Junk Plant Columbia: UCS on Special Inspection

Columbia Generating Station: NRC’s Special Inspection of Self-Inflicted Safety Woes

Dave Lochbaum, director, Nuclear Safety Project | April 13, 2017, 6:00 am EDT

Energy Northwest’s Columbia Generating Station near Richland, Washington has one General Electric boiling water reactor (BWR/5) with a Mark II containment design that began operating in 1984. In the late morning hours of Sunday, December 18, 2016, the station stopped generating electricity and began generating problems.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dispatched a special inspection team to investigate the event after determining it could have increased the risk of reactor core damage by a factor of ten. The NRC team sought to understand the problems occurring during this near-miss as well as assess the breadth and effectiveness of the solutions proposed by the company for them…

I put the below on the UCS's blog. They seemed to taken it down.

Special Inspection #1

Yet another special inspection on transporting radioactive material in Nov 2016.

http://www.tri-cityherald.com/news/local/hanford/article144310564.html

Two special inspections in about a month. One wonders if the NRC can call up a special inspection on their whim. In other words, a lot of secret non-documented violations occur at the plant as the price of doing business. Then the NRC can pull up from a huge bank of non-disclosed but known violations as a tool to perform a particular purpose.  

Special Inspection #2 

Why do we always do this? This accident is contextual. Why don't whistleblowers ever get the credit they deserve. Here is where whistleblowers went to the press saying the plant is in more trouble than Columbia or the NRC understands. The NRC in response said the plant is safe. They had a big internal investigation basically saying there are communication problems, but no big problems. I am just saying, out of the whole highly paid lot of them officialdom, the closest one to the anticipating and knowing the future truth was the Columbia Whistleblowers. I will guarantee you, if there were no Columbia whistleblowers, there would be no special inspection. The NRC is terrorized by these whistleblowers. I guarantee to you, the NRC never even for one second, forgot they had unknown knowledgeable whistleblowers simmering at the plant. That special inspection was set up to protect the NRC if things got worst at the plant. I find it despicable you didn’t put the Columbia whistleblower context into explaining the setup of this accident.

I was in a similar situation at Vermont Yankee in 1991. I was leaking documents (stealing) and talking with media. Talking to the governor…she came out on a podium and made big my issues at the plant. Like I said, big internal investigations and NRC investigations. I thought nothing really big is changing as the process played out, they were doing their same lying and falsifying documents as the NRC was breathing down their necks. I thought maybe there is a delay in the atmosphere change we all expected. About a year after getting the governor on the podium, VY had the worst accident in the life of the plant. We had a LOOP on taking shortcuts and not following procedures in switchyard, with insufficient cooling water flow to the diesel generators. The control was in a mess during the event.  A lot of equipment showed as degraded or broken in this accident.

This was when my great disillusionment with how the world works began. All the internal and NRC investigations was just showboating for the public appeasement. There was no intention of ever changing a thing at plant.  

 

Entergy: Why All The Valve Line-up Problems?

Is there a Potential Adverse Trend?

Here are 3 different plants with valve mis-positioning events.

One thing in common – valve mis-positioning events.

One thing not in common, these are three different plants.

Another thing in common - is this the same fleet operator?

Could this be an adverse trend?

How come we do not hear of other plants with different fleet operators having valve mis-positioning events?

( We are waiting for Grand Gulf's special inspection report on generally licensed operator incompetence and poor training. They voluntarily shutdown for four months to retrain their employees  It emerged from a valve line-up problem.) 

Power Reactor    Event Number: 52655

Facility: PILGRIM

Region: 1 State: MA

Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]

RX Type: [1] GE-3

NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA

HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO    Notification Date: 03/31/2017

Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]

Event Date: 03/31/2017

Event Time: 11:55 [EDT]

Last Update Date: 03/31/2017

Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY

10 CFR Section:

50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION

Person (Organization):

BILL COOK (R1DO)

Unit    SCRAM Code    RX CRIT    Initial PWR    Initial RX Mode    Current PWR    Current RX Mode

1    N    Y    97    Power Operation    97    Power Operation

Event Text

PRESSURE SUPPRESSION POOL DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO TORUS HIGH WATER LEVEL

"On March 31, 2017 at 1155 hours [EDT], with the reactor at 97% core thermal power and steady state conditions, operators inadvertently caused water level to rise in the Pressure Suppression Pool (TORUS). Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was restoring normal system valve line-ups after performing flushing of the suction piping of the Core Spray system in accordance with station procedures. During the process of restoring the appropriate valve line-ups, water was inadvertently transferred to the TORUS from the Condensate Storage Tank. The cause of the event is understood.

"The Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.7.A.5 was entered. The LCO AS was exited at 1540 when TORUS water level was restored to the limits specified in LCO's 3.7.A.1.b and 3.7.A.1.m. Because the TORUS was declared inoperable, PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"This was a case of the water level in the TORUS being above the TS limit. The TORUS was potentially available to provide cooling to the reactor if required.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Plymouth County.

No: IV-17-003 March 6, 2017

CONTACT: Victor Dricks, 817-200-1128

NRC Will Conduct a Special Inspection at Cooper Nuclear Station

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a special inspection at the Cooper Nuclear Station to review operator errors that affected a safety-related heat removal system. The plant, located in Brownville, Neb., is operated by the Nebraska Public Power District. “This special inspection will help us better understand the circumstances that led to the operator error,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Kriss Kennedy. “We need to assess the potential impact on plant safety and the licensee’s corrective actions to ensure that the cause has been effectively addressed.”

On Feb. 5, 2017, workers discovered that a misalignment of valves may have rendered one of the plant’s residual heat removal systems inoperable for several months. Operators also performed maintenance and testing on a second residual heat removal system during the same period. As a result, there may have been a period of approximately 72 hours when both systems were unavailable. The residual heat removal system is used to mitigate the effects of a variety of accidents.

Two NRC inspectors will begin their weeklong inspection on Monday, March 13, 2017. Areport on the findings will be publicly available within 45 days of the end of the inspection.

Power Reactor  Event Number: 52600

Facility: WATERFORD

Region: 4 State: LA

Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]

RX type: [3] CE

NRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN

HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON     Notification Date: 03/08/2017

Notification Time: 20:13 [ET]

Event Date: 03/08/2017

Event Time: 16:27 [CST]

Last Update Date: 03/08/2017

Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY

10 CFR Section:

50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION            Person (Organization):

JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)

Unit       SCRAM Code      RX CRIT Initial PWR          Initial RX Mode  Current PWR      Current RX Mode

3             N            Y             100        Power Operation              100        Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH TRAINS OF LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE ERROR

"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3.

"On March 8, 2017 at 1627 [CST] Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours.

"It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable.

"Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve [SI-135B] was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. "

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Junk Plant Watts Bar 2: A Main Condenser Collapsed

This has been nightmare since first start-up.

TVA investigates failure of condenser at Watts Bar nuclear unit

Washington (Platts)--7 Apr 2017 423 pm EDT/2023 GMT

Workers still are developing a repair plan for Tennessee Valley Authority's new 1,210-MW Watts Bar-2 nuclear generating unit in Spring City, Tennessee, after a condenser failure shut it last month, a spokesman said Friday.

TVA is investigating the cause of the structural failure of a portion of the steel condenser and repairs will involve reinforcing the structure, Jim Hopson said in an email.

The condenser is the part of the plant where steam from the turbines cools and turns back into water that can be sent back into steam generators.

"[S]ome of the structural supports within the condenser did not operate as designed," Hopson said. Those supports must be repaired and reinforced as part of a plan to return the condenser to service, he said.

That plan is being developed, and TVA does not have an estimate for the return to service of the unit, Hopson said.

Because of limited space inside the condenser, the assessment is taking longer than expected, he said.

Watts Bar-2 shut March 23 while it was starting up from an outage to check condenser and feedwater pumps. The unit shut immediately after synchronizing to the grid as condenser vacuum was lost, TVA said in an event report to NRC that day.

The 'B' waterbox of the condenser experienced a structural failure tripping the main turbine, NRC said in a preliminary report March 23. This allowed steam to enter into the main turbine hall, resulting in closure of the main steam isolation valves at the unit, the report said. Operators manually shut the unit after the incident.

Waterboxes are part of the condenser containing cooling water from the ultimate heat sink, which, in this case, is river water.

Watts Bar-2 is the newest nuclear unit in the US, having entered commercial operation in October. The unit had been "running like a top," TVA President and CEO Bill Johnson told reporters February 1.

Construction of Watts Bar-2 began in the 1970s but was suspended for two decades before TVA decided in 2007 to complete the unit.

The adjacent 1,210-MW Watts Bar-1 has been shut since March 18 for refueling and maintenance. The repair plan for the unit 2 condenser is being designed to avoid affecting the unit 1 refueling outage, Hopson said.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is following TVA's repair activities, but the condenser is not considered a safety-related component, so the agency will not need to approve the federal power producer's root cause analysis before restart, agency spokesman Roger Hannah said Friday.

Junk Plant FitzPatrick: More Testing Instrumentation Problems

Rash of Problems Testing Instrumentation at Nuclear Plants

Just like Pilgrim .

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52664
Facility: FITZPATRICK Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: HENDRIK VERWEY HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 04/04/2017 Notification Time: 11:32 [ET] Event Date: 04/04/2017 Event Time: 07:35 [EDT] Last Update Date: 04/04/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INADVERTENTLY ISOLATED DURING CONDUCT OF MAINTENANCE SURVEILLANCE "On April 4, 2017, at 0735 [EDT], the HPCI System was inadvertently isolated during the performance of l&C [Instrument and Control] testing. "Technicians were in the process of performing instrument surveillance tests for the HPCI [high pressure coolant injection] System (using Allowed Out of Service Times) when a trip signal was applied to the incorrect instrument. This caused a HPCI System isolation signal on High Area Temperature, resulting in the closure of the HPCI steam isolation valves and rendering the system inoperable and unavailable. RCIC was immediately verified to be operable. "The surveillance testing was aborted and system restoration is in progress. "This condition is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)." This placed the plant in a 14-day LCO action statement under Technical Specification 3.5.1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Junk Plant Grand Gulf: Staggering Around On Heroin And Nobody Knows How To Keep Him Sober

This is what you get with hearing it from the horses mouth.

I called the inspectors. Basically two feet disappeared from the condensate tank. The normal level is 26 feet. He doesn't know the amount of water. It was a bypass line around a main valve in the condensate system. It was a weld that leaked. All the water was collected in the condenser sump area and process back in rad waste. I believe the condensate pressure is 400 psi. The scram went well, but some communication issues surrounding the control room.       

Holy Christ, a steam pipe leak. Safety or non safety...

SUGAR LAND, TEXAS--April 4, 2017--Researched by Industrial Information Resources (Sugar Land, Texas)--Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station, located in Port Gibson, Mississippi, tripped offline its 1,259-megawatt (MW) Unit 01 reactor due to a steam-piping leak. System Energy Resources Incorporated (Jackson, Mississippi), a subsidiary of Entergy Corporation (NYSE:ETR) (The Woodlands, Texas), holds a 90% ownership and leasehold interest, and South Mississippi Electric Power, holds a 10% ownership interest.

A Surry level event:

(UCS)

Surry Nuclear Plant
On December 9, 1986, the 18-inch diameter pipe supplying water to main feedwater pump A for the Unit 2 reactor at the Surry nuclear plant in Virginia ruptured. This feedwater pipe provided water to the steam generators where it absorbed the heat produced by the reactor core. The pipe contained water at 370°F and pressurized to 450 pounds per square inch. The water flashed to steam as it jetted from the broken pipe ends, scalding eight workers installing insulation nearby. Four workers died from their injuries. The steam also tricked the fire detection system into actuating the fire suppression systems. Water from fire sprinklers shorted out computer card readers at locked doors, impeding responders trapped on the wrong side of doors that could not be opened with their keycards. Emergency systems unaffected by the broken pipe protected the reactor core. Investigation revealed that the pipe, which was installed with a wall thickness of 1/2-inch, had thinned to about 1/4-inch by erosion from the water rushing through it. The section that ruptured was an elbow where the pipe bent, forcing an accelerated erosion rate.

I don't get it, if leaked inside the turb or reactor building, there would be electrical shorts and fires all over the place. If outside, they would have to make a report radioactive contamination outside same building... 

They would have to enter a emergency classification declaration...

Reposted from 4/4

April 5

Wait a minute, the enormous condensate storage lost 24 feet of water and they had to scram on a condensate emergency procedure. Did anyone drown in the plant? Is it a instrumentation accuracy issues, did all the water leak inside the plant or outside the plant.

The condensate storage tank are notorious for being highly radioactively contaminated especially if lots of fuel failure.   

The silence is deafening loud!!!!

This is makeup water for all reactor leaks...   

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52663
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: DAVID BURRUS HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 04/04/2017 Notification Time: 06:57 [ET] Event Date: 04/04/2017 Event Time: 00:10 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/04/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	75	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO CONDENSATE LEAK "At 0010 [CDT], 04/04/2017, the reactor was manually scrammed from approximately 75 [percent] core thermal power due Condensate Storage tank level lowering to 24 feet. All control rods fully inserted and all systems actuated and operated as designed. No safety relief valves actuated. Reactor level and pressure are currently being controlled within normal bands. RCIC [reactor core isolation cooling] was manually initiated for level control. "This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the manual start of the reactor core isolation cooling system." The cause of lowering level was a condensate pipe leak. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant loads. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

But no coast down, that could be because of the four month "training" shutdown

Could they be entering a regular outage? .  

Today:

Grand Gulf 1

0

yesterday@100% power

Google Popperville, Grand Gulf

There is no event report...must be shutdown intentionally without a trip.

Last time they did this, they went into the 4 month shutdown over licensed operator incompetence.

These guys got a disgusting capacity factor.

I predicted their problems were just beginning.

Junk Corp Westinghouse: Chinese Wants To Buy Them.

This is a smart move by the Chinese. It's undermining the stature of the USA and Japan.

With all this deregulation, the USA should buy Westinghouse. Then build twenty plants at a time and super standardized them. We need to build them four times bigger than the big guys we have now.

Trump Officials Alarmed Chinese May Bid for Westinghouse Unit

The Trump administration is so alarmed that Chinese investors may try to purchase Westinghouse Electric Co.’s nuclear business that U.S. officials are trying to find an American or allied buyer for the company instead, two people familiar with the matter said.
Cabinet members including Energy Secretary Rick Perry and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin have discussed preventing Westinghouse’s purchase by a Chinese-linked company, three U.S. officials said.
For years, Chinese entities have been interested in the nuclear reactor builder, and the company has been a repeated target of Chinese espionage. Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on March 29 and its parent company Toshiba Corp. is seeking a buyer for its money-losing reactor business.
Trump administration officials and members of Congress are concerned the bankruptcy filing could allow a bid from an investment group with hidden Chinese backing, one of the officials said. All of the officials requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter…

Junk Plant Perry's Supersonic Outage, Should They Be Bragging About This?

I'll be watching them for now on.

Perry NPP Outage Shortest In 30 Years

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company on Tuesday said its Perry Nuclear Power Plant in Perry, Ohio was returned to service at 11:42 a.m. today, following a March 5, 2017, shutdown for refueling and maintenance.

In putting the plant back into operations, technicians accomplished a new record for an outage. FirstEnergy announced that the 29-day outage was the shortest refueling outage in Perry's 30 years of operation, with the previous record being 34 days in 2001.

The 1,268-megawatt plant is currently operating at approximately 20 percent power. Power levels will vary over the next several days as the plant ramps up to full power, the company noted...

Red Mercury And I 85 Collapse in Atlanta Cleanup

I 85 bridge collapse

Basically crack and cocaine heads lit up stored PCV under the bridge. It should be noted, minimum wages black crack heads destroyed the bridge in one of the whitest counties in Georgia (Gwinnett). Basically slave labor. I lived within a few miles of the collapse years back. Basically a homeless encampment with a sofa under the bridge.    

Red Mercury

Something sure looks fishy here. No arrest after disrupting a large building and housing an important gov regulator. No mention with the content of the so called red mercury. This guy traumatized the federal employees in the building. He talking red mercury and then declaring it in the NRC tells me something was going on in his head. The NRC didn't say this material was harmless.  

Junk Brown's Ferry Safety Relief Valves: Humongus Example of Inconsistent Enforcement with NRC's Regulations

It's call insanity.

What is the big deal here with two SRVs being inop this cycle, while Hope Creek I believe last outage, having something like 12 of 13 SRVs being inop. Why does the three SRV plant get a pressure setpoint drift violation, while the 12 of 13 SRV valve violations plant gets nothing but approval.

I am almost certain if the platinum seats were installed correctly it would make no difference. 

Hope Creeks's SRVs pressure test drift has been in violation of tech spec for a decade and the number of failed valve test has been ramping up till 12/ 13 failed this period. How does this make since?

Repeated events should require a escalated violation level and the number of valves failing per test should required another increase in a violation level.

A plant being in violation of tech specs requiring a immediate safety shutdown repeatedly and it's only a non cited violation...no wonder a large number of employees are in a deep state of disillusionment with the industry.

Risk perspectives makes following tech specs voluntary...    

November 9, 2016 

SUBJECT: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000259/2016003, 05000260/2016003, AND 05000296/2016003

Closed) LER 050000296/2016-004-00, Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specification Required Setpoints

a. Inspection Scope

On April 6, 2016, the Tennessee Valley Authority was presented with as-found testing results from NTS Huntsville indicating that three of the thirteen Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) from Browns Ferry Nuclear, Unit 3, exceeded the +/- 3 percent setpoint required for their operability. TS 3.4.3 required twelve of the thirteen MSRVs to be operable for MSRV system operability. The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report associated with this event and determined that the report adequately documented the summary of the event including the cause of the event and potential safety consequences. The residents reviewed the licensee’s corrective actions and associated analysis for this recurring issue. This LER is closed.

b. Findings

Introduction: A self-revealing Green Non-cited Violation (NCV) of TS 3.4.3, Safety Relief Valves was identified for two required Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRV) being inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specifications.

Description: Browns Ferry has thirteen MSRVs per unit of which twelve are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The MSRVs ensure that the maximum reactor vessel pressure is not exceeded. Every refueling outage, all thirteen MSRV pilot valves are replaced with ones that have been refurbished. The as-found technical specification required surveillance testing results indicated that three of the thirteen MSRVs from Browns Ferry Nuclear, Unit 3, exceeded the +/- 3 percent band around the setpoint. Any MSRV exceeding the +/- 3 percent band results in that MSRV being declared inoperable. Troubleshooting determined that the MSRV pilot valve discs failed by corrosion bonding to their valve seats. The valve discs were previously platinum coated to prevent this, but the valve seat's rough Stellite surface caused the coating to flake off. TVA determined that the MSRVs were inoperable from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016. Upon further analysis, the affected valves remained capable of maintaining reactor pressure within ASME code limits. The valves' ability to open by remote-manual operation, activation through the Automatic Depressurization System, and MSRV\ Automatic Actuation Logics were not affected. The system remained capable of performing its required safety function. TVA’s corrective actions were to replace all Unit 3 MSRV pilot valves, to analyze the pilot valves of the inoperable MSRVs, and to revise procedures to verify the pilot disc finish meets its requirements prior to valve assembly. MSRV operability was restored on March 28, 2016, during the scheduled replacement of the MSRVs with refurbished valves which were certified to lift within the technical specification required setpoint limits.

Analysis: The licensee’s failure to maintain operability of the MSRVs was a performance deficiency. Two of the twelve required MSRVs were determined to be inoperable during testing following the Unit 3 refueling outage. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. Specifically, two required MSRVs were not able to lift within their required pressure band. This performance deficiency was screened using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. This performance deficiency screened to Green because although the system was inoperable for greater than its allowed outage time and follow on action completion time, the system maintained its function. The inspectors assigned a cross cutting aspect of Resolution since the licensee has not taken sufficient corrective actions to address the continued out of tolerance lift results caused by corrosion bonding of the MSRV pilot valve seats. (P.3)

Enforcement: Technical Specification 3.4.3 required, in part, that 12 MSRVs be operable while in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and that if one required MSRV is inoperable that the Unit be placed in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours. Contrary to the above, from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016, Browns Ferry Unit 3 operated in Mode 1 with more than one required MSRV inoperable and did not enter Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours. The licensee’s immediate corrective action was to replace all Unit 3 MSRV pilot valves prior to the completion of the refueling outage. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1157981. (NCV)

Junk Facility Brunswick: The Mixure Of A Flaccid NRC and Contempuous Licensee

For most plants this is a security door. A security system at other plants monitors the opening and closing of the door. Why didn't this system catch it?

Thus if a explosion, the door would fly open and damage both DGS.

With the inspection findings of prolonged wear on the mechanisms, one can only wonder how long the door was really inop. Bet you the employees knew about the broken latch for years and just gave up writing up a work order because of a bum prioritization system.

How bankrupt the NRC, why isn't this written up by the NRC as three independent violations and violation lever escalated each time the agency caught it.

It should be a green, then yellow and finally a red finding...

As to throw salt on the wound, they just threw a warning ticket to the licensee on the three violations...

The ROP is completely broken down and throws no incentive to fix their organization.

It is a absolution system building a mountain of paperword and requiring no change of heart.  

New Inspection Report: Brunswick 05000325/2017007 AND 05000324/2017007 

Findings

Introduction: The NRC identified a Green NCV of Brunswick OLC 2.B(6) for Units 1 and 2, for the licensee’s failure to correct a nonfunctional fire door in the DG building.

Specifically, on three occasions, NRC inspectors identified door 2-DGB-DR-EL023-118 as having a stuck open latch, which prevented the door from closing and latching securely.

Description: Door 2-DGB-DR-EL023-118 was a single, hollow metal, swinging door equipped with self-closing hardware. It is an Underwriters Laboratory listed, threehour

rated door installed for access/egress between diesel generator cell no. 1 and diesel generator cell no. 2. The door is credited as a three-hour fire rated barrier

The NRC caught the door broken the first time and licensee reported it fixed?

separating the diesel cells. On February 10, 2017 the NRC inspectors found the latch mechanism for the door intermittently sticking, such that the door would not secure in the closed position. The licensee initiated AR 02099153, and dispatched an operator to investigate the door. The operator reported that they manipulated the door several times with no deficiencies noted, but recommended

The NRC caught it broken the second time and licensee reported it fixed?

that maintenance lubricate the latch. On February 14, 2017, the inspection team followed up on the issue and found

the door unlatched upon arrival. The licensee investigated the condition, declared the door non-functional, and initiated AR 02099929. The licensee entered the appropriate

action statement in accordance with site procedure 0PLP-01.2, “Fire Protection System Operability, Action, and Surveillance Requirements,” and maintenance replaced the old latching mechanism with a new one. After repair, the door was reported working satisfactorily and the action

The NRC caught it broken the third time and licensee reported it fixed, and the NRC "means it" this time?

statement was exited. The following morning, February 15, 2017, the team returned to the diesel generator building to

confirm the door was repaired adequately. Upon arrival, the

The NRC here below gets too emotional.

team, again, found the door unlatched. In response, the licensee investigated the condition, declared thedoor non-functional, and initiated AR 02100405. The licensee entered the appropriate action statement in accordance with site procedure 0PLP-01.2. The licensee took actions to install a new thumb latch, and to install a new door closure mechanism. The door was tested satisfactorily and the action statement was exited. Examination of the old hardware noted wear and tear on internal hardware parts, as well as a burr on one of the internal metal parts that most likely prevented full and consistent closure of the door. As a part of the corrective action, the licensee also initiated a cause evaluation to evaluate the repetitive nature of the failure, and the adequacy of the post-maintenance testing.

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Unprofessionalism Abounds

How much time did the leakage occur? It would tell you if the control room personnel are alert.

A high torus water lever make containment less effective. Bottom line, it is a short term event.

Water floods from storage tank into base of Pilgrim reactor

Monday Posted Apr 3, 2017 at 6:07 PM Updated at 7:37 AM

By Christine Legere
           
PLYMOUTH — Operators at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station failed to follow standard procedure last week and incorrectly re-aligned some valves, causing water to flood from a massive storage tank into the reservoir at the base of the reactor known as the torus.

The torus plays a role in depressurizing and cooling down the reactor in a severe accident.

At noon on Friday, Pilgrim operators were flushing out some piping in the reactor’s cooling system in preparation for the upcoming refueling. Workers opened a valve on the torus out of sequence, without first closing the valve on the water storage tank. This resulted in water being drained into the torus from the storage tank, setting off an alarm in the control room.

“This volume of water placed the torus level above the administrative limit for readiness should an unplanned event occur,” Patrick O’Brien, spokesman for Pilgrim’s owner-operator Entergy Corp. wrote in an email. “Station personnel appropriately responded to close the valves and processed and filtered the water from the torus back to the condensate storage tanks.”

The procedure took about four hours.

David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said such mistakes don’t built public confidence. “When control room operators err during low stress, fairly common activities, one has to wonder how they will perform in the highly stressful conditions during an infrequent accident,” Lochbaum wrote in an email. “Their proper responses can turn an accident into an incident. Their improper responses can turn an accident into a disaster.”

It is not even close to a guild. It's a rather simple procedure. Mostly flipping switches in the control room. Following a procedure exactly is mandatory for both the NRC and management. The public affairs officer is really working for the licensee. They sugar coat this events. Turning this into more or less a voluntary guild than following the procedure to the letter of the law is a example to that.

It sounds to me the torus was sitting at the upper limits of the normal operating band. Why was it there. One wonders if they got something leaking into the torus. Operating HPIC or RCIC raises water. Were they just too lazy to return the torus level to mid level of the operating range?    

Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said there are standard guides for operating the valve systems. “This was a breakdown in the process that shows lack of adherence to procedure,” he said.

The resident inspector from the NRC went to the control room immediately after notification of the event “and remained on hand to verify that the water flow to the torus had been halted and that the situation had stabilized,” Sheehan said There were no immediate safety concerns. “Nevertheless, the NRC staff is continuing to assess the event, including its risk significance,” Sheehan added.

The incident was the second involving operator error that occurred last week. On March 27, technicians doing heat testing on another reactor system triggered the wrong switch, which caused the temporary shutdown of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System — another of the systems needed to cool the reactor in an emergency.

It is a very large tank. It would take a lot of water to raise  the water level that high.

Why didn't the employees hear the leakage? Was the pump on? The torus is at a much lower elevation than the condensate storage tank.

I still say we got the inexpensive technology in real time to give us the position of every valve in the control room including all manual valves. A new plant would have that capability.   

Junk Plant Pilgrim: Unprofessionalism Abounds

Power Reactor    Event Number: 52655

Facility: PILGRIM

Region: 1 State: MA

Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]

RX Type: [1] GE-3

NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA

HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO    Notification Date: 03/31/2017

Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]

Event Date: 03/31/2017

Event Time: 11:55 [EDT]

Last Update Date: 03/31/2017

Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY

10 CFR Section:

50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION

Person (Organization):

BILL COOK (R1DO)

Unit    SCRAM Code    RX CRIT    Initial PWR    Initial RX Mode    Current PWR    Current RX Mode

1    N    Y    97    Power Operation    97    Power Operation

Event Text

PRESSURE SUPPRESSION POOL DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO TORUS HIGH WATER LEVEL

"On March 31, 2017 at 1155 hours [EDT], with the reactor at 97% core thermal power and steady state conditions, operators inadvertently caused water level to rise in the Pressure Suppression Pool (TORUS). Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was restoring normal system valve line-ups after performing flushing of the suction piping of the Core Spray system in accordance with station procedures. During the process of restoring the appropriate valve line-ups, water was inadvertently transferred to the TORUS from the Condensate Storage Tank. The cause of the event is understood.

"The Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.7.A.5 was entered. The LCO AS was exited at 1540 when TORUS water level was restored to the limits specified in LCO's 3.7.A.1.b and 3.7.A.1.m. Because the TORUS was declared inoperable, PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"This was a case of the water level in the TORUS being above the TS limit. The TORUS was potentially available to provide cooling to the reactor if required.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Plymouth County.

Svinicki: NRC's Feminized Black "Darth Vader"

Heard an NRC independent source about the mass firing.

This begins queuing up the Walking Dead Video at the question point.   

Wiki:

The Walking Dead takes place after the onset of a worldwide zombie apocalypse. The zombies, colloquially referred to as "walkers", shamble towards living humans and other creatures to eat them (they are attracted to noise, e.g., gunshots, and to different scents, e.g., humans). Humans they bite or scratch become infected and slowly turn into walkers as well. It is revealed early in the series that all living humans carry this pathogen, so that if they die from any other cause, they will also turn into walkers. The only way to permanently kill a walker is to damage its brain or otherwise fully destroy the body, such as by cremating it.The series centers on sheriff's deputy Rick Grimes, who wakes up from a coma to discover this apocalypse. He becomes the leader of a group of survivors from the Atlanta, Georgia region as they attempt to sustain themselves and protect themselves not only against attacks by walkers but by other groups of survivors willing to assure their longevity by any means necessary

My linkedIn comments on the speech

Mike Mulligan What do you think in the written comment part of her speech about what she thinks about the TV program the "Walking Dead"? Was the comment respectful or disrespectful? She answered it perfectly. Was it a metaphor for our times and the condition of the industry? Are the zombie-walkers us (outsiders)? Was it a kind of pretest?

You get the paradox here? The mother-of-all industry crisis and most of what she was talking about is a form of deregulation and budget cuts. Show less 

Mike Mulligan It’s highfalutin code language. It designed to mean one thing to outsiders and a completely different thing to special insiders. It’s designed to booster a agenda of the insiders. 

Like, she said this season’s “Walking Dead” begins with a lot of violence and killings. But it gets back after a few shows to the regular theme of epochal survival of the fittest, she says. Was this intimidation to her employees? Is the agency heading for mass firings and getting rid of special people? After all, this is the beginning of her chairperson administration of the NRC just like the opening programs of this season’s Walking Dead? ?

I never seen such a disgraceful comment posed to an US agency head and disgraceful comment back.

Are all NRC employees required to watch “The Walking Dead.” She was prepared to answer that strange question. 

And she took out Jaczko. Was she referencing this event?  

Mike Mulligan Was the "Walking Dead" mocking the state of the industry?

I call it "getting off" on gratuitous human violence, death and human suffering...

'The Walking Dead' sets stage for war in tense season finale

Brian Lowry

Andrew Lincoln in 'The Walking Dead'

(CNN)The following contains spoilers about "The Walking Dead's" Season 7 finale.

"The Walking Dead" certainly seemed aptly named through the second half of this season, which didn't really go anywhere in much of a hurry. That ambling build-up set the stage for an extended tension-filled finale Sunday that contained a little bit of everything, and at least avoided the irritating cliffhanger stunts that have characterized seasons past.

There was, finally, something cathartic about seeing Rick (Andrew Lincoln) and the coalition he had painstakingly, gradually assembled fight back against the brutal Negan (Jeffrey Dean Morgan) and the Saviors. Not that the battle really settled anything, since Negan managed to escape, rallying his massive army at the end by announcing, "We are going to war!"

Since Negan first made his presence felt on the show -- in a stomach-turning sequence that milked his cheerful sadism for all it was worth -- AMC's signature hit has both been significantly altered and lost a substantial portion of its audience. While previous years were built around carefully constructed arcs as the central group sought elusive refuge in one location or another, Negan's vise-like hold on the disjointed communities under his thumb cast a very long shadow, even during those stretches where the charismatic Morgan wasn't on screen.

The finale, in a way, felt like an effort not just to spin the show into a state of open warfare -- with all the tactical aspects that entails -- but also to address some of the concerns voiced about its dramatic drift. Perhaps that's why there were so many different flourishes upon which to chew, from Sasha (Sonequa Martin-Green) engaging in her noble sacrifice to an unexpected betrayal to an old-fashioned last-minute rescue, sending Negan and his band into uncharacteristic retreat.

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Having been pretty overtly emasculated by Negan in their early encounters, Rick was also given an opportunity to exhibit some of his trademark grit, telling his nemesis yet again that he would eventually kill him, despite being captured and beaten.

The writers even set aside what amounted to a calming moment near the close to acknowledge the various losses and provide the characters a momentary respite. Mercifully, they also spared die-hard fans from sweating out, say, who was on the wrong end of Negan's bat until October.

That chance to inhale felt welcome, especially if the coming season is indeed going to be one long martial exercise, in a show that has long since moved beyond fear of zombies to the horrors people will inflict upon each other when not bound by laws. (Notably, except for the Sasha interlude, "walkers" were an afterthought in this latest episode.)

The challenge facing "The Walking Dead" going forward is how to balance the more epic qualities the current storyline augurs without losing sight of the core characters. In that respect, Sunday's finale can be viewed as a tentative step in the right direction -- a victory, however modest, for a series whose biggest and best days appear well behind it.