Pilgrim: Final White Finding On Safety Relief Valves

July 10, 2015 blog entry: 

The Battle for Safety at Pilgrim Nuclear Plant (secret cell phone recording of NRC officials)

Here is my March 7, 2013 10 CFR 2.206 petition requesting a "Emergency Shutdown of Pilgrim Surrounding Their SRVS" relating to this Sept 1, 2015 white finding.

Excerpt:                 

2.206: Request Emergency shutdown of Pilgrim surrounding their SRVs 

March 7, 2013:

"The repeated nature of the failure of the safety relief valves means Entergy doesn't know the mechanism of the failure.. .it is a common mode failure. The design and manufacture of these valves are defective and it is extremely unsafe to operate a nuclear plant with all safety relief valves being INOP. A condition adverse to quality..."    

Request:  

1) Request an immediate shutdown with the Pilgrim Plant.

2) This is the second time I requested a special NRC inspection concerning the defective SRV valves.

3) Not allow the plant to restart Pilgrim until they fully understand the past failure mechanisms of the four bad new three stage safety relief valves.

4) Request the OIG investigate this cover-up to keep an unsafe nuclear plant at power.

According to recording of the high NRC official in the next paragraph (Mr Mckinley and Mr.Cahill), I read this 2.206 excerpt to them for a comment. They said in this 2013 time-frame it was impossible the anyone (NRC) or you (me) to see any degradation in the valves. I sure if you seen all the records of the prior leaks, valve degradation, down-powers and shutdowns over trying to control these defective leaking valves, you would think these NRC officials in July 2015 were crazy. It was crazy talk! 

During the Aug 8, 2015 meeting and in the next few days, I was paddling my ass off with NRC trying to influence them to be a lot tougher on Entergy.   

***Fundamentally in this 2011 to 2013 time-frame with the new defective three stage relief valves, as Vermont Yankee was in the death rattles, I believe the NRC was pulling their punches on Pilgrim. The NRC was fearful Pilgrim would catch the VY disease. The NRC inaction allowed Pilgrim to spiral down into the deep and profound problems in 2015. 

Aug 8, 2015 recorded conversations between Mr. Mckinley, Chief Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 5, Christopher Cahill Senior Reactor Analysis and Mike Mulligan concerning Pilgrim’s Safety Relief Valve preliminary white finding. This is the NRC meeting with Entergy officials leading to the NRC's final white finding seen below.  

1)  Mr. McKinley and Mike Mulligan recorded discussion concerning white determination

2)  Mr. McKinley, Mr. Cahill and Mike Mulligan recorded discussion concerning LOOP frequency

September 1, 2015

EA-15-081

Mr. John Dent

Site Vice President

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

600 Rocky Hill Road

Plymouth, MA 02360-5508

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION - INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000293/2015011 –PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

Dear Mr. Dent:

This letter provides you the final significance determination for the preliminary finding discussed in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter dated May 27, 2015, which included NRC Inspection Report Number 05000293/2015007 (ML15147A412).1 The finding involved the failure by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) to identify, evaluate, and correct a significant condition adverse to quality associated with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) ‘A’ safety/relief valve (SRV). Specifically, Entergy did not identify, evaluate, and correct the ‘A’ SRV’s failure to open upon manual actuation during a plant cool-down on February 9, 2013, following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event. The failure to take actions to preclude repetition resulted in the ‘C’ SRV failing to open due to a similar cause following a January 27, 2015, LOOP event. The NRC also determined that the ‘A’ SRV had been inoperable for a period greater than the Technical Specifications allowed outage time of 14 days.

The May 27, 2015, NRC letter informed you that the NRC preliminarily determined the finding to be of low to moderate safety significance (i.e., White), and included a choice for Entergy to accept the preliminary finding as characterized in the inspection report, attend a regulatory conference, or reply in writing to provide the licensee’s position on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the finding and its safety significance. At Entergy’s request, a regulatory conference was held on July 8, 2015, at the NRC Region I office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. The presentation provided by Entergy at the conference is included as Enclosure 1. The conference agenda and attendee list is included as Enclosure 2. As described more fully below, after considering the information presented by Entergy at the conference, the NRC maintains that the finding is appropriately characterized as White.

At the regulatory conference, Entergy staff did not contest the performance deficiency, the related violation, or the NRC description of the event. Entergy staff described the corrective actions that have been taken in response to the issue, which include: performing an ongoing root cause analysis, the results of which the licensee staff would share with the Entergy fleet; and continuing improvements to the site corrective action program (CAP), including establishing performance indicators to monitor CAP performance. These actions were in addition to the actions Entergy has already completed including: replacing the ‘A’ and ‘C’ SRVs in February 2015, prior to restarting from the January 27, 2015 event; and replacing all four SRVs with a different model during the Spring 2015 refueling outage.

Entergy staff also presented the results of their quantitative and qualitative assessments of the issue, which supported Entergy’s view that the finding is of very low safety significance (i.e., Green). Entergy staff presented the results of the vendor’s analysis of the ‘A’ and ‘C’ SRVs, which revealed wearing of internal components, resulting in the valve first stage piston rings creating grooves in the guide cylinder. As a result, the valve pistons required higher pressure in order for the rings to lift out of the grooves to allow the piston to move and open the valve. This degradation (the cause of which was not fully understood, but was likely caused by the method of vendor testing followed by operational vibration and pressure fluctuations) was less significant on the other two Pilgrim SRVs (‘B’ and ‘D’), which had not failed to open at any pressure. Entergy also stated that, although the ‘A’ and ‘C’ SRVs had failed to open at low pressures, both valves had demonstrated functionality at high pressure, thereby reducing the range of plant scenarios for which the finding was of concern. Accordingly, Entergy stated that the NRC’s risk analysis should treat the ‘B’ and ‘D’ valves separately from the ‘A’ and ‘C’ valves and also that the NRC common cause failure methodology and risk assumptions were overly conservative.

The NRC considered the information developed during the inspection and the information provided by Entergy at the regulatory conference, and concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as White. A summary of the information provided by Entergy during this regulatory conference, and the NRC response, are provided in Enclosure 3. Because the finding has been determined to be White, we used the NRC’s Action Matrix to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this finding. You were notified of that determination in the Mid-Cycle Assessment Letter issued today (ML15243A259).

The NRC also determined that the finding involved a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” as cited in the Notice included as Enclosure 4. The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered an escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.

The NRC has concluded that the information regarding: (1) the reason for the violation; (2) the interim and long term corrective actions already taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence; and, (3) the date when full compliance was achieved, is already adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report 05000293/2015007, in your presentation at the July 8, 2015, regulatory conference, and in this letter. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position.

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the NRC staff’s determination of significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 2. An appeal must be sent in writing to the Regional Administrator, Region I, 2100 Renaissance Boulevard, King of Prussia, PA 19406.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room located at NRC

Headquarters in Rockville, MD, and from the NRC’s Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response, if you choose to provide one, should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Raymond McKinley, Chief, Projects Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects in Region I, at (610) 337-5150.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Daniel H. Dorman

Regional Administrator

NRC RESPONSE TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC (ENTERGY) AT THE JULY 8, 2015, REGULATORY CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY ENTERGY

At the regulatory conference, Entergy staff presented the results of its quantitative and qualitative assessments of the issue, which supported Entergy’s view that the finding is of very low safety significance (i.e., Green).

Entergy staff presented the results of the vendor’s analysis of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) ‘A’ and ‘C’ safety/relief valves (SRVs), which revealed wearing of internal components, resulting in the valve first stage piston rings creating grooves in the guide cylinder. As a result, the valve pistons required higher pressure in order for the rings to lift out of the grooves to allow the piston to move and open the valve. This degradation (the cause of which was not fully understood, but was likely caused by the method of vendor testing followed by operational vibration and pressure fluctuations) was not as significant on the other two Pilgrim SRVs (‘B’ and ‘D’).

Based on the results of this analysis, Entergy staff stated that the NRC should factor the following considerations in its qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the finding:

• The ‘B’ and ‘D’ valves exhibited only minor degradation and remained operable at all times, and opened and closed reliably on multiple demands when called upon across the entire pressure range. Therefore, pressure control for Pilgrim was always available.

• Although the ‘A’ and ‘C’ SRVs had failed to open at low pressures, both valves demonstrated functionality at high pressure, thereby reducing the range of plant scenarios for which the finding was of concern.

• Other mitigating strategies remained available, including alternate depressurization systems (High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Main Steam Line drains, and Reactor Water Clean-Up in let-down mode) and for high pressure injection (HPCI, RCIC, Feedwater, Control Rod Drive, and Standby Liquid Control). Pilgrim Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) provided direction to operators to use these alternate means, if necessary.

• The value used by the NRC for an increased probability that the SRVs would fail to close was not credible. This was because, due to the design of the valves, sufficient pressure was always available to achieve closure.

• The value used by the NRC for the probability that the SRVs would fail to open was overly conservative. Independent engineering analysis obtained by Entergy indicated that the ‘A’ SRV would have opened at pressures above approximately 200 psig and that the ‘C’ SRV would have opened at pressures above approximately 300-400 psig. The ‘B’ and ‘D’ SRVs should have been credited for opening at any pressure based on actual in-plant observation and the minimal degradation of the valves.

• The common cause failure methodology applied by the NRC in its Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) modeling was overly conservative and failed to consider plant specific information.

NRC RESPONSE

The NRC’s preliminary risk determination was performed utilizing NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix M, “Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria.” This method was utilized because an existing, quantitative significance determination process is not available that can adequately assess the significance of the finding given the uncertainty in the actual pressure at which the SRVs would fail to function, as well as other uncertainties as described below. The resulting NRC preliminary analysis utilized a quantitative assessment to bound the risk and qualitative insights based on the circumstances of the finding and the licensee’s actions.

The NRC evaluated the considerations raised by Entergy. Specifically:

• Regarding Entergy’s position that pressure control for Pilgrim was always available due to the continued operability of the ‘B’ and ‘D’ SRVs, the NRC determined that, due to the as-found condition and historical observed degradation of the valves of the same design, there was an increased likelihood that the valves would fail if called upon. The as-found and historical degradation of the valves was determined to have an impact on the overall reliability of all the valves to function. Testing performed by the vendor and validated by the licensee’s engineering finite element analysis indicated that new or refurbished valves were experiencing damage during pre-installation testing at pressures as low as 60 psig. This is significantly less pressure and driving force than the valves would be exposed to during at-power transients. This degradation was expected to worsen with additional cycling of the valves during plant transients.

• The NRC determined that it was reasonable to conclude that given the performance history of the valves (including but not limited to the fretting wear, stem deformation, spring shortening, piston de-torqueing, piston wobble, thread damage, and locking device failures), there was an increased likelihood that the valves would fail if called upon during an event. This, in conjunction with the risk importance of the valves, could challenge the ability to depressurize the reactor under postulated accident conditions. Taken collectively, the NRC determined that additional information provided by Entergy regarding performance of the degraded SRVs did not establish that their failure rate should be considered equivalent to the failure rate of non-degraded SRVs. Entergy accounted for the uncertainty in the valves’ degraded condition by assuming a 2X increase in the probability of failure (above the baseline probability of failure), while the NRC’s analysis assumed a 10X increase in the SRVs’ probability of failure for events other than medium break loss of coolant accidents (MLOCAs). This difference highlighted an uncertainty associated with conducting a quantitative risk assessment for this condition. Based on Entergy’s assumption that the degraded SRVs would fail at twice the rate of non-degraded valves, they determined that the core damage frequency (CDF) for internal events not associated with MLOCAs would increase by 3.6E-7. Both the NRC’s and Entergy’s methods conclude that the degraded SRVs would increase the CDF by some amount.

• The NRC reviewed the independent engineering analysis obtained by Entergy that provided a postulated lower pressure range at which the valves would function. The independent analysis provided an approximation of the pressures at which the ‘A’ and ‘C’ SRVs would function, but did not include any in-situ measurements or consider other relevant factors that would have correlated to or impacted the calculated lift pressure. Specifically, the calculated lift pressure was highly sensitive to the assumed value assigned to the coefficient of friction (i.e. a small increase in the coefficient of friction would result in a large increase in the expected lift pressure). The coefficient of friction assumed in the analysis was reported as conservative and derived from industry reference data. However, a review of the available NRC-published data (e.g., NUREG/CR 6807, “Results of NRC-Sponsored Stellite 6 Aging and Friction Testing) indicated that the credible range of coefficients could be higher than assumed in the analysis. In addition, the coefficient used in the evaluation apparently did not consider other factors such as the buildup of corrosion or wear products that could further increase the coefficient of friction above that assumed in the calculation. Inspectors observing the valve disassembly and pictures taken by Entergy indicated that some amount of corrosion and/or wear products were present in the main body of the valves. Further, the analysis did not consider the potential impact of multiple cycles on the degradation rate of the SRVs. Taken collectively, the NRC determined that the engineering analysis did not fully resolve the uncertainty associated with the operation of the SRVs at low pressures or make an adequate case for significantly revising downward the NRC’s CDF determination.

• Regarding Entergy’s position that the common cause failure methodologies and values used in the NRC’s risk analysis for failure to open and close were not credible, the NRC determined that the licensee did not provide an adequate basis to demonstrate that the valves should not be coupled within the same common cause failure grouping or provide any other accepted method to quantify the risk from common cause failure. Specifically, the licensee stated that one of the degradation mechanisms (the amount of wear in the guide cylinder from interaction with the piston rings) was less significant for two of the valves, but did not provide any plant data or specific reason for the difference. In addition, the licensee did not address why the valves should be treated differently considering that they exhibited multiple degradation attributes that were common to all of the valves. The NRC determined that the valves should be treated as a common group since they had multiple, comparable degradation mechanisms and no information was presented to differentiate the design, manufacturing, testing, maintenance, or operation of any of the valves. The NRC’s methodology used to determine the risk associated with common cause failure potential for these valves was peer-reviewed, published, and is considered to be state-of-the-art and the appropriate method to estimate the risk impact associated with the failure of common components.

• Entergy estimated an increase in CDF of 1.3 E-7 for internal events associated with a MLOCA. The NRC agreed with the Entergy’s determination that the degraded SRVs would increase plant risk during MLOCA events but calculated a higher core damage frequency based on the difference in how the common cause failure potential was determined.

• Entergy did not present any specific risk insights with regard to external event risk; however, Entergy’s risk analyst indicated that the increase in risk from external events was approximately equal to the increase in internal events. The NRC determined that the dominant external risk contributors would be from seismic and fire events, resulting in loss of offsite power and/or a complete station blackout. Core damage would result in the event of further failure of high pressure injection systems coupled with the failure to depressurize the reactor. The NRC did not conduct a more detailed analysis but agreed with the licensee’s estimation that the risk from external events would be approximately equal to the internal event risk contribution. The NRC did not consider the external event contribution to be as significant for the MLOCA scenarios and did not include this risk in the summary below.

Combining the above quantitative aspects, Entergy estimated an increase in CDF of 4.9E-7 for internal events that, when considering the risk of external events (for non-MLOCA scenarios) would result in an overall estimated CDF increase of 8.5E-7. This was comparable to the NRC’s computed increase in CDF of 4E-6. The differences are due to the analytical uncertainties and differences in some of the assumptions used in the quantitative analysis. Based on the above, the NRC determined that the risk estimates for this performance deficiency overlapped the green to white threshold. The NRC staff concluded that there are significant limitations in the use of existing tools to fully and accurately quantify this risk because of the uncertainties associated with: the degradation mechanism and its rate and the range of reactor pressure at which the degraded valves could be assumed to fully function; any potential benefit from an SRV lifting at rated pressure, such that the degradation would be less likely to occur and, therefore prevent a subsequent failure at low pressure in the near-term; the time-based nature of plant transient response relative to when high pressure injection sources fail and the associated impact of reduced decay heat on the SRV depressurization success criteria; and the ability to credit other high pressure sources of water. Therefore, the above numerical values were considered as an input into the final significance determination, along with the qualitative factors described in IMC 0609, Appendix M.

Entergy provided information regarding operational risk mitigating factors as discussed earlier in this section, and Enclosure 1 contains their assessment of the Appendix M qualitative factors. The NRC reviewed the factors in Appendix M starting with a conservative bounding analysis. As described in NRC Inspection Report Number 05000293/2015007, the NRC calculated a bounding increase in CDF of mid E-4. The NRC determined this value was overly-conservative since both the ‘A’ and ‘C’ SRVs passed as-found high pressure American Society of Mechanical Engineers code required testing and a subsequent lower pressure special test at 100 psig at the testing vendor. This, and the fact that the ‘A’ SRV successfully functioned at high pressure in the plant after the failed low pressure attempt, partially supported the theory that the valves would function at high pressure. However, as previously discussed, there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with SRV performance, which can strongly influence the specific initiating events, success criteria, and common cause factors. The first attribute described in Appendix M is to consider whether the finding impacted defense-in-depth. As noted above, Entergy stated that other mitigating strategies remained available, such as alternative pressure control and high pressure injection. Even so, the NRC considered that the SRVs and low pressure injection provide redundancy and backup to the high pressure injection sources. Specifically, the SRVs are required to perform both an overpressure protection function and to provide a means to rapidly reduce pressure to allow for low pressure sources to inject into the reactor vessel. Emergency depressurizations are directed in the emergency operating procedures when the suppression pool reaches it heat capacity temperature limit, when there is a reactor coolant leak into secondary containment, and when level reaches the minimum steam cooling water level. The NRC determined that SRVs were associated with and required to perform a defense-in depth mitigation function and, therefore, this attribute was impacted by the performance deficiency.

The second attribute is to determine the effect of the finding on a plant’s safety margin, and the fourth attribute is to consider the degree of degradation of the failed components. These two attributes were considered jointly, as they could be assessed by their impact on plant risk.While there is no existing tool to precisely model the impact of the degraded SRVs on plant risk, the NRC and Entergy performed independent risk assessments, achieved comparable results, and bounded the risk in the overlap range between the green to white significance threshold. The third attribute in Appendix M is to consider the effect of the finding on other equipment. The NRC determined that Entergy’s failure to identify and correct the condition of the ‘A’ SRV following the 2013 winter storm event resulted in the failure to identify a significant condition adverse to quality that led to the failure of the ‘C’ SRV during plant cool-down following an actual plant event in January 2015. Thus, the NRC determined that this performance deficiency affected redundant safety equipment.

The fifth attribute is to consider the period of time of the effect of the finding. While Entergy stated that the time period should be limited to twelve months, the NRC determined that it was likely that the valves were nonconforming upon installation, and that the period would then exceed one year. The NRC determined that the performance deficiency led to operation with degraded SRVs for a significant period of time.

The sixth attribute is to evaluate the likelihood that the licensee’s recovery actions would successfully mitigate the finding. As described above, Entergy stated that other mitigating strategies remained available, including alternative pressure control and high pressure injection, which the operators would have utilized in accordance with EOPs. However, the NRC concluded that these strategies are highly dependent on initial plant conditions and operator response to the event. The NRC considered that the redundant mitigation strategies would have been included in the risk estimates provided above, which quantified the risk of this event in the green to white significance level.

The final attribute in Appendix M is to consider any additional qualitative circumstances associated with the finding. Accordingly, the NRC considered Pilgrim’s organizational performance during the 2013 and 2015 events, as documented in NRC Inspection Report Number 05000293/2015007. Specifically, during the 2013 event, Pilgrim staff did not identify that the ‘A’ SRV had failed to open in spite of having sufficient information available to do so.

During the 2015 event, Pilgrim operators and staff did identify that the ‘C’ SRV failed to open. However, engineering, operations, and plant management erroneously concluded that the SRV was operable. Pilgrim did not declare the SRV inoperable until NRC inspectors on the Special

Inspection Team raised concerns about the valve’s response. Additionally, during the 2015 event, operators used a high-volume injection system (Core Spray) when other, more desirable, injection systems were available to provide finer level control. As a consequence, reactor level remained high in the control band, allowing reactor pressure to rise, requiring operators to cycle the SRVs. Given that all of the SRVs were exposed to some level of degradation, it is plausible to conclude that stressors, such as excessive cycling, had the potential to increase the probability of SRV failure.

Based on the above factors, taken in conjunction with the uncertainties of the quantitative analysis, the NRC concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as White (low to moderate safety significance).

Natural Gas: Way Beyond A Miracle

There are so many efficiency efficiencies coming on line with the natural gas industry, like new fracting techniques and managing the whole natural gas enterprise...the price of natural gas can go to mind boggling low levels and these guys still are going to make massive profits.

This massive thing is going to restructure our nation...

***That be fracting expanding the petroleum and natural gas fields way beyond what we could imagine just a few years ago. 

Drillers Unleash ‘Super-Size’ Natural Gas Output

Applying newer fracking methods to existing field offers potential for more and cheaper fuel

 

Drillers Unleash ‘Super-Size’ Natural Gas Output

Applying newer fracking methods to existing field offers potential for more and cheaper fuel

 

Newer production techniques being applied to a natural-gas rich area that stretches from northeast Texas into Louisiana are affecting U.S. pricing because of its potential to ‘super-size’ output in an area close to many fuel pipelines. 

 

Updated Sept. 1, 2015 7:12 p.m. ET
 

The U.S. may have far more natural gas than anyone imagined, all reachable at a profit even with today’s bargain-basement prices. 

Experimental wells in Lou isiana by explorers including Comstock Resources Inc. CRK -10.49 % and Chesapeake Energy Inc. CHK -3.07 % are proving highly lucrative thanks to modern drilling techniques and the sheer volume of fossil fuels that can be coaxed out of the ground.

The trick is applying supersize versions of the horizontal-drilling and fracking techniques that worked successfully elsewhere to an area that hasn’t seen this approach yet. The gains come from extending the lateral portions of wells by thousands of feet and pumping them full of enormous volumes of sand, chemicals and water to flush out more hydrocarbons.

So far, the impressive results have been confined to a small area in a single Louisiana parish near the Texas border. But if the approach works across the giant Haynesville Shale, which spans 120 miles across both states, the era of low American gas prices could extend for decades into the future, experts say.
 

“There’s a large likelihood that the United States will be enjoying very low gas prices for a very long time, maybe 20 years,” said Mark Papa, who has monitored Haynesville developments as a partner at Riverstone Holdings LLC, one of the biggest energy-focused private-equity firms in the U.S.

The field produces 8% of the nation’s natural gas, making it the second largest after the giant Marcellus Shale in the Northeast. Because it is located in Louisiana, near several interstate pipelines, potential export facilities and industrial consumers, an increase in gas production in the Haynesville has an outsize impact on gas prices across the entire country.

The cost of natural gas matters because the fuel increasingly powers the U.S. economy and is critical to the Obama administration’s push to reduce carbon emissions in electricity generation. American gas consumption has risen at a 2.4% annual growth rate for the past decade, while demand for coal has fallen by 2.7% and oil by less than 1%, according to the federal Energy Information Administration. Gas now is used to generate about 30% of U.S. electricity and heat nearly half of all American homes…

Waterford Diesel Generators Are Junk

They are just not doing the proper proactive maintenance on this machines. Within hours, they had a generator protective trip and then during testing a damper failed on startup. It implies you could have both DGs fail in a bad accident.  

***But  the inverse, if EDG A is already running and loaded, then do they really need to worry about a EDG start?

But in the inverse,  usually one division is in maintenance test, and the other is protected, do not touch.

So with EDG A in test/ maint, there could have other systems / equip in maint / test and not ready for a safety function (SF).

Now with Div B protected, and now have an inop EDG B when it is protected and being counted on to perform its SF,  I think you may have a major gap in reliability and high likelihood of protected Div B ECCS failure.

Time for some deep probing questions that only a skilled experienced deep prober can perform.

***Sep 1 at 11:00 AM  

I am glad I have you to do the deep probing. 

Were you going to use a foot long ruler or yard stick?

This is a severe indicator of maintenance in the whole plant.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51348
Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [3] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: MARIA ZAMBER HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA	Notification Date: 08/26/2015 Notification Time: 15:47 [ET] Event Date: 08/26/2015 Event Time: 07:40 [CDT] Last Update Date: 08/31/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test', Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start' to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2 6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b. (1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f. was entered due to the exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started. "Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f. was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' exhaust fan. "Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress. "This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) (A) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) (D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition' and (D) 'mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable.'" "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." * * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1328 EDT ON 8/31/2015 * * * "The following is a correction to a non-emergency event notification from Waterford 3 originally made on 8/26/2015: "On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b and d were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test,' Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start' to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2(e)6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b.(1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f was entered due to the room exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started. "Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B room exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EDG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' room exhaust fan. "Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress. "This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Exelon's Nuclear Plant Shutdown Follies

So now its Oct 1, 2015? Supposedly a line limits the load during critical periods making the plant unprofitable. Why don't they upgrade the capacity of the line.

Bottom line, Exelon 10 years ago owed the employees a brand new facility. They should have had a replacement facility up and running ten years ago, the current facility now in decommissioning.  

Future uncertain for Quad Cities nuclear plant 

CHICAGO (AP) — Exelon Corp. has until Oct. 1 to decide if it'll close its unprofitable Quad Cities nuclear plant, and is still pushing state lawmakers for a fix. The company says the two-reactor plant in Cordova is losing money because of high costs of moving electricity along transmission lines shared with wind power and increased competition from lower-cost natural gas-fired plants.

Exelon is asking legislators to approve a monthly surcharge on consumers' electricity bills that would generate about $300 million annually to help keep unprofitable plants open. Company officials say that's fair because renewable energy like wind and solar receive subsidies. But opponents say Exelon is a profitable company and doesn't need a bailout for a few unprofitable plants. They say Illinois should concentrate on increasing the market for renewable energy and promoting energy efficiency programs.

Clinton nuclear plant owner to decide facility's fate

The company learned that one of the at-risk plants – in Byron – is going to make millions after a recent electricity reliability auction, while the future of the third plant, Clinton in the central part of the state, is still in doubt.

Voodoo Medicine At The NRC

Update 8/31

The so called violation in the Confirmatory Letter are illusory Violations. They totally bypass ROP...it is as if they really don't count to the NRC. Basically the violations are a off the books contractual agreement between the NRC and Dominion...a agreement saying they are violations. This has no bearing on the "report card grade" of Dominion.

Honestly this emerged from a highly skilled professional Millstone employee-whistleblower...it looks like the NRC is burying his concerns. This is a NRC failure.

This began with a official employee NRC allegation in 2011, why did it take so long for the agency admit it with a Confirmatory Letter.

Justice delayed is justice denied. I think with all those NRC employees the agency should make a swift determination of wrong-doing and then quickly make the licensee bring the facility back to licensing condition.

It should never be a negotiation of equals...it should be a demand with a noose around their necks if they don't comply.

They decay heat deal has a long history. Taking to many professional, the decay heat deal is astonishing. Shocking. In the last life mid (1990s) it created a host of whistleblowers on  site and got them shutdown for three years.  Basically it took them 3 years to deal with it. It is like getting a speeding ticket three years after speeding. 

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 - INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2015201, INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 1-2012-008, AND APPARENT VIOLATIONS (report dated April 29, 2013)

OI Investigation

Pg 1 inspection Front Page: This letter refers to an investigation completed on May 23, 2013, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of Investigations (01) at Dominion Nuclear Connecticut's (DNC's) Millstone Power Station (Millstone). The purpose of the investigation was to determine if DNC staff deliberately violated NRC requirements…

Pg 1 Factual Summary: On November 4, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of Investigations (01), Region I Field Office, conducted an investigation to determine if Dominion Nuclear Connecticut (DNC) staff at Millstone Nuclear Power Station (Millstone) deliberately violated NRC requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," when implementing changes to documents related to the Millstone, Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) charging pumps and spent fuel decay time limits.

NRC Confirmatory Letter

In a letter dated April 29, 2015, the NRC provided DNC the results of the investigation, informed DNC that escalated enforcement action was being considered for two of the three apparent violations, and offered DNC the opportunity to attend a predecisional enforcement conference or to participate in ADR in which a neutral mediator with no decision-making authority would facilitate discussions between the NRC and DNC.

Millstone Dominion: Zombie NRC

I have something to say about this later. Why didn't this stop last years dual plant trip and LOOP? Basically the same problem stated in the OI investigation. Why is the agency is years behind the massive engineering decline of a nuclear plant?

No: I-15-034 August 27, 2015
CONTACT: Diane Screnci, 610-337-5330 E-mail: opa1.resource@nrc.gov
Neil Sheehan, 610-337-5331   

Dominion Institutes Corrective Actions at Millstone Nuclear Plant Under Settlement Agreement with NRC

Under a settlement agreement reached with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dominion is implementing a broad range of corrective actions at its Millstone Unit 2 nuclear power plant in Waterford, Conn. These actions are designed to address violations of certain regulations, prevent recurrences and respond to questions the NRC raised regarding changes involving a reactor safety system at the facility.  

The settlement was achieved under the NRC’s Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) process after apparent violations of agency regulations were identified during an investigation by the NRC’s Office of Investigations. 

"The use of the ADR process in this case has yielded meaningful corrective actions on the part of Dominion that are designed to prevent these kinds of issues from occurring in the future, at Millstone and at other U.S. nuclear power plants," said Scott Morris, Director of the Division of Inspection and Regional Support in the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. "The lessons learned will be shared at the site, throughout the Dominion nuclear plant fleet and throughout the industry."  

In September 2011, the NRC became aware that Dominion, the plant’s owner and operator, had submitted requests for NRC approval of amendments to the Millstone Unit 2 operating license that were incomplete and inaccurate. The requests sought to modify the requirements for Millstone Unit 2’s charging pumps and irradiated fuel decay time.
The Office of Investigations initiated an investigation in November 2011 to determine if wrongdoing had occurred. In an inspection report issued on April 29, 2015, the agency notified Dominion that the violations were being considered for heightened, or escalated, enforcement. 

The first violation considered for escalated enforcement was for a willful violation for changes made to the plant’s Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, without a license amendment, that removed credit for a specific type of safety-related pump in the mitigation of a postulated accident. The second violation was a non-willful violation for a failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC pertaining to the changes. A third apparent violation, related to Dominion’s failure to obtain a license amendment prior to making changes related to spent fuel pool heat-load analysis, was not considered for escalated enforcement. 

The NRC offered Dominion a choice of attending an enforcement conference or ADR to address the apparent violations. ADR entails a trained neutral mediator working with the parties to reach resolution on the issues. ADR can result in broad, long-term corrective actions.
Based on those discussions, a settlement agreement was reached. In exchange for the array of corrective actions by Dominion, the NRC agreed not to pursue further enforcement action against the company related to the apparent violations. The NRC issued a legally binding Confirmatory Order on Aug. 26, 2015, that requires the company to, among other things: 

● Make any needed changes to plant procedures governing the operation and testing of the charging pumps, and perform an evaluation of the use of the pumps.  

● Issue a fleet-wide communication to reinforce the importance of providing complete and accurate information to the NRC.  

● Submit a license amendment request to the NRC addressing the use of charging pumps and seek the agency’s approval of the spent fuel pool heat-load analysis.  

● Complete an assessment of its 50.59 program. (50.59 refers to a section of NRC regulations that allows plant owners to make changes to their facilities without prior NRC approval, provided certain criteria are satisfied.) The results of the assessment will be provided to the NRC and any corrective actions deemed necessary will be performed. 

● Complete a formal sampling program of plant changes made under the 50.59 program since 2002 to identify whether other deficiencies exist in this program. 

● Provide a presentation at an industry forum to discuss the events that led to the Confirmatory Order.
The NRC will follow up to ensure the corrective actions are fully implemented. A copy of the settlement agreement is available in the NRC’s ADAMS electronic documents system under Accession Number ML15236A207.

Mike Mulligan's List of Zombie Nuclear Power Plants

Basically 14 16 known plants who are severely financially threatened.

We are talking about a terminus amount of grid capacity.

That is about a amazing 15% of our nuclear fleet capacity nation wide...

We are facing this worsening condition for many years...

Under severe economic pressure. One big embarrassing accident away from a shutdown! My main beef with nuclear power is these plants don't get enough funding keeping up with the best maintenance and equipment updating. Everyone has to settle for less.  

Former Exelon CEO Rowe: Shutting down struggling nukes is 'the proper market-driven answer'

Basically any merchant nuclear plant is at tremendous risk of a shutdown.

Ten Exelon plants facing the proverbial electric chair...

Clinton one plant (1)

Quad Cities two plants (2)

Dresden (2) 

Byron two Plants (2)

Oyster Creek one plant (1)

Three Mike Island 1 (1)

Ginna  (1)

My list:

Pilgrim (1)

Fitzpatrick (1)

Wolf Creek (1) 

Fort Calhoun  (1)

Indian Point (2) 

Saudis Bombing Our Nuclear Industry and our State of Texas.

Look at how crazy I sounded in in Oct 2014. I was widely optimistic. Now the Iraniums (Iran) are saying they will pump out at any price in order to gain market share. They are predicting by the end of fall most gasoline will sell at less than $ 2.00 a gallon. There is a lot of components causing petroleum including natural gas fracting. Look at where this $2.00 gas sits on the graph? I think this will last for 5 to 8 years.  

There is a lot of funny stuff going on in the grid trying to artificially bolster the price of electricity...sabotage low priced electricity. The low cost electricity today is mostly supporting the uncompetitive stock price of the utilities, not to drive low cost electricity to support our great nation and the greater economy.

I'd basically say all greenie electricity is ostensibly aimed towards supporting exorbitant electric prices to support the faltering utility stock prices. Most of the state and greenie subsidies is stealing food and support for poor people, massively sucking taxes from supporting government to us all and especially the poor people. Honestly, greenie energy is the greatest invention of the teabaggers and government haters. Do you want expensive green energy or roads, bridge and infrastructure. 

I don't mind a independent market that sells non productive expensive green electricity to rich 1%er people for empty status, environmental vanity and egotism...   

It is as if god evented the universe for the benefit for electric utilities...not god evented the utilities to support our nation and society.   

Reposted from Oct 10, 2014

Have you seen the decline in the prices of gasoline of recent? It is less than 3 bucks in Boston in some places. There is a high likelihood we are in price war and forces are aimed at destroying a large percentage of our expensive petroleum production capability.

Gets you wondering if this is how war looks like with Islamic fundamentalism.

A massive drop in petroleum prices and our real-estate,  S&Ls  and banks crumbles.  The last time this happed was in the Iraq and Iran war. These crazy guys were flooding the world with petroleum in order to limit their purchase of military weapon, along with the Saudis trying to reclaim their market share.  These guys nearly destroyed our well drilling capabilities and the economy of Texas was devastated with near depression level of economic declines.

All the other sources of energy are keyed to the price of petroleum.  I bet you we will be seeing at least a 33% decline in the price of electricity without considering our USA petroleum and natural gas miracle in the coming decade.

Texas is screwed again! Expensive green electricity is toast and I expect more bank failures over this.

The 1980s almost destroyed nuclear industry. The buildup of cost cutting nearly decimated our nuclear capacity by the mid 1990s. Do you remember all the nuclear industry troubles building up in the early 1990s and the Commissioner Jackson era?  The Saudis and others have commenced bombing our nuclear industry and the state of Texas as we speak!    

Oops, There Goes TMI...

“This auction was the first held under new "capacity performance" reforms designed to spur investment in power plants that will improve their performance and strengthen electric grid reliability.”

Translated: basically in the frigid polar vortex in recent past plants trip off the line for a number of reasons. It really wasn’t unexspected cold winter temperatures…we invented a new phrase for the expected winter temperatures. Instead of severely punishing plants the non preforming plants…we allow them to blackmail us into giving them more money for electricity. They are basically colluding to withhold electricity from the grid to jack up all our rates.

Basically our whole electric system is horrendously dysfunctional…where is Donald Trump when you need him?    

Here is eight nuclear plants that are directly under the pall of a closure due to not profitability and low grid prices. It is only going to get worst. We see safety only in terms of broken and degraded equipment. We see safety in terms of our material world. What as safety in terms of the spirit of a human being? We never considered the magnitude of a condition as this with such power to do harm.

All these economically degraded and in decline plants should be under a special watch by the NRC. A lot more scrutiny and inspector hours should be apportioned to threatened plants.      

Three Mile Island nuclear plant being considered for closure?

Could the Three Mile Island nuclear plant be headed for premature closure?

Last week, no one bought a year’s worth of TMI’s electricity at a key energy-buying auction held by PJM, the regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of power in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia.

The PJM Capacity Auction is not the only place TMI owner Exelon can sell the plant’s electricity, but it’s a key and profitable one.

The results have led to speculation that Exelon may be considering closing TMI as it is considering doing at three of its nuclear plants in Illinois.

Asked if the plant was in a troubled financial situation, Ralph DeSantis, Exelon’s spokesman at TMI, issued this statement: “The fact that TMI did not clear the 2018-2019 auction makes it clear the plant’s economics are challenged.

“We will continue to work with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and stakeholders to improve market design to recognize the significant reliability and environmental value TMI provides.”

Asked if Exelon was seeking protective legislation from Pennsylvania state legislators, DeSantis replied, “We mean everyone involved in creating policy for environmental regulations and market regulations…could include legislators.”

Exelon’s corporate headquarters also addressed the situation after power at three of its nuclear plants, including TMI, were not purchased at the auction.

“Although capacity revenue in a single year is an important consideration in a plant’s long-term viability, it is just one of several factors Exelon will use to make decisions about its plants’ future operations,” Exelon said in a statement.

Said Exelon CEO Chris Crane, “We will consider auction results. along with other data points, including EPA’s Clean Power Plan, as we make decisions about the future of these critical long-life assets.”

In Illinois, Exelon has threatened to close as many as three of its money-losing nuclear plants because of competition from natural gas and subsidized wind energy.

Two of those three plants are in the PJM, as is TMI, and neither of the Illinois plants were competititive enough to sell electricity in the last auction in May 2014.

Exelon has sought support from Illinois legislators and one bill being considered would require the state's utilities to buy 70 percent of their power from "low carbon" sources such as that generated by nuclear plants. The utilities could offset that cost by charging ratepayers with a surcharge of up to 2 percent.

Eric Epstein of the clean-energy group Three Mile Island Alert had this to say about TMI’s shutout at the capacity auction: “Single reactor sites like TMI are more vulnerable to closure since they are unprofitable and require  government and ratepayer subsidies.

“Several developments this summer have weakened the nuclear industry and wrought havoc on Exelon's corporate fortunes: EPA devalued nuclear's role in combating carbon emissions, three Exleon plants, including TMI, did not clear PJM capacity auctions, and the DC Public Service Commission nixed the Exelon-Pepco merger.

“TMI's shuttering creates long-term problems for the local community, and will intensify the shortfall in cleanup funding, and postpone the storage of high-level radioactive waste from spent fuel pools to dry casks.

“It's hard to imagine a scenario where Three Mile Island does not become a permanent nuclear garbage site in the middle of the Susquehanna River."

The increasing building of power plants fired by cheaper natural gas is clearly resulting in cheaper electricity being sold on the wholesale market.

Talen Energy announced recently that it would retrofit its coal-fired Brunner Island power plant along the Susquehanna River in York County so it can also burn natural gas.

On the other hand, owners of nuclear plants are hoping that the President Obama administration's Clean Power Plan to cut back on sources of carbon dioxide, such as coal plants, will raise the value of nuclear plants.

Says DeSantis, “Exelon is continuing its ongoing work to educate policymakers and others about the fact that markets are failing to properly value nuclear power’s environmental and reliability benefits and the need to find solutions that will correct that.”

In 2009, Exelon received a license extension from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to continue operating TMI until 2034.  

Exelon is the nation’s largest owner and operator of nuclear plants, with 22 reactors in 13 locations, including TMI and the Peach Bottom nuclear plant in York County.

TMI produces enough electricity to power 800,000 homes. The plant has 520 employees, the majority of whom live in Lancaster and Dauphin counties.

Nuclear engineer Pissed No Clear Definition of "Important To Safety"?

He is complaining to the NRC. Why did it take so long?

From: Kurt Schaefer

To: Rule making Comments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Request for Rule Making - Defining “Important to Safety”

Date: Monday, July 20, 2015 4:07:25 AM

Attachments: Request for Rule Making.pdf

Office of the Secretary;

I have been performing nuclear power plant (NPP) licensing since in 1980, and have never met two people that agree about what nonsafety-related structures, systems and components (SSCs) should be categorized as "important to safety." That is because there is only a general description of what is "important to safety" in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, and the regulations do not provide a specific set of criteria for determining which SSCs are "important to safety."

The term “important to safety” is used in numerous regulations and NRC guidance documents. In addition, one of the regulations most used at NPPs, 10 CFR 50.59, has used and after a number of revisions still uses that term for evaluating changes to determine if a license amendment is required before making a change. Therefore, there are regulations, regulatory guidance and routinely generated regulatory evaluations, based on SSCs with no specific criteria that determines what are the applicable SSCs.

Since 1984, there have been differences of opinion on what SSCs are “important to safety.” The nuclear industry is on its third generation of engineers and regulators with no clear definition of what is “important to safety.” At this point, there is no excuse for not having a concise set of functional criteria defining such a used term. The attachment provides a request for rule making to define (i.e., provide criteria for determining) "important to safety."
Regard;
--
Kurt Schaefer

Principal Licensing Engineer

ktschaefer@gmail.com

P.S. I am currently working in Korea, and my cell phone does not function here.

Therefore, please contact me by email.

Amazingly Low NE Wholesale Electric Price in July 2015

Wholesale electricity prices and demand in New England, July 2015                   

Amazingly Low Wholesale Electric Price in 2015 July   

Tuesday, August 11, 2015 at 2:07PM 

Another month of low natural gas prices brought July’s average power price to the third-lowest monthly level in 12 years

Following on June’s record-setting average natural gas and wholesale electricity prices, which were the lowest monthly prices in 12 years in New England, July’s prices were also very low, but slightly higher than June’s record. The average monthly natural gas price was 37% lower than the average price during July 2014, and was the third-lowest monthly average in 12 years. As a result of the low natural gas prices, July’s average wholesale power price was the third-lowest since March 2003, when New England launched competitive power markets in their current form. The July average power price was $25.40 per megawatt-hour (MWh)*, 27% below the year-ago price.

July brought warmer weather that drove up air conditioning use, which drove up demand for power. As a result, total power usage during July was almost 20% higher than during June. The average price of natural gas during July was almost 17% higher than the June price. July’s average real-time electric energy price of $25.40/MWh was about 30% higher than June’s average price of $19.61/MWh, the lowest monthly price in 12 years.

In fact, wholesale power and natural gas prices during April, May, June and July this year are among the lowest monthly averages since March 2003 in New England. But these low prices come on the heels of near-record-high prices just a few months earlier, highlighting the price volatility stemming from natural gas pipeline constraints during periods of high demand in New England. February, the coldest month since 1960, brought the third-highest average wholesale price of power of $126.70/MWh. Due to heavy demand for natural gas for both heating and power generation, combined with pipeline constraints, the average price of natural gas during February was $17.27 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) **, the fourth-highest monthly level since 2003.  

Last night Thought Something was On Fire At Vermont Yankee?

Update

Yep, at about the same time, Cersosimo Lumber yard was burning scraps again tonight. Different atmosphere conditions, the plume wasn't going up in the air. The smoke was staying on the ground. I never notice this before. I bet you they been doing this for decades.     

 

***I am on my bike trail near my house by the Vernon dam. They got a virgin piece of forest abutting the river...it is just a glorious ride on my mountain bike. I am on the peninsula. I am taking a wonderful picture with my new cell phone camera (Galaxy S6). It voice records things even better.

   



 

I spin around to see this below at Vermont Yankee. All I can assume is its coming from the plant. It is about 7:45 pm on a Tuesday night. I am thinking VY is burning construction debris. It is so late in the evening.  

The recordings of my call phone conversations reporting the fire: 

1) Call to Vermont Yankee reporting fire.

2) Call to 911

3) 911 call back

Basically I continued on with my trail ride heading about two miles south. I was right across the river from Vermont Yankee near the Hinsdale Connecticut River setback. The fire was coming from the Cersosimo Lumber yard in Vernon. Why were they burning scrap lumber at 7:45 pm on a Tuesday night? Why didn't they notify the Vernon fire department they were going to do it. Did they have a fire permit?

I thought of the whole deal, better to be safe than sorry??? 

I was disappointed with VY. I wished they would have taken my name and number, gave me a courtesy call back explaining there was no fire at the site and we think it was in the Cersosimo lumber yard burning scrap lumber.    

LaSalle Nuclear Plant Purchasing Junk Foreign Secuity Weapons?

I proposed this a few years back and got a FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force visit a few years back. It was very unpleasant meeting at my local police department headquarters with two special agents. Basically my theme on the internet was, the bad guys stealing the guard force's weapons and then they attacking the control room and gaining control of the facility. Didn't mention anything about stealing any ammo? There is not that much difference between stealing the security forces guns and bad guys entering the control room to do harm. Right, stealing the guns bypasses all the security controls at a nuclear power plant. The idea of bad guys entering the control room using regular methods with unapproved weapons.

Why wasn't the gun locker room thoroughly security camera'd up?

I got a new Galaxy s6. I have to use my thumb print in order to open up my screen. Do they use similar or face recognition software for entering the control room? The scenario is the bad guys with the stolen guns could steal a card key and thus could gain access to the control room with the guns. Maybe the janitors or the guys filling up the vending machine could be in cahoots with the security guys who stole the guns?

Maybe even the worst out of this whole deal; why is Exelon purchasing foreign Swiss guns. Why is Exelon so unpatriotic with not purchasing US guns? Doesn't Exelon care about jobs for American workers?  Isn't their similar quality guns made in the USA? You go Donald Trump!!!

Two Sig Sauer 9 millimeter weapons were stolen from the armory at the LaSalle nuclear power plant located 65 miles southwest of the City of Chicago. 

Exelon, the licensee who operates the nuclear facility, claims that the security of the site was not breached during the theft, which may imply that the person who stole the weapons is a worker at the nuclear power plant. 

Exelon has notified the LaSalle County Sheriff’s Department and officials at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who will launch an investigation into the matter.  The NRC has dispatched a senior inspector to the plant to oversee the case. 

Officials from the power plant told reporters that the weapons were primarily used for training purposes and could have been stolen nearly a month ago, on July 27^th, and may reveal why the theft was not made public earlier.