Junk Plant Pilgrim: Why not Employee Sabotage within this LER?

Update march 24

Lawmakers in Pilgrim zone urge NRC to shut nuke plant down
March 22, 2017

eclark@wickedlocal.com

PLYMOUTH – Some supervisors on performance improvement plans didn't know they were on performance improvement plans.

Wrong names appeared on some of these plans.

A part broke on a generator and a part that didn't match that part was used to replace it. An event report for an issue with the plant wasn't filed within the required 60 days.

A problem pertaining to the dry well was "closed out" without being fixed.

There was failures to take corrective action and to "adequately implement" a fix to the safety culture problem.

A temporary fix of injecting sealant to stop a water leak in the residual heat exchanger was treated as a permanent solution, not a temporary one.

The wrong part of a safety relief valve was fixed, and the root cause of the problem went unnoticed…

Reposted from 1/23/2017

I am getting from some plant employees there has been a agreement amongst them to minimally participate with the NRC. There are so pissed off with the bullshit spinning games of NRC and

"The failure is attributed to minimal engagement of the pressure adjusting threaded union for the relief valve setting of 15 psig, and there is some contribution from either engine vibration or possibly human error which makes the cause indeterminate."   

Entergy this is their way protesting it and getting attention. They are sick and tired of working in a poorly funded plant. They are sick and tired of constantly of being under the intimidation of being fired by everyone. They are sick and tired with Entergy threatening they will get fired for telling the truth to the NRC and NRC telling them they will get them fired for not telling the truth to the agency.

December 9, 2016

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report 2016-008-00, Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' Past lnoperability

On September 28, 2016, while performing the pre-start checks prior to running the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-A •or the monthly Technical Specification (TS) surveillance, the oil level in the EDG radiator fan right angle gearbox was found ~o be low and additional checks found the gearbox oil pressure relief valve in a loose state which provided a pathway for gear oil to be pumped out of the gear box while the EDG was operating. EDG-A was declared inoperable, the relief valve was repaired, pressure tested and the pressure adjusting threaded union was staked to eliminate any risk from vibration induced motion in the future, the gearbox oil was replaced and the EDG run for a post-maintenance test.

A Functional Failure Determination completed on October 11, 2016 determined that the EOG would not have been able to run for its stated mission time of 30 days. This condition existed for a period of 28 days since the last surveillance test on August 31, 2016 which is greater than the TS Allowed Out of Service Time (AOT) of 72 hours. However, the Station Black Out Diesel Generator was available during this time frame. This issue is reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an Operation or Condition which was Prohibited by the plant's TSs. On September 15, 2016 EDG-B was made inoperable to perform its monthly operability run. This created a situation where •or a brief period of time both EDGs were inoperable which is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident which is reportable in accordance with 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A), 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B), and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). EDG-B remained available and could quickly have been restored by manual action to an operable condition if needed during the operability run.

The safety objective of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) is to provide a source of on-site AC power adequate for the safe shutdown of the reactor following abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents assuming a complete loss of off-site power, as described in Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Two EDGs and their associated fuel supply systems provide a single failure proof source of standby AC power. Pilgrim EDGs are 2600 KW ALCO 251-F type diesel generators. These EDGs are designed to automatically start upon receiving a valid signal, and come to operating speed ready to assume load. Each generator is sufficient to power all loads on its emergency bus upon failure of all off-site power. Each generator has the ability to pick up loads in sequence within a specified time period. The two EDGs at PNPS are cooled by a self-contained system consisting of radiators and a fan that is driven through a right angle gearbox.

The standby AC power source provides two independent diesel generators as the onsite sources of AC power to ~he emergency service portions of the station Auxiliary Power Distribution System. Each onsite source provides ~C power to safely shut down the reactor, maintain the safe shut down condition, and operate all auxiliaries necessary for station safety.

Historical review revealed that this fan drive gearbox was replaced on the EOG-A in the May 2000 time frame. At ~hat time, the original gearbox, Cotta Transmission Model Number J1327-2 was replaced with an upgraded Model Number J1327-3. Correspondence with the OEM vendor indicated the inside of the cases were identical with the only major physical change on the outside which was the addition of a relief valve in the oil circuit. Changes to the gearbox inspections were not updated to include any inspections or preventive maintenance for the relief valve.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 28, 2016, while performing the pre-start checks prior to running the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-A monthly Technical Specification (TS) surveillance, the oil level in the EOG radiator fan right angle gearbox was found low and additional checks found the gearbox oil pressure relief valve was loose.

The two EDGs at PNPS are each cooled by self-contained systems consisting of radiators and fans that rotate through a right angle gearbox. At the time of discovery, even though the oil level was low, the EOG would have started on a valid start signal. However, it would have been losing gearbox oil and we conservatively assumed it would have overheated due to failure of the cooling fan from gearbox damage. ~Functional Failure Determination completed on October 11, 2016 conservatively determined that the EOG would not have been able to run for its stated mission time of 30 days. This condition existed for a period of 28 days, which is greater than the TS Allowed Out of Service Time (AOT) of 72 hours. However, the Station Black Out Diesel Generator was available during this time frame.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The failure was determined to be low oil level found in the EOG-A radiator fan right angle gearbox due to the external relief valve pressure setting screw and the cap which goes over it being disconnected from the valve body. This allowed a pathway for oil to escape the gearbox when the EOG was running.

The radiator fan right angle gearbox oil level is checked prior to every monthly EOG run and the last time it was performed was August 31, 2016 with no problem identified during the pre-start checks. The last maintenance performed on the EOG radiator fan right angle gearbox was part of the routine examination and checks during the 2 year Preventive Maintenance (PM), which was completed on March 7, 2015. The inspection includes draining and changing the oil, performing internal inspection of the drive gears and bearings and performing backlash measurements of the drive and driven gears. However, the two (2) year PM does not perform any maintenance on ihe gearbox oil pressure relief valve. The relief pressure of 15 psig was set at the time of installation in 2000. Changes to the gearbox inspections were not updated to include any inspections or preventive maintenance for the relief valve.

The failure is attributed to minimal engagement of the pressure adjusting threaded union for the relief valve setting of 15 psig, and there is some contribution from either engine vibration or possibly human error which makes the cause indeterminate.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

EOG-A was declared inoperable, the relief valve was repaired, pressure tested and the pressure adjusting threaded union was staked to eliminate any risk from vibration induced motion in the future, the gearbox oil was replaced and •he EOG run for a post-maintenance test.

PNPS conducted an extent of condition review for EDG-B by performing an inspection to ensure that a common mode failure did not exist. 1 -,

The following are additional corrective actions to address this issue which are being processed through the PNPS Corrective Action Program:

1. Update station procedure 8.9.1, "Emergency Diesel Generator and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance," to identify the plug that is used to check the oil level and visually inspect the reli~f valve to ensure the cap is appropriately aligned before and after each EOG run.

2. Incorporate a vendor manual change to capture the upgraded EDG's Cotta Transmission gear box. The gear box was updated in the 2000 time frame but the drawings/vendor manual was never updated.

3. Establish PM's for both EOG radiator fan right angle gearbox relief valves.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There were no consequences to the safety of the general public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, and radiological safety due to this event.

The safety objective of the EDGs is to provide a source of on-site AC power adequate for the safe shutdown of the reactor following abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents assuming a complete loss of off-site power, as described in PNPS UFSAR.

At the time of the event, the preferred AC and the secondary AC power sources were Operable and available to perform their intended safety function. In addition, the Station Blackout AC Power Source was Functional and available as the onsite source of AC power to the emergency service portions of the Auxiliary Power Distribution System.

REPORT ABILITY

In a determination completed on October 11, 2016 it was conservatively determined that EOG-A would not have been able to run for its stated mission time of 30 days. This condition existed for a period of 28 days, which is greater than the TS Allowed Out of Service Time (AOT) of 72 hours. However, the Station Black Out Diesel Generator was available during this time frame. This issue is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an Operation or Condition which was Prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

In addition, on September 15, 2016 EDG-B was made inoperable to perform its monthly operability run. This created a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident which is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), and 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D).

The date the condition was discovered was September 28, 2016. As such, this 60-day 10 CFR 50.73 Licensee Event Report was due to the NRC Staff on November 27, 2016. This LER is being submitted late, and PNPS is addressing this through the Corrective Action Program.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

Events involving LERs where both EDGs were inoperable were reviewed. One related LER was identified and is summarized as follows:

LER 2016-001, "Both Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable," dated June 9, 2016 stated while EDG-B was out for maintenance, EOG-A was declared inoperable due to a 130 dpm leak from the jacket water pressure boundary.

There were no other LERs involving EOG inoperability at PNPS identified in a search of the past five (5) years.

REFERENCES:

CR-PNP-2016-7443

CR-PNP-2016-9552

CR-PNP-2016-9653

CR-PNP-2016-9831

Junk NRC's "Puff Piece" News Article on Bankrupt FirstEnergy's Beaver Valley Nuclear Facility

Why did the NRC create newspaper Puff piece? Did you know how to identify Trump's" Administrative State" in any US government agency. It is when there image is more important than doing the public's interest. It is a US agency who is at war with the people.

Won't you like to hear from the NRC, "we have seriously ramped up our inspection activities based on FirstEnergy threating to shutdown Beaver Valley (and others) based on the facility being not profitable and FirstEnergy threatening declaring bankruptcy with the whole corporation." Won't raising inspection activities be conservative?

What is the agency's motives for writing this up?   

For nuclear inspectors, a 'boring' day is a perfect day

March 20, 2017 12:00 AM

By Daniel Moore / Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

Stacey Horvitz admitted she was a little excited on a recent morning, as the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant quietly loomed nearby.

She checked with her colleague, Jim Krafty, then reached for an emergency-red knob on the control panel, a sprawling bank of buttons, switches, computer monitors and lights that blinked dully. It would be a bit startling, she warned.

When she pulled it, several alarms sounded at once. Green lights turned red. Indicators showed the plant’s power generation plummeting, off-site power sources turning on, and water pumps kicking into gear.

It was such a nightmare scenario for Ms. Horvitz and Mr. Krafty that they seemed to take comfort in stressing to visiting journalists that — despite this simulated control room being a replica of the real one across the street — none of this was real.

In fact, as the two resident inspectors at the Beaver Valley plant, they spend their days ensuring there’s as little disruption as possible.

“A perfect day is a very boring day,” said Mr. Krafty, the senior resident inspector, only a little tongue-in-cheek. “Boring means 100 percent power and everything’s stable.”

The job of a nuclear inspector is immensely important. Employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, they are the public’s eyes and ears at the one hundred or so nuclear power plants across the country.

The NRC launched the inspector program in 1978 — just prior to the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island in Dauphin County — to improve the agency's oversight by being able to independently verify the performance of plant operators and equipment.

Although U.S. nuclear plants have not suffered a breakdown of Three Mile Island magnitude since, inspectors address plenty of issues that would otherwise go unnoticed by reviewing equipment, reading paperwork and, occasionally, responding to an error known as a “safety-significant event.”

The Beaver Valley inspectors, like everyone else, begin their day by passing through security at the 1,800-megawatt nuclear plant, which is owned by Akron, Ohio-based FirstEnergy Corp. and sits on 453 acres along the Ohio River in Shippingport.

The inspectors get a first status update on the plant by looking over the operators’ logs, Ms. Horvitz said. “We’ll read the issues they’ve identified to see if anything has safety significance,” she said. They glean more information by talking to the operators in the control room and attending daily meetings with plant management.

They then go about a routine schedule of inspections, keeping in touch with the NRC’s regional office near Philadelphia.

Each year, their work culminates in an annual review of the plant’s performance published by the NRC, which is discussed at a public town hall. This year’s meeting is Monday from 5 to 6:30 p.m. at the Shippingport Community and Municipal Building.

The NRC trains prospective inspectors for months before sending them to a plant, pairing them with other resident inspectors to learn the ropes.

The inspectors are not licensed to operate the equipment and generally stay out of the way and let the company work, they said. They do, however, need to understand the plant equipment and know how to speak the lingo.

Every nuclear plant’s control room and operations are slightly different, Mr. Krafty said. Even at Beaver Valley, where the two reactors are both manufactured by Westinghouse, there are subtle differences due to the evolving technology: The first unit came online in 1976 and the second in 1987.

Mr. Krafty, who joined the NRC in 2004, earned a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy and served as a submarine officer for seven years.

Ms. Horvitz joined the NRC in 2013, shortly after graduating from the University of Pittsburgh with a bachelor’s in mechanical engineering. After completing the NRC’s 18-month training program, she joined the regional office and this year was named a resident inspector at Beaver Valley.

Despite any natural tension between government agencies and businesses they regulate, the inspectors described the relationship the NRC has with FirstEnergy as constructive and respectful.

A big reason is the inspection program itself: While strictly prohibited from socializing or getting too close to any FirstEnergy employees, the resident inspectors are on the ground every day with the workers.

“They see us every day, which puts them more at ease,” Mr. Krafty said. “They know we’re not there to make issues. We’re there to identify issues when they occur.”

“We can disagree,” he added, “but we can be professional about it.”

In recent years, Mr. Krafty said, inspectors have been involved in a number of incidents on a scale of importance: In March 2015, a security officer placed an explosives detector in service without noticing an out-of-service sign; in April 2015, a water pump failed, forcing the plant to temporarily shut down; in January of this year, a false fire alarm occurred in one of the reactor containment buildings.

Incidents are graded on four tiers of emergency. For an “unusual event” — declared by the NRC for January’s false fire alarm — is the lowest of four levels of emergency classification, for problems that “indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.”

Though tasked with alerting the public of flaws, they insist nuclear power is safe and clean. Ms. Horvitz was surprised that a good chunk of Americans — nearly 1 in 3 in 2016, according to public opinion polls — oppose nuclear power.

“If people were allowed to come in and observe all of this, they would see the great lengths they go to ensure safety,” Mr. Krafty said.

Ms. Horvitz added, “If I didn’t think it was safe, I wouldn’t be here.”

Here below expresses the real financial condition of Beaver Valley and FirstEnergy.

Fate of Beaver Valley nuclear plant hinges on subsidies

Excerpts
(March 20, 2017) PITTSBURGH (AP) — One way or another, come next year, FirstEnergy Corp. is getting rid of the Beaver Valley nuclear power station.
Either the Ohio-based company will shut down the 1,800-megawatt plant, two decades ahead of schedule, or it will sell it to another operator. The latter option is a nonstarter unless something — aka someone, aka legislators in Pennsylvania and Ohio — intervenes to give nuclear energy a boost.
The Beaver County nuclear plant and two others in Ohio share the same chopping block as about a dozen fossil fuel plants in FirstEnergy’s portfolio across several states where electricity generation is not directly supported by ratepayers.
The primary reason why nuclear is in trouble is cheap, plentiful natural gas.
Nuclear plants don’t ramp up or down with demand. They’re steady workhorses, running when it’s economical as well as when it isn’t and providing a backbone to the electric grid. In the U.S., about 20 percent of electricity comes from nuclear power.
In Pennsylvania, which ranks second in nuclear power production in the nation, it’s closer to 35 percent.
But the price of electricity is determined by a regional wholesale market each day. Power plants offer to produce power at various prices and their offers are accepted from the lowest to higher until the demand for electricity is met.
The price offered by the last plant in that line becomes the price for all plants called on to produce power.
More often than not, the price is set by a plant that runs on natural gas. As the price of that fuel has fallen over the past several years, the price of electricity on the grid has fallen as well.
That dynamic, along with regulatory costs and lower electricity demand overall, has hurt not only nuclear plants but coal plants as well.
Last month, FirstEnergy reported a $9.2 billion impairment of its competitive generation business, erasing all but $1.5 billion of the value of its three nuclear plants and many of its fossil fuel assets. The debt associated with these plants far exceeds their current value, Mr. Jones said last month, so one of the options the company is exploring is bankruptcy protection.
The write-off is the latest step in FirstEnergy’s strategy to untangle its business from unregulated generation and focus solely on utility and transmission businesses, which are supported by ratepayers. The company announced in November that it would seek to sell or close down its unregulated plants…

New Junk Plant Watts Bar 2 is a Lemon

So two scrams in three days. These guys got serious safety cultures problems and a very poor initial startup record...

Heading for a 95001?

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52630
Facility: WATTS BAR Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: DAMON FEGLEY HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH	Notification Date: 03/23/2017 Notification Time: 02:48 [ET] Event Date: 03/23/2017 Event Time: 00:14 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	16	Power Operation	3	Startup

Event Text

AUTOMATIC START OF AUXILIARY FEED WATER "On March 23, 2017, at 0014 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN2) experienced an unplanned trip of both Turbine Driven Main Feed Pumps (TDMFP) following a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum. The trip of both TDMFPs caused an automatic start of both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump. [The] cause of the loss of Main Condenser Vacuum is currently under investigation." The plant was performing a normal startup, and had just synced the main generator to the grid. Subsequent to the event, the plant was transitioned to Mode 3 by inserting all rods with a manual trip. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 remains in Mode 5 for a refueling outage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 52625
Facility: WATTS BAR Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JOHN TUITE HQ OPS Officer: NESTOR MAKRIS	Notification Date: 03/20/2017 Notification Time: 10:17 [ET] Event Date: 03/20/2017 Event Time: 08:13 [EDT] Last Update Date: 03/20/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	M/R	Y	91	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AS A RESULT OF SECONDARY PLANT TRANSIENT "On March 20, 2017 at 0813 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 operations personnel manually tripped the plant from approximately 91 percent power based on lowering steam generator levels. Prior to the plant trip, the 2A Hotwell pump tripped at 0758 EDT and the 2C Condensate Booster Pump subsequently tripped at 0802 EDT. Operations personnel commenced to lower plant power after the 2A Hotwell pump trip in an attempt to maintain steam generator levels, but were unable to recover level and manually tripped the unit. "All control rods fully inserted and all automatically actuated safety related equipment operated as designed. At 0905 EDT, operations personnel exited the emergency operating instructions after the plant was stabilized. The cause of the event is under investigation. "This event is reportable to the NRC within four hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a result of the actuation of the Reactor Protection System and in eight hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a result of actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Junk Plant Grand Gulf New Inspection Report: No Violations.

Everyone is waiting for the special inspection report.

The new inspection report indicates continued profound weakness in the organization. Remember, the inspectors told me the plant has been having leading industry experts coming in and out of the site. Was it enough to turn around the organization...  

IR 05000416/2017009; 01/17/2017 – 02/17/2017; Grand Gulf Nuclear Station; Integrated

Inspection Report.

Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed simulator training for operating crews. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators’ critique of their performance.
• January 19, 2017, the inspectors observed “Just-In-Time” simulator training for an operating crew which consisted of implementation of the startup integrated operating instruction.
• January 21, 2017, the inspectors also observed a directed learning activity for a shift manager which focused on a weakness identified during high intensity training.

The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems and/or to impact barrier
integrity:
• January 27, 2017, the reactor core isolation cooling motor operated valve inoperable/power loss annunciator illuminated; the licensee stopped withdrawing control rods and performed immediate troubleshooting of thirteen isolation valves prior to verifying the capability of the reactor core isolation cooling system to
perform its function.
• January 28 – 29, 2017, the intermediate range monitor C failed; the licensee stopped withdrawing control rods and performed immediate troubleshooting that revealed a damaged cable.
• January 31 – February 3, 2017, the local power range monitor inputs to the 3D Monicore program failed to transmit data such that safety limits could be readily verified; the licensee stopped withdrawing control rods, maintained power below 21.8 percent, performed troubleshooting, and ultimately replaced the computer system.

Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee’s corrective action program. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution.

The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee’s

problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

On February 8, 2017, the inspectors completed a review of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station’s recovery plan, specifically focused on the restart plan corrective actions and operator high intensity training. Grand Gulf Nuclear Station performed a technical specification required shutdown on September 8, 2016, to address an issue with the residual heat removal pump A. During the shutdown, the licensee had two human performance errors in the operations department. On September 27, 2016, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station plant management notified the NRC of their intent to delay start-up of the plant, following the

forced outage, to implement corrective actions to assess and resolve operational performance concerns (See Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-16-003, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16273A330).

b. Observations and Assessments

1. Restart Corrective Actions

• The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s restart plan, dated January 4, 2017, and focused on the corrective actions that the licensee had designated as, “Actions required for restart.” Of the nine corrective actions with this designation, the inspectors concluded that four were satisfactorily completed, four had received due date extensions that extended beyond the date of the restart without documented justification, and one was closed without documentation demonstrating that the intent of the corrective action was met.

The four due date extended corrective actions were centered on performing external assessments/benchmarking to ensure that normal and off-normal procedures were up to industry standards. The actions were also to address benchmarking in the area of immediate operator actions. These corrective actions were identified because inadequate procedures and operator actions played a significant role in the events leading up to the decision to stay shutdown for over four months.

Following the team’s questions, the licensee provided written discussions to be documented in the corrective actions that justified the due date extensions. In addition, the licensee was able to demonstrate that the corrective action which was closed without documenting that the intent had been met was actually

accomplished through another corrective action. They performed out-of-the-box evaluations (OBE’s) with first line supervisors in the maintenance department which met the intent of the closed corrective action.

The inspectors assessed the licensee’s problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions

and that these actions were adequate to correct identified weaknesses in operator fundamentals and station weaknesses.

2. Roles and Responsibilities

• The inspectors noted weaknesses in the outage control center’s precision, rigor, and leadership. The inspectors did not observe the outage control center driving completion of work items, and instead noted a more reactive mode of operation.

• The team noted that the operations manager occasionally stepped outside of his broader oversight role and provided specific guidance on the performance of a procedure to answer the questions of the at-the-controls operator. The inspectors concluded this was, more appropriately, the responsibility of the control room supervisor.

3. Communications

• The inspectors observed that three way communication in the control room and the field has improved significantly.

• The inspectors noted that pre-job briefs tended to be lengthy, unfocused, and unengaging. For instance, reading a procedure from start to finish was not uncommon, and the level of engagement by the operators diminished significantly after a few minutes.

• The inspectors observed that communications between the outage control center, the control room, and the in-the-field crews were not consistent, and this resulted in multiple miscommunications. On numerous occasions, while trying to ascertain status or schedule of activities, neither the shift manager nor the outage control center could provide an accurate answer.

• The inspectors observed that control room log entries lacked detail which made it difficult for an independent reviewer to assess the events reflected in the entries.

4. Procedure Use and Adherence

• During the inspection, the team observed activities that involved the operations, maintenance, and radiation protection departments. The team observed that procedure use and adherence was generally improved and that discrepancies or ambiguities in procedural steps were addressed by stopping and involving supervisors to get the problems resolved.

5. Operator Fundamentals

• The inspectors observed that the high intensity training has had a substantial impact on the operating crews, and it appears that the new higher standards are being applied throughout the operations organization. The team observed many activities in the field, which involved licensed and non-licensed operators, and directly observed the new standards in use.

• The inspectors observed operators being engaged and deliberate when manipulating controls in the control room; the operators discussed the action, the expected outcome, and verified the desired outcome following manipulations.

6. Training for Other Departments

• The inspectors noted that the licensee invested significant resources in high intensity training and improving operator fundamentals, standards, expectations, and procedures for the operations department. However, the inspectors noted

that the licensee invested fewer resources in improving the performance of the maintenance department, and the team noted that very little emphasis was placed on training, procedure quality, and setting standards and expectations in the engineering, security, chemistry, and radiation departments.

These activities constituted completion of one annual follow-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

Hinsdale, NH Police Department Response Times Decimated by Heroin Epidemic

Right, the Hinsdale Police department has had prolonged issues with a lack of proper funding...

The choice with small town America, either you have great schools or a great police department...you can't have both.

We should get a yearly synopsis from the courts and prosecutors on the capabilities and function of the local police department. But this is the brotherhood of the system, nobody want to criticize each other. They don't want to give ammo to those facing the courts.   

Reposted from 8/12/16

• Rumors are the Winchester Police Chief quit over the stresses of the heroin epidemic.
• Some lower level heroin crimes are not being prosecuted in order to conserve severely limited police and court resources.
• Hinsdale because situated in the "special tristate area" is the hot bed of heroin related crime in our region. Hinsdale has the highest police case load in the Manadnock and Cheshire county area.
• Last week the Hinsdale police department opened up 10 new female assault or sexual assault cases. 
• Police Chief Faulkner: "If I had to report all the crime committed in Hinsdale to our citizens nobody would want to live here."
  
• Police Chief Faulkner: "There are some really nasty and dangerous "bad guys" now living within our midst".

Update 8/13

This is way beyond a local, city, state problem...it is a national security concern. It is destabilizing the police departments and courts on a massive scale. It is intensifying gang behavior and law breaking on a massive level.

We need to embargo countries and prepare to military enter countries in order to curtail production of heroin or fentanyl. We need to take out and disrupt the organized gang activity. If a country can't control the production of heroin or fentanyl aiming to sell into the USA, then your indifference to the problem is a declaration of war on the USA. We need to declare war on a country so the rest of the nation states will begin to control the their heroin production. And cut off any monies we are sending to heroin producting nations.     

Keene firefighters respond to overdoses

Posted: Saturday, August 13, 2016 8:00 am            

Keene firefighters respond to overdoses

                                           

By Cheyenne Vaughn Sentinel Staff

                                                           

Keene firefighters administered Narcan for three opioid overdoses on Thursday. 

The department responded to as many as five overdoses, according to Keene Deputy Fire Chief Jeffrey Chickering, but administered Narcan — an opioid antagonist — for only three. 

Two of the overdoses that Narcan was used for appeared to be heroin overdoses, Chickering said, and the third was for another type of opioid. 

Chickering declined to comment on a potential cause for the unusually high number of Narcan uses Thursday, but said that numbers do fluctuate sometimes.

We numbers like these below for a small town like Keene, NH, can't you imagine how the new case loads would gum up the bureaucracies and paperwork of the courts and police. Right, we are talking massively increasing the size of the police force and building new jails on a industrial scale. This thing is going to echo through generations of families.

"As of Aug. 1", firefighters had administered Narcan 93 times for 48 suspected opioid overdoses, according to Keene Fire Chief Mark F. Howard. 

So far this year, there have been three confirmed deaths from opioids in Keene. The class of drugs includes fentanyl, oxycodone and other prescription painkillers, as well as heroin.

 State officials: 196 confirmed drug deaths in 2016

Posted: Friday, August 12, 2016 12:00 pm | Updated: 12:05 pm, Fri Aug 12, 2016.


State officials: 196 confirmed drug deaths in 2016

By Sentinel Staff SentinelSource.com

Posted on Aug 12, 2016

by CLARK

CONCORD — The number of confirmed drug deaths in New Hampshire this year has hit 196, the state’s Office of the Chief Medical Examiner announced Thursday. Another 101 cases are awaiting toxicology results.

By year’s end, officials are projecting 482 people in New Hampshire will have died from drug overdoses, as the state weathers epidemic levels of opioid abuse. Despite signifying a third consecutive record-breaking year in New Hampshire’s drug-death toll, the projection is actually slightly down from an earlier forecast; as of last month, state officials were estimating 494 people would die from overdoses before 2017.

“It’s based on what week we’re in of the year and how many cases we’ve had so far and how many cases that are pending that look like drug deaths,” said Kim Fallon, chief forensic investigator for the medical examiner’s office. “So I imagine it will go up and down.”

The potent painkiller fentanyl continues to be responsible for the lion’s share of confirmed deaths; it was involved, either alone or in combination with other drugs, in 139 of them. Heroin has been linked to 12.

Approximately 13 percent of confirmed drug deaths so far this year — 26 — were caused by drugs other than opioids.

In addition to fentanyl, opioids include painkillers such as morphine, oxycodone and codeine, as well as heroin.

The 482 projected deaths would mark a 9.8 percent increase over the 439 people who officials confirmed died from drugs in 2015, and a 48 percent increase from the 326 deaths the year before.

Posted: Friday, August 12, 2016 12:00 pm

More 'smash-and-grab' car break-ins reported in area 

By CALLIE GINTER Sentinel Staff SentinelSource.com

Posted on Aug 12, 2016

by Callie Ginter

Police are investigating more vehicle break-ins in the area — this time, incidents in Brattleboro and Brookline, Vt.

The latest reports from Brattleboro and Vermont State Police come on the heels of Chesterfield police’s recent announcement that several so-called “smash and grabs” — burglaries in which someone smashes a vehicle window and grabs anything of worth — have happened in Chesterfield, Hinsdale and Winchester.

Within the past two weeks, there have been at least six vehicle break-ins in Brattleboro, according to Brattleboro police Lt. Michael Carrier.

Most of them occurred at the public boat launch on Old Ferry Road and at the parking area at the Harris Hill Ski Jump, he said. Similar to other recently reported cases, windows were smashed and valuables were stolen, according to Carrier, who said mostly wallets and purses are being taken.

He noted that valuables shouldn’t be left in a car — especially not in plain sight.

In Brookline, Vt., Vermont State Police got a call from David Levenbach of Brattleboro, reporting that his vehicle had been broken into around 4:15 p.m. Thursday. Levenbach’s had parked his Subaru at the Trailhead parking area in Brookline and left it for nearly four hours. Nothing was reported stolen. Vermont State Police’s agency in Westminster, Vt., which handled the case, was unreachable to comment on whether the incident is related to the other break-ins.

Meanwhile, Jennifer M. Matthews, 40, of Westmoreland said her black Nissan Altima was broken into last Sunday. She said she and her husband were at Sheep’s Rock, a popular swimming spot on Route 63 in Westmoreland, around 5 p.m.

They were out of their car for 20 minutes at most, she said, and when they returned to their vehicle, the driver’s side window was smashed out, and her husband’s wallet and watch were stolen from the console.

“We literally had no idea. We just walked down by the water and back up. and we didn’t even notice it. ... He walked to his side of the car and he was like, ‘What the hell?’ ” she said this morning.

“We were in shock, that doesn’t happen here.”

But in recent weeks, it has been happening, according to area police departments.

The Chesterfield Police Department cautioned the public via Facebook last Saturday of an influx of “smash and grabs,” and stressed that belongings either be hidden or locked in the trunk of the vehicle.

Hinsdale Police Chief Todd Faulkner said Monday his department had 10 reports over the course of three days — five on Sunday and a couple more during the midnight shift that same night.

Most reports in Hinsdale came from either the Wantastiquet State Park parking lot or behind the old Wal-Mart on Field Road, he said.

Chesterfield police Chief Duane Chickering said that generally one or two “smash and grabs” are reported yearly in town and that six have been reported within the past two weeks.

Carrier said he can’t say if the Brattleboro break-ins are related to the series of other break-ins that happened in Chesterfield, Hinsdale, and Winchester over the past few weeks, but his department is working with those agencies to see if there is a connection.

The crimes are being actively investigated and police advise the public to park in more public places, hide valuables, and continue to lock their cars.

Winchester police have been unavailable for comment since last week.

Any information about the “smash and grabs” can be reported to either of the police departments: 355-2000 for Chesterfield police (Cheshire County dispatch), 802-257-7950 for Brattleboro police, or at 336-7766 for Hinsdale police. Information can also be shared anonymously online on their websites at www.nhchesterfield/police or www.town.hinsdale.nh.us.

Callie Ginter can be reached at 352-1234, extension 1409 or cginter@keenesentinel.com. Follow her on Twitter @CGinterKS.

Troubles At The Hinsdale NH Police Department

The new police officers would get more pay and benefits working at Wal-Mart. I'd seen the trouble outline here before anything ever was written up. I went to the selectmen this summer saying the police department was overwhelmed. I said the nature outcome of this pressure was going to cause a unnecessary police shooting, either a police getting shot or a citizen getting shot, or a big expensive legal suit.

Remember I was involved with a 3.5 year old little boy who was lost, the heroin addled mother was hysterical...I called the police department three times with no response. 

The police department dressed this up in the absolute certainty they can tell the difference between a need of a immediate police response or a non immediate response. People calling 911 are just giving the contact person their impressions of a transitory experience with missing pieces of information. We all got different communication skills. Some are overly hysterical and others downplay events. Prioritizing police responses based on limited resources is extremely dangerous.  Yep, that air of absolute certainty for those in power is a big problem. Especially when the powerful are afraid to speak up with resource problem. 

New police officers, elementary school addition on tap in Hinsdale

By Xander Landen Sentinel Staff

SentinelSource.com

HINSDALE — Voters overwhelmingly approved two big-ticket budget proposals at Saturday’s annual Hinsdale School District and town meetings: the construction of an addition to the Hinsdale Elementary School and the hiring of two new police officers…You need an online service to view this article in its entirety.

No voters raised questions about the operating budget or any warrant article until article 8, which proposed the town raise $184,000 to hire two new police officers.

But when the article was put up for discussion, no one criticized the proposal. Instead, town residents expressed concern over under-staffing and mounting pressure at the department. 

In the police department’s 2016 annual report, Hinsdale Police Chief Todd Faulkner wrote that crime in Hinsdale is up, in part due to the state’s drug crisis.

Faulkner wrote that in 2016, the department handled 805 criminal investigations, compared to 705 investigations in 2015 and made 74 more “on-scene” arrests than in 2015.

With an increase in crime and only eight police officers on staff, he said the department can’t respond efficiently to many of the non-emergency calls it gets. And because of low staffing levels, the department had to request assistance from other police departments 150 times in 2016, he said.

A large burden is put on individual officers, and the department sees a high turnover rate, according to Faulkner.

“We have actually had officers tell us that they left because they burned out,” he said at the meeting.

After asking questions of Faulkner, Hinsdale residents voted in favor of hiring two new officers in a paper ballot vote of 113-24.