (first stage) is the pressure sensing and control element and the main valve (second stage) provides the pressure relief function. The first stage consists of a pilot-stabilizer disc assembly. The pilot is the pressure sensing member to which the stabilizer disc movement is coupled. Though not mechanically connected, a light spring keeps the stabilizer in contact with the pilot. A pilot preload spring permits set point adjustment of the valve and provides pilot seating force. The solenoid-operated pilot valve controls the pneumatic pressure applied to a diaphragm actuator which controls the relief valve directly. An accumulator is included with the control equipment for each relief valve to store pneumatic energy for relief valve operation. The second or main stage consists essentially of a large piston which includes the main valve disc, the main valve chamber, and a preload spring.
PNPS has four safety relief valves. Each of the four relief valves is equipped with an accumulator and check valve arrangement. These accumulators are provided to assure that the valves can be held open following failure of the nitrogen supply to the accumulators, and are sized to contain sufficient nitrogen for a minimum of 20 valve operations for each safety relief valve. Bottled gas can be used to manually recharge the accumulators associated with two safety relief valves. This capability was installed to address a potential loss of normal nitrogen supply to the accumulators which was identified during seismic reviews.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On April 24, 2017, while performing testing on the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) safety relief valves a high resistance was measured across the solenoid valve coil circuit of SV203-3A.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The degradation mechanism has been determined to be the solenoid pilot valve coil with high electrical resistance. Per input from our offsite vendor, corrosion of the SV203-3A crimp connections inside the coil created the high resistance indicated by a 9 VDC multimeter.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Removed and replaced solenoid pilot valve assembly for SV203-3A.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015) Page 2 of 4
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
. . "t"'i;, ...... "/
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nureqs/staff/sr1022/r3l)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITYNAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE OFFSITE VENDOR
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
-007
REV NO.
- 01
After performing multiple tests including destructive examinations of the SV203-3A solenoid valve coil the offsite vendor provided the following conclusions: Degradation of SV203-3A was limited to corrosion at the copper crimp connectors used to attach coil lead wires to the coil winding wire; the construction of the crimp connectors in SV203-3A included an insulating PVC sleeve material; although installation of the coil winding wires in the SV203-3A crimp connectors are inconsistent with industry practices, the coil winding wires were securely joined to the stranded lead wires at the stranded lead wire end of the crimp; the PVC sleeve material on the SV203-3A crimp connectors likely released chlorine, resulting in corrosion of the crimp connectors and wires; corrosion of the SV203-3A crimp connections created .the high resistance indicated by a 9 VDC multimeter prior to application of higher voltage; application of voltage as low as 30 VDC was sufficient to overcome the corrosion product layer allowing the SV203-3A valve to actuate with no nitrogen pressure applied to the inlet port; application of higher voltages up to and including 125 VDC during electrical testing disturbed the corrosion layer sufficiently to allow a 9 VDC powered multimeter to measure SV203-3A coil resistance values representative of actual service conditions with respect to voltage. The valve operated as intended throughout the electrical testing despite the corrosion product accumulation on the crimp connectors; and subsequent to electrical testing, coil resistance values remained within acceptable limits.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
There are no consequences to the general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety and radiological safety from this event. The original concern was that there was a potential inoperability of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) which provides a means to rapidly depressurize the primary system to a pressure where low-pressure systems can provide makeup for core cooling in the event of a small or medium break Loss of Coolant Accident. An Engineering evaluation determined that the safety relief valve was fully operable at all times and rem~ined available and capable of performing its intended safety function.
The engineering evaluation that was performed concluded that this event did not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure. (Reference NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Section 2.2, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Safety System Functional Failures, Clarifying Notes, Engineering Analyses.) As such, this event will not be reported in the NRC Performance Indicator for Safety System Functional Failures since an engineering evaluation was performed which determined that the system was capable of performing its safety function.
No actions to reduce the frequency or consequence are necessary.
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015) Page 3 of 4
NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)
~'11.IU.!lr.,,,, l i -:.t ; ~ ...... ..,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D
APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc:gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER
YEAR
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293
2017
REPORT ABILITY
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 007
REV NO.
- 01
PNPS believed at the time of the event that it was reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and also, potentially reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, additional information provided by our offsite vendor and an engineering evaluation, support the conclusion that there was never a loss of safety function regarding SV203-3A. Therefore, this event was not reportable under 1 O 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) nor under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(B) cir (D).
PREVIOUS EVENTS
LER 2015-002-00, Main Steam Safety Relief Valves Determined to be Inoperable. Following Evaluation
LER 2013-002-00 and -01, SRV-38 Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift
LER 2011-007-00, Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage
REFERENCES
CR-PNP-2017-5067
CR-PNP-2017-5386
CR-PNP-2017-6183

The Southern Co And Vogtle Nuclear Plants.

Since the Ga PSC OK'd the continuation of Vogtle, the Southern Co stock price has been in steep decline. Is it the new tax laws or what?

Hinsdale NH: The Mike Mulligan Memorial Bridge

I created the political energy that got this bridge. I creatively protested at this bridge for years leading to a chain of events ending in this. Picturing up this bridge, the disgusting underside of the bridge.

Do you know the similarity between the Titanic and the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges? All the iron beams and plating are held together by 1920's rivets. There is not a weld in the structural parts of the bridge. The Titanic was constructed in 1909 and the two Bridges were constructed around 1921. I wonder how many other bridges are held together rivets?    

Hinsdale officials seek to spur economic development with zoning changes

By Liora Engel-Smith Sentinel Staff 


HINSDALE — With a new bridge in the works that will make the town more accessible from Interstate 91, town officials are proposing zoning changes they hope would spur economic development.

The changes would affect Brattleboro Road (Route 119), which runs from just west of the town’s center, and then north along the Connecticut River before crossing the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges into Brattleboro.

The N.H. Department of Transportation plans to replace those bridges with a single-span structure to the south beginning in 2019.

Meanwhile, Hinsdale officials hope to bring the proposed zoning changes to the voters at the March town meeting.

The public will have an opportunity to comment on the zoning changes at a Jan. 16 hearing at 6:30 p.m. at Hinsdale Town Hall.

The town’s planning board will present a proposal that would zone smaller commercial lots near homes along Brattleboro Road as appropriate for outfits such as restaurants, gas stations or childcare facilities. Larger parcels that aren’t near homes would be zoned to allow light-industrial businesses, such as auto body shops and warehouses.

The affected properties — about 100 of them, according to the public notice posted in The Sentinel — are already zoned for commercial uses, but ordinances don’t specify what types of commercial activities are permissible. The new proposal would clarify the uses, increasing zoning transparency, Michael J. “Mike” Darcy, vice chairman of the board of selectmen and ex-officio member of the planning board, said.

Darcy said the new bridge could bring more traffic into Hinsdale, potentially creating fertile ground for new businesses along Route 119. Unlike the existing bridges, the new bridge will be wider, enabling more truck traffic.

“(It) will create the potential for more traffic, and part of that traffic can be the 18-wheelers that can carry the goods that can feed (the growth of) a retail store,” he said.

The zoning proposal, which has been in the works since spring 2017, would make the town “as development and business-friendly as it can be,” he said

“Our hope is that the clarification will make it easier for a property owner to promote their land to a developer, that it will actually create more appeal for developers,” he said.

The new bridge between Brattleboro and Hinsdale will replace two older bridges, which were built in 1920 and underwent rehabilitation in 1988.

In September 2017, the N.H. Department of Transportation presented a preliminary construction plan. Its staff will hold a public hearing about the bridge project on Jan. 18 at 7 p.m. at Hinsdale Town Hall. Construction will likely conclude in 2021 or 2022, Kathryn M. Lynch, Hinsdale’s community development coordinator, said.

“With the bridge coming, (the planning board) wanted to prepare for business to come to town,” she said.

Also along Brattleboro Road are several parcels of land owned by the state of New Hampshire. These parcels would be zoned for rural and agricultural uses, Darcy said.

“It’s one of those back burner things,” he said. “It existed, and it’s been a (question of) how do we use this (land) the best that we can. I think it was a strong exercise for the planning board to really delve into something and understand what our zoning is and how it works.”

Is River Bend Going Power Nuts Like Grand Gulf

Least ANO looks good?

Jan 8 0%
Jan 7 66%
Jan 6 100%

Opening Almost All Off Shore Drilling

 Bout time!!!

Junk Plant Pilgrim Crashes In A Blizzard, Again

Update Jan 12

The experts and NRC knows I set up the NRC to be more interested Pilgrim's SRV problems and the massive Pilgrim downgrade. I wonder why I never get credit for my activities?

More on the Safety Relief Valves.  


***Waiting for the event report.

Here it is. What I am looking for.

1) Did they isolate from the main condenser, did the MSIVs go shut?

2) Any troubles from the safety relief valves?

3) Was it a clean shutdown or scram, did they have lots of equipment or employee problems.

Really, history proves this plant isn't designed for the winter weather?

The event report.

Having the switchyard breaker trip is grossly incompetent. But they kept the MSIVs open. It makes the scram really easy and doesn't challenge equipment as much. Is a easy scram good or bad? On the bad side, you don't get a wider view with the condition of the equipment? But on the big picture, they done good with the scram.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53147
Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD	Notification Date: 01/04/2018 Notification Time: 17:57 [ET] Event Date: 01/04/2018 Event Time: 14:10 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/04/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO) MICHAEL F. KING (NRR) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	81	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM "On January 4, 2018, at 1410 hours EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent power and steady state conditions, the winter storm across the Northeast caused the loss of offsite 345 kV Line 342. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent and a procedurally required manual reactor scram was initiated. All control rods fully inserted. "As a result of the reactor scram, indicated reactor water level decreased, as expected, to less than +12 inches resulting in automatic actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System, and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System. "Reactor Water Level was restored to the normal operating band. The Primary Containment Isolation Systems have been reset. The Reactor Protection System signal has been reset. "Following the reactor scram, the non-safety related Control Rod Drive Pump "B" tripped on low suction pressure. Control Rod Drive Pump "A" was placed in service. All other systems operated as expected, in accordance with design. "This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - "RPS Actuation" and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - "Specified System Actuation." "This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The main steam isolation valves are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser. Offsite power is still available from 345kV line 355. As a contingency, emergency diesel generators are running and powering safety busses per licensee procedure. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The licensee will be notifying the town of Plymouth as part of their local notifications. The licensee will be issuing a press release.

   

Northern Nuke Industry Doing Astonishingly Well In Frigid Weather So Far

:)

NE Grid Is Huffing And Puffing Over Our Historic Cold

Prices are around $240?

Vogtle: Not Appropriate Engineers Working At Vogtle

Update 

Is The Same Going On In Vogtle, as in VC Summer?

I got a NRC investigation on same issue...

Anti-nuclear group files complaint over construction drawings for Vogtle project in Georgia

Dec 14, 2017

By Andrew Brown abrown@postandcourier.com

COLUMBIA — Just like South Carolina, a complaint has been filed in Georgia over Westinghouse's decision not to use licensed engineers to oversee and approve the designs for two unfinished nuclear reactors. 

Nuclear Watch South, an anti-nuclear group, filed a formal complaint with the Georgia Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors earlier this week, as state regulators continue to discuss whether construction on two reactors at Plant Vogtle near Augusta should be finished. 

The group asked the state regulatory board to determine whether Westinghouse and Georgia Power violated state law by allowing construction drawings for the reactors at Vogtle to be used without being vetted and signed by professional engineers...

Junk Plant Cooper Is Mightily Troubled

What do they call these kinds of problems (configuration}. It is as clear as a bell, the NRC doesn't give these plants enough incentives to clean up their problems quickly.

It looks like a severe deterioration of both organizations...  

Licensee Event Report 2017-001-01

Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow Valves Out of Position Results in Loss of Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On February 5, 2017, during a quarterly sealed valve log audit, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Valves RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were discovered sealed closed. Normal configuration for these valves is sealed opened. Consequently, Operations declared RHR pumps A and C Inoperable at 0756 hours and entered Technical Specifications (TS} Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

Subsequently, the operating crew opened RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, independently verified the position of the valves and applied seals to the valves. As such, RHR pumps A and C were declared Operable at 1041 hours on February 5, 2017, and TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A were exited.

The root cause is Operations Department standards related to Operator Human Performance and Configuration Control are inadequate and do not meet industry expectations. Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators completed training focused on Standards and Expectations related to attention to detail and configuration control. To prevent recurrence, expectations will be established and institutionalized for Operations Leadership to reinforce consistent application of operator fundamentals and to identify and correct performance gaps for the operating crews.

BACKGROUND

The safety objective of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system [EIIS:BO] is to provide core cooling, in conjunction with other Emergency Core Cooling Systems, and to provide containment cooling as required during abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents. The RHR system consists of two heat exchangers [EIIS:HX], four main system pumps [EIIS:P] in two divisions, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation.

The motor-operated minimum flow valves automatically provide the necessary flow through the pump in order to prevent pump overheating. The manual isolation valves for the motor-operated minimum flow valves, RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, are normally configured open and sealed.

RHR pumps A and C provide RHR Loop A safety functions associated with Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) and Containment Cooling. These pumps also provide RHR Loop A Shutdown Cooling (SDC) function during outage conditions. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 29, 2016, during Refueling Outage 29 (RE29), RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were closed and danger tagged in accordance with a clearance order to support the RHR Loop A Maintenance Window.

On October 7, 2016, the danger tags for RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were released and the clearance order directed that both valves be restored to their normal configuration. The danger tags were removed and seals applied to the valves. However, the valves were not opened before placing the seals. Second verification incorrectly verified that the valves were sealed open, when they were sealed closed.

A quarterly sealed valve log audit was performed on November 29, 2016, and the seals were verified to be intact. The audit required only that the seals be verified, the audit did not require the valve configuration be checked.

On February 5, 2017, during a quarterly sealed valve log audit, it was discovered that RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were sealed closed. Consequently, Operations declared RHR pumps A and C Inoperable at 0756 hours and entered Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

03/14/17 - Condition Report written to document incorrectly installed seals on two service water valves (SW-V-105 and SW-V-124) that occurred in late February 2017. 01/30/17 - Fuse was installed incorrectly. I 01/10/17- Incorrect bulb installation caused light for Local Power Range Monitor downscale to remain on. I

01/14/17-Augmented Off-Gas +34 Glycol pump/compressor switches found in an incorrect position.

LER 2016-009-00- On December 7, 2016, a Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan was removed from service due to human error resulting in a loss of safety function.

12/02/16 - Setpoints verified on the Normal Range Kaman instead of the High Range Kaman.

11/21/16 - Incorrect log entry resulted in missed surveillance.

10/15/16 - Relay was found not reset.

10/03/16 - Control Rod Drive high cooling water differential pressure was noticed while making preparations to hang tags. Upon investigation, it was noticed that 75 Hydraulic Control Units (HCUs) were isolated, which left 62 in service for cooling. This is contrary to a precaution statement in a procedure which requires 70 HCUs to be in service.

09/30/16 - A CNS Operator and an Entergy Operator entered the steam tunnel to hang tags and inadvertently severed and extracted tubing being used for Local Leak Rate Testing.

09/28/16 - While performing rounds, the on watch non-licensed plant Operator adjusted air load pressure to the specifications in their logs, not per the procedure for the current plant condition. This caused Control Room indicators to show a lower Reactor Pressure Vessel level than actual. LER 2014-001-00 - On January 6, 2014, a differential pressure transient occurred in the reactor building due to a non-licensed plant Operator inadvertently opening the wrong drain valve while hanging tags.

NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)

Nuclear Plant: Deep Cold Spell Going On

I be looking at power history all over the USA to see how reliable they are during the deep cold???

Doing well so far!!!

Abuse of Police Power Within The Hinsdale NH Police Department

Update Dec 28

Is it good the selectman didn't call yet? 

Comments To Me From The Police Chief 

"Even if this wasn't according to the ordinance, I could have towed your car and ticketed you on at least "six" state laws."

"If the department was really after you, we could have ticketed and towed your car. It would have really cost you then."

The nice police officer just came to my house and asked me to move my car, or be towed? right.

Update

The selectman's office

So I give the office secretary my shortened spiel. The first thing she implied in this it is a police matter. The first thing the police chief said in the police station window to me is, this is a selectman's issue. Freakin bureaucrats? 

I posed the question to the selectman secretary as succinctly as I could. She was by now taking notes. She asked me if I looked up the ordinance. I said four times, one reading it real slowly. She had opened up her computer to the snow emergency plowing/towing ordinance. She read the ordnance for two or three minutes. I popped up saying, "just show me where it clearly states the police can tow or ticket cars in a snow emergency during the daylight hours between 6 am and midnight"? I am sure she felt she could show me the wording quickly. Then I get a, "well, I will have to take this to the selectman. She never admitted to me she couldn't find the wording, just like the police chief. I hate this excessive organizational self protection. That is when I tell her my blog address. I am a blogger!. Told the secretary, "This is my interpretation and analysis of events here". I wrote it up on my blog so the selectman could know clearly in writing what I was  thinking.  

It is very risky me going off on an events and interpreting rules and ordinances like this without all my ducks in a row. This all is basically a information gather tacit and engaging the organization to starting thinking about my issue. I find it very painful to me when police come to my door with their duck not in a row. I might miss a few words or misinterpret a rule or laws. I have little training and contacts with these systems. I got a big chance I might be wrong. Especially the police chief, he has tremendous legal training and experience with the system, as with the regular police and selectmen people. 

My impression with the selectman's secretary, she couldn't find the clear wording saying the police have the political authority to ticket or tow cars in a snow emergency. 

I think the best way to handle this is just to ask the car owners to take their cars off the road for the good of the community and help the plow drivers. I think 99% of the community population would do as the police wanted. Why does the police always go to the intimidation route? 

I just wanted to talk abothe beyond ut this with the police. I want him to sit down with me and go over the ordinance word by word. I wanted the police to be more commutative to outsiders and explain how they operate. I though he was dismissive when he said, if I find something wrong with the ordnance, I will change it. It wasn't, we will then talk more about your concerns. These guys are always minimizing their profile. I just want communications, openness and transparency with the police. I want the police to know me, and me to know the police...we trust each other when the shit hits the fan. This applies to everyone(not just the police)in my community and the beyond in the USA. These police have always been overwhelmed with crime problems and severely poor public funding.        

Update Dec 27

My issue was our elected officials dictated by ordinance cars can only be towed during a storm and between the midnight and 6am.That is the way the rules are written according to my interpretation. He said even if we are outside the town rules, we got at least five state laws where we can ticket and tow your car parked on the side of the road. I asked him, did you read the ordinance? He gave me a weak yes. He promised me he would take a look at the rules. If he finds the rules unclear, he will get it changed. I was disappointed he didn't say, he would get back to me and we can have a further talk about it. There are bigger implications here. As far as all the state laws he could have used in this particular case, yea they maybe there, but the prosecutor and judge would laugh them out of court.   

Why don't the police officers have pre season training on it? If I am right, why didn't a police officer speak up saying the ordinance don't give us a right to tow cars during daylight. It not right threatened emediately we will tow you car, when we don't have a right to do that. By the way, the chiefs first swipe at this was, it is the way we always worked in the winter. Why didn't a cop say, we got to clear up the ordnance, or I won't participate with unethically towing strategy.       

I extensively questioned my wife about the tone of the police officer and who he was? My wife picked up my troublesome vibes...she didn't want me to get in trouble again with the police department. We talked at length with the our interpretation of this encounter. Was the cops picking on me and were they professional? By the end of the ride home, we concluded this was a innocent occurrence and I was a bit paranoid. The cop was just doing his job and no harm what so ever. I have a abnormal curiosity, so I decided to just check our  the  snow ordinance.  I concluded our elected politicians only allowed towing cars and fines during the night. The implication are bigger than me, what if i am right? What do they owe to the people who got their cars towed or fined with this unauthorized police activity? 

You want people like me pinging on the police department and always testing them, making them stronger...           

Update:

When My wife called to notify me of the police visit, my wife and son emediately picked up the car and brought it back home.

It is Christmas Today. I got a beautiful new heavy duty winter coat. I spend an enormous amount time in the woods and trails in our area. I use a mountain bike and hike. I got diabetes...this is my exercise to counteracts my disease. But it is much more than that. I consider being next to our locale nature and weather as a spiritual or religious experience. Being out their exhausting myself calms me for days. As far as a winter experience, out there in a raging snowstorm or blizzard...I feel there is no better spiritual experience anywhere. It is so freeing out there being isolated from the societal experience. I have been traipsing out in these winter storms for many years now. I am usually out in the woods for six to eight hours. I always have a cell phone with me for safety. I gotten bumps and scraps out there, but no big accident. I am pretty conservative with my safety, I don't want to get hurt out there to keep me from my biking and hiking for any time.

So today I am parked (car) on the Taryn Ln entrance to the power lines trails and snowmobiling area. I have been hiking for about hour. I get a cell phone call from my wife. She says the Hinsdale cops just came to the door. The cop says, "your husband's car is impeding snowplowing". "If he doesn't get his car off the road emediately he is going to get towed". The cop irked said, "He has been warned about this many times before". His tone was very polite to my wife and he wished her merry Christmas.

This call happen about 2pm. But I call it a gross misuse of police power and intimidation. Clearly, according to the Hinsdale ordinances, he had no police power to tell me to get off the road or to tow my car. It is not plausible he doesn't understand the winter emergency towing/ plowing ordinances. My best guess is the police department just takes the lazy and most effective way out, just unjustly threatens his poor citizens with a $200 towing fine. It is outside the court's punishment type a thing.

As far as the storm plowing philosophy, I think it goes like this. You keep the roads open plowing during the daylight hours. You don't do really detailed plowing. During the first or second night after the storm, you go back over all the roads doing the detail plowing. This is when they should catch the area of snow buildup area around where I parked my hour. The priority is not disrupt the public interest, recreation or business interest during the storm. The storm does enough damage on their own.

So my big question is how many cars have you towed for the last five years during a winter storm not ordinance authorized period of midnight to 6am. It is a illegal action.

I am really irked the cops are passing around bogus information  concerning me... I am a snowstorm emergency habitual parking on the side of road ordinance violator. It is not based on any law or ordinance. I am appalled the police doesn't understand this.

2016

***Accosted be Ex Chief Gallagher in 2016. He was acting as a town selectman chairman and police officer within this encounter simultaneously. 

Taryn Ln is deep in a small neighborhood. It doesn't have a lot of traffic. It is in a isolated section of the road, 

1) About noontime. The same place as above on Taryn Ln road near the power line as in today's encounter above. I was basically plowed in and stuck in the snow as the same place as today on the side of the road. It was in one mother of a blizzard. I was shoveling out my car in a stuck condition. Gallagher stopped and got out. I was just about shoveled out. I told him I had been hiking out in the woods. I got in my car and it came right out from the snow bank. I took this first encounter as a good police officer just trying to be helpful to his citizen. Rather impressed you know.

2) Same storm...about six hours later. I was hiking in and around the area of the Vernon Dam of cource on the Hinsdale side. It was the worst  blizzard of 2016. The wind was howling and it was still snowing hard as hell. About 4:30 pm. It was a raging storm all day. I didn't want to get stuck in the storm again, so I parked aside the sewer plant on River road. I am walking about 500 feet before my car when I see a police car ahead of me. I am tired as hell, the snow was still raging and the wind was howling. Gallagher asked me, "what are you doing here? Said hiking up by the dam all afternoon. It was the ending of a spectacular blizzard day. He replied irked, "you are interfering with town plowing operations". I didn't want to create any scenes there. I just said OK. Lets just say, Gallagher was the selectman chairman when I was protesting about the Hinsdale/ Brattleboro dilapidated bridge, and my arrest. I had made a complaint to the selectman that the police department wasn't getting adequately funded and manned in this timeframe. So you see, we had issues.

So far, I don't think this is related to the bridge protest, my arrest or my police complaint... It is too far in the past. But these small NE town's people have a reputation of never letting go of a grudge...

 

Ordinances & Regulations

TRAFFIC CONTROL OR..DINANCE

AUTHORITY

In accordance with an under the authority of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, Chapter 41, Section 11 and Chapter 47, Section 17, VII and VIII, authorizing the Board of Selectmen to enact ordinances governing the use of public ways and traffic devises and signals, the following Ordinance is adopted by the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Hinsdale.  This ordinance repeals and replaces the Parking Ordinance.

III. Between November 1st and April 1st from 12:00 A.M. to 6:00 A.M., no vehicle shall be parked beyond the boundaries of the public way within the Town so that it interferes with the removal of snow from the highways and parking lots.  This shall not apply to vehicles parked in designated areas except between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.  However, the Historical Society lot shall be designated as an overnight lot for emergency purposes only and vehicles must be removed by 7:00 a.m.

I generally park off the tar on the side of the road or as close to the snow bank as possible.   

V. Any vehicle parked contrary to this ordinance may be towed at the owners’ expense, in the following manner: A. Any Police Officer may authorize towing for any violations of this ordinance.  

B. The Supervisor of the Hinsdale Highway Department or his designee may order vehicles towed for violations of Section III when said violator is impeding the plowing or removal of snow.

C. Any person(s) whose vehicle is towed pursuant to this ordinance shall be liable for all costs of such towing and storage, but shall have a right to a hearing upon the same terms and conditions as set forth in RSA 262:33 II and III.

The Vogtle Decision: Southern's Stock Price Down 1% Yesterday

Update

Now down 1.3%. I just don't understand why the stock hasn't gone up on the news. So late this afternoon, it is done 1.8%?

**Did Vogtle really get the all clear signal yesterday with the PSC?

You would think Southern would get a nice pop yesterday. I think storm clouds are still building all around this plant.

Clinton Gets A Special Inspection

NRC Launches Special Inspection at Clinton Nuclear Plant  

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has launched a Special Inspection at the Clinton nuclear power plant to review the circumstances surrounding the failure of a transformer and a subsequent manual shutdown of the reactor on Dec. 9. The two-member inspection team arrived onsite Monday to better understand the event, review the operation of equipment and evaluate the plant’s actions in response. NRC inspectors, who will spend time both on and off site, also plan to review the corrective actions taken and the extent of condition evaluation, as a similar event occurred in 2013 on another transformer. The event did not impact public health and safety. As part of the inspection, the NRC team will independently review the technical details regarding this operational failure, and the plant’s response to the previous event. Following the inspection, a report documenting the team’s findings will be made publicly available. When the operational failure occurred, operators in the control room received numerous alarms indicating a transformer failure, which resulted in a loss of power to certain safety related equipment. Redundant safety systems remained available and operable. Other plant systems responded as expected. Workers installed a new transformer before the plant restarted operations. The single-unit plant is operated by Exelon Nuclear Generation Co., and is located in Clinton, Ill., about 23 miles southeast of Bloomington, Ill.
 

Junk Plant Waterford: Startling Number Of Components Broke in Event

All the Entergy plants in region IV are very Troubled!!!

December 20, 2017

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2017011