The Palisades Saga
March 21:
Today at 11:37 AM
Mr. Chawla,
I don't agree with the agency's decision on the impeller. I'd like to speak to the PRB by telephone please.
But, good job on the CRDMs!
Can i speak to agency experts about the Palisades PCP broken impellers...can they be "up" on the history of PCP impeller damage at Palisades and the industry?
I am waiting to see the NRC PCP impeller report concerning this on Adams...what is your proof that it is safe? I am particularly interested in IN 85-03.
Thank you,Mike
March 17: I am sure Palisades and the NRC got twenty pointy headed nuclear safety engineers each locked in a room for weeks poring over the paperwork and pictures. They call that safety. I call actual testing and experiments as safety.
The NRC has validated my scenarios as valid in my 2.206...the head corroding and blocking off flow to the assemblies. I certainly know my way around a PWR core and vessel.
Here is my criticism of their plan."The NRC conducted an in-depth, independent review of the plant analysis of the impact the piece of metal within the vessel may have on the reactor vessel and fuel safety."
The Palisades Cracked and Detached PCP Impeller SagaSo the agency is answering me and validating my scenarios in my 2.206.
"The NRC conducted an in-depth, independent review of the plant analysis of the impact the piece of metal within the vessel may have on the reactor vessel and fuel safety."Originally published on March 5
March 11
Honestly, this is what would make me conformable. Make a mockup of the core...then get a size assortment of impellers pieces. Say measure the stuck piece as best as can...say the accuracy is plus or minus 10%. You then get something like three pieces of of the impeller pieces, one the estimated size and shape, then a piece 10% bigger and another 10% ssmall. Then bang the pieces around in all kinds of core flows. In the mock up, you could carefully monitor where the pieces go and how they behave. I am certainly not a engineer...but you get the idea.
So it is in to the NRC...I misdated it as of yesterday.
Another area of increased non transparency is the leaking fuel pins and damaged fuel tubes. It would be legal today with half the pins in the core being pierced and fuel pellets are rattling around in coolant:)They have administratively reduced the reportability requirements with damage fuel.Honestly, I am beginning to wonder if Palisades would intentionally damaged a few fuel pins. It would kick up to radioactive dose rates all over the plant. Palisades could then use the high dose rates as justification for reducing half their maintenance and testing. I bet you they could cut the outage time in half! We know the NRC would buy into this craziness.Personally, I think we have entered a very dangerous period within nuclear power. The idea that a lot of insiders and outsiders fear that one little "huff and puff of a little wolf’s breath" could knock prominently Palisades off the line. It is plain as daylight that a lot of people and news media around Palisades fear one more article could knock Palisades off the line.
Everyone is pulling their punches fearing their utterance will kill 1000 or more jobs...
March 5, 2014
Mr. Mark A. Satorius
Executive Director
for Operations
U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Washington, DC 20555-0001
DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE
Nuclear safety culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.
TRAITS OF A POSITIVE NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE
Nuclear safety culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.
TRAITS OF A POSITIVE NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE
Experience has shown that certain personal and organizational traits are
present in a positive safety culture. The following are traits of a positive
safety
culture:
• Leadership Safety Values and Actions—Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.
• Problem Identification and Resolution—Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.
• Personal Accountability—All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.
• Work Processes—The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained.
• Continuous Learning—Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented.
• Environment for Raising Concerns—A safety conscious work environment is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination.
• Effective Safety Communication—Communications maintain a focus on safety.
• Respectful Work Environment—Trust and respect permeate the organization.
culture:
• Leadership Safety Values and Actions—Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.
• Problem Identification and Resolution—Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.
• Personal Accountability—All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.
• Work Processes—The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained.
• Continuous Learning—Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented.
• Environment for Raising Concerns—A safety conscious work environment is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination.
• Effective Safety Communication—Communications maintain a focus on safety.
• Respectful Work Environment—Trust and respect permeate the organization.
• Questioning Attitude—Individuals avoid complacency and
continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in order to identify
discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action.
(The problem I have with
“commensurate with their significance” is the agency and nuclear industry
exaggerates their granularity with seeing safety significance reality
boundary...it is a political statement. Nobody here has a god’s eye perfect
view of what engineering reality is...the demarcation between safety and safety
insignificant. You can’t even anticipate or predict with all the scientific and
engineering tools known to mankind when a PCP impeller or CRDM will crack with
accuracy. My proof of this is within this outage and the repetitive nature of
these events.)
Dear Mr. Satorius,
The links on the below are all on my blog:
The research concluded that the cause of the failures is fatigue-related effects from the operation of the pumps in conditions beyond the maximum flow rates and below the minimum net positive suction head recommendations as described in the UFSAR and other design documentation.
I’ll just say, San Onofre came to the end through many years
of horrendous maintenance and operational problems. The last straw came from poor
maintenance and bum engineering associated with the new generators. I think if
San Onofre had a sterling NRC and public record...they would have survived.
Do you even want one nuclear plant operating in the USA if the
agency allows a corporation to operate a nuclear plant in such a sloppy
manner...indeed the NRC's ROP accommodates this sloppiness over and over again?
SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2012003
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety
significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design
Control, for the failure to operate the Primary Coolant Pumps (PCPs) in
accordance with their design operating criteria. In October 2011, a slight rise
in vibration levels on the ‘C’ PCP occurred and was sustained for approximately
24 hours. This was followed by a short spike in vibrations and a return to a
lower stabilized value than what had been previously observed. Investigation by
the licensee revealed it was likely a piece of an impeller vane which had
deformed and broken free. Based on a review of operating experience associated
with impellers and further licensee investigation, the inspectors concluded
that the PCPs had been operated outside of their license/design basis as stated
in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with regard to minimum net
positive suction head and maximum flow. Further, based on impeller-like pieces
found in the reactor vessel in 2007 (which an apparent cause stated likely came
from a PCP), and an operating history which indicated past occurrences of vane
breakage and degradation, the inspectors concluded the licensee had the ability
to foresee and correct the condition affecting the PCPs prior to the release of
a piece in October 2011. The licensee entered the issue in their Corrective
Action Program (CAP) as CR-PLP-2011-5744 and performed additional research into
the phenomena leading to the impeller degradation. The PCP operating sequence
was changed, an Operational Decision Making Issue was implemented, and efforts
to explore further procedural changes are on-going to mitigate
degradation of the impellers.
Criminal and
malicious facilitative assumptions never backed up by science and
evidence...judgments dictated by self-interest and massive political
corruption. The utilities get to write the rules and control the agency.
2012-003: Investigation by the licensee with the assistance of
outside consultants concluded it was likely that a piece of the ‘C’ PCP
impeller deformed and broke free. There was no indication of degradation to the
primary coolant system or reactor core components as a result of this
postulated failure. NRC inspectors, including experts at the Offices of
Research and Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) reviewed the data gathered by the
licensee and concluded that the pump was safe to operate until the refueling
outage in April 2012 with the monitoring plan that the licensee had put in
place.
This is a huge
piece of metal.
The metal is 5 inches by 12 inches long..
"Lindsay
Rose, spokeswoman for Entergy Corp"...why do we let these officials
speak to us so plausibly stupid? Why are they so ill prepared with
the history of the issue when they talk to the public? I think this is
purposeful. Why aren't they technical people talking to us, instead of highly
paid corporate spokesmen paid to talk stupid to us! This was intentional she
didn't have the history on the impellers.
Rose said she did not have any information about when the metal
piece might have broken off the impeller, which has been replaced. An impeller
is a rotor that is used to pump water within the reactor.
This exactly
like the "safety injection refueling water tank", which took them
decades of leaks and half ass fixes before they discovered the tanks weren't
constructed as designed (constructed poorly). Don't forget about the massive
self-destruction of the Palisades CRDMs they are dealing with right now. The repetitive
nature of flaws, cracks, leaks and shutdowns...the obscene nature of the exact
same NRC violations and failed revolutionary alloy designs repeated
over and over again derived from poor quality maintenance and plant operations!
The impeller weld job from the Walmart Superstore Automart known to be a lessor quality
than the Primary Coolant initial design requirements.
The NRC
accommodates plant and corporate destructive behavior...they aren't in the game
of mandating a change of bad behavior! The NRC isn't in the game of picking up
the easily detectable early stages of bad behavior...then turning it into good
business behavior towards the better interest of the USA and our communities.
Believe me we get it, this result is a political congressional and presidential prerogative.
The licensee identified impeller cracking had been observed at
Palisades on several occasions since 1984, when the pumps had been removed for
inspection and refurbishment/replacement.
How many total pieces?
Obviously they falsified past investigations and searches for broken impeller
pieces...knowing the current piece was unrecoverable or not removable. At
worst, they were incompetent with past searches.
Additionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were
discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007.
The broken impeller
and cracked CRDM are terrible and dangerous news...but all the things that has
happened in last four years at this plant are much worst?
Epic
non-conservative judgments. It is systemic engineering certainty and
uncertainty gaming. Why didn't the agency stop Palisades...make them
inspect all the PCP impellers considering all this history upon the
first detached impeller vane? Why wasn’t this reportable to the public. What
else is not openly disclosed to the public. The 2011 Red
Finding yellow finding spoke of endemic and habituated non
conservative judgments (a pattern). They are doing the same engineering and
regulatory gaming with the massive and repeated CRDM cracks and the broken
off impeller vanes seemingly with the NRC 's permission...the yellow finding medicine through 2012 absolutely
did not take hold. It was all a fake phony facade.
I'll put it in
the grid and ISO perspective. Exelon is threatening to shut down an
assortment of nuclear plants within a short period of time because of low ISO
market prices of electricity and unfair competition from corrupt green electricity. Palisades is
situated in the same market and undergoing the same pressure. Well, except it
is a merchant plant. The NRC is severely
pulling their punches because they know Palisades is so economically
vulnerable. Why didn't we ever know what the true motives with the decision the NRC
and Entergy makes? Why is everything always hidden from us? Why is
our electricity market so Soviet style, when we are supposed to be the
most open society is the world?
Approx. May 2012: In response to the discovery of two
pieces that resembled the PCP impeller composition during reactor
vessel inspections in 2007, the licensee conducted an apparent
cause analysis. The conclusion was that the pieces were most likely from the
‘D’ PCP. Additionally, the analysis explored the history of Palisades’
PCP impeller conditions which included repeat occurrences of
cracking having been identified and an instance of "heavy recirculation
damage," which rendered an impeller unfit for continued use. The pump
manufacturer, Flowserve, also released a Tech Alert due to the Palisades PCP
vane cracking history. The apparent cause analysis implied that the
pieces were fatigue generated and that additional vane breakage was possible.
Despite this, the PCPs were not declared as non-conforming nor were any
compensatory measures taken. When the ‘D’ PCP was later inspected after removal
during the 2009 refueling outage, it did not have any pieces of impeller
missing. Inspections of the other PCPs, which were recommended in the apparent
cause and had been planned to be executed if the ‘D’ PCP was not the source of
the 2007 pieces, were cancelled. The cancellations were based, in part, on
thoughts that the pieces may have originated elsewhere. However, vessel
inspections done in 2007 revealed no deficiencies that would infer the pieces
were generated somewhere within the reactor vessel, and the 2007 apparent cause
analysis had essentially ruled out other sources.
Come on, the
inspection was cancelled because they were trying to save a few pennies by
not lengthening an outage. The pressures on making a short refueling
outage is going to be very damaging to the USA someday...
Right, the
above is engineering certainty/uncertainty language gaming...found impeller
pieces in 2007, opened one pump in 2007, found no damaged impeller, assumed
they found nothing broken in the primary piping system and core...thus all the
other pumps must have no broken impeller. Conservative judgment would consist
of finding one piece of impeller...then opening up all the PCP pumps and
replacing all the impellers with good quality impellers... matching up the
broken pieces with impellers.
Remember, I talked about beautiful science and technology. Why the fixes coming out of the 2012 NRC inspection didn’t put an end of with vane damage. They inspected the impeller this outage and then found this huge piece of metal at the bottom of the vessel. It seems like the opened up pump didn’t have the damaged impeller. How do we know right now there is not another broken impeller in a non-inspected pump? Obviously the pump is a defective design...not good for the duty intended. We still don't know why Palisades operated this pump outside the manufacture recommendations and plant designs.
Remember, I talked about beautiful science and technology. Why the fixes coming out of the 2012 NRC inspection didn’t put an end of with vane damage. They inspected the impeller this outage and then found this huge piece of metal at the bottom of the vessel. It seems like the opened up pump didn’t have the damaged impeller. How do we know right now there is not another broken impeller in a non-inspected pump? Obviously the pump is a defective design...not good for the duty intended. We still don't know why Palisades operated this pump outside the manufacture recommendations and plant designs.
I try to
use science and engineering to anticipate problems and fix them
early...Palisades and the NRC uses science and engineering to
justify not fixing defects and running equipment irresponsibly. Science is
just a tool...you can use any tool to do good or evil. Or just plain “bullshit”
the outside with disconnected scientific and engineering talk and
rationalizations. Dressed up disconnected corporatese public relations talk. It is just a choice!
Rose said the impeller piece was from one of the plant's four main
coolant system pumps. That impeller was recently replaced during this outage,
she said.
Personally in
the below, I'd be worried PCP seal damage with a damaged off balanced
impeller...that is in the accident studies with the largest risk to the
community. I wouldn't trust the accuracy of the installed vibration detectors.
Any good
corporate citizen would immediately recognize weld repairing a safety related
nuclear pump impeller in a high temperature environment is just plain crazy
science and engineering talk. Where is the NRC in establishing standards! Maybe
the pump is so obsolete they didn’t have new impellers in stock? Why has
the NRC allowed Entergy to weld repair PCP impellers? Ah, the
codes are god...you can’t question the store bought corporate engineering codes.
The licensee noted, based on metallurgical examination of a
previous fragment, previous pump inspection findings, and the mechanism by
which the cracks propagate, that weld-refurbished impellers were particularly
susceptible to degrading to a point where a piece could be released.
Entergy always
knew where to look.
Additionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were
discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007.
I think this
all is a broad corporate business philosophy...Entergy is Systematically Destroying Nuclear Plants
through a Run-to-Failure Philosophy. Here is a new Pilgrim nuclear
plant NRC inspection report. The agency speaks of
non-safety component's run-to failure philosophy. It does get you wondering,
will the non-safety equipment run-to-failure-philosophy cause the public to
lose faith in the safety of a plant? Does Entergy even care? It might be legal to the corporatized NRC,
but it is not be acceptable to the public?
New Pilgrim Plant inspection-The following observations have been
noted by the inspectors: SRV performance was a driver for several down powers
and forced outages in 2012 and into 2013; a number of unplanned down powers and
shutdowns were the result of non-safety-related equipment failures; it appears
that non-safety-related equipment that was characterized as a run-to-failure is
starting to reach the end of their service life and can likely become
contributors to such events.
Do you want
anything nuclear to ever run-to-failure? Are these guys so smart with completely
understanding the complexity of the reality inside these plants? If they did, these
guys would operate these plants without blemish. We wouldn't be here today. They
think we can see a god’s eye granularity...or at least they pretend to speak to
us outsiders that way.
This is a prime
example with the NRC inspection, licensee notification system to the public and
the ROP. What is the agency covering up? Why hasn’t every flaw or crack in PCP
impeller thoroughly covered in a Licensee Event Report? Why wasn’t all the
broken off vanes thoroughly covered in a LER. Why wasn’t every flaw or worst in
an impeller thoroughly covered in an inspection report? What you hide, you
repeat; what you openly disclose, you fix and begin repairing the organization.
Further, this
is questions if the NRC are selectively releasing troubling information at
all the plants. That is, what information disclosures are required and what info
actually gets released? It invalidates the ROP and the trustworthiness of the
NRC. In an open democracy like the great USA, so they say...there should have been
a public document trail from the moment the first impeller flaw showed up in the
NRC and Entergy. I get the NRC has the power of kings...they get to decide what
rules are valid for the agency and utility irrespective of the rules on the
brooks. The rules are secretly situational for the agency. This is all razzmatazz corruption up with phony scientific
and engineering language.
The worst
agency sin of all, why wasn’t there a follow up report on “NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV
05000255/2012003-02, Operation of Primary Coolant Pumps Outside the Design
Basis”?
Basically the
NRC and Entergy are saying it is safe to operate these components outside their
manufacturer and plant designs...even after repetitive damage. Even after the
manufacturer told them to knock it off. It is self-destruction on a massive
scale! The NRC allows a utility to run- to-failure safety components? This is a
run-to-failure philosophy just like Pilgrim except it is actually safety
related. Are components ever designed, tested and licensed to run-to-failure...where we know by engineering how it happens? You notice the NRC never
gets to the bottom of it...public democratic disclosure...the
ultimate rationale or justification with
why Entergy was operating these components to damage outside the
manufacturer’s recommendation. Oh brother, we know why they are doing it. This
looks terrible on the nuclear industry to the outsiders...they are protecting themselves
through the high powered Soviet style secrecy and deceptions. They are the ones with the keys to the actual information with what is really going on.
The research
concluded that the cause of the failures is fatigue-related effects from the
operation of the pumps in conditions beyond the maximum flow rates and below
the minimum net positive suction head recommendations as described in the UFSAR
and other design documentation. These conditions are present when operating
only one or two PCPs during reduced temperatures and pressures (typically
during startup and shutdown activities). Cyclic pressure pulses and stresses
are created under these reduced pressure conditions that act on the leading
edges of the impellers, which can ultimately lead to vane cracking and the
release of impeller fragments. The licensee noted, based on metallurgical
examination of a previous fragment, previous pump inspection findings, 18
Enclosure and the mechanism by which the cracks propagate, that
weld-refurbished impellers were particularly susceptible to degrading to a
point where a piece could be released. Currently, none of the PCPs
contain any remaining weld-repaired impeller areas (ones that did are
postulated to have released pieces already). Also, at normal operating
temperature and pressure, there is adequate net positive suction head on all
PCPs, so these additional stresses are not present.
In response to
the discovery of two pieces that resembled the PCP impeller composition during
reactor vessel inspections in 2007, the licensee conducted an apparent cause
analysis. The conclusion was that the pieces were most likely from the ‘D’ PCP.
Additionally, the analysis explored the history of Palisades’ PCP impeller
conditions which included repeat occurrences of cracking having been identified
and an instance of “heavy recirculation damage,” which rendered an
impeller unfit for continued use. The pump manufacturer, Flowserve, also
released a Tech Alert due to the Palisades PCP vane cracking history. The
apparent cause analysis implied that the pieces were fatigue generated and that
additional vane breakage was possible. Despite this, the PCPs were not declared
as non-conforming nor were any compensatory measures taken. When the ‘D’ PCP
was later inspected after removal during the 2009 refueling outage,
it did not have any pieces of impeller missing. Inspections of the other PCPs,
which were recommended in the apparent cause and had been planned to be
executed if the ‘D’ PCP was not the source of the 2007 pieces, were cancelled.
The cancellations were based, in part, on thoughts that the pieces may have
originated elsewhere.
Engineering
and scientific certainty/uncertainty gaming is pernicious engineering language corruption. It is stealing community security and lying to the CEO and stockholders.
However, vessel
inspections done in 2007 revealed no deficiencies that would infer the pieces
were generated somewhere within the reactor vessel, and the 2007 apparent cause
analysis had essentially ruled out other sources.
In response to
the October 2011 event and subsequent research conducted to better understand
the phenomena affecting the PCPs, the licensee has instituted a monitoring
plan, changed the preferred sequence for starting/stopping PCPs during startups
and shutdowns, and has corrective actions to explore further procedure changes
regarding operation of the PCPs and the resultant impact on other aspects of
plant operation.
Yet here
we sit in 2014 with a broken impeller and a blade stuck in the
vessel. They don’t know where the broken blade came from...there is no
engineering proof it didn’t come from a non inspected pump impeller. Are you absolutely sure your at power plant vibration detectors would detect every detachment?
There is no absolutely no proof that the corrective actions coming from IR 2012003 actually fixed the problems. If the problems was so easy to fix as to the “properly sequence the RCP pumps” during heat up and cool down operation, why didn’t they do this easy and cheap fix three decades ago?
There is no absolutely no proof that the corrective actions coming from IR 2012003 actually fixed the problems. If the problems was so easy to fix as to the “properly sequence the RCP pumps” during heat up and cool down operation, why didn’t they do this easy and cheap fix three decades ago?
Since the
licensee was intending to have this non-conformance on the C pump (missing
impeller pieces) the entire cycle, the inspectors (including experts at the Offices of Research and
NRR) reviewed the impact of this non conformance on the PCP safety functions.
Key safety functions of the pump are to provide a coolant pressure boundary and
ensure an adequate coast down of flow. The review indicated there were no
current safety issues with this non-conformance. The inspectors are evaluating
the monitoring plan to determine its long-term effectiveness.
You get it, no intent in 2012 to inform the public and its being
repeated in March start-up?
How do we know what are the forces holding the broken vane to between
the reactor vessel and vessel shirt? Everyone in New Hampshire this winter
knows the power of water and ice expanding and contracting. We are inundated
with frost heaves and frozen broken pipes. So what about the difference of
contraction between the vessel and flow skirt from 550 degrees/2250 psi to room
temperature? In other words, there could be tremendous forces squeezing the
broken vane between the vessel and the flow shirt solely due to the cool down.
How do we know if a bolt isn’t snapped or it there is weld failure attaching the
shirt to the vessel or other components? How do we even know if the cladding
has been penetrated into the vessel alloy by the broken vane. How do we know if
some corrosion mechanism on steroids would secretly take place at power and normal temperate?
What if this leads to a vessel penetration and then onto a LOCA? Would it get past a vessel design max
flaw leading to a vessel LOCA?
So you tried yanking out the broken vane. What if all you did is just
loosened it? The vessel and skirt re-expands upon heat-up and normal flow
vibration releases the errant broken impeller vane. It then travels into a centerish
high powered fuel assembly inlet and blocks off coolant flow? What if it blocks
off flow to two fuel assemblies? What if we wake up one morning and two fuel
assemblies have been destroyed? Palisades and the NRC have melted down two fuel assemblies. It
would be a tremendous internal release of radioactive. Most likely it will be an
insignificant release of radioactivity to the outside. It would destroy the
core and the operability of the plant. Hope your steam generators are tight. It would
probably take out many other plants in the USA. It would be a media circus much
worse than TMI. There would be massive re-regulation.
I would characterize this off normal event as extremely complex
and there is an assortment of barriers preventing everyone from seeing what is going.
Palisade has once again over stated their granularity with understanding of what
is going ...predicting future interactions. These guys think they have turned water into
wine again. If these palisades engineers are so good at predicting the
future...why did n't they allow the impeller even crack and break off? Why didn’t
Palisades and the NRC prevent the impeller damage based solely on their perfect science and
engineering? These guys can’t even control and predict human behavior...why did
they tolerate operating outside the plant designs? There is just so much
complexity and missing science and engineering information here...the future of this is not understandable or predictable!
Engineers make sense out of the apparent
available evidence...I worry about the unknown unknowns. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_are_known_knowns).
DonaldRumsfeld: ‘Reports that say that something
hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are
known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns;
that is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we
do not know we don't know”.
You guys are running is the
greatest “confidence game” the world has ever known (professionalism and
educational). A confidence game are words and utterances by the NRC or a licensee
not backed by true science, engineering or the facts. More, situational quasi science,
engineering or the facts...ghost truth and evidence!
confidence
game, any elaborate swindling operation in which advantage is
taken of the confidence the victim reposes in the swindler.
I respectfully request the following.
1)
The NRC and Entergy hold a mandatory public meeting before
start-up and disclose at the facts surrounding this. The NRC has a well-known
path with only disclosing the dirty laundry months after start-up, if ever.
2)
Palisades and the NRC explain why the plant was allowed operate
outside its design bases for so long. Why did the NRC allow this violation
until damage show up?
3)
Palisades pop open every pump for an inspection...all flaws
cleared up with new impeller.
4)
Palisades explain why they went to dangerous weld repair instead
of new impellers. Please detail how all the other plants repaired their
impellers...weld or new impellers?
5)
Request a ten million dollar fine over these events.
6)
Palisades is mandated to remove the broken vane before start-up.
7)
Please detail all activities to prevent going beyond the design
basis? Has it been proven this “explored different sequencing of
PCP operation during subsequent startups” has prevented further violations of the design
basis?
8)
Please disclose all plant information and investigatory
information associated the damaged impellers. Have there been any flaws post
new “sequencing of the PCP” discovered?
9)
Were there any Entergy internal reports or concerns made before
the 2012003 NRC inspection that Entergy was operating outside it design bases?
Please disclose all documents associated with this.
10) Please disclose all information associated with the CRDMs flaws
and crack replacement activities this outage. Request that Palisades not
startup until all the CRDMs are replaced.
God help you if the eight or so CRDMs not replaced develops a leak
during this next operation period. Please disclose the reasons and resource
limitations preventing the replacement of said CRDMs.
11) Please disclose the date and time when the broken vane was
reported to the NRC.
12) Is this going to be an LER or event notification...please explain
why it is not reportable?
13) I Request Palisades be returned to the yellow or red
status...intensification of NRC monitoring!
This plant continues to be a very dangerous plant to the community of US
nuclear plants. This plant has a recent history of excessive shutdowns, taking
dangerous shortcut risking human life and plant safety (DC) and the
uncontrollable intensification of component flaws, cracks and leaks. Entergy
has a known run-to-failure philosophy with the NRC and it clearly has been
defusing into safety systems at Palisades.
14) Please list all the plant debris...especially metal shards and
pieces discovered in the inlet to the primary side of the steam generators. Please list and
explain any debris discovered anywhere in the primary system for the last ten
years.
15) Please replace the Primary Coolant Pumps with a design for its
intended duty!
This rises to the level where the public are not being adequately
apprised of the conditions of the nuclear plants. Members of the public are
being systemically denied an adequate democratic process within the nuclear
industry. If big and important events are being withheld from public view...then any minimal NRC process is a impossibility. I
hereby declare, we are pre TMI with mandated public disclosures!
Palisades spokeswoman Lindsay Rose tells WSJM
they have "determined there will be no impact on safe operations."
She went on to say the piece is separated from the fuel and the material "does
not rise to the level of being reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission."
Sincerely,
Mike
Mulligan
Hinsdale NH
16033368320
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
Hinsdale NH
16033368320
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com
