Vogtle Nuclear plant: NRC Showing Comtempt For the Staff's Technical Ineptness

Vogtle PEmails 

From: Gleaves, Bill Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 12:07 PM To: Vogtle PEmails Cc: Gleaves, Bill Subject: Vogtle Units 3&4 - LAR-17-010 Additional Information to Supplement the December 1, 2017 Supplement 4
From: Chamberlain, Amy Christine [mailto:ACCHAMBE@southernco.com]  Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 1:12 PM To: Dixon-Herrity, Jennifer <Jennifer.Dixon-Herrity@nrc.gov> Cc: Gleaves, Bill <Bill.Gleaves@nrc.gov>; Grant, Eddie <X2EDGRAN@SOUTHERNCO.COM> Subject: RE: Question regarding your 12.1.17 LAR-17-010 Response

Hi Jennifer,

To follow up on our phone call from this morning and the question below.  Based on the physical arrangement of the system, the system components, and the flooding scenario described in the LAR, there would be no breach of the WGS system to allow moisture incursion into the system.  There is no controlled valve that allows a bypass of the WGS Charcoal Delay beds, and the valve which isolates the normal system release (post-delay bed) is both (a) fail closed and (b) controlled to close on a high-high radiation signal (WGS-PL-V051, non-safety valve).  We are not postulating flooding of PLS cabinets, so a spurious control signal is not postulated as a consequence of this event.  There are no other valves that could cause a spurious release due to the flooding described in the LAR.  

 Amy Chamberlain, P.E. Interim Licensing Manager Nuclear Development - VEGP 3&4 Construction Office: (205) 992-6361 Cell: (205) 603-1240 ***New*** acchambe@southernco.com


From: Gleaves, Bill [mailto:Bill.Gleaves@nrc.gov]  Sent: Tuesday, December 5, 2017 12:13 PM To: Chamberlain, Amy Christine <ACCHAMBE@southernco.com> Cc: Dixon-Herrity, Jennifer <Jennifer.Dixon-Herrity@nrc.gov>; Stutzcage, Edward <Edward.Stutzcage@nrc.gov>; Burkhart, Lawrence <Lawrence.Burkhart@nrc.gov>; Lavera, Ronald <Ronald.LaVera@nrc.gov>; Eddie Grant (x2egran@southernco.com) <x2egran@southernco.com> Subject: Question regarding your 12.1.17 LAR-17-010 Response

Amy,

Our concern has not changed…it has always been about the potential for radioactive gas release due to the submergence of the system (a scenario for which the system was not designed).  We stated that in the call two weeks ago and believed it to be clear in the RAI.  Although it may have been discussed, the NRC was not making any assumption about the specific scenario that you should address, e.g., the pressure of the gaseous waste system in comparison to the pressure due to the depth of the flood water.   We discussed water infiltration – yes – but this could be water infiltrating a control system or motor operated valve that could cause
2
the system to malfunction and perhaps release gases to the ventilation system or environment.  We asked how submergence of these systems could adversely affect its function and could there be a release.  

We talked about physical integrity of the system OR other system of component failure mechanisms that may lead to a release.  SNC addressed the physical integrity part but not how the system could fail that could result in a release.

So we believe that the concern is the same as expressed in the RAI.

“Please provide additional information to enable the staff to reach a reasonable assurance finding that the worst case flooding will not result in a significant release from the gaseous waste management system. The charcoal guard bed and delay beds are located in Room 12153, which are on the bottom floor of the building. Table 2 in response to Question 7.a indicates 168" of flooding in that room. The concern is that potentially the water could damage the system or the beds or that water could infiltrate the beds and cause them to loose there adsorption ability, resulting in a significant release of the content of the beds (physical integrity of the rad waste system or other system or component failure mechanisms that may lead to a significant release of gaseous activity, etc.).”

We believe that SNC did not provide sufficient information about completely evaluating if and how submergence of the gaseous waste management system could result in a release of gaseous radioactivity.

If the SNC cannot provide reasonable assurance that the flooding will not result in a release from the gaseous waste management system, then SNC should document the results of its evaluation of the dose consequences and acceptance criteria for a release of radioactive material.

Billy William (Billy) Gleaves Senior Project Manager Licensing Branch 4 Office OWFN 8H17 US NRC, Office of New Reactors The contents of this message may be sensitive.  If this message has been received in error, please delete it without reading it. Your receipt of this message is not  intended to waive any applicable privilege. Do not disseminate this message  without the permission of the author. Communications by this author are not  binding on The Commissio

Junk Plant Grand Grand Gulf: Crashes to 27%

Update Dec 22 

40%

Update Dec 21

Startling increase of power from yesterday...three times the rate of increase from yesterday. Now we are on the way. Increasing three percent to 30% power. 

Update Dec 20

A day later, a 1% increase in power. 

Been mostly stuck at 60% power for the last few days, then crashes to 27%. Just came out of a outage?

Junk and Dangerous Grand Gulf: Screaming Up In Power To 25% Today

Dec 13: NRC Senate Hearing

Update: 

Tom Carper Admitted to Hitting His Wife in 1998 Interview

Senate Hearing

For years, the NRC was the Best Place To Work . Today eleven agencies are better than the NRC. It is a dramatic decline.

In last two years, NRC employees declined by 12%. Is the "Best Place to Work" decline related to this?

USC report on NRC's safety Culture.

Project Aim terminating early? Right sizing (secret deregulation).

Low wholesale price of electricity causing most of the troubles in industry.

( Waiting for the, what happened to the Summer construction plant and it Vogtle plant going to sink like them )

(I feel information to the Commissioner are stoved piped and controlled. All these guys are is politician and have very little experience and knowledge. So why doesn't the senate hear testimony from the EDO, region heads and resident inspectors. I feel the senators are so frighten of the utilities, they gild the lilies with allowing real sharing of information. So everyone's interest is to soften the testimony.)

(I find it horrible the commissioner weren't ready to talk fully about the Clinton Uranium issues. We pay these guys to stay abreast of current issues.)

Aim and budget cuts have effected NRC moral. (Baron) It has been a challenging times.

GAO: NRC has two sets of budgets? One for public consumption and other internal.

What a joke question? Did Fukushima cost in USA cause the end of Summer? Did the low cost of natural gas cause the failure of Summer? Why didn't Carper ask if the NRC was implicated in the demise of the Plants? (Carper)

Carper: Is their anything we (committee) can do here the to help you do your jobs better. Then nothing but stroking the committee.

Clinton's Loss Of Their Div 1 Safety Bus..Identicle To Grand Gulf?

Another Div 1 transformer killing an important safety bus. It is the same bus and transformer as Grand Gulf. Is this a coincidence. If Grand Gulf was at 100% with their loss of  the Div 1 bus, they would have had a scam. They were just lucky to be a low power.

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION
 December 13, 2017
 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-III-18-001
 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance.  Some of the information may not yet be fully verified or evaluated and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.
 Facility Clinton Power Station, Unit 1  Exelon Generation Co., LLC Clinton, IL Docket No.: 05000461 License No.: NPF-62 Licensee Emergency Classification       Notification of Unusual Event       Alert       Site Area Emergency       General Emergency   X  Not Applicable

SUBJECT:   UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO THE DIVISION 1 480 VOLT ALTERNATING CURRENT (VAC) BUS

On December 9, 2017, at 1347 CST, the Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, received numerous alarms in the control room indicating a loss of power to the Division 1 480 VAC bus.  Plant operators responded to the alarms and indications for the loss of power and scrammed the reactor in accordance with their procedures. 

The Division 1 480 VAC bus provides power to numerous safety systems at the plant.  The redundant Division 2 480 VAC bus remained available and operable throughout the event.  The plant is currently in a stable condition.  There was no impact on public health and safety.  

Following the plant shutdown, licensee personnel began investigation to the cause of the event and identified a ground fault in the Division 1 480 VAC transformer.   The licensee plans to start up the unit later this week after the faulted transformer is replaced.

The resident inspector responded to the control room to monitor plant parameters and licensee actions.  The NRC resident staff continues to monitor licensee actions of the repair activities.

The State of Illinois has been informed.

This preliminary notification is issued for information only.

The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee, and is current as of 4pm on December 12, 2017.

Dangerous Junk Plant Grand Gulf: Another Delayed Startup, A Host Broken Equipment and Chaos In The Control Room

Update

Dec 11 4% power: came out of refueling outage.

Dec 12 19%

Dec 13 14% core cooling safety bus failure and multiple equipment problems. 

***Basic licensed training cautions us from prolonged operation at low power levels(1-100%). The moderator void coefficient is less efficient in the low power area, than up at 100%. In other words, in the low power area, there will be less of a designed automatic feedback fuel protection mechanism than in the high power area.   


It seems a core cooling safety transformer or breaker failed beginning at 9:18. 

Then an additional core cooling system (RCIC) failed over valve issues.  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53115
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: RYAN MEYER HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 12/12/2017 Notification Time: 17:40 [ET] Event Date: 12/12/2017 Event Time: 09:18 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	16	Power Operation	16	Power Operation

Event Text

AUTOMATIC START OF EDG DUE TO LOSS OF ESF TRANSFORMER "At approximately 0918 CST on Tuesday, December 12, 2017, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a loss of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Transformer 11 which was powering the Division 1 ESF bus. Subsequently, the station experienced an automatic start of the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG], partial isolation of the primary and secondary containment buildings and the isolation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System [RCIC]. "It is not currently understood why the RCIC system isolated during this event. A team is investigating this issue separately from the loss of the ESF 11 transformer. "The cause of the event is under investigation at this time. "No other issues or unexpected events occurred. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

Then approximately 4 hours later a div 3 safety battery is questioned over connectivity issues. My guess this came from a annunciator alarm in control room. I wonder if the div 3 charger was power from div 1bus. I think the div 3 charger is powered from the div 1 bus. Basically I think losing the div 1 bus took out the div 3 charger when the transformer failed that went unnoticed for four hours. This made core spray broken.

The gist of this is look at all the safety systems we lost in a short time

A enormously important bus and transformer.

A host of important primary and secondary partial isolations.    

RICI 

and one side of core spray

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53117
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: WESLEY MARSHALL HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 12/12/2017 Notification Time: 20:34 [ET] Event Date: 12/12/2017 Event Time: 13:30 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	15	Power Operation	15	Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE "At approximately 1330 CST on Tuesday, December 12, 2017, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station declared Division 3 'C' Battery inoperable due to questions concerning battery terminal connection continuity. Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating, Condition E, Required Action E.1, requires the station to declare the High Pressure Core Spray System inoperable immediately. The Division 3 'C' Battery and High Pressure Core Spray System was declared operable and the LCOs [Limiting condition of operation] were declared met at 1731CST on Tuesday, December 12, 2017. Based on field measurements of terminal torque and resistance, the as-found and as-left terminal resistance micro-ohm readings indicated satisfactorily all times. Formal evaluation of the as-found condition of the battery is in progress. "This report is to notify the NRC of a loss of safety function on the High Pressure Core Spray System." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

Junk Plant Watts Bar 2 Fortuitous Scram Report Today

So why is a northern boy interested on this particular plant and at this point and time? The below document was not publically available until this morning. 

My two Watts Bar 2 blog articles were written about at 5 and 6pm yesterday. 

The trip also occurred yesterday at 8:59am.

The official big dogs are closely going to be securitizing the timing of this all. Either I am a prophet or somebody called me up?

I called the two officials (NRC/TVA) identified in the document Watts Bar Unit 2 MSPI Effectiveness Date submitted on my blog. Explained my problems. The MSPI document is Watts Bars trying to be exampled from the ROP performance Indicator system because they are a new plant. Generally they blame initial startup issues on getting the bugs out of a new plant (bathtub curve). My theme is all the plant trips, scrams and down powers comes from construction related incompetence, poor quality workmanship and components. The Plant and TVA needs another kick in the ass to straighten up. They need the full force of the ROP and MSPI to be applied to the plant and it's resultant documentation and inspections.

My theme is TVA is trying to fraudulently gain exemption from the MSPI to April 1, 2018. As example, TVA blames the collapse of main condenser as construction issue in the 1970s, implying our new construction guys and quality processes are exempt from accountability leading to plant operations today.  

As far as the Fort Calhoun simulations justifying this all, none of this is facts or science based. It seem this guys can come up with any computer crack pot simulation based on nothing justifying anything they want.

The nice Watts Bar 2 senior resident reminded me the main condenser is not a safety related system. "We don't spend much time on these systems", he said. But is it really a balance of plant system, it is more a intermediate system between safety and balance of plant non safety system. If the main condensers is available, then you don't test the safety cooling system. I'll make the case TMI emerged from broken or degraded non safety systems that cascaded into a nuclear event.      

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53112
Facility: WATTS BAR Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 12/11/2017 Notification Time: 11:06 [ET] Event Date: 12/11/2017 Event Time: 08:57 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/11/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	M/R	Y	97	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP IN RESPONSE TO INDICATION OF MULTIPLE DROPPED CONTROL RODS "While operating at 97% power, the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped at 0857 EST on December 11, 2017 due to multiple dropped control rods. All control and shutdown bank rods inserted properly in response to the manual reactor trip. All safety systems including Auxiliary Feedwater actuated as designed. The plant is stable with decay heat removal through Auxiliary Feedwater and the Steam Dump System. "The cause of the dropped rods is being investigated. "The manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is being reported as a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified for this event."

Junk Plant Watts Bar: How The NRC is Pulling Their Punches

Having issues with staying up at power. I just think there are a lot of crap components in the plant that is causing this.

November 22, 2017 

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT –NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2017003,05000391/2017003

Unit 2 began the reporting period shutdown for repairs to the main condenser.  The unit was started up on July 23, 2017, but was shutdown to hot standby later that day due to equipment problems.  On July 25, 2017, startup resumed, but the reactor was tripped before criticality due to rod position indication problems during the startup.  Startup commenced again on July 27, 2017, but was stopped due to additional rod position indication problems.  Unit 2 started up after rod position indication repairs on July 30, 2017, and achieved 29 percent RTP on August 2, 2017.  The unit remained at that power until August 8, 2017, when the turbine was tripped due to a steam leak on a turbine drain line.  The unit stabilized at 8 percent RTP and remained there until power ascension resumed after drain line repairs.  Unit 2 reached 100 percent RTP on August 8, 2017, and remained there for the remainder of the reporting period.

Very troublesome. The not counted violation is mostly not following procedures which is very serious.  

Six violations of very low safety significance, identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the NRC.  Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee’s CAP.  These violations and the corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

So basically a NRC inspector below thought his peers were too tough on TVA. Was that the geneses of the not counted violations on the above inspection. 

Non-Concurrence Process.

Integrated Report 2017003 documents a self-revealing NC\’ when licensee personnel did not properly implement a surveillance procedure (See attached 4-part writeup.)

In the analysis section, the reason be a more that minor determination was the performance deficiency caused a depressurization that had to  be stopped by operator action.” The rational used was detailed in an e-mail to me from Alan Blarney (see attached e mail); the opening of the PORV impacted plant stability (depressurization) and challenged the critical safety function of heat removal (loss of inventory). However, as stated in the analysis section “the resultant leakage from the open P0kV would not have caused the current decay heat removal method to fail (lit went undetected and leakage would be self-limiting such that it would stop before impacting the operating method of decay heat removal This statement directly contradicts the rational tor a more than minor determination that either depressurization impacted plant stability or the loss of inventory challenged the critical safety function of heat removal…

Junk Plant Watts Bar: An Official Lying Zone Going On Here

No wonder the plant is having prolonged safety culture problems with official outright lying such as this?

Watts Bar Unit 2 MSPI Effectiveness Date

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML17345A052

Event or circumstances requiring guidance interpretation:

During March 2017, during the first operating cycle Watts Bar U2, the Condenser failed and required extensive repair to return to service.  The reactor was shut down while the work on the secondary side was performed. This resulted in a loss of 3100 critical hours.  The cause of the failure was inadequate vendor design (1970’s) of the condenser wall support structure leading to support and wall failure.  In addition, a 35-day refueling outage is planned for fourth Quarter of 2017 with an additional loss of 840 critical hours.

The cause was the QA peoples not adequately scoping out the main condenser for quality and  a design sufficient for it’s duty. It ridiculous solely depending on a components 1970s  design especially with  the magnitude of  TVA or problems during the 1970s and 1980s. They are shifting blame on 1970s guys from the Unit 2’s employees who prepared the site in around the 2015.

Think I am going to talk to the project manager…  

Junk Plant Grand Gulf At 4% after Third Scram/Trip After First Scram/ Shutdown

Update: Dec 12

Least they haven't scrammed yet. Its looking like a very slow startup. Just 19% power today. Is the slowness carefulness or is it general incompetence or poor training.

***I think this guy is setting the low bar for everyone else. This is how bad everyone can get before we step in and shut you down. These guys have been pretty degraded for the last two or three years with no hint they got control of themselves.

Everyone is just waiting for a big accident out of these guys. With all these trips, scrams, shutdowns and down powers in recent years, one wonders if this kind of despicable behavior will lead to a type of accident never seen before???

Vogtle Death Spiral

Georgia regulatory staff calls the last U.S. nuclear construction project “uneconomic”

By Steven Mufson December 5 at 2:41 PM

Southern Company said Tuesday it had reached an agreement with Toshiba to speed up a $3.2 billion payment to help salvage two nuclear reactors under construction in Georgia.

Under the agreement, Toshiba will make the payments by December 15 on behalf of its nuclear construction subsidiary Westinghouse, which is in bankruptcy.

The agreement was disclosed four days after three staff members of the Georgia Public Service Commission said that the project at the Vogtle power station “is no longer economic” given huge cost overruns, construction delays and the burden that would be thrust upon ratepayers while the company profits. The PSC commissioners will decide in February whether to let the project go forward.  

Junk Plant Grand Gulf @8%

Dec 6,

One day later, still at 8%. What a absolute disgrace.

Well, I screwed up this update. It is much worst than stated. The highest reported power reached this startup is

Dec. 3 4%

4 12%

5 8%

6 0%