Near Miss: Nuclear Industry Ending Event Level at Salem Nuclear Plant.

7/17@4pm

So I got that call back from the Salem senior NRC resident. They are a kind of a neat resource not many people use. He says they were having troubles with a turbine driven feed pump…they had to replace parts and test it. That was why the delay or hold at 46% power. He says these guys have been pretty problematic of lately with the MFP causing scrams and down powers.

I got done with all my questions, and then he started to ask me how I am doing. I talked about my new mountain bike, going all over the place. He talked about a couple of bike rides he has had…the most memorial of his recently was a ride through Manhattan. These guys are really trying to be personable. Way more than a few years ago.

He going to ask NRR my scenario...a much higher probability of a double pump seizure in a DBA earthquake with the diffuser bolts all broken and the diffuser loose. He says they are covered in a single pump seizure.  

Again, this is much more dangerous than the possibility of an accident for the condition of the pumps. The Salem and Hope Creek plants has millions of components and thousands of systems…they are probable treating all their millions of components all in a similar manner. The plants could end up becoming very unreliable and if stressed in a transient or accident, a lot of component could show up to broken or degraded, confusing the hell out of the control room. Let alone, this behavior could demoralize the staff.   

So it needs two pumps to seize up simultaneously?

I think with a conservative maintenance PCP regime a locked rotor event his highly improbable. But under extremely poor maintenance regime leading to broken bolts on all the pumps and fallen down diffusers on three and for a prolonged exposure period…outside the well-treaded path of known engineering… then you have to assume a double locked  rotor event is probably . You have to treat this negligent behavior as punishment, with charging them as double locked rotor event is highly probable. This is how you get everyone else to never to go down this path again.

So what if we had a large earthquake in the area around Salem, as example? This jostles the loose diffusers in the four pumps leading to near simultaneous locked rotors in two pumps before the scram.   I think they should be punished severely just for being outside the well warn path of knowable engineering…way outside the licensing of the plant and design testing.

We are way outside the designed in protection for this plant...this kind of damage is uminmanageble to the plant designers amd licencing.  

I read a divergence between the 1984 NRC information notice and Westinghouse (Toshiba)?

Editorial: Stop and learn lessons from Fukushima before restarting Sendai reactors

"We must not forget that after the outbreak of the Fukushima disaster, the stance of thinking, "As long as we meet the standards, that's enough," came under criticism, including from overseas."

Why wasn’t Salem Forced to stay shut down until all safety inspections were complete and full disclosures, especially the NRC inspection. 

Honestly can you say the standards were adequate and with even the measly self standards they were unenforceable?

So why aren't we into a special or augment inspection...bet you they don 't want to disturb these bad actors.

Bet you this will be a yellow or red NRC finding like Palisades or Browns Ferry?  

Will Salem become one of the worst nuclear power actors in the nation in the eyes of the NRC...

7/17

Holy smoke, all the way up to 67% last night?

Updated 7/16

A letter to the CEO: 

 9 Twin Orchard Drive

Oswego, NY 13126

July 11, 2014

Dr. Ralph Izzo, Chairman & CEO

80 Park Plaza

P.O. Box 570

Newark, NJ 07101

Dear Dr. Ralph Izzo:

Since the Tokyo Electric Power Company/Fukushima Daiichi accidents, I believe that I have been a little more interested in nuclear plant preparedness. And, it would be my guess that those high level U.S. nuclear industry management people who visited that site are also more interested. (Maybe even you went there.)

Anyway, after reading the very scarce information available on your Salem 2 outage, I decided yesterday, (Thursday), at about 9:30 am, to call 856-339-1002 and talk with Skip. My feeling was that a plant that experienced the same problem outage after outage after outage probably isn’t too prepared for anything. I thought Skip could provide a fuller explanation. (Incidentally, I believe that I obtained Skip’s telephone number back a number of years when your Hope Creek plant had major problems with the “B”reactor recirculation pump, which you may remember, was run for many 10,000s of hours past the vendor’s recommended teardown inspection time.) Well, Skip was not there. Who did I want to talk to? Well, since I do not know who else is available, I said that I wanted to talk to anybody that could tell me about the reactor coolant pumps. But, why don’t you send me over to whoever is covering for him. Guess what? Nobody is covering for him at 9:30 am on a Thursday. No problem there: I just asked to speak to his supervisor. Can’t do that. How about I take your name and telephone number and I will try to get someone to call you back?

Can you tell me if I got a call back?

I didn’t. So, rather than talk to Skip, how about I tell you what I, a stockholder, see of your Artificial Island operation. First off is trending, a popular pastime today. A few years ago at Hope Creek, 1 of 2 reactor recirculation pumps was run in a bad state of repair. That is 50%.

Recently, it appears that all 4 of the Salem 2 reactor coolant pumps were run in a poor state of repair. That is 100%. Note that the trend shows that your Artificial Island major pump condition is getting worse.

Why would that be? Especially since the industry prides itself on telling the public of the many layers in the defense in depth theory. In your case, these layers seem to be missing.

Do you have a paid systems engineer responsible for the reactor coolant pump system? Do you have a paid function (pump) engineer? Do you have a paid plant thermal performance engineer? Does each of these 3 people have 3 additional supervisors? Does a QC program exist and include such safety-related items as reactor coolant pumps? Is there an active QA function on site? Do the plant operators do tours through the plant? Do you have a predictive maintenance program for rotating equipment? Do you follow vendor recommendations for (major) pump maintenance? Are there any installed (and operating) monitoring equipment on these pumps? Do you have an aging management program in operation?

Shouldn’t just about any ONE of these layers of defense in depth been sufficient to warn you that pump work was needed at the START of the outage?

So, how about doing two things? First, why don’t you have calculated the cost of all those people, functions, and programs who did not warn PSEG that the Salem 2 reactor coolant pumps needed work this outage, (starting from the end of the last refueling outage?)

Second, how about providing some transparency to the interested public to show you now have control of the situation?

Thank you,

Thomas Gurdziel

 

Yesterday morning I noticed in the Power Reactor Status Report Salem 2 was stuck at 46%. I thought it was abnormal …but it was less than 24 hours from start-up. Today it is still stuck at 46% power and that is highly abnormal.  

“Substantial safety hazard”

Palisades:

Information Notice No. 85-03: Separation of Primary Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft and Impeller

3) Although the event described here is apparently isolated, it demonstrates the credibility of a pump failure event which could lead to a rapid flow decrease transient of the type expected with a sheared shaft event. Most PWRs have a licensing basis analysis for that event or the similar seized rotor event. These analyses generally assume an automatic response of the plant's reactor protection system which generates a reactor trip as a result of low reactor coolant flow.

Plants which sense primary flow by pump shaft rotation rather than a fluid flow measurement for this automatic trip function are cautioned to the vulnerability of the protective system to a failure of the pump impeller.

 

***I got it, but it was always safe?

Probable Nuclear Industry Ending Level Event At Salem Nuclear Plant

This is the USA’s Fukushima…an extremely unlikely event, but one with enormous consequences( 9.0 earthquake with a huge tsunami)…this is a tricky judgment.

“Westinghouse determined that the dislodged parts could have created a “substantial safety hazard” had they suddenly locked up a pump, according to Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the NRC’s regional office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. He added that the company considered a pump freeze-up “extremely unlikely.”

Does the NRC think this was extremely unlikely? What is it based on?

What is the evidence that it is unlikely…did the Westinghouse build a mockup and try every way possible with all the bolt broken to get the locked flow? Or is this just a industry’s advantaged "opinion" not backed up by testing and real engineering.  

There you guys go using insider code words the outsiders can’t understand…name and explain in detail the least and worst scenarios that gets you to the “substantial safety hazard”.

*** I’ll bet you it would get you to significant fuel damage and then bring up terms like a meltdown…it would be a nuclear industry ending level event based on just a “opinion” a freeze up is extremely unlikely!  

Documents ShowGeneral Motors Kept Silent on Fatal Crashes

Now, G.M.'s response, as well as its replies to queries in other crashes obtained by The New York Times from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, casts doubt on how forthright the automaker was with regulators over a defective ignition switch that G.M. has linked to at least 13 deaths over the last decade.

They provide details for the first time on the issue at the heart of a criminal investigation by the Justice Department: whether G.M., in its interaction with safety regulators, obscured a deadly defect that would also injure perhaps hundreds of people.a car crash.

The company repeatedly found a way not to answer the simple question from regulators of what led to a crash. In at least three cases of fatal crashes, including the accident that killed Mr. Erickson, G.M. said that it had not assessed the cause. In another fatal crash, G.M. said that attorney-client privilege may have prevented it from answering. And in other cases, the automaker was more blunt, writing, “G.M. opts not to respond.” The responses came even though G.M. had for years been aware of sudden power loss in the models involved in the accidents.

At the end of the day, the industry would say it was just a few fuel pins that burst, you know how the antis would term it..but what would the public think? Would it become a media circus trying to drive viewership and circulation? 

You catch how the dirty linen always comes out after the start-up? They never have a pubic start-up meeting and explain what happened.

Remember these pumps are as hot radioactively as a fire cracker? 

Warnings on Salem-type bolt troubles go backdecades

Bolts that failed by the dozen inside four Salem Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps, idling the plant for months, were made of a metal alloy deemed unsuitable for nuclear reactors as long ago as 1984, industry and Nuclear Regulatory Commission filings show.
 
Manufacturer Westinghouse Electric Co. determined that parts loosened by bolt failures could have created a “substantial safety hazard” at the plant along the Delaware River had they suddenly locked up rapidly spinning parts in one or more of the 30-foot-tall coolant pumps, according to Neil Sheehan, a regional NRC spokesman.
 
Sheehan added that although Westinghouse considered a pump freeze-up “extremely unlikely,” it considered it “prudent” to formally report the bolt issue Tuesday to the NRC and the owner of two other reactors near Newport News, Virginia, where the same bolts are still in use.
 
The Westinghouse notification also revealed additional details about the severity of the problem inside the Salem pumps, which circulate water from the reactor to a system that transfers heat to make nonradioactive steam for generators.
 
In three of the four damaged units, large metal assemblies that redirect water flows dropped from their regular positions just above water-moving impellers when retaining bolts broke or sheared off. In two of those three pumps, Westinghouse said, diffusers made contact with the impellers, which spin at thousands of rotations per minute.

Why didn't the noise monitors catch the diffusers rubbing the blades...bet you they were turned down. Why wasn't the pump pressure or flow changes noticeable?

Was reactor power level accurate?

“We’re still reviewing how PSEG responded to the bolting issue and will be documenting any findings in an upcoming inspection report,” Sheehan said. Although two of the loosened diffusers and spinning impellers made contact, “it did not cause any notable degradation” in pump flow or performance, Sheehan said.

*That sounds like there was detectable degradation, but they ignored it. 

NRC documents show that Brookhaven National Laboratory concluded in 1984 that the metals used in the type of bolts in Salem’s pumps should “not be used as a reactor structural material because of its susceptibility” to damaging changes under high stress and temperature. Reactor designer Babcock & Wilcox removed the alloy from its designs the same year, and the same alloy concerns were detailed in NRC notifications to industry in 1990, 1994 and 1995.
 
Salem’s bolt problems also prompted the NRC to notify inspectors and officials at Dominion Generation’s Surry Units 1 and 2 reactors northwest of Newport News, Virginia, the only other plants to use the same “A-286” alloy bolts in coolant pumps. The Virginia company is reviewing reports from Salem “to evaluate a course of action going forward,” Sheehan said.
 
PSEG Nuclear restarted Unit 2 over the weekend and reported the plant at 45 percent of its 1,180-megawatt capacity Tuesday morning. The 33-year-old reactor was taken offline in mid-April for a scheduled replacement of a third of its fuel, with the company reporting in mid-May that the shutdown would be extended because of the bolt problem. 

Bolt failures were discovered in the same PSEG pumps during two previous refueling shutdowns for Unit 2, which take place about every 18 months. All bolts were found to be broken or sheared off during the latest outage. Some broken bolt heads were found far out of place, including at the bottom of the reactor core.
 
Full details on the damage and cost of the repairs and shutdown have yet to be released.
 
Joe Delmar, spokesman for PSEG, said that pump-maker Westinghouse issued a technical bulletin on the issue in 1996. The bulletin, he said, noted that even if all bolts on a pump failed, “it would not affect the performance of the pump and, therefore, they did not recommend going in and replacing the bolts with others with different material unless you were going into the pump for another purpose.”
 
David Lochbaum, a nuclear engineer and director of the Nuclear Safety Program for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said Tuesday that PSEG might be found in violation of an NRC requirement that defective materials “are promptly identified and corrected.”
 
“Clearly, PSEG violated this requirement,” Lochbaum said on Tuesday, adding that the notification from Westinghouse “suggests that the defective material represented a significant condition adverse to quality.”

Dummy: why didn't they do that for the Palisades with their spewing PCP impeller blades all throughout their coolant going back decades?  Why are we getting a rash of primary coolant pump problems recently?  

PSEG’s neighboring Salem Unit 1 and Hope Creek reactors are equipped with different types of pumps and fasteners.
 
Westinghouse officials could not be reached for comment Tuesday.
 
Salem Unit 2 is one of three reactors that PSEG operates on Artificial Island along the Delaware River southeast of Augustine Beach.
 
Contact Jeff Montgomery at 463-3344 or jmontgomery@delawareonline.com.

Bolt-bedeviled Salem reactor begins restart

July 15: Why are they only at 45 % power last night...problems? RCP testing or problems?

The company also said Monday that several bolt heads had previously been recovered during the prior two refueling outages. During this most recent outage, eight turning vane bolt heads were recovered from the reactor cooling system.

A safe company would have discovered these issues when cracks first emerged and certainly when bolt heads were recovered from the cooling system.

Remember, these events usually emerge from a broad change in strategies of the company. Usually it is buget cutting. These companies have millions of components and tens of thousands of systems…if you reduce care to millions of components, then a site could become very troublesome with a lot of breakdowns. If the degradation goes on long enough, the components are stressed in an emergency or transients, or when electricity is really needed in a summer heat wave.  This is when you see many components mis-operated in a stressful emergency and many components failing at the same time and could confuse the hell out of the control room staff.   

Also nationwide, because these cooling pumps troubles don’t have to be reported to the NRC and inspected by the NRC, we really don’t know the extent of these problems broadly.  This is probably the reason why this happpened in the first place...excess secrecy.  

If these negative strategies go on for a long period of time, it usually takes them many years of really intense recovery before they will even see any measurable result. And usually, there is a few slide back times in the recovery where they revert to the bad habits.  

And as another example with conditions in the industry…generally until it gets to a atrocious unprofessional condition…things going wrong with primarily coolant pumps and recirc pumps need not be inspected and reported on to the public by the NRC. Terrible events going on with these crucial safety components need not be reported by the licensee to the NRC. The public is totally left out of the loop. There was prior events with falling out bolts and nut that wasn’t reported to the NRC.

Bolt-bedeviled Salem reactor begins restart

Jeff Montgomery, The News Journal 10:30 a.m. EDT July 14, 2014

Aerial photo of the nuclear power plant in Salem, New Jersey. Nov. 18, 2009. (Photo: GARY EMEIGH/THE NEWS JOURNAL )    

PSEG’s troubled Salem Unit 2 nuclear plant began a restart over the weekend after a three-month idling triggered by the discovery of dozens of broken bolts in four pumps. 

A Nuclear Regulatory Commission status report on Monday morning showed the 33-year-old plant, along the Delaware River southeast of Augustine Beach, had reached 18 percent of its full power by Monday morning. 

Obviously this site has a lot more troubles than what can be seen.

New: A failed wiring termination on the Unit 1, A Phase Neutral Generator CT{EL/XCT} caused the Generator Differential Trip to occur. A root cause investigation was performed to address this and the previous generator CT connection failure event on April 13, 2014. The root cause was determined to be an improper termination of the CT lead wire to field wire connection. A contributing cause was that the extent of condition visual examination and testing to identify potential common mode failures was not adequately challenged by the station. Failure analysis determined that the CT connection insulating tape failed due to chronic thermal fatigue permitting moisture intrusion due to inadequate environmental controls.

Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulator Commission’s regional office in King of Prussia, Pa., said that nuclear plants usually begin to feed electricity to regional power systems when output hits 30 percent of capacity. 

PSEG Nuclear spokesman Joe Delmar said that the company would release a statement after the reactor had completed its synchronization with the regional PJM grid. 

During a refueling outage originally scheduled to end in mid-May, workers found that all of the dozens of bolts used to secure water moving impellers had broken or sheared off in all four of Salem’s 30-foot reactor coolant pumps. 

Some bolt-heads and pieces had not yet been found by late last month, and some were found in the bottom of the reactor core itself, or in cooling water piping. 

“We are satisfied with the repairs done on the reactor coolant pumps, as well as with the supporting evaluations,” Sheehan said Monday morning. “We will be documenting our reviews in an upcoming inspection report.” 

The NRC allowed the company to investigate and complete the work without putting a formal hold on operations. NRC spokeswoman Diane Screnci said the commission’s on-site, resident inspectors have been following the repairs and assessments throughout the shutdown.

 

The below is based on a special technical ideology of selfishness...not on the engineering and what is best for our nation. They are talking about a leak in the primary coolant system...it is prohibited...it is basically a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). It is a continuation of the Palisades impeller problem with flinging off blades caused by not following the rules. Cavitations and and not enough NPSH. They are basing the safety in risk perspectives...a process outsiders can't understand...undecipherable and scrutinizable.  Basically a behavior that is acceptable as long as it is perceived as not leading to a severe core meltdown. Smaller core melts are acceptable....which would severely damage our nation.

The NRC definition of safe is starkly different than what a reasonable person would use. They are using language as a weapon of misunderstanding…

Regulators said that bolt failures in the coolant pumps were never classified as a direct safety issue, although the problem could have caused fast-spinning blades to dislodge and possible break open the coolant pump casing, spilling cooling water into the containment building. 

Salem Unit 2 is one of three reactors on PSEG’s Artificial Island complex in Lower Alloways Creek, N.J. Exelon owns 43 percent of the the two Salem reactors at the site. PSEG owns 57 percent of Salem and 100 percent of the newer Hope Creek nuclear plant.

Contact Jeff Montgomery at 463-3344 or jmontgomery@delawareonline.com

NE Electric System is a Market Failure

Whether it is power plant builders or environmental consideration...they are all gaming the public to delay fixing our electric system. They are now creating a legal and acceptable California electricity crisis to boost profits.  

Well, the regulatory system set up saying no other entries and lower consumer cost welcome.

I say with some exaggeration, declare a dire national emergency and martial law, give an above fair price for the property taken...then immediately construct the pipeline or power line basically without any rights or appeals.  Make it a government project and eminent domain…

Basically every second we delay fixing this problem, we are making our lives harder and we are losing jobs. It contrast how weak government is with solving our greater problems.

They are now creating a legal and acceptable California electricity crisis to boost profits.

Maybe the rest of our nation wants a weakened NE?

Moniz: NE faces energy problem

By STEPHEN SINGER

Associated Press

Monday, April 21, 2014
(Published in print: Tuesday, April 22, 2014)

HARTFORD, Conn. — The nation’s top energy official delivered a blunt message Monday to a Connecticut audience of energy executives, regulators, environmentalists and others who already know that fuel heating and cooling homes and businesses and running power plants in New England is among the costliest in the nation.

Ernest Moniz, U.S. secretary of energy, stopping in Providence, R.I., and Hartford in a months-long federal review of energy issues, said New England doesn’t share the good news developing in the field of energy with the rest of the country.

“Out there, in much of the country the talk is about the energy revolution, the abundance of energy that we have, the way that we are in fact drawing upon new resources ... promoting renewables, at the same time reducing carbon emissions,” he said.

“But yet if we come here, it’s not a discussion of abundance. It’s a discussion of, in particular, infrastructure constraints,” he said.

Speaking to an audience of about 150 in Hartford, Moniz said that in New England, piping in natural gas and otherwise delivering heat or electricity is limited by a lack of delivery systems.

During the severe winter, natural gas prices soared to more than $120 per million British thermal units from about $5 in the summer. The spike was blamed on strong demand, a lack of pipeline systems, limited regional liquefied natural gas deliveries and inadequate storage.

Energy prices in New England often are “very volatile and much higher than other parts of the country,” Moniz said.

Moniz knows New England. A physicist and professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Moniz said even when fuel is available, it cannot be moved in emergencies, such as Superstorm Sandy in October and November 2012, because of power outages.

New England governors announced a plan in January to expand natural gas use. The governors of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont asked the region’s grid operator for technical help to seek proposals to build transmission equipment and public works to deliver enough electricity to serve 1.2 million to 3.6 million homes. The states also asked the system operator, ISO-New England, to devise a way to finance the project.

Gordon van Welie, ISO president, said Monday that because many non-gas-fired plants are to be retired beginning this year and public works improvements are scheduled to start years from now, New England’s power system will be in a “precarious position” for a few years.

Anthony Buxton, general counsel for the Industrial Energy Consumer Group, a trade association of industrial facilities, said he told Moniz in his visit to Providence that 2 billion cubic feet per day of more pipeline capacity into New England is needed to tame

natural gas price spikes.

Connecticut director William Dornbos of Environment Northeast, an advocacy group, urged Moniz and state policymakers to seek ways to cut demand via greater energy efficiency and to avoid major capital projects such as interstate natural gas pipelines or electric transmission lines.

 Why New England power situation is precarious

Quick Take: I sit on advisory boards with various executives from the electric power sector. Recently they've been telling me about a disturbing discovery from this year's Polar Vortex winter. The gating factor in the Northeast is not the number of power plants. Nor the capacity of the power lines. It is the capacity of the region's pipelines. And now the Secretary of Energy is out delivering the warning. – Jesse Berst

U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz delivered a blunt message to New England last week, according to a story in the Daily Hampshire Gazette. “In much of the country the talk is about the energy revolution, the abundance of energy that we have," he told a Connecticut audience of energy executives, regulators, environmentalists. “But yet if we come here, it’s not a discussion of abundance. It’s a discussion of, in particular, infrastructure constraints."

The challenge is getting fuel to the region's natural gas-powered plants. Bringing in natural gas is constrained by the shortage of pipelines. During the severe winter, natural gas prices soared to more than $120 per million British thermal units from about $5 in the summer. The spike was due to strong demand, a lack of pipeline systems, and inadequate storage.

Why did natural gas prices jump to such extremes? A recent newsletter from Luthin Confidential Associates offers this explanation: "Federal regulations treat pipelines as common carriers and limit the profits of pipeline owners. But once that capacity gets "rented" by investors and speculators, the sky is the limit on what they can add to local gas pricing for the use of the pipe."

The problem will soon get even worse. Many coal plants are due to be retired soon. Meanwhile, pipeline improvements are years away, causing Moniz to warn that New England will be in a "precarious position" for a few years.

Indeed, those much-needed pipeline improvements may be delayed even further by protests from environmental groups. For instance, the director of Environment Northeast urged policymakers to cut demand via greater energy efficiency rather than approving new pipelines or electric transmission lines.

Jesse Berst is the founder and Chief Analyst of SGN and Chairman of the Smart Cities Council, an industry coalition.

Oyster Creek Going Summertime Wackco on Us

Problems:

1) A poorly addressed problem like this could more damage the safety culture of a plant than the risk of the components not working in a accident.

2) So what has changed...considering these components have been around since the dinosaurs without much problems...what has changed to cause this problem.

3) This is a grand experiment. The idea  of a notification over permeant shutdown many year in advance…giving a company the chance to reducing funding for maintenance and upkeep in anticipation of a permanent shutdown.

Pilgrim's Relief

Oyster Creek Shut Down Again For SecondTime This Week

July 11, 2014: Oyster Creek operators were restarting the plant at 3:12 a.m. this morning when problem with "vacuum conditions" in plant's condenser were discovered, NRC says

Posted by Patricia A. Miller (Editor) , July 11, 2014 at 06:27 PM

by Patricia A. Miller

Operators at the Oyster Creek Generating Station shut down the plant early this morning because of problem with the facility's condenser, a spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said.

Plant operators manually scrammed (shut down) the plant at 3:12 a.m. after they discovered a reduction in vacuum conditions inside the condenser, said NRC spokesman Neil A. Sheehan.

"There were no complications during the shutdown and the NRC has not identified any immediate safety concerns," he said.

The condenser - which cools down and condenses steam produced by the reactor after it has passed through the turbine - is operated in a vacuum condition to maximize efficiency, Sheehan said.

It was the second time this week the 45-year-old plant had to be shut down.

Oyster Creek operators took the plant off line on July 7, due to "degradation" of five solenoid electromatic relief valves used in the plant's cooling system.

Operators were attempting to start the plant up again early this morning and had reached 55 percent of power when the problems with the condenser were discovered, Sheehan said.

"However, it appears the shutdown will change the plant's Performance Indicator for Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Hours of Operation from "Green" to "White" and result in additional NRC oversight," he said.

Exelon spokesman Suzanne D'Ambrosio said plant operators and technicians closely monitor pressures, temperatures and plant equipment for safe, reliable operation.

"It is crucial that during start up, every system operates flawlessly," she said. "If anything is not as expected, operators stop the start-up process and address the issue. This comprehensive process and attention to detail has helped Oyster Creek reach industry leading levels of reliability."

Oyster Creek is the oldest nuclear plant in the United States. It went online on Dec. 23, 1969.

Oyster Creek shuts down to check safety valves

 July 8: LACEY – Operators of the Oyster Creek nuclear reactor shut down the power plant to check and possibly replace five safety valves, plant officials said.

The shutdown was prompted by an inspection of previously removed valves, which showed unexpected wear on two of them and could have caused them to fail, according to plant owner Exelon and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Oyster Creek operators started shutting down the reactor power at about 8 p.m. Monday, and it’s not known how long the plant will remain offline, according to Suzanne D’Ambrosio, a spokeswoman for the plant.

July 9 NRC event report: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

 
"On July 7, 2014 at approximately [2040 EDT], an issue was discovered with currently removed Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRVs) that calls the operability of the currently installed EMRVs into question. Based on this new information, all 5 of the currently installed EMRVs were conservatively declared inoperable. With the potential of 5 EMRVs inoperable a Technical Specification shutdown is required under Technical Specification 3.4.b, whereby reactor pressure shall be reduced to 110 psig or less within 24 hours. This event is immediately reportable under:

"50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.'
 
"50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'"
 
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the State of New Jersey and issue a press release.

She said the reactor must be shut off for workers to access the five installed electromatic relief valves inside the plant’s drywell, the containment vessel around the nuclear reactor. They are part of the plant’s automatic depressurization system, linked to the emergency core cooling system. In the event of a loss of coolant from a small pipe break — when pressure inside the reactor area remains high — the valves are there to quickly lower the pressure so the emergency system can inject water into the reactor core.

Electromatic Relief valves come right out of the Stone Age. Remember the Pilgrim safety Relief Valves fiasco…they bought new valves and the parts were all loose. Pilgrim took a lot of shutdowns and power downs over these defective valves. They had so called main steam line vibrations problems damage the SRVs. Vermont Yankee with their new SRV…improper seal material.

The potential problem began in late June during a maintenance inspection of the valves, NRC officials said. That raised a red flag with nuclear critics, who questioned why a plant shutdown was not required sooner by the NRC.

“The valves are designed so you can do without one, you can possibly do without two,” said Arnie Gundersen, an independent nuclear analyst whose Fairewinds Associates firm often consults for anti-nuclear groups. “That’s the question. When did they know the two valves were inoperable, and when did they decide to shut down?”

The valves are operated by solenoids, powerful electromagnets that slam the valves open when energized. NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said plant workers “found more than expected wear” on valve springs and supporting parts. Gundersen said the valves are routinely tested in place, but also that kind of wearing can come from the machinery vibration that’s part of the environment inside a nuclear plant.

Sheehan said the agency was on top of the situation as it evolved: “Our resident inspectors assigned to Oyster Creek on a full-time basis have been closely following developments involving the evaluation of the valves and the decision to take the reactor offline to address the issue. They will continue to do so until the problem is satisfactorily resolved.”

According to a formal notice posted by the NRC, the problem with the electomatic relief valves was confirmed Monday and “based on this new information, all 5 of the currently installed EMRVs were conservatively declared inoperable.”

In those instances, a shutdown is required, according to the notice.

Gundersen said he wonders why the shutdown did not happen sooner.

“Were they waiting for parts?” he said. Technically, the indications that valves could have a problem should initiate what’s called a “limiting condition of operation” that needs to be resolved soon under NRC rules, Gundersen said.

“That said, the decision to declare it in operable is less defined,” allowing the NRC to cut operators slack, he added.

The valve issue shows why reactors such as Oyster Creek need filtered vents to control discharges during emergencies, said Janet Tauro of the local group Grandmothers, Mothers and More for Energy Safety, which have pushed for the NRC to impose that proposed rule.

But the economics of building improved vents won’t work for the plant in Lacey, Gundersen said: “Oyster Creek will shut down before they would install them.”  

***"The Oyster Creek nuclear power plant was shut down last night (Monday) in response to degradation of electromatic relief valves (ERVs) that has been identified," NRC spokesman Neil A Sheehan said. "Five such valves are involved."

Oyster Creek personnel replace the solenoid-operated valves that operate the plant's five electromagnetic relief valves (EMRVs) during each refueling and maintenance outage. The solenoid valves are then tested in the maintenance shop to determine their condition.

"In late June, Oyster Creek staff tested five solenoid-operated valves that had been removed from the plant previously and determined that two of the five valves did not operate properly," Sheehan said. "Oyster Creek staff disassembled the valves and identified more than expected wear on the solenoid-operating valve springs and support parts."

Oyster Creek operators decided a plant shutdown was needed on July 7, to inspect the currently installed solenoid operated valves associated with the EMRVs might be affected, Sheehan said.

The EMRVs and their associated solenoid valves are not accessible when the plant is in operation, he said.

NRC inspectors will independently assess the condition of the installed EMRV solenoid-operated valves once they are accessible during the current plant outage, Sheehan said.

The ERVs are part of the plant's automatic depressurization system (ADS), which supports the emergency core cooling system. The ADS is designed to depressurize the reactor during a small (pipe) break loss-of-coolant accident to permit the low-pressure core spray system to inject water into the reactor core, Sheehan said.

Ya, they are all critical for the public good as the companies can't afford to run them anymore...

Ginna owner seeks deal to keep nuclear plant open

The owner of the Ginna nuclear power plant, hoping to stave off closure of the facility, has asked New York regulators to help secure a deal with RG&E to sustain Ginna's operations.

Exelon Corp., which owns the Wayne County nuclear plant, wants Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. to sign a contract promising payments keep the plant running. Chicago-based Exelon filed a petition Friday asking the state Public Service Commission to enter into a multiyear contract by the end of 2014.

The contract would be based on the conclusion that Ginna, which provides a good part of all the electricity used by RG&E's customers, must continue to operate to ensure the continued reliability of that service.

With no contract, Exelon said in its petition that it likely would close the 44-year-old Ginna, one of the oldest commercial nuclear plants in the country. Located on the Lake Ontario shoreline, it can generate 577 megawatts of electricity, or enough to satisfy the needs of about 400,000 residential customers.

"It is no secret that our plant, like others in the region, faces financial challenges. But this filing is actually good news for the hundreds of hardworking men and women that work at the plant and for the community that we serve because it is an encouraging step toward continuing to operate the plant for the foreseeable future," Joe Pacher, Ginna site vice president, said in a statement released Friday.

About 700 people work at the plant, which is by far the largest property taxpayer in the town of Ontario and likely is the largest in Wayne County.

In statements issued Friday afternoon, RG&E and Exelon both pledged to work with the PSC on the proceeding. Exelon will continue to operate the plant while the process unfolds, spokeswoman Maria Hudson said.

RG&E built the plant in the late 1960s and named it for a former chairman, Robert E. Ginna. As part of a move to deregulate energy markets, the PSC ordered utilities to sell off their power generation, and in 2004 RG&E sold Ginna to Constellation Energy for $423 million. Constellation now is part of Exelon.

Under terms of the Ginna sale, RG&E was given the right to buy up to 90 percent of the electricity generated at Ginna at fixed prices, an arrangement cast at the time as a good deal for both parties. That 10-year arrangement expired June 30.

Exelon, the nation's largest nuclear-plant operator, has talked openly about the possibility that it might close some of its facilities because they're not economically viable.

In the petition filed Friday, the company said that as the expiration of the long-term arrangement with RG&E loomed, it examined Ginna's finances and concluded it was likely to lose money and was a candidate for closure.

But Exelon then asked for a study to determine what effect Ginna's closure would have on the reliability of electric service in RG&E's service territory. According to the petition, that study, finished in May, concluded that Ginna remained essential.

So Exelon now has invoked a regulatory procedure under which, if the PSC issued the requested order, RG&E would pay a fixed amount of money each year to keep Ginna in operation. The amount, the number of years and other terms remain to be negotiated after the commission acts, if it does.

A similar "reliability support services agreement" exists between the owners of a coal-fired power plant in Tompkins County and New York State Electric and Gas Corp., RG&E's sister company.

That deal drew criticism from environmentalists because NYSEG was paying to prop up a polluting coal plant. It remains to be seen whether an RG&E-Exelon deal with provoke similar criticism from opponents of nuclear power, some of whom have stated publicly they hope financial pressure would lead to the shuttering of Ginna and other plants.

Arkansas Nuclear One: Reactor Power Running Completely Out of Control

Arkansas Nuclear One and Arkansas are ground zero for tornadoes!

US tornado risk map: This map features the US regions which are prone to strong winds, hurricanes and destructive twisters. Found on: blacksamcashinterestingthigs.blogspot.com

Right, these guys have tornado warnings all the time. Basically I bet you the history is they come and go harmlessly within a half an hour or so. Bet you the shift supervisor thought, I will lollygag around trying to shutdown…it will all clear away in minutes and I will save my company tons of money instead of scramming both plants.  

This hasn't been covered in a inspection yet...these guys are so dangerous...the whole entergy fleet. They are dangerous for our nation!

The most recent NRC inspection 

Wiki: Overall, the tornado remained on the ground for an hour, from 7:06 p.m. to 8:06 p.m. (0006 – 0106 UTC), and traveled along a 41.3 miles (66.5 km) path. Sixteen people lost their lives due to the tornado,^[16] making it the deadliest in Arkansas since an F4 killed 35 on May 15, 1968.

Tornado path  

Tornado Path  

Russellville is about where ANO was.   

So the massive EF 4 tornado passed about 50 mile east of the plant. Why didn’t they just scram? If the tornadoes was directly heading right for them,  would they bungle it by doing the normal shutdown. Right, the time frame in the LER is from 1912 to 2002. The EF 4 tornado was passing 50 miles to the east of them...between them and Little Rock. I bet you the whole front that passed directly over them had dire warnings of intense tornadoes.  The tornado began at 7:25 pm and completed at 9:24 pm.  You get it, the Tornado began at 7:25 pm on April 27, 2014, with the system operator saying we are in a grid emergency telling the ANO to come off the line as soon as possible at 7:34pm…
Man, have these plants been off the line so much for stupidity in the last few years...

This gives you an idea of how much planning time they got before a tornado hits.

Description. On April 23, 2010, Units 1 and 2 were notified of a severe thunderstorm warning at 1:50 p.m. Procedure OP-1203.025, "Natural Emergencies," Revision 30 was entered. At 3:25 p.m. the licensee received a tornado warning, transitioned into a tornado watch at 4:12 p.m. and exited the watch at 8:00 p.m. The resident inspectors observed entry into the procedures and subsequently performed a site walkdown to ensure all potential missile hazards were identified and controlled as directed in the natural emergencies procedure.

>>>You got to the know the stimulator should have picked up the bum reactivity procedure...bet you the simulator modeled this inaccurately...

...to go over the high ponts of how they are going to shutdown or downpower the reactor and the issues near refueling.

... By the way, I doubt they could see real power level. They had no idea where power was…the power reading shown by the detectors and meters up in the control room were wildly are inaccurate. Don’t worry, this is normal…

 Arkansas Nuclear One: Reactor Power Running Completely Out of Control

The NRC’s ROP’s is tolerating nuclear plants running widely out of control and this government regime or oversight don’t cause bad operator to change their bad ways.

This is the same event as 2010...they don't learn from earlier near misses. So Entergy has all this NRC activity concerning the stator yellow finding, killing of the one and injuring 8 others, the so called internal changes out of this...and these events happen over and over again as if the NRC has just the power of a gnat.

These guys are extremely dangerous and are a threat to the whole US nuclear industry, for that matter, nuclear power worldwide.

A review of the ANO corrective action program and Licensee Event Reports for the previous three years was performed. There was a similar condition relative to the effects of ASI found in 2010 at ANO-2. The ASI TS limit was exceeded during a planned down power. The cause was identified to be an inaccurate reactivity management plan which contributed to the crew not being aggressive enough with ASI control.

Unit 1: March 31, 2013,

Axial Shape Index Trip at the End-of-Life During Rapid Plant Shutdown

ANO: 04 26 2014

Licensee Event Report 50-368/2014-003-00

During severe weather on April 27, 2014, both units at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) were informed of a system-wide grid emergency and were ordered to come off-line as soon as possible. Both units commenced a rapid plant shutdown. ANO, Unit 2 (ANO-2) was at the end of the core life. During the shutdown, the Axial Shape Index (ASI) became more negative (power rising to the upper portion of the core) during the shutdown.

This led to one channel of the Plant Protection System (PPS) to be actuated on an ASI auxiliary trip. At this time, the direction to manually trip the reactor was given, but before the action could be taken, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to the two-out-of-four PPS logic being made up for the ASI conditions. The cause of this condition was not effectively executing the reactivity management plan by delaying insertion of Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) and not inserting CEAs deep enough to maintain ASI within the desired control band.

Crane accident had ‘substantial’ safety significance,reports US regulator

2 July 2014

A March 2013 crane accident at Entergy's Arkansas One nuclear power plant that killed one worker, injured eight others, damaged the plant and required days of backup emergency diesel power was judged to be of substantial safety significance by the US nuclear regulator.

Workers were moving the 525-­ton main generator stator out of the plant's turbine building during maintenance when a temporary lifting assembly collapsed, causing the component to fall, damaging plant equipment, killing one person and injuring eight others.  

Unit 1 was in a refuelling outage at the time, with all of the fuel still in the reactor vessel, safely cooled. 

The stator fell on and extensively damaged portions of the Unit 1 turbine deck and subsequently fell over 30 feet into the train bay. The stator drop resulted in a Unit 1 loss of offsite power for 6 days and a Unit 2 reactor trip and loss of offsite power to one vital bus. The dropped stator ruptured a common fire main header in the train bay, which caused flooding in Unit 1 and water damage to the electrical switchgear for Unit 2. The alternate alternating current diesel generator (station blackout) electrical supply cables to both units were pulled out of the electrical switchgear and the diesel was therefore not available to either unit, according to a 24 March 2014 follow-up inspection report (NRC document ML14083A409). 

Unit 2, which was operating at full power, automatically shut down when a reactor coolant pump tripped due to vibrationscaused by the heavy component hitting the turbine building floor when it fell. Unit 2 never completely lost off-­site power, and means existed to provide emergency power using the diesel generators, said the regulator in a press release. 

In September 2013, the US government's Occupational Safety and Health Administration cited Entergy and three contractors, Precision Surveillance Corp, Bigge Crane and Rigging and Siemens Power Generation for 26 safety violations. 

The nuclear regulator blamed Entergy for approving a temporary gantry design not supported with adequate documentation, for failing to identify load deficiencies in the vendor's calculations, failing to identify a component of the wrong size in the north tower. It also said that the tower was not designed for 125% of the load, and inadequate load testing (including a 125% proof load test) was carried out before the lift. 

Initially, the regulator assessed the risk significance of the event at the highest level, red, for unit 1, and at the next lower level, yellow, for unit 2, but reduced the unit 1 significance to yellow after Entergy gave evidence in a 9 May conference arguing that there was a high likelihood of success (90%) for recovering electrical power to cooling pumps before water in the core boiled away, exposing fuel. 

An Entergy spokeswoman said: "Entergy is dedicated to the safe operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, and we take the NRC's findings very seriously. We are committed to learning from this tragic incident, sharing our knowledge with the industry, and ensuring that it never happens again." 

As of early July, the nuclear regulator was still determining what its response to the incident would be.

Training material is being modified to include details on the dynamic effects of ASI change that occurs at the end-of-cycle. Additionally, improvements to the guidance in the reactivity plans that involve rapid plant shutdowns are being made as are changes to the standards for use of CEAs during transients.

During the shutdown, the operator performed manual turbine load reductions, CEA insertions, and was responsible for the boration. Multiple alarms were received throughout this event due to the continuous storm activity (lightning strikes on the grid). In addition, there were multiple phone calls from the SOC dispatcher concerning the state of the grid, the down-power, and related issues. These distractions were determined to be a contributing cause for the automatic reactor trip.

The reactivity management plan was not effectively executed due to lack of specific training on understanding the magnitude and rate of ASI shift that occurs at the end of a fuel cycle and the optimal approach to control ASI during the performance of a rapid plant shutdown at the end of core life. 

Not have adequate procedures or training issues is an excuse...

The approved reactivity plan that was being used during this event included target CEA positions that reflected CEA insertions of 17 to 19 inches being necessary to keep ASI on target between each of the provided 15-minute intervals. Reactivity plans are written to 15-minute intervals for timing the expected CEA insertions and boration rates needed to maintain ASI on target through the prescribed maneuver. The rate of CEA insertion needed was only evident in the numerical CEA position targets provided in the plan. There was no additional guidance on rate of insertion or size of insertion steps provided in the text of the plan. The operator delayed CEA insertion over the initial interval because it was noted that ASI was tracking closely with the target ESI early into the maneuver. This delay in CEA insertions was found to be a direct contributor to the challenges associated with maintaining ASI in the desired control band which ultimately led to the automatic reactor trip.

In other words, when the moderator temperature coefficient heads towards the postive direction the safety feedback of  the cofficient become much less...when the coefficient becomes positive, as the coolant temperature increases, this adds reactivity uncontrollably. This is the Chernobyl. This is the ABC's of nuclear professionalism.  

Due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient that exists at low boron concentrations, control of ASI in the ANO-2 core, is challenging during end-of-cycle maneuvers. The magnitude of the temperature-driven ASI shift requires aggressive insertion of CEAs during end-of-cycle power reductions. The delay in the insertion of the CEAs and the smaller rate of insertion than needed resulted in the TS limit being exceeded.

A review of the ANO corrective action program and Licensee Event Reports for the previous three years was performed. There was a similar condition relative to the effects of ASI found in 2010 at ANO-2. The ASI TS limit was exceeded during a planned down power. The cause was identified to be an inaccurate reactivity management plan which contributed to the crew not being aggressive enough with ASI control.

Defective Scot 29er Aspect 940 Bike?

OMG: two full days of bike riding and no flat tires yet...

July 8: This company is such a dick....I am so happy I am out of them. Bought a equivalent Treck. Around my house and even in some pretty ratty tires, I get about one flat a year, if that. Within two hours of bringing the new bike home, a flat in the front tire, then next day after another two hour ride, another flat tire but on the back...come on!

Treck Excalibur 6 with bobterger tires…abouts$ 700. We like the Scot paint job better but maybe the cars will see me better.

To Me

Today at 12:37 PM

Hi Mike,

Thank you for contacting SCOTT SPORTS.

I’m sorry to read that you have gotten some thorns in your tires and punctured the inner tube. This is a very common, unfortunate part of riding bicycles. We do not consider thorn punctures a defect, but rather a part of normal riding. Please work with Norms to repair this 2nd flat tire, and I’ll hope that you’re luckier than you have been during your first few rides.

Take care, thank you for buying and riding SCOTT Bikes

Ben

Ben Chournos
Warranty & Technical Dept
SCOTT SPORTS USA
651 West Critchlow
Ogden Utah 84404

OFFICE: 888-607-8365 ext 2019
FAX: 801-627-8014
SKYPE: benchournos
warranty@scottusa.com
bchournos@scottusa.com
www.scott-sports.com
JOIN US ON FACEBOOK!
www.facebook.com/scott-sports

July 8: Well, I am off to Concord to purchase my new bike again. I don’t really feel good about it like the first time. I don’t want to get hurt again. These bikes are come from China and use the same parts…

 


I bought a Scot 29er Aspect 940 Mountain bike in a Keene bike shop this past Thursday for $650. I took two rather light bike rides around town during this. Spent about two hours riding on the road and less than an hour riding on mostly railroad trails on each trip.

I woke up on the morning after the first ride…my front tire has a flat tire. My bike has a warranty on it. I am smart enough to bring it back to the shop. I watched them change the tire…they find a really small thorn that pushed through the middle of the tire thread. I can hardly see the bush thorn it was so small. My first instinct was the tires are defective. But I am in love with the bike…so I didn’t say anything. I am thinking the owner would throw me a new tube because I am so unlucky or patch it up for free…but he charged me for it. A little more than two hours on a brand new $650 bike…I told them I must have won the million dollar lottery with this kind of luck. I intentionally told them I don’t have the $5.00 for the new tube and I will come back on saturday with the five bucks.

I take the second right on the bike. I become even more in love with the bike. But I am still a little irked about the flat tire on the first ride. I saying it is a one off…I probably won’t have another flat for two years. Next morning, well two days later because Friday was the Fourth of July...I wake up to an unbelievable second flat tire and now it is the back tire. I am outraged. I have a talk with the owner of the little shop on the phone…I can tell he becoming irked with me. I tell him I consider him as a professional…he sees bike troubles all the time. He tells me this kind of thing is normal and I say my extensive experience with bike riding says this is extremely abnormal.

I head right out to his shop. I bring the back wheel off my old bike. The tire on it is three years old and I purchased it from his shop. I never had a flat on this tire. The puncture is on the side of the tire and he can't tell what caused it. Well, he said something small punctured the tire and it didn't stay stuck in the tire. He says something punctured it without any evidence. I say it is a tube defect. So show me your proof it was pierced I asked. He becomes incensed with my attitude.

I can see the angle he was taking was everything was my fault and this happens all the time.I can see it from the very first flat when the technician asked if I took a hard fall off the bike...like I was abusing the bike. I never raised my voice to him…but I kept saying I don’t trust what you are saying anymore and this whole event poisoned my experience with this shop and the Scot brand. I would have been happy if he just put on new tires. I surmised he might refund my purchase price. He ended up unhappily refunding my money. He made a few nasty remarks as he was writing the check…I said, as our relationship has come to an end, it is pointless for me to make any further comments.

I was really happy with the brakes and shifting …the feel of the bike  was really good. It is just about the tires. I kept thinking the future is nothing but maintence problems with the bike because of cheap parts. I realize it is on the rather cheaper end of the price of mountain bikes...but not the $500 bikes or walmart bikes.

I bet you this would have been a great bike and I would have been very happy over it...if they would have put good quality tires on it. Or if I had enough money to waste another $60 to put good quality tires on it.

I am exhausted and bummed by the whole deal...