Millstone: FSAR Safety Valves not fixed because of "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges".

This went on for 7 years and hopefully fixed it this outage. You see how this attitude carried over to 2014 in the turbine driven Aux Feedwater pump problems and then the plant trip and LOOP. They were improperly sized, then put off fixing it till this outage

"Dominion had deferred correcting this condition over a period of six years (three refueling outages) which the inspectors noted in NCV 05000423/2012010-01, a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” Dominion has since deferred repairs from the April 2013 refueling outage until the October 2014 outage."

See how they hide problems from us and allow they guys not to fix safety components for many years. At the end of 2013, this is the first time we are hearing about...why wasn't made into a LER in 2007?

 

Did you catch that below, profound "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges" over 4 years. 

The valves were initially scheduled to be restored to full qualification during refueling outage (RFO), 3RFO12, in October 2008, but the repairs were deferred to 3RFO13 due to maintenance schedule conflicts. Subsequently, repairs were not completed in 3RFO13, 3RFO14, or 3RFO15 due to scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges."

Imagine if they had a unimaginable accident like removing a transmission circuit and then getting a troublesome LOOP in a feed water piping burst and these valves did not work like specified in the FSARs? Can you imagine the fall out with agency not being able to see  defect or that they gave the plant permission to continue on with plant operation.  

2007:Dominion discovered problem.

2012: NRC first reported on it and found additional problems.

Late 2013: NRC dinged them not replacing the valves.

(I mean, who do you trust.) 

November 8, 2013

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2013004 AND 05000423/2013004 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT NO. 07200047/2013001 

Failure to Restore Feedwater Isolation Valves to Full Compliance

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for Dominion’s continued failure to take timely and effective corrective actions for conditions adverse to quality involving the degradation of the closing capability of four Unit 3 main feedwater isolation valves. Dominion had deferred correcting this condition over a period of six years (three refueling outages) which the inspectors noted in NCV 05000423/2012010-01, a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” Dominion has since deferred repairs from the April 2013 refueling outage until the October 2014 outage. The violation is cited because Dominion has failed to restore compliance or

Can you believe this...why didn't the NRC demand fix it or you can't start up?  

demonstrate objective evidence of plans to restore compliance at the first opportunity in a reasonable period of time following initial identification in 2007 and documentation in 2012 NRC inspection reports.

Description. On June 27, 2007, Dominion identified that the Unit 3 feedwater isolation valve hydraulic actuators for 3FWS*CTV41A, B, C and D were not adequately sized to fully close against main feedwater pump discharge pressure to isolate feedwater flow into containment in the event of a main feedwater line rupture. Further analysis concluded that the feedwater isolation would likely occur when the feedwater pumps were subsequently stopped by either a non-safety grade trip signal or manual operator action.The feedwater isolation valves are safety-related valves that comprise train ‘B’ of the main feedwater isolation function as described in the Millstone UFSAR. Dominion determined that the hydraulic actuators for these valves were inadequately sized based on operating experience as described in Electric Power Research Institute Technical Report TR-103232. The valves were initially scheduled to be restored to full qualification during refueling outage (RFO), 3RFO12, in October 2008, but the repairs were deferred to 3RFO13 due to maintenance schedule conflicts. Subsequently, repairs were not completed in 3RFO13, 3RFO14, or 3RFO15 due to scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges. Once again, Dominion has rescheduled repairs to the upcoming refueling outage 3RFO16 in October 2014, seven years after the problem was first identified.

The main feedwater isolation valves are safety-related containment isolation valves that rapidly close in response to a phase ‘B’ feedwater isolation ESF signal. These valves are relied upon to ensure that the flow of hot feedwater is rapidly isolated for a variety of analyzed events including the rupture of a feedwater header inside containment. If feedwater flow is not isolated to the break, the additional energy transported into containment may challenge containment pressure and temperature limits, as well as the equipment qualification of various instruments and equipment inside containment.

Dominion determined (in CR-7-07160 and Operability Determination (OD) MP3-014-07) the valves would not go fully closed until after the feedwater pumps had tripped and therefore, the feedwater isolation (FWI) function was operable with a degraded margin. A subsequent review (OD000237 completed in 2009) reaffirmed this conclusion. The justification for continued operability was based on the conclusion that the feedwater line break (FLB) event remained bounded by the main steam line break (MSLB) event and that operator actions could be relied upon to manually trip the motor-driven main feedwater pump in time to reduce the differential pressure across the feedwater isolation valve allowing the valve to go fully closed before containment limits were exceeded.

On May 10, 2012, the inspectors reviewed this active OD and determined that the justification for continued operations did not meet the requirements of OP-AA-102-1001, “Development of Technical Guidance Basis to Support Operability Determinations,” Revision 6. Specifically, Dominion had concluded that the FWI function was operable because the MSLB accident bounded the FLB accident

You catch this, the overly optimistic and inaccurate engineering safety analysis that justified continued operations. Just like the analysis on not getting permission to yank out the SLOD and transmission system leading to the plant trip and LOOP.  

because the main steam break event had a greater energy release rate and no further analysis was necessary to demonstrate safety. This analysis did not fully consider the impact of continued high temperature feedwater flow from full power conditions into containment and the subsequent challenge to the electrical equipment qualification temperature limits inside containment. The inspectors documented this issue as FIN 05000423/2012003-01.

Based on the inspectors documented findings, Dominion issued CR483637 on August 1, 2012, and placed the motordriven feedwater pump in pull-to-lock to prevent it from automatically starting if a drop in feed header pressure occurred from a feed header rupture. Dominion subsequently completed an immediate operability

So why not a temporary Licence amendment request and the opportunity for a public hearing?    

determination, which concluded that the feedwater isolation function was degraded but operable based upon the conclusion that the main feedwater pumps would likely trip within a short period of time. The non-safety grade main feedwater pump trip signal that would likely stop the pumps and operator actions would also manually stop the main feedwater pump while implementing emergency operating procedure E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.” 

The inspectors noted the deferral of repairs to 3FWS*CTV41A, B, C, and D from 3RFO15 to 3RFO16 and questioned the continued validity of the operability determination which relied upon an untested, non-safety grade main feedwater pump trip signal for another operating cycle. Dominion developed a procedure, SP 3621.5, “Overlap Testing of Main Feedwater Pump Trips,” Revision 000, which operators used to test the feedwater pump trip signal. This successfully completed test allows Dominion to continue to consider the feedwater isolation function degraded but operable until full compliance is restored in 3RFO16. 

Analysis. The inspectors determined that the failure to take timely and effective corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, following identification of a degraded condition of the Unit 3 main feedwater isolation valves was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Dominion’s ability to foresee and correct.

The inspectors determined this issue was more than minor because it is similar to the more than minor examples, 4.f and 4.g of IMC 0612, Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues.” Specifically, Dominion did not correct a condition adverse to quality in a timely manner and resulted in a situation that impacted the operability of the feedwater isolation valves. Additionally, the finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone’s objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.

In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,” the inspectors performed a Phase 1 SDP screening and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the issue did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. In the event of a ruptured feedwater line, the train ‘A’ main feedwater regulating valves and bypass valves would remain capable of closing to isolate feedwater flow.

The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Resources component, because Dominion did not maintain long term plant safety by minimizing long-standing equipment issues and ensuring maintenance and engineering backlogs which are low enough to support safety. Specifically, Dominion deferred the feedwater isolation valve replacement project from 3RFO15 to 3RFO16 because the design change could not be issued to support online work on the project required prior to the outage. Additionally, there were a number of outstanding technical issues for the design change that were not resolved in time despite the condition existing since 2007 (H.2.a).

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, from 2007 until repairs are completed in October 2014, Dominion failed to take timely correction action to correct the degraded condition of the Unit 3 main feedwater isolation valves. Dominion entered this issue into their CAP as CR507299. The NRC identified a performance deficiency with these valves on August 31, 2012, which is documented as a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” (NCV 05000423/2012010-01). The inspectors determined that Dominion had failed to restore compliance at the first opportunity within a reasonable time following the issuance of the finding and NCV. Dominion has since deferred repairs from the April 2013 refueling outage until the October 2014 refueling outage. Therefore, this violation is being cited, consistent with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 2.3.2. A Notice of Violation is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

Virus have infected my computer

Virus have infected my computer...I have been dealing with it since sat morning. Cloud 7 something or other. I think I just cleared it up. I couldn't use my computer all weekend long.

I was thinking of throwing my computer against the wall a few times it got me so  mad and then running over it with my car!!!

NRC OIG's San Onofre Inspection Quotes

Basically the quotes from all the NRC employees in the NRC OIG inspection. 

You notice we don't have quotes from the San Onofre organization employees"

Every sentence in this could be a talking point in its own right.  

Team Leader

"The Team Leader described her role as the administrative coordinator of the inspection but with some technical oversight."

"She did not view herself as an authority on the team, and said team members were "pretty much even."

"The Team Leader thought existing 10 CFR 50.59 guidance could be improved."

"She recalled that each region interpreted the inspection procedures differently."

"Additionally, the Team Leader said there was no specific training for 50.59."

"She thought NRC has a good 50.59 inspection program, but it needs to be revamped to eliminate these discrepancies."

Team Member 1

"OIG learned that the team member who was assigned to review the replacement steam generator evaluation as part of the 2009 50.59 inspection was a Region IV DRS Reactor Inspector, and the 2009 SONGS 50.59 inspection was approximately his second 50.59 inspection."

"He said the team "pulled the screen, which was very large, for the 50.59 for the Unit 2 steam generators and went line by line to ensure that there was no adverse impact pertaining to installation of the new steam generators at SONGS Unit 2."

"He said while neither he nor any of the other team members was an ABAQUS or ANSYS "guru," they would have asked to see evidence that this statement was supported."

"He said if he were doing the inspection now and came across UFSAR items indicating a methodology change that was not captured in the screen, he would question the licensee." 

   

"Team Member 1 told OIG that training for 50.59 inspections could be improved."

"He went into this inspection right out of college and said it would have been helpful to have had more training."

"At the time of this inspection, regional inspectors were not involving the headquarters technical experts, like they do now."

"Team Member 1 also thought the 50.59 guidance available to inspectors is too vague."

"For example, he said At the time of this inspection, regional inspectors were not involving the headquarters technical experts, like they do now."

"For example, he said "more than a minimal increase" should be defined by a specific value in 1O CFR 50.59. (OIG notes that "more than a minimal increase" is the terminology used in several of the 1O CFR 50.59(c)(2) screening criteria.)"

"Furthermore, he noted that an inspector's knowledge and background influences the conclusion of an inspection."  

"He said, "I could read it one way, [you] could read it a completely different way," and subsequently come up with a different conclusion."

"He added that inspector "skill sets are to determine and ask appropriate questions that could lead us to potential issues."

Team Branch Chief

"A Region IV DRS Branch Chief told OIG that during the 2009 integrated inspection at SONGS that included the 10 CFR 50.59 review of the SONGS replacement steam generator, he was in a 3-month rotational position acting as the Branch Chief responsible for the Region IV DRS Engineering Branch that did the SONGS 71111.17 inspection."   

"The Branch Chief did not work with the inspectors on the scope of their work or provide any oversight of their onsite inspection activity, but he said he would have looked at the results they brought back and would have approved the "feeder'' report that they prepared for inclusion in the integrated inspection report."

Interviews of NRC Subject Matter Experts

"Although the purpose of any 50.59 process should be to evaluate changes to the facility as described in the FSAR, the SONGS _evaluation rarely discusses the actual changes to the FSAR. You cannot tell from the evaluation what exact statements were changed."

"For a document that is supposed to evaluate adverse changes to "license and design basis" functional requirements, there is little mention of what the actual design and license basis requirements are."

"This displays a significant lack of understanding of the 50.59 process and requirements at the plant."

There are a number of general statements in the screen that are never supported. Just stating these types of conclusions does not make it so; this is a large, involved screen that, after dissected, lacks substance.   Examples cited regarding the comparison of the original steam generators (OSG) against the replacements include the following:

''These differences represent a vast improvement over the OSG materials in terms of corrosion, erosion-corrosion and wear resistance."

"These differences also represent functional improvements over the OSG components."

"There are some instances where the licensee and their contractor appear to have deviated from NRG-approved guidance and, as a result, failed to perform 1O CFR 50.59 evaluations related to portions of the steam generator replacements." 

"The most prevalent deviation from guidance involves areas where reanalysis was completed to demonstrate that all required safety functions and design requirements were met. NRG-approved guidance states that in these circumstances, the change is considered to be adverse and a 1O CFR 50.59 evaluation is required."

Another area of deviation from guidance involves the licensee's understanding and use of guidance related to changes to one or more elements of evaluation and changes from one method of evaluation to another.  Each discussion related to methods of evaluation is incomplete or flawed.  In general, these discussions lack adequate detail to support the stated conclusions.

"Review of this document would take substantial effort by an inspector. There really are not enough hours allotted within the baseline 50.59 inspection to perform a good review. It would take a tremendous amount of time just to get the required documents to support the licensee's conclusions, if such documents exist."

"One of the Branch Chiefs noted in his review that 10 CFR 50.59 is an administrative process to determine if facility changes can be implemented without prior NRC staff approval by way of the license amendment process of 10 CFR 50.90. He wrote, "Errors in executing the 10 CFR 50.59 process do not directly impugn the ultimate acceptability of the design and analysis associated with the proposed change."

"The Branch Chief also told OIG that training was an area that needed improvement and that the quality of a 10 CFR 50.59 inspection is dependent on the inspector's knowledge, experience, and background."

"He said the guidance is complex and there is a lot of judgment that is applied in using it."

"The Branch Chief said the only way to provide effective oversight is to make sure the inspectors have the tools and training to effectively execute the inspection procedures."

"He said that currently, the only training people get on conducting 50.59 inspections is through the inspector qualification process and that it would be much better to have some kind of recurrent refresher training or lessons learned."

 "The Branch Chief said some regions do more than others in that regard."

"The Branch Chief also noted that NRC 50.59 inspections generally occur after the fact and it is the licensee's responsibility under the license to complete this process properly, using their procedures, and our inspection activity is reviewing that and aimed at holding them accountable on a sampling basis for the quality of the projects they produce and adherence to their procedures." 

"He said while there may be an opportunity - if an inspector reviews something while it is being worked on - to identify something that can change the course of the licensee's path, but typically the activities are already done in the field, or on their way to being done, before NRC starts looking."

"The other Branch Chief told OIG that the 50.59 regulation is complex and NRC inspectors need clear guidance, specific training on the 1O CFR 50.59 inspection process, and increased hours to perform the inspections."

"In his opinion, the NEI 96-07 guidance is too vague, allows for too many judgment calls, and needs solidifying of definitions."

"From his experience, the licensee and NRC routinely get into disagreements because of interpretation of the guidance."

"This Branch Chief told OIG that had he reviewed the SONGS 50.59 in 2009, he would have come to the conclusion that, without additional documents, he would have absolutely no reasonable assurance that SONGS could pass a 50.59 inspection." 

"He would have told the licensee that their documentation was inadequate and not documented properly, and the licensee may have had time before the install to produce adequate documentation."

"The Branch Chief said he would have expected the 2009 inspectors to ask questions and follow up on the unsupported general statements made by the licensee in the 50.59 documents; however, he could not determine from the documentation he reviewed whether a license amendment was needed."

"He said while there may be an opportunity - if an inspector reviews something while it is being worked on - to identify something that can change the course of the licensee's path, but typically the activities are already done in the field, or on their way to being done, before NRC starts looking."

"The NRR Program Manager also commented that inspectors can watch an activity every month - for years even - and then a different inspector will come in and find something the others never identified."

NRR Response to OIG Questions About Methodology Changes

"According to the memorandum, it was not unexpected that NRC did not have on hand all the information needed to answer OIG's questions "based on NRC Inspection Manual 2515, 'Light­ Water Reactor Inspection Program,' which states, '[t]he NRC inspection program covers only small samples of licensee activities in any particular area,' and 'individual inspectors are expected to exercise initiative in conducting inspections, based on their expertise and experience."'

Interviews of NRC Region IV Management

Former Deputy Regional Administrator

"Regarding the 50.59 inspection process, the fundamental question is to understand whether or not the licensing staff, NRR, needs to conduct a review before a change is permitted to the licensing basis of the plant."

"He said that samples are taken to see if the licensee comported with criteria of the regulation."

"He believed that in hindsight, SONGS needed a license amendment based on what was known today (2013), however, he could not speak to what was known in 2009 or 2010."

"He believed that in hindsight, SONGS needed a license amendment based on what was known today (2013), however, he could not speak to what was known in 2009 or 2010."

"The former Deputy Regional Administrator explained that the design, as built, was fundamentally flawed and would not have been approved under any conditions."

"The overall design was unacceptable because of the adverse thermal-hydraulic conditions and the upper tube structure support being inadequate."

"Regarding inspection guidance procedures relevant to the 50.59 process, the former Deputy Regional Administrator stated that the inspection guidance appears to be focused on the updated FSAR, and provides some practical guidance."

"However, it does not address the issue of why a change might need to have pre-approval."

"The inspection guidance does not cover the details of the rule, why each of the 50.59 criteria exists, and how to interpret them."

"According to the former Deputy Regional Administrator, the inspection guidance can be improved."

"He noted that he has heard from staff members that they are dissatisfied with NEI guidance."

"The challenge is that there are so many different types of components, structures, and systems and it is hard to write a procedure that captures all those different circumstances."  

"Having a detailed inspection plan that allows one to probe into the important areas is part of inspection preparation and for an effort like the steam generator replacement, which is like inspecting a system, there would need to be more individuals involved, more resources, more time, and more preparation."    

"He added that the steam generator replacement inspection guidance is focused on a number of activities including opening up containment, removing the old generators, placing new generators, patching the containment and verifying containment integrity."

"The guidance allocates 350 hours for this activity and only approximately 60 hours are devoted to design, including the 50.59 review, which is not very much time to actually delve into a complex component such as steam generators."

"The former Deputy Regional Administrator said that the agency has to decide if it is important enough to inspect every one of these (steam generators) as they come along, and that inspections are funded and adequately supported."   

The program guidance needs to be reviewed and could be enhanced and the resource allocation needs to be reviewed.   

"The former Deputy Regional Administrator added that guidance for inspecting in-service steam generators experiencing tube degradation provides a lot of insight, but has not been updated in 18 years."

"Some of the guidance is out of date and some needs to be strengthened."

"The former Deputy Regional Administrator said that there are not many findings that result from [steam generators or 50.59] inspections."

"When the staff initially started conducting steam generator replacement inspections they were a huge deal and the inspection plan was discussed at the branch, division, and regional administrator's level and there was a lot of communication with the other regions."

"However, in his view, over time these inspections have become routine."

Former Regional Administrator

"Although these reviews are never 100 percent because they are done through sampling, his expectations are that the inspectors look hard and that they challenge."

"The former Regional Administrator wants them to be as thorough as they can be, but their time is limited."  

"So they can never look at everything."  

"The former Regional Administrator told OIG that inspectors review the important functions of the important systems and components that are being changed and the evaluation behind the change to see if it is justifiable that it is not increasing the risk - not triggering those criteria from the 50.59 rule."

"He said that knowing what they know now, "the steam generators as designed were basically unlicensable."  

"We wouldn't approve them."

"The former Regional Administrator advised 50.59 could be strengthened with explicit instruction to the inspector in preparation for their inspections."   

***"He mentioned a limiting factor with 50.59 is that a lot of information contained in the licensing basis is not contained in the FSAR and may not be reviewed under 50.59."

"The former Regional Administrator felt the NRC should consider excluding some design changes from 50.59."  

"He said it is worth the time and effort for the NRC to do a license amendment on a major reactor coolant system component."  

"He said a license amendment would not accomplish design validation, but it will get to a certain set of criteria and, in the case at SONGS, it would have caused reviewers to ask good questions to determine."

'What's behind it?"

"For example, he said that based on guidance in the Standard Review Plan,26 one item that certainly would have been questioned by reviewers was the acceptance criteria of 95 percent (void fraction27), because no other plant in the industry is over 90 percent."  

"Some reviewer would have said that this is an outlier and we need to understand that."

***"The former Regional Administrator stated to leave the review of such a large and broad component with the scope and depth of engineering of the steam generator with the inspection oversight program may be risky."  

***"The inspection program will miss things because it is not encompassing enough to review to the level of detail or scrutiny as does the Standard Review Plan."

Current Region I V Deputy Regional Administrator

"When asked to interpret the differences of opinion from the 2009 inspection to the subject matter expert reviews during this inquiry, the current Region IV Deputy Regional Administrator said he did not know the amount of time taken in 2009 as compared to the AIT and AIT followup and any additional reviews."

"He said the different outcomes could reflect the level of experience of inspectors."

"However, he added the fact that the AIT cited SONGS for a couple of minor violations, indicates the 2009 inspection team did not conduct a proper 50.59 evaluation."

"The RIV Deputy Regional Administrator commented that if two 50.59 inspectors have the same information and come to different conclusions, we need to take a look at our guidance and make sure that it is clear and more objective."   

"He advised based on what he knows about the SONGS issues, the agency may benefit from a different inspection approach to do some kind of screening and determine if a more detailed design-type review for major component replacement inspections is necessary. " 

"This issue is being addressed with the lessons learned review."  

"Additionally, he believes there could be improvements in training and guidance, as evidenced by the subject matter experts having different observation in reviewing the SONGS replacement steam generator evaluation. " 

***"And if experts have different views, inspectors with less experience may have more variability in their conclusions."

Interviews of NRC Headquarters Managers

"However, he said that inspectors do not look at everything and are trained to sample."

 "NRC does not have the resources, including time or manpower, to review everything and so inspectors sample."

"The former NRR Director said that the problem with the SONGS steam generators was a design issue."

"The 50.59 process would not have prevented the steam generators from leaking and this is not the purpose of the 50.59 process."

"The 50.59 process is not going to stop a licensee from buying bad equipment, or from operating a plant incorrectly.  It is not NRC's job to make sure that a licensee buys good generators."  

"The NRC's job is to protect public health and safety."

"The former NRR Director told OIG that the 50.59 process is a threshold as to whether a licensee can take a particular action without NRC approval."

"According to the former NRR Director, this information indicated that NRC was reviewing the 50.59s and that mistakes were being made; however, none of these findings were particularly safety-significant."

"Consequently, based on this data, he does not believe that he has a lot of problems

with the generic use of 50.59 by licensees or a problem with NRC oversight of the 50.59 process."

"According to the former NRR Director, if there were problems with the 50.59 process, it would have manifested itself in many more issues than just the steam generator issue."

"The former NRR Director added that NRC has not had an issue with the approximately 53 nuclear power plants that have changed their steam generators under the 10 CFR 50.59 process."

"According to the former NRR Director, based on the information provided by OIG pertaining to methodology changes, it appeared that NRC may have done a bad job of reviewing the SONGS 50.59 during the 2009 inspection; however, one should be careful before concluding that this was a broader problem than SONGS."

"He did not have data to conclude that NRC needs to do a larger inspection sample.  What happened at SONGS was not particularly safety-significant."   

"It was a good question to ask whether the NRC was doing enough of a review of the 50.59s being conducted.  

"Nevertheless, as the NRR Director responsible for the operational safety of 100 nuclear power plants and research and test reactors, he has limited resources."

Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness  Programs

***"Safety of the plant is the licensee's primary responsibility, and NRC relies on licensees to implement technical specifications and the conditions of their license."

"A licensee may make changes in their facility without obtaining a license amendment only if they meet the eight criteria in 1O CFR 50.59."

"Also, he said, "We're only going to be able to sample, and you always want to make sure that you're sampling the items with the highest likely safety significance input."

"His main concern is that the process is not overly driven by subjectivity and judgment."

"NRC staff and is not intended to pick up problems with design flaws like 10 CFR 50.90 (i.e., license amendment requests) reviews; however, it could."  

Also, he said, "We're only going to be able to sample, and you always want to make sure that you're sampling the items with the highest likely safety significance input."

"The Deputy Executive Director commented that the high frequency with which licensees use the 50.59 process coupled with the relatively low frequency of issues identified by NRC suggests to him that training could be a factor."  

"He believes that if we look at training in a broad sense - qualification training, on-the-job-training, and experience - we may be able to understand how training influenced inspectors' decisions made or should have been made differently."  

***"For example, communications with external stakeholders will be an area that NRC improves and possibly areas with the 50.59 process and how it gets implemented."

"They screwed it up and we didn't pick it up."

"Turns out we didn't look at it in detail because they did a 50.59 review - didn't believe they needed to get us to look at [a license amendment request]."

"ISSUE 2: AIT Review of SCE's 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation

Interviews of AIT Participants

Former Division of Reactor Safety Director

"He recalled that the Region II Senior Reactor Inspector used NEl's NRG-endorsed guidance (NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation ) to review the 50.59 screens and evaluations and determine whether a license amendment was needed."

"We had a lot of stuff to look at. ..We didn't look at everything."

"The AIT was focused on the tube degradation."   

"Furthermore, the AIT inspection is an incident based inspection; he explained it is not a 50.59 inspection but questions arose regarding the adequacy of 50.59 and the AIT did more work to address those questions."

"The AIT Team Leader explained the AIT cited SCE with a thermal hydraulic modeling design violation of (10 CFR Part 50) Criterion Ill, (Design Control), which resulted in Region IV issuing SCE an apparent white violation."  

"He said, Region IV concluded that they did not believe the velocity information was available at the time (during the 50.59 process), like it is now." 

***"Had the information been available, SCE would have had to do something differently from a 50.59 perspective."   

"He advised that, collectively, the team thought if SONGS had done a more thorough evaluation, ·they potentially could have identified the problem if they had checked the adequacy of some of the information that they had questions on, specifically questions regarding velocities and questions concerning design control."

 Region II Senior Reactor Inspector

"The Senior Reactor Inspector said the decision to review the licensee's 50.59 evaluation arose after the AIT member from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research ran an independent thermal-hydraulic model of the replacement steam generators and identified some inconsistencies between his model and the licensee's model."

"He said that 1O CFR 50.59 specifies that if the licensee departs from the methodology as described in the FSAR, then a license amendment is needed."

"However, because the FSAR did not contain what was used for the original steam generators, there was no basis to conclude a departure from methodology had occurred."

(Catch 22)  "He said, "if the methodology is not in the FSAR, they didn't depart from it."

"So legally, by 50.59, they don't meet that criteria."

"He said the AIT's determination was - based on review of the FSAR, the engineering change package describing the new design, the 50.59 screen and evaluation, and other items - there was no indication that the licensee needed a license amendment."

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Project Manager

"The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) headquarters specialist to whom the AIT Team Leader referred was an NRR Project Manager assigned as the 10 CFR 50.59 Program Manager since 2009.

He was not told how to conduct the review and he was not an official member of the AIT."

"He said that reviewing the 50.59 entails reviewing a sampling and based on his years of experience as an inspector, he said, "you don't expect 100 percent of everything, but you review it. . . and you dig deeper into things that don't sound right."

"He said that all inspections are done by sampling."

"ANSYS with ABAQUS, he said this was a methodology change and the regulation is clear: If you use a new method, you have to justify it based on whether the NRC has previously approved that method for the intended application."

"He communicated to Region IV AIT followup team members that if ABAQUS had not been previously approved by the NRC for the specific application, a license amendment would be needed."

(SONG Chief Engineer Gary J Kline)

"The Project Manager recalled this was an item the licensee objected to because they said it was a revision to an existing method, and not a new methodology, whereas he believed it was a new methodology." 

"He was not sure what information the licensee provided to the AIT followup inspectors, or to what extent the NRC inspectors looked for where NRC had previously approved this method, but that the region closed the item out."

"He said he reviewed it and went with the region's judgment."

"The Project Manager acknowledged the methodology changes discussed in Issue I of this report (i.e., steam generator related methodology changes reflected in the UFSAR that were not mentioned in the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 screen)."  

"He said he did not notice this during his review (he checked the UFSAR to see that changes mentioned in the evaluation were reflected, but did not do a reverse comparison to see if all the changes to the UFSAR were reflected in the 50.59), but the licensee should have included them in the description of changes."

"However, he said, "just because they should have included that, and therefore they did not evaluate . . . does not mean it would have resulted in the need for prior NRC approval.  It just means they didn't completely document it."

"The purpose of 10 CFR 50.59 is not to identify design deficiencies but to determine whether prior NRC review and approval is required."

"He said design deficiencies should be picked up through licensee quality assurance programs and potentially through NRC oversight of licensees' design control process through inspection, which is accomplished through a sampling process."

AIT Followup Team Member

"After discussion with OIG about the 10 CFR 50.59 provision concerning the need for NRC approval for the "intended application" when changing from a method of evaluation concerning methodology changes described in the FSAR to another method (10 CFR 50.59 (1)(2)(ii)), the Senior Project Engineer said the inspection plan was "probably flawed" because they did not look for explicit approval by the NRC for the intended application."

"With regard to the second area of concern within this URI, the Senior Project Engineer said that it was not a change in methodology because they went from using STRUDL and ANSYS to using just ANSYS to analyze a limiting event."

"However, when OIG discussed the use of a manual calculation to replace STRUDL, he said the regulatory basis for closing this area was probably not" adequate, based on the rule."

Review of Closeout Justification by Subject Matter Experts

"The other Branch Chief told OIG that NEI 96-07 guidance states that licensees who cite approved methodology from another licensee need to document their review of the method, approved application, safety evaluation report, and related documentation and verify that applicable terms, conditions, and limitations are met and to ensure the method is applicable to their type of plant."

SONGS Special Project Branch Chief

"A Region IV Branch Chief with oversight responsibility for SONGS since 2009 who also served as Branch Chief of the SONGS Special Project Branch told OIG, in hindsight, if NRC were to go through the 50.59 questions now, some of those screening questions would have to be answered yes and would require NRC approval."  

"But back then [2007- 2009], NRC did not know and SONGS did not know what NRC knows now [regarding the FIT-Ill thermal-hydraulic model], and an [NRC Office of Investigations] investigation was ongoing [as of February 2013] to determine what information was available."   

"He advised all indicators are that SONGS was not aware of the failure of the code error (used with the FIT-Ill) and SONGS could not have predicted it."

Former Deputy Regional Administrator

"According to the former Deputy Regional Administrator, SONGS' 50.59 did not meet the criteria 50.59 (2)(c)(ii) because design changes resulted "in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system or component important to safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report as updated."    

"He noted that this issue was not pursued because of the 2.206 petition submitted to the NRC Petition Review Board by the Friends of the Earth."

"The former Deputy Regional Administrator said that while he and some of the staff members involved in the AIT believed that SONGS violated 50.59 (2)(c)(ii) during its' implementation of the 50.59 process, other staff members did not share this view."

"According to the former Deputy Regional Administrator, the staff's focus and emphasis was not so much on whether one could point to a single criteria, but whether or not it (the violation) was fair and reasonable and met the standards for discretion."

"As noted under Issue 1, the former Deputy Regional Administrator said in hindsight, he believes that SONGS should have requested a license amendment from NRC prior to making the change."

"He also believes the steam generator design was fundamentally flawed and would not have been approved as designed."

Former Region IV Regional Administrator

"The former Region IV Regional Administrator told OIG that because the event surrounding the SONGS steam generator tube degradation was unprecedented in the industry, Region IV immediately established an AIT."

"The AIT may have conducted a focused 50.59 because NRC rarely, if ever, conducts a 100-percent review."

"Consequently, the AIT could have very easily selected items they viewed as important aspects to review to determine if the licensee reached the right conclusion."

 "In his view, the AIT focused on design issues and the 50.59 process is not intended to identify design issues."

"He was aware that the AIT has raised methodology-type questions because some of it surfaced in the AIT report and that the team considered methodology changes."

"However, if the region missed some of the methodology changes it was because inspections have always been no more than a sampling."

"If the AIT did not focus on the methodology changes, it was because there was something about their approach, plan, and scope of review, coupled with guidance they received that took them in the direction they took.  It was not malevolent or intent, but a part of the mentality and process of how inspectors pick their sample and selection process."

Current Region I V Deputy Regional Administrator

"The current Region IV Deputy Regional Administrator said that based on what the NRC looked at during its inspections, the agency made definitive statements that the licensee did not require a license amendment."

"However, he acknowledged there could be other aspects of the 50.59 that were done incorrectly that would require or would have required a license amendment.  He said that without additional inspection, NRC does not know the answer."  

"He said to make a definitive decision on whether a license amendment request was required, the agency would have to talk about the resources needed to accomplish that."  

"He said, "It comes down to a prudent use of resources to go back and accomplish that.""

"He does not believe the licensee's 50.59 evaluation would have picked it up."

"He also doubts the NRC license amendment review process would have picked this up. If the licensee explains the model used and reports the value reached, NRC may accept the output."

The NRC review process is not going to identify an error that the licensee made in either the modeling or the inputs to the modeling or the assumptions that went into the modeling."

Former NRR Director

"The former NRR Director noted that whether the NRC should have conducted a much more thorough review because of external stakeholder interest is a different question and should have been a management decision."

"However, from a safety significant standpoint, the answer would have been that it did not warrant a more thorough review. He noted that there was no release offsite that was consequential to anyone."

Interview of NRR Acting Director

"The Acting NRR Director told OIG the region does not have latitude to deviate from the 50.59 rule [similar versus intended use]."

"But, in this case, it is NRC's job to have the licensee provide the justification, as the licensee is responsible for doing the 50.59 evaluation."

"The Acting NRR Director informed OIG that the examples cited by the licensee in the AIT followup report (as described in footnote 32), which included three NUREG contractor reports, are reports of research that have been done for the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and do not constitute NRC approval."

"They were examples of how the NRC used the code for a vessel head, and dissimilar welds, which are good uses of ABAQUS, but they are not steam generator tube bundle interactions with tube support plates."

"His inference in reading the next paragraph of the AIT followup report was that inspectors looked at Comanche Peak's FSAR and recognized SCE's examples were not NRC approvals and they looked for another analog and presented the Comanche Peak analysis of ABAQUS." 

"He stated it is debatable if Region IV found the best application to cite in closing the open URI 10 issue."

"He said the trigger to require a license amendment is intended to focus on safety and not necessarily to avoid a bad investment by the licensee."

"The safety outcomes of this event were well within the licensing basis of the facility and were a low-consequence event in terms of public exposure impacts."

"he result was not a significant safety impact.  In the end, SONGS had a tube leak that was well within the design basis accident analysis."

"And it was not clear to him that the analysis that supported the design would have driven the NRC to a conclusion that would have identified and anticipated the wear identified in the secondary side."

"The Acting NRR Director said that industry has replaced the vast majority of steam generators on pressurized water reactors. under 50.59 from the late 80's and early 90's forward, and up until SONGS, these replacements have occurred without issue."

Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs

"The Deputy Executive Director told OIG that the complex issues with the SONGS replacement steam generators are problems the NRC has not previously witnessed."  

"Had SCE submitted an amendment for review, the NRC would have touched those issues that resulted in the flaws in that generator (which experienced the tube leak)."

"He further explained that a 50.59 review (inspection) is not a safety review and that the design problem should have been found by the licensee."

"Hypothetically, he stated the NRC could have potentially found the problem in the licensing review process; but the 50.59 would not be the process to find that."

"The Deputy Executive Director told OIG the 50.59 process is utilized to determine if the NRC is required to review a change proposed by the licensee or if the NRC relies on the licensee's review of the change."

"With regard to the closeout of URI 10 concerning the use of ABAQUS, the Deputy Executive Director stated it is ultimately the region's responsibility to close out the URI."

"The inspector determined the NRC had approved ABAQUS for the reactor coolant system structural integrity analysis and without more information he could not provide an answer regarding the adequacy of the region's closure."

ISSUE 3: NRC Oversight of SONGS UFSAR

OIG Review of NRR Oversight of Other Updated UFSAR Submittals

"To conduct the review, the Project Manager pulled all license amendments from 2002 forward, took a random sampling, and compared them to the FSAR. (Random or risk informed or smart)"

 "The Project Manager said that the UFSAR reviews by project managers are a low priority and he was not sure if they could be given a higher priority because project managers have a lot of work already."

"Although he remembered receiving the 2009 and 2011 FSARs from SONGS, he did not remember doing a review for either one. He was not aware if the SONGS Project Manager before him reviewed or documented a review."

"He said that even if there is some guidance to project managers on these reviews, it was his impression from talking to peers, that the UFSAR reviews were not consistently performed."  

"He thought the review was considered a low-value activity."

"As far as the 50.59 summary document submitted by the licensee, this Project Manager described the reports as being brief and containing a summary of the licensee's basis for determining that the change can be made under 50.59."

Former Region I V Deputy Regional Admini strator

"The former Deputy Regional Administrator told OIG that during the AIT, Region IV staff reviewed the original SAR and noted that the licensee had made many changes to the steam generators over a 25-year period, which were no longer reflected in the UFSAR or consistent with the original SAR."

"When a licensee then goes to replace the steam generators, they are then comparing to whatever existed just before the replacement."

"All the changes have already occurred and were never updated [in UFSAR."

Current Region IV Deputy Regional Administrator

"The current Region IV Deputy Regional Administrator, stated that his general expectation is that all material submitted to the NRC from a licensee would be reviewed by headquarters staff."

Former NRR Director

"The former NRR Director advised OIG that he expected project managers to review revisions the UFSAR submitted by licensees under the 10 CFR 50.71(e) process and verify that changes made by licensees through various processes such as the 50.59 evaluations, license amendments,  and licensee commitments, have generally been updated into the UFSAR."

"Regarding OIG's observation that the SONGS FSAR was reviewed twice during an 11- year period and that review of the 2011 submittal was completed in December 2012, the former NRR Director acknowledged that this was unacceptable to go for such a long period of time without FSARs being reviewed."

"Regarding the NRR staff's review of FSARs submitted by other nuclear power plants, the former NRR Director said NRC should either change the requirement to complete such reviews within 90 days or do a better job to accomplish the requirement."

"The FSAR review is a self-imposed requirement and if the agency was not meeting its own internal guidance, then the agency should change the guidance and consider what really makes sense based on safety significance."

"The former NRR Director said that the project manager's review of the UFSAR is an administrative task. 

He noted that this review is a bookkeeping exercise and it is not a technical exercise."

Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs

"The Deputy Executive Director told OIG that NRC oversight of 10 CFR 50.71(e) is critical since it enables the NRC to know whether or not a plant is in compliance with its licensing basis."

 "He added the purpose of 10 CFR 50.71(e) is to ensure that changes either approved by NRC or made by licensees made under 1O CFR 50.59 process are captured in the UFSAR."

"He considers it a priority to review the UFSAR."