The whole pattern of plant operations in the last few years constitutes extreme unprofessionalism. Why can't we do something about these dangerous guys?
They are going to wreck the whole industry.
Then two different nuclear instrumentation broke for separate reasons. Unbelievable. What about the signoff checks before startup that failed to detect these. These guys weren't prepared for startup.
We need a special inspection for this or higher...
Power Reactor Event Number: 53090 Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID BURRUS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORENotification Date: 11/25/2017
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2017
Event Time: 02:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2017Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICALPerson (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 M/R Y 0 Startup 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP
"At 0238 [CST] a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 [CST], with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, IRM [Intermediate Range Monitor] channels A, C, and D received a spurious upscale trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, operability of RPS [Reactor Protection System] scram function for Intermediate Range Detectors was placed in question. This event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON NOVEMBER 26, 2017, AT 1850 FROM GRAND GULF TO MICHAEL BLOODGOOD * * *
"At 0238 [CST] a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 [CST], with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, Intermediate Range Monitor neutron flux detector (IRM) channels A, C, and D received a spurious Upscale Trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, IRM channels A, C, and D were declared Inoperable. IRM G was already Inoperable for another reason. RPS scram function from IRM channels B, E, F, and H was always Operable and available. That event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical.
"This Revised Statement to Event Notification # 53090 is being made to make it clear that only four IRM channels (A, C, D, G) were Inoperable and that the IRM RPS SCRAM function was still available from the four remaining Operable IRM channels (B, E, F, and H)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe)