Junk Gov Corp TVA: Soiled Underwear Of Staff At Browns Ferry

Usually this comes from long term problems of maintenence with the automated obsolete equipment that washes and reinstalled the resin in the condensate deminerizer. This contradicts anything risk perspective, as this non safety condemin malfunction triggered 1979 Three Mile Island. But you had to have a lot of maintenance problems to create core rubble at TMI. The PWR's pressure operated relief valve (PORV)are very similar valves as the BWR's SRV valves but at a lot higher water pressure. 

This is the first time I remember a notification of high radiation cause by resin intrusion. This had got to be a lot a resin in the reactor. Usually they get a lot of smaller intrusions until the big one. 

Junk condensate deminerizer filter system causes loss of feed system and scram in 2009. These are amazingly complex mechanical and electronic system for being a non safety system. That is why it bites them in the ass over and over again.   

Unit 3 also: Licensee Event Report 50-29612009-001

Duane Arnold Licensee Event Report#2007-006-00

Reactor Shutdown as a Result of a Chemistry Excursion

On March 18, 2007, while operating at 28% power, a chemistry excursion occurred shortly after Condensate Filter Demineralizer 1T-13D was placed in service. The magnitude of the chemistry

excursion required operators to shutdown the reactor in accordance with abnormal operating procedures and plant chemistry procedures. As a result of inserting the manual scram, Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, and 4 isolations occurred when reactor water level dropped below 170 inches. All isolations went to completion. The reactor water level decrease is normal following a scram from 28% power due to void collapse in the reactor vessel. Reactor water level was subsequently restored to normal and the PCIS group isolations were reset.

Troubleshooting subsequently determined that the chemistry excursion was the result of resin intrusion from Condensate Filter Demineralizers into the Condensate System.

Facility: BROWNS FERRY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [ ] [ ] [3] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: MATTHEW SLOUKA HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 04/06/2016 Notification Time: 17:07 [ET] Event Date: 04/06/2016 Event Time: 15:45 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/07/2016
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): REBECCA NEASE (R2DO) BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD) BILL DEAN (NRR) CATHY HANEY (R2RA)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	N	Y	100	Power Operation	91	Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO MAIN STEAMLINE HIGH HIGH RADIATION CONDITION At 1545 CDT on 04/06/16 Browns Ferry Unit 3 declared and exited the declaration of an unusual event due to a main steam line high high radiation condition. Power to Unit 3 was reduced to 91 percent power. The high radiation condition alarm cleared at 1526 CDT. Browns Ferry Unit 3 reported that the high radiation conditions were due to resin intrusion from the condensate demineralizers into the reactor and hydrogen water chemistry was a potential contributor to the event. The cause is still under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. State and Local notifications were made. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA (email). * * * UPDATE FROM BILL BALL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0034 EDT ON 04/07/2016 * * * "At 1941 [CDT] BFN [Brown's Ferry] determined this notification to be potentially newsworthy due to receiving notification that counties [surrounding the plant] were alerted of this event. No plant conditions changed." The licensee may issue a press release. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Nease).

Junk Presidential Candidate Clinton On Indian Point

This must be her Benghazi answer on Nuclear Power. This is why things are the way they are. Didn't she, her husband or the foundation accept huge speaking fees from Entergy. "Huge"! She should have said, if they violate any rules, we should give the NRC humongous power to inflict a terrible price to make them toe the line.

Don't forget, she is a pawn of Russian Putin's uranium trading and centrifuging business! 

Isn't that just terrible, benignly calling for oversight...not talking about the NRC massive reform. Why isn't she criticizing the NRC. She has a green light with the Gallup nuclear power public disapproval rate.

She doesn't know how to wheel power or get involved. It is anybody but Clinton in my house of woman teachers. I like Trump because he is such a system disruptor.

Clinton calls for oversight, but not closure, of Indian Point

Scott Waldman

ALBANY — Hillary Clinton said she wants more review of the Indian Point nuclear facility but stopped short of calling for its closure. 

That’s in contrast to her presidential primary opponent, Sen. Bernie Sanders, who has called for its closure. 

“I’m glad he’s discovered Indian Point,” Clinton said Monday in an interview with "Capital Tonight’s" Liz Benjamin. “When I was a senator, I went after oversight; I went after safety.” 

Earlier Monday, Sanders had called Indian Point a “catastrophe waiting to happen," referring to the recent revelation that the plant had faulty bolts, and called for it to close.

Clinton said she had a history of calling for more oversight of Indian Point, from her time as a U.S. senator. 

Gov. Andrew Cuomo has repeatedly called for the closure of the plant because of its proximity to New York City. He has said there is no way safely to evacuate 20 million people in the greater New York City region who could be affected during a catastrophic accident. 

Clinton said Indian Point cannot easily be replaced, since it provides such a significant amount of power for New York. 

“There’s a current Nuclear Regulatory Commission study being undertaken, but we also have to be realistic and say, you get 25 percent of the electricity in the greater New York City area from Indian Point,” she said. “I don’t want middle-class taxpayers to see a huge rate increase, so this has to be done in a careful, thoughtful way.

Junk Plant Hatch Unit 2 2015 SRV testing report.

Hey Hatch: I know how to get you inexpensively though two or three cycles with leaking and testing failure prone SRV problems. Tell the NRC you diamond coated the pilot disc??? 

It doesn't matter you don't have the engineering evidence to prove diamond coating works? :)

Then go to coated pilot disc valves with: 

Rhodium

Ruthenium 

Iridium

It will get you to 20 years of reckless plant operation. 

If this 2 stage and 3 stage SRV thing doesn't get you confused, then something is wrong with. What was the first model SRV put in these plants when new? The 3 stage SRVs was put in new plant, the much improved design was the 2 stage model? Basically leaking and unreliability drove the industry into the much improved design with the 2 stage.   

I had a insider tell me Target Rock hasn't been making new SRVs for many decades. When a 2 or 3 stage SRV irreparably breaks, they just get old valves from the nuclear plant junk yards and get repair parts from China to refurbish them.    

LER 2-2011-002, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 3-stage SRVs during the Unit 2 Spring 2011 refueling outage which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue. Subsequent to that outage the 3-stage SRVs exhibited signs of unacceptable leakage which resulted in two separate outages that involved changing out four SRVs during the first outage and the remaining seven SRVs during the subsequent outage in May 2012. The 3-stage SRVs were replaced with 2-stage SRVs containing pilot discs that had undergone the platinum surface treatment.

This is last years unit 2 SRV testing report. The problem valves today are in unit 1. 

I  talked extensively to the senior resident at Hatch. He was amazingly open to me. He is the guy in charge of collecting the operating record on the industry and Hatch SRVs for the special inspection. He told me two valves went bad on lift point setpoint accuracy and two other valves didn't fully open or close leading to the special inspection. We talked all about the finding at Pilgrim and the part 21 report. He seems to think the test stand damage before installation causing component damage at Pilgrim has been ruled out. They did all sort of pre-installation inspection especially angled for preventing the Pilgrim problem.    

It is either on one or the second SRV going outside tech specs is where Hatch needs to shutdown to fix the valves. They can't see the damage at power.

Licensee Event Report 2015-004-00

Safety Relief Valves As Found Settings Resulted in Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria

On May 11, 2015 at approximately 0923, Unit 2 was at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) when the "as-found" testing results of the 2-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) were received which indicated that two of eleven of the Unit 2 SRVs had experienced a setpoint drift during the previous operating cycle which resulted in their failure to meet the Technical Specification (TS) opening setpoint of 1150 +1- 34.5 psig percent as required by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1.

The root cause of the SRV setpoint drift is attributed to corrosion-induced bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces. This conclusion is based on previous root cause analyses and the repetitive nature of this condition at Hatch and within the BWR industry. All 2-stage SRVs with platinum coated pilot seats were removed from Unit 2

So here is where they put all 3 stage valves into the plant. This is crazy as hell. Five years earlier in LER 2-2011-002 Hatch experimentally put in all 3 stage relief as a solution to fix the massive setpoint inaccuracies. Before the next outage, they had massive leakages and two shutdowns over the defective 3 stage that also failed at Pilgrim. They yanked the 3 stage out of the plant and reinstalled the 2 stage. Now in 2015 they reinstalled the 3 stage in Unit 2 and unit 1 has multiple 3 stage SRV failures to operate and two having violated tech specs over setpoint inaccuracies.

Notice the below phrase below in 2011; "replaced with 3-stage SRVs with a modified pilot, 3-stage SRVs typically do not exhibit set point drift". These SRV LERs are riddle with uncontested deception and fraud. Were is the evidence this is accurate: "replaced with 3-stage SRVs with a modified pilot 3-stage SRVs typically do not exhibit set point drift".  They stuck the 3 stage in the plant for one cycle and in the 2016 SRV LER not yet put out, it is going to say their were two SRVs who didn't pass their setpoint lift accuracy. It all gaming difinision of words in order to make money.   

during the 2015 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs with a modified pilot. 3-stage SRVs typically do not exhibit set point drift and the modified pilot reduces instances of vibration induced spurious openings and leak-by.

A 3-stage SRV with a similar modified pilot was installed on Unit 2 during the ·2013 refueling outage. Based upon "as-found" testing results, it was seen that pressure lift setpoints were maintained during plant operation.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On May 11 2015, at approximately 0923, with Unit 2 at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP), "as-found" testing of the 2-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) (EllS Code RV) showed that two of the ten main steam SRVs that were tested had experienced a drift in pressure lift setpoint during the previous operating cycle such that the allowable technical specification {TS) surveillance requirement (SA) 3.4.3.1 limit of 1150 +1- 34.5 (+/- 3%) psig had been exceeded. Below is a table illustrating the as found testing results of Unit 2 SRVs that were removed from service during the Spring 2015 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs.

MPL Pilot Serial No. Lift Pressure Percent Drift

2B21-F013B 1006 1155 0.40%

2B21-F013C 1231 1172 1.90%

2B21-F013D 303 1184 3.00%

2B21-F013E 315 1210 5.20%

2B21-F013F 1189 1179 2.50%

2B21-F013G 302 1174 2.10%

2B21-F013H 1230 1190 3.50%

2B21-F013K 1229 1164 1.20%

2B21-F013L 1228 1163 1.10%

2B21-F013M 1008 1179 2.50%

The 2-stage SRVs that were installed on Unit 2 during the previous cycle (Cycle 23) utilized platinum coated pilot discs. The 3-stage SRVs currently installed on Unit 2 have a modified pilot that helps reduce the possibility of inadvertent lift and leak by due to system vibration. The one 3-stage SRV that was installed on Unit 2 during Cycle 23 was recently successfully tested and found to be within the allowable TS SA pressure lift setpoint limit of 1150 +1- 34.5 (+/- 3%) psig.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of the SRV setpoint drift is attributed to corrosion-induced bonding between the pilot disc and its seating surface. This conclusion is based on previous root cause analyses and the repetitive nature of this condition at Plant Hatch and in the industry. In General Electric (GE) Service Information Letter (SIL) 196, Supplement 16, GE determined that condensation of steam in the pilot chamber of Target Rock 2-stage SRVs can cause oxygen and hydrogen dissolved in the steam to accumulate. As steam condenses in the relatively stagnant pilot chamber, the dissolved gases are released. In a volume such as the pilot chamber which is normally at approximately a 1000 psig pressure and a temperature of 545 degrees F, the total pressure consists primarily of water vapor partial pressure because 544.6 degrees F is the saturation temperature at 1000 psi g. This wet, hot, high-oxygen atmosphere can be very corrosive and can increase the likelihood of corrosion-induced bonding of the pilot disk to its seat. It was also noted that proper insulation minimizes the accumulation rate of non-condensable gases and the steady-state oxygen partial pressure. Despite improvements made in maintaining the integrity of insulation for the previously installed 2-stage SRVs and installing new platinum coated pilots, the corrosion-induced bonding continued to occur as evidenced by the test results from this most recent outage.

REPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because a condition occurred that is prohibited by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1. Specifically, an example of multiple test failures is given in NUREG-1022, Revision 3, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73" which describes the sequential testing of safety valves. This example notes that "Sometimes multiple valves are found to lift with set points outside of technical specification limits."

NUREG-1022 further states in the example that "discrepancies found in TS surveillance tests should be assumed to occur at the time of the test unless there is firm evidence, based on a review of relevant information (e.g., the equipment history and the cause of failure), to indicate that the discrepancy occurred earlier. However, the existence of similar discrepancies in multiple valves is an indication that the discrepancies may well have arisen over a period of time and the failure mode should be evaluated to make this determination." Based on this guidance and the fact that the development of the corrosion occurred over a period of time of plant operation, the determination was made that this "as found" condition is reportable under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

There are eleven SRVs located on the four main steam lines within the drywell in between the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) (EllS Code RPV) and the inboard main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) (EllS Code ISV). These SRVs are required to be operable during Modes 1, 2, and 3 to limit the peak pressure in the nuclear system such that it will not exceed the applicable ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Limits for the reactor coolant pressure boundary. 

The SRVs are tested in accordance with TS surveillance requirement 3.4.3.1 in which the valves are tested as directed by the In-Service Testing Program to verify lift set points are within their specified limits to confirm they would perform their required safety function of overpressure protection. The SRVs must accommodate the most severe pressurization transient which, for the purposes of demonstrating compliance with the ASME Code Limit of 1375 psig peak vessel pressure, has been defined by an event involving the closure of all MSIVs with a failure of the direct reactor protection system trip from the MSIV position switches with the reactor ultimately shutting down as the result of a high neutron flux trip (a scenario designated as MSIVF).

The results from this MSIVF event analysis was performed by the Nuclear Fuels Department in order to bound the "as-found" results of the U2 Cycle 21 2-stage SRVs pressure setpoint drift. The results from this analysis showed a small increase in peak pressures relative to the Hatch-2 Cycle 21 reload licensing analysis (ALA) results. The higher peak pressures were due to the fact that eight of the eleven SRVs opened at pressures higher than that which was assumed in the ALA. It should be noted that in this analysis, the larger actual valve bore size was used in the calculations for nine of the valves rather than the smaller bore size which was conservatively assumed in the ALA. Therefore, higher steam flow capacities than those assumed in the ALA were used in this analysis for those nine valves.

Based on the analysis, the calculated minimum margin to the 1375 psig ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code overpressure limit for peak vessel pressure would have been 27.7 psig and the minimum margin to the 1325 psig Tech Spec Safety Limit for the reactor steam dome pressure would have been 2.9 psig during an MSIVF event during Cycle 21 operation. Therefore, these test results show that in this case, where two of the eleven SRVs would have opened at pressures higher than that which was assumed in the RLA, the peak pressure at the bottom of the vessel would have remained below the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code limit and the peak RPV dome pressure remained within the TS Safety limits.

Additionally, a highly reliable, though non-credited, electrical actuation system serves as a redundant, independent method to actuate the SRVs. During Cycle 23 this redundant electrical logic system was fully functional. Based on the analyses performed, the overpressure protection system would have continued to perform its required safety function if called upon in its "as found" condition. Therefore, this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety and was of very low safety significance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 

The 2-stage SRVs with platinum-coated pilot discs were removed from Unit 2 during the 2015 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs that have a modified pilot. 3-stage SRVs typically do not exhibit set point drift due to their design. The modified pilots will help reduce spurious openings and leak-by due to system vibration.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Other Systems Affected: None

Failed Components Information:

Master Parts List Number: 2B21-F013E, H

Manufacturer: Target Rock

Model Number: 7567F

Type: Relief Valve

Manufacturer Code: T020

EllS System Code: SB

Reportable to EPIX: Yes

Root Cause Code: B

EllS Component Code: RV

Commitment Information: This report does not create any licensing commitments.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LER 1-2014-003, identified multiple SRV setpoint drifts for 5 of the 11 two-stage SRVs installed on Unit 1. The two-stage SRVs with platinum-coated pilot discs were removed from Unit 1 during the 2014 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs that have a modified pilot. The modified pilots will help reduce spurious openings and leak-by due to system vibration.

LER 1-2012-004, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 2-stage SRVs whose pilot discs had undergone a platinum surface treatment which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue.

(2) The above LER was stellite with a 72% failure rate. Now they going to put in platinum

LER 2-2011-002, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 3-stage SRVs during the Unit 2 Spring 2011 refueling outage which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue. Subsequent to that outage the 3-stage SRVs exhibited signs of unacceptable leakage which resulted in two separate outages that involved changing out four SRVs during the first outage and the remaining seven SRVs during the subsequent outage in May 2012. The 3-stage SRVs were replaced with 2-stage SRVs containing pilot discs that had undergone the platinum surface treatment.

Here we are in unit 2 with platinum surface treatment at the spa in LER-2-2011-02. There should be a 2013 unit 2 LER but there isn't. But in LER 2-2015-004-00 there is 2 SRV set pressure failures. Hatch explains in that LER they are replacing the platinum with the 3 stage SRVs because of 2 stage valve leaking problems and setpoint inaccuracy issues. Basically the 2 stage and 3 stage target rock SRV valves are lemons...poor design.       

LER 1-2010-001, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 5 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included refurbishment of the pilot valves and included the replacement of the pilot discs with discs made from Satellite 21 material. Additionally, the insulation surrounding each SRV was upgraded to improve resistance to corrosion-induced bonding. These were the same actions that were taken following similar failures reported in LER 2-2009-001, since improved results had been seen to some degree in the industry for at least one operating cycle when these actions were implemented.

(1) Lets do the "similar events" in chronological order. On the above LER 1-2010-001, these guys are so riddled by engineering deception and fraud. In a nuclear plant, there should never be a ongoing experiment. So plating a surface or installing stellite disc on the scheme of things, is unbelievably inexpensive. You are suppose to before installation, put the stellite or platinum plated disc and SRV valve on a test stand modeling the plant worst coolant inviroment. Put the disc and seat through three times the worst duty as the plant. Does it stick or get glued to the seat? Then you will know how the material will stand up under the worst conditions. No surprises. We think the stellite and the platinum was just a con job over the NRC to keep the plant running based on any crack pot explanation. In one cycle with the new stellite disc on  LER 1-2012-002, they had 8 of 11 SRV teck spec setpoint lift failures with the stellite. It is a much worst failure rate than without the stellete. It is a 72% failure rate. Hatch promised the stellite would fix the tech spec violation. 

Hatch Plant SRV Problems And Clear Indications On Normalization Of Deviance

Updated 4/5/2016

I knew Hatch was in trouble with their SRVs at the end of 2015.

Originally published on 11/6/15...republished

On May 11, 2015 at approximately 0923, Unit 2 was at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) when the "as-found" testing results of the 2-stage main steam safety relief valves (SRVs) were received which indicated that two of

Only two violations and it still blew accident assumption models.

eleven of the Unit 2 SRVs had experienced a setpoint drift during the previous operating cycle which resulted in their failure to meet the Technical Specification (TS) opening setpoint of 1150 +1- 34.5 psig percent as required by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1.

The root cause of the SRV setpoint drift is attributed to corrosion-induced bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces. This conclusion is based on previous root cause analyses and the repetitive nature of this condition at Hatch and within the BWR industry. All 2-stage SRVs with platinum coated pilot seats were removed from Unit 2 during the 2015 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs with a modified pilot. 3-stage SRVs typically do not

They put back the LER 2-2011-002 leaking ones. Based on the failed experimentations of the past, what evidence do they have with the modified pilot 3 stage... 

exhibit set point drift and the modified pilot reduces instances of vibration induced spurious openings and leak-by.

As I asked in Pilgrim, early LERs never spoke about steam line vibrations damaging SRVs. It seems like a new or intensifying phenomena. Please show me the historic trends with main steam line vibrations over time?  

Licensee Event Report 2015-004-00 

Safety Relief Valves As Found Settings Resulted in Not Meeting Tech Spec Surveillance Criteria

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because a condition occurred that is prohibited by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1. Specifically, an example of multiple test failures is given in NUREG-1022, Revision 3, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73" which describes the sequential testing of safety valves. This example notes that "Sometimes multiple valves are found to lift with set points outside of technical specification limits."

NUREG-1022 further states in the example that "discrepancies found in TS surveillance tests should be assumed to occur at the time of the test unless there is firm evidence, based on a review of relevant information (e.g., the equipment history and the cause of failure), to indicate that the discrepancy occurred earlier. However, the existence of similar discrepancies in multiple valves is an indication that the discrepancies may well have arisen over a period of time and the failure mode should be evaluated to make this determination." Based on this guidance and the fact that the development of the corrosion occurred over a period of time of plant operation, the determination was made that this "as found" condition is reportable under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

_________________________________________________________________________________

Wiki: Professionalism/Diane Vaughan and the normalization of deviance 

Diane Vaughan is an American sociologist who devoted most of her time on topics as different as "Tension in private life" and "Deviance in organizations". She states, "I find that in common, routine nonconformity, mistake, misconduct, and disaster are systematically produced by the interconnection between environment, organizations, cognition, and choice. These patterns amplify what is known about social structure and have implications for theory, research, and policy". One of Vaughan's theories regarding misconduct within large organizations is the normalization of deviance. 

Philosophy: What is normalization of deviance? 

Description of Normalization of Deviance 

"Social normalization of deviance means that people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviant behavior that they don't consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules for the elementary safety". People grow more accustomed to the deviant behavior the more it occurs. To people outside of the organization, the activities seem deviant; however, people within the organization do not recognize the deviance because it is seen as a normal occurrence. In hindsight, people within the organization realize that their seemingly normal behavior was deviant.

 ________________________________________________________________________________

The results from this MSIVF event analysis was performed by the Nuclear Fuels Department in order to bound the "as-found" results of the U2 Cycle 21 2-stage SRVs pressure setpoint drift. The results from this analysis showed a small increase in peak pressures relative to the Hatch-2 Cycle 21 reload licensing analysis (RLA) results. The higher peak pressures were due to the fact that eight of

Man, look at the runaway "normalization of deviance"? Higher pressure than assumed in the RLA. There should be big alarm bells going off in people heads when actual plant condition goes past nuclear safety analysis assumptions. I exceeded the spending limit but I am safe because a police officer didn't give me ticket. This is related with shifting from plus or minus 1% to plus or minus 3% setpoint accuracy tech spec limits. 

the eleven SRVs opened at pressures higher than that which was assumed in the RLA. It should be noted that in this analysis, the larger actual valve bore size was used in the calculations for nine of the valves rather than the smaller bore size which was conservatively assumed in the RLA. Therefore, higher steam flow capacities than those assumed in the RLA were used in this analysis for those nine valves.

Based on the analysis, the calculated minimum margin to the 1375 psig ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code overpressure limit for peak vessel pressure would have been 27.7 psig and the minimum margin to the 1325 psig Tech Spec Safety Limit for the reactor steam dome pressure would have been 2.9 psig during an MSIVF event during Cycle 21 operation. Therefore, these test results show that in this case, where two of the eleven SRVs would have opened at pressures

Man, "normalization of deviance" on steroids with accident dome pressure going past accident assume valves. What about just fixing the valves so the plant stay way clear of any assumed accident analysis or limits?

higher than that which was assumed in the RLA, the peak pressure at the bottom of the vessel would have remained below the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code limit and the peak RPV dome pressure remained within the TS Safety limits.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LER 1-2014-003, identified multiple SRV setpoint drifts for 5 of the 11 two-stage SRVs installed on Unit 1. The two-stage SRVs with platinum-coated pilot discs were removed from Unit 1 during the 2014 refueling outage and replaced with 3-stage SRVs that have a modified pilot. The modified pilots will help reduce spurious openings and leak-by due to system vibration.

LER 1-2012-004, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 2-stage SRVs whose pilot discs had undergone a platinum surface treatment which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue.

This is what irks me about Pilgrim's 3 stage problems. Why don't these guys learn from each other? These guys below had terrible troubles with the new install 3 stage (leaks), two forced shutdowns, then immediately yanked them out. Pilgrim danced with their over two operational period and got themselves deeply in trouble with the NRC.      

LER 2-2011-002, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 8 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included replacement of the 2-stage SRVs with 3-stage SRVs during the Unit 2 Spring 2011 refueling outage which was considered at that time to be the long term fix for this corrosion bonding issue. Subsequent to that outage the 3-stage SRVs exhibited signs of unacceptable leakage which resulted in two separate outages that involved changing out four SRVs during the first outage and the remaining seven SRVs during the subsequent outage in May 2012. The 3-stage SRVs were replaced with 2-stage SRVs containing pilot discs that had undergone the platinum surface treatment.

LER 1-2010-001, identified multiple SRV setpoint drift for 5 of the 11 SRVs. Corrective actions included refurbishment of the pilot valves and included the replacement of the pilot discs with discs made from Satellite 21 material. Additionally, the insulation surrounding each SRV was upgraded to improve resistance to corrosion-induced bonding. These were the same actions that were taken following similar failures reported in LEA 2-2009-001, since improved results had been seen to some degree in the industry for at least one operating cycle when these actions were implemented.

Huffington Post on IP's Baffle-Former Bolts

Best article on the baffle bolts in the media. It is interesting the NYTs not following this. So the NRC is thinking about shutting down Indian Point 3 and others.

It is a perfect storm with Indian Point. Long term problems with the owner and the plant. The governor stepped in again and again. The relicening board is in progress. The relicencing board stepped in and got the bolt inspection on the advice of the activist.  

Critical Nuclear Reactor Bolts Fail at Indian Point 2

04/01/2016 10:05 am ET | Updated 3 days ago

• Roger WitherspoonJournalist

A special inspection of the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor found that more than a quarter of the stainless steel bolts needed to channel cooling water through active nuclear fuel rods were broken, distorted or “missing”, a finding that calls into question the effectiveness of the long term management of this and other ageing power plants.

The inspection, which began March 7, concerned the 832 “baffle-former assembly bolts” which hold special metal plates around the 100-tons of uranium fuel within the reactor and channel cooling water to the bottom of the reactor and then up through center of the bundled 12-foot fuel rods to keep them from overheating. Entergy, which owns the twin Indian Point plants, stated in a March 29 report to the three judge panel of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (http://1.usa.gov/1Y1oqVO ) that 227 of the baffle-former bolts were degraded, broken, or “missing.” That is an extraordinarily high failure rate of 27.2%.

In its public statement, Entergy sought to minimize the problem by stating they inspected some 2000 bolts and 11% of these were degraded. But their legal filing was more specific. It was only the 832 bolts holding the baffles that had the greatest exposure and suffered the most damage. All 227 of the deteriorated bolts were in this category. Entergy spokesmen at Indian Point and at their corporate office declined to discuss the issue.

The fact that entire bolts or parts of them could not be initially located is considered a serious safety threat. That was the cause of the partial meltdown of the Fermi power reactor outside Detroit in August, 1966. In that case, bits of metal blocked the flow of coolant through two bundles of active fuel rods, and they overheated and melted.

Because of that risk Entergy, after discussions with officials at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is considering whether or not to shut Indian Point 3 and conduct a similar inspection now, rather than wait until a scheduled refueling outage in 2017. That would be a difficult fiscal pill for Entergy to swallow. The twin plants currently provide only 5% of the electricity used in New York City and neighboring Westchester County, primarily through its 560 megawatt contract with ConEd, the regional transmission company. The New York Power Authority, which provides power to the subways, airports, and municipal buildings, dropped Indian Point two years ago because there are cheaper alternatives.

NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said “Entergy will have to assess the implications for Indian Point Unit 3. There is no ETA at this point.”

For its part, the NRC is weighing whether or not other plants should be required to conduct similar special inspections of their reactor linings and, if so, how soon. It is not clear at this point how many other plants might have the same type of condition. But, said Sheehan, “we always look for possible generic implications and will do so in this case.”

David Lochbaum, nuclear safety specialist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said “the NRC is struggling with the question ‘Do we shut down Indian Point 3 and see if there is a problem, or do we look further?’ If it were just those two reactors it would be an easier decision.

“But if they shut down Unit 3 based on probable cause, then why not shut down the other plants that may have this issue? This problem has surfaced before at D. C Cook in Michigan and R.E. Ginna in upstate New York. Why assume those are the only ones?”

Critics of Indian Point urged the NRC to force Entergy to inspect both reactors. “Since IP3 is virtually identical in design as IP2,” said Gary Shaw of the Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition, “IP3 should be shut down immediately to examine the integrity of the reactor core liner. Aging management is a predicate of relicensing and the last year of problems and near misses has already shown that the plant should not be relicensed and decommissioning should be initiated as soon as possible.”

Forced by NY Attorney General

The special inspection that discovered the disintegration of the bolts was undertaken by Entergy to put an end to a series of challenges by the Environmental Unit of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s office dating to November, 2007. The Environmental Unit has filed more than 35 “contentions,” or legal challenges before the three-judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the judicial arm of the NRC. Their decisions can be appealed to the full NRC board, whose commissioners can uphold, modify, or reverse their conclusions.

Three of the New York challenges involve “embrittlement” of key components within the reactor, including the bolts holding the baffles. These serve a critical function in a pressurized system where temperatures approach 900 degrees Fahrenheit and it is difficult to even out the temperature fluctuations within the huge reactor core. Each of the fuel bundles has a temperature gauge at the end called a thermocouple, so the reactor operators can track the temperature o variations within the reactor. The danger of a breakdown of the zirconium cladding around the uranium fuel does not begin until the temperatures hit around 1,800 degrees Fahrenheit, so there is a lot of room for variation before temperatures hit a dangerous level.

At Fermi, operators saw the temperatures climb inside two of the fuel bundles, but assumed they were getting readings from faulty thermocouples since the other bundles were fine. But a metal plate which had fallen to the bottom of the reactor because of degraded bolts was blocking the flow of coolant through the inside of the two fuel bundles, and these heated up past the melting point.

The Environmental Unit asserted that Entergy’s ageing management program was inadequate and did not take into account the embrittlement of metal as a result of years of intense bombardment by high levels of radiation within the reactor.

In fact, the State’s attorneys found six cases - including Fermi, Cook, and plants in France that were younger than Indian Point - where metal pieces had become brittle, broken off, and blocked critical valves, control rods, or cooling water flow within the reactor. Despite those experiences, inspection of the baffle-former bolts is not required by the NRC and was not originally part of Entergy’s long-term maintenance plan, according to their court filings.

“Entergy voluntarily agreed to have this inspection,” said Lochbaum. “Without the State of New York, that would not have happened. When you look at the reasons that the State wanted them to do the inspections, it is not a surprise that when Entergy did the inspection they found the problem that the State was warning about.

“It had happened many, many times before. Since our reactors are older than the French reactors where this problem showed up, it seemed just a matter of time before it happened here.”
Attorney General Schneiderman said in a statement yesterday that “For years, my office has raised serious concerns about the aging of components of the Indian Point nuclear plants, including “baffle-former assembly” bolts...Our concerns have been repeatedly dismissed by Entergy and the NRC.

“After finally conducting inspections that my office had long called for, Entergy revealed that at Indian Point Unit 2, over one-quarter of these bolts were found either missing or degraded to a point they must be replaced. This significant finding - coupled with the spate of other recent problems revealed at Indian Point - underscores real and present safety issues related to continuing to operate this aging nuclear facility in close proximity to more than 17 million people.”

The Bern On Indian Point: Just Say No

You know what would be terrible for nuclear power...if the Bern gets leverage over his anti nuclearism. It another perfect storm. Remember he comes from a state that shutdown Vermont Yankee. Gov Shumlin rode the coattails of shutdowning VY. It happened on his first election to become governor. It was a close election until the VY leak showed up. His stand on shutting down VY propelled him to be governor twice.

We are in historic territory with the majority of the population now not approving nuclear power according to the Gallup polls. It was a large spike down in approval and the Republican disapproval spiked the most.

I honestly don't like his stand on producting electricity. His is against all forms of producing electricity including fracting. Green electricity can never scale out and this form is all old old technology. The only way it works is if you steal food from poor people, subsidized power. And the industry is less transparent than any other.      

Sanders calls for shutting down NY nuke plant

04/04/16 11:58 AM—Updated 04/04/16 02:25 PM

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By Alex Seitz-Wald

Highlighting his opposition to nuclear power ahead of the Empire State’s primary later this month, Bernie Sanders is calling for the shutdown of a nuclear power plant outside New York City that has leaked radioactive material into groundwater supplies.
The Indian Point plant has long been a source of controversy, thanks to numerous leaks and safety concerns. In February, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo called the latest leak at the plant “unacceptable.” But the plant produces about a quarter of the electricity used by New York City and neighboring Westchester County, making it difficult to replace.

RELATED: What does a tight Dem race in WI mean for NY?

“I am very concerned that the Indian Power nuclear power reactor is more than ever before a catastrophe waiting to happen,” Sanders said in a statement Monday. “In my view, we cannot sit idly by and hope that the unthinkable will never happen. We must take action to shut this plant down in a safe and responsible way. It makes no sense to me to continue to operate a decaying nuclear reactor within 25 miles of New York City where nearly 10 million people live.”

view photo essay

The presidential campaign: Bernie Sanders

The self-described democratic socialist is known for pushing change on income inequality, college affordability and criminal justice reform.

“Even in a perfect world where energy companies didn’t make mistakes, nuclear power is and always has been a dangerous idea because there is no good way to store nuclear waste,” Sanders said. “That is why the United States must lead the world in transforming our energy system away from nuclear power and fossil fuels.”
Sanders is the only candidate in either party who wants to end nuclear energy production, which currently accounts for 20% of U.S. electrical generation. But this is the first time Sanders has leaned into the issue in a high-profile way as a potential wedge issue between rival Hillary Clinton and the Democratic base. 
Sanders wants to replace nuclear with clean renewable energy, like wind and solar. But some environmentalists have called his opposition to nuclear power misguided, arguing nuclear is a good alternative to fossil fuel before renewables can take up the slack.
A narrow majority of Americans favor nuclear energy, while 43% oppose it, according to Gallup. That’s down from a peak in 2010, when 62% supported nuclear power, undermined by the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan. Wind and solar energy are highly popular in polls.
Hillary Clinton, whose Chappaqua home is just about 15 miles from the plant, was one of the most vocal critics of Indian Point while she served in the Senate. “Just about every week we pick up the local newspaper and find some other problem at Indian Point,” Clinton said in 2007 as the plant faced a relicensing battle.
But Clinton called for improving operations at the plant rather than shutting it down entirely.
Sanders has used local energy issues, generally pipelines, in past contests to galvanize his supporters and draw contrasts with Clinton.
In Iowa and New Hampshire, he campaigned against pipelines that had general local opposition. In Minnesota, he came out against two Enbridge Pipelines, which he said would a similar impact on climate change as the Keystone XL pipeline.

Explore:

Bernie Sanders, Democrats, Election 2016, Elections, Energy, Energy Policy, Hillary Clinton and Nuclear

Junk Plant Hatch Junk SRV valves Just Like Pilgrim

Sounds like unit 1. It could be unit 2, they usually do these testing just before the outage. 

March 7, 2016: Upgrades To Plant Hatch Unit 1 Enhance The Production Of Low-Cost, Carbon-Free Electricity, Protect Against Extreme Events

05000321/366

These are the same 2 stage SRVs in Pilgrim right now. They pulled a Pilgrim with installing a few 3 stage SRVs in a plant, they were unreliable and they removed the 3 stage. They went to the 3 stage because the current 2 stage SRVs were so unreliable.

I just think there are no “new” replacement SRVs in the US market.

April 4, 2016

CONTACT: Roger Hannah 404-997-4417

Joey Ledford 404-997-4416

NRC Launches Special Inspection of Safety Relief Valves at Hatch Nuclear Plant

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission today launched a special

I am a idiot?

inspection of safety relief valves on Unit 1 of the Hatch nuclear plant.

The plant, operated by Southern Nuclear Operating Co., is located near Baxley, Ga., about 20 miles south of Vidalia.

After the unit’s last refueling outage, plant officials sent all 11 of the safety relief valves, which provide protection from excessive steam pressures and had been replaced during the outage with the same type of valve, to a laboratory for testing. During test procedures, three of the valves did not perform as expected. The cause of the three valves failing to close during the tests has not yet been determined.

Even though the valves were in service during the unit’s last operating cycle, none failed during reactor operations and there was no danger to the public.

“These valves provide an important safety function and it is essential that we understand why they failed to perform as expected during these tests,” said Cathy Haney, Region II administrator. “We felt a special inspection was warranted to gather more information about these valves.”

The onsite inspection will be led by the senior resident inspector at Hatch. He will be assisted by the second Hatch resident inspector and two inspectors from NRC headquarters in Rockville, Md., both with valve expertise. A senior risk analyst from Region II in Atlanta will also contribute to the effort. The five-member team will identify the circumstances of the test failures, review Southern Nuclear’s actions following discovery of the failures, review the testing methodologies, assess Hatch’s maintenance practices, evaluate the operating history of the valves and assess the licensee’s conclusions of the operability of the valves in service.

The onsite portion of the inspection will take several days. A report documenting the results of the inspection should be issued within 45 days of the completion of the inspection.

Junk Plant River Bend: Massive Run to Failure

This is so unprofessional! I can't imagine why aux building ventilation isn't safety related.  

Potential Loss of Secondary Containment Safety Function Due to Failure of Auxiliary Building Ventilation System  

On January 5, 2016, at 10:58 p.m. CST, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, the main control room alarm indicating high pressure in the auxiliary building [NF] actuated. Operators confirmed that the building pressure was out of specification. Secondary containment was declared inoperable, and the Division 2 standby gas treatment system [BH] was started. This action restored building pressure to the acceptable range, and secondary containment was declared operable at 12:27 a.m. on January 6. This condition is being reported in accordance wi,th 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that caused the secondary containment to be potentially incapable of performing its safety function.

INVESTIGATION and immediate ACTIONS 

The normal ventilation system was inspected, and it was determined that a combination of degraded components caused the condition:  

• Seals on the exhaust fan (**FAN**) discharge damper (**BDI\1P**) vanes were degraded. This allowed air to flow backwards through the idle exhaust fan, causing the total exhaust outflow to decrease and building pressure to increase: 

• The flow controller for the supply fan modulating dampers (**CDI\1P**) had failed, allowing excessive air flow that caused building pressure to increase.

Junk Plant River Bend: Better Reactor Level Control

So ever time lightening strikes that line or others you can expect another scram???

Really tripping the feed pumps on high level in a scam is not in licensing. Effectively the level swell getting a feed pump trip is distracting the operators from holistic monitoring the plant for other problem.  If the plant had other problems, say a fire…the staff might get overwhelmed.

Good job on only one restart of a feed pump.

Automatic Reactor Scram and Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation Due to Offsite Grid Electrical Transient

Licensee Event Report 50-458 I 2016-002-00River Bend Station - Unit 1
The initial upward swell of reactor water' level caused all three reactor feedwater pumps to trip. Reactor feedwater pump "C" was restarted approximately eight minutes after the scram.

Following the first automatic actuations of the reactor safety-relief valves (SRVs), operators controlled reactor pressure with intermittent manual opening of selected SRV s. After reactor parameters were stabilized, the MSIV s on the "D" main steam line were opened at approximately 4:29 a.m. to re-establish automatic pressure control.