The Amazing Collapse with the Palisades Nucelar Plant.

The research concluded that the cause of the failures is fatigue-related effects from the operation of the pumps in conditions beyond the maximum flow rates and below the minimum net positive suction head recommendations as described in the UFSAR and other design documentation.

Palisades yellow finding not red.

I’ll just say, San Onofre came to the end through many years of horrendous maintenance and operational problems. The last straw came from poor maintenance and bum engineering associated with the new generators. I think if San Onofre had a sterling NRC and public record...they would have survived.

Do you even want one nuclear plant operating in the USA if the agency allows a corporation to operate a nuclear plant in such a sloppy manner...indeed the NRC's ROP accommodates this sloppiness over and over again?

SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2012003

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to operate the Primary Coolant Pumps (PCPs) in accordance with their design operating criteria. In October 2011, a slight rise in vibration levels on the ‘C’ PCP occurred and was sustained for approximately 24 hours. This was followed by a short spike in vibrations and a return to a lower stabilized value than what had been previously observed. Investigation by the licensee revealed it was likely a piece of an impeller vane which had deformed and broken free. Based on a review of operating experience associated with impellers and further licensee investigation, the inspectors concluded that the PCPs had been operated outside of their license/design basis as stated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with regard to minimum net positive suction head and maximum flow. Further, based on impeller-like pieces found in the reactor vessel in 2007 (which an apparent cause stated likely came from a PCP), and an operating history which indicated past occurrences of vane breakage and degradation, the inspectors concluded the licensee had the ability to foresee and correct the condition affecting the PCPs prior to the release of a piece in October 2011. The licensee entered the issue in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as CR-PLP-2011-5744 and performed additional research into the phenomena leading to the impeller degradation. The PCP operating sequence was changed, an Operational Decision Making Issue was implemented, and efforts to explore further procedural changes are on-going to mitigate degradation of the impellers.

Criminal facilitative assumptions never backed up by science and evidence...judgement dictated by self interest and massive political corruption. The utilities get to write the rules and control the agency.

2012-003:Investigation by the licensee with the assistance of outside consultants concluded it was likely that a piece of the ‘C’ PCP impeller deformed and broke free. There was no indication of degradation to the primary coolant system or reactor core components as a result of this postulated failure. NRC inspectors, including experts at the Offices of Research and Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) reviewed the data gathered by the licensee and concluded that the pump was safe to operate until the refueling outage in April 2012 with the monitoring plan that the licensee had put in place.

This is a huge piece of metal.

The metal is 5 inches by 12 inches long..

"Lindsay Rose, spokeswoman for Entergy Corp"...why do we let these officials speak to us so plausibly stupid. Why are they so ill prepared with the history of the plant when they talk to the public? Why aren't they technical people talking to us instead if highly paid corporate spokesmen paid to talk stupid to us! This was intentional she didn't have the history on the impellers.

Rose said she did not have any information about when the metal piece might have broken off the impeller, which has been replaced. An impeller is a rotor that is used to pump water within the reactor.

Exactly like the "safety injection refueling water tank", which took them decades of leaks and half ass fixes before they discovered the tanks weren't constructed as designed (constructed poorly). Don't forget about the massive self-destruction of the CRDMs Palisades is dealing right now. The repetitive nature of flaws, cracks, leaks and shutdowns...the obscene nature of the exact same NRC violations and failed revolutionary alloy designs repeated over and over again derived from poor quality maintenance and plant operations!

The NRC accommodates plant and corporate destructive behavior...they aren't in the game of mandating a change of bad behavior! The NRC isn't in the game of picking up the easily detectable early stages of bad behavior...then turning it into good business behavior towards the better interest of the USA and our communities.

The licensee identified impeller cracking had been observed at Palisades on several occasions since 1984, when the pumps had been removed for inspection and refurbishment/replacement.  

How many pieces? Obviously they falsified past investigations and searches for broken impeller pieces...knowing the current piece was unrecoverable or not removable. At worst, they were incompetent with past searches.

Additionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007.  

The impeller is terrible and dangerous news...but all the things that has happened in last four years at this plant is much worst?

Epic non-conservative judgment. It is systemic engineering certainty and uncertainty gaming. Why didn't the agency stop Palisades...make them inspect all the PCP impellers considering all this history.  The 2011 Red Finding yellow finding spoke of endemic and habituated non conservative judgement (a pattern). They are doing the same engineering and regulatory gaming with the massive and repeated CRDM cracks  and the broken off impeller....the yellow finding medicine through 2012 absolutely did not take hold. It was all a phony fake phony facade.

I'll put it in the grid and ISO perspective. Exelon is threatening to shutdown a assortment of nuclear plants within a short period because of low ISO market price and unfair competition from green electricity. The NRC is severely pulling their punches because they know Palisades is so economically vulnerable. Why didn't we ever know what the true motives of  decision  the NRC and Entergy makes? Why is everything always hidden from us.Why is our electricity market so Soviet when we are supposed to be be the most open society is the world?

Approx May 2012: In response to the discovery of two pieces that resembled the PCP impeller composition during reactor vessel inspections in 2007, the licensee conducted an apparent cause analysis. The conclusion was that the pieces were most likely from the ‘D’ PCP. Additionally, the analysis explored the history of Palisades’ PCP impeller conditions which included repeat occurrences of cracking having been identified and an instance of "heavy recirculation damage," which rendered an impeller unfit for continued use. The pump manufacturer, Flowserve, also released a Tech Alert due to the Palisades PCP vane cracking history. The apparent cause analysis implied that the pieces were fatigue generated and that additional vane breakage was possible. Despite this, the PCPs were not declared as non-conforming nor were any compensatory measures taken. When the ‘D’ PCP was later inspected after removal during the 2009 refueling outage, it did not have any pieces of impeller missing. Inspections of the other PCPs, which were recommended in the apparent cause and had been planned to be executed if the ‘D’ PCP was not the source of the 2007 pieces, were cancelled. The cancellations were based, in part, on thoughts that the pieces may have originated elsewhere. However, vessel inspections done in 2007 revealed no deficiencies that would infer the pieces were generated somewhere within the reactor vessel, and the 2007 apparent cause analysis had essentially ruled out other sources.

Come on, the inspection was cancelled because they were trying to save a few pennies by not lengthening a outage.

Remember, I talked about beautiful science and technology. Why didn't the fixes coming out of the 2012 NRC  inspection put an end of with vane damage. They inspected the impeller this outage and then found this huge piece of metal at the bottom of the vessel.  Obviously the pump is a defective design...not good for the duty intended. We still don't know why Palisades operated this pump outside the manufacture recommendations. I try to use science to anticipate problems and fix them early...Palisades and the NRC use science and engineering to justify not fixing defects and running equipment irresponsibly. Science is just a tool..you can use any tool to do good or evil. It is just our choice!

Rose said the impeller piece was from one of the plant's four main coolant system pumps. That impeller was recently replaced during this outage, she said.

Personally in the below, I'd be worried PCP seal damage with a damage off balanced impeller...that is in the accident studies with the largest risk to the community. I wouldn't trust the accuracy of the installed vibration detectors.

Any good corporate citizens would immediately recognize weld repairing a safety related nuclear pump impeller in a high temperature environment is just plain crazy science and engineering talk. Where is the NRC in establishing standards! Maybe the pump is so obsolete they didn’t have new impeller in stock? Why has the NRC allowed  Entergy to weld repair PCP impellers?    

The licensee noted, based on metallurgical examination of a previous fragment, previous pump inspection findings, and the mechanism by which the cracks propagate, that weld-refurbished impellers were particularly susceptible to degrading to a point where a piece could be released.

Entergy always knew where to look.

Additionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007.

I think this all is a broad corporate business philosophy...Entergy is Systematically Destroying Nuclear Plants through a Run-to-Failure Philosophy. Here is a new Pilgrim nuclear plant NRC inspection report. The agency speaks of a non-safety component run-to failure philosophy. Gets you wondering, will the non safety equipment run-to-failure-philosophy cause the public to lost faith in the safety of a plant. It might be legal to the NRC, but will not be excepted by the public?

Pilgrim Plant-The following observations have been noted by the inspectors: SRV performance was a driver for several down powers and forced outages in 2012 and into 2013; a number of unplanned down powers and shutdowns were the result of non-safety-related equipment failures; it appears that non-safety-related equipment that was characterized as a run-to-failure is starting to reach the end of their service life and can likely become contributors to such events.

Basically the NRC and Entergy are saying it is safe to operate these components outside their manufacturer designs...even after repetitive damage. Even after the manufacture’s told them to knock it off. It is self-destruction on a massive scale! The NRc allows a utility to run to failure safety components...this is a run-to-failure philosophy just like Pilgrim except it is actually safety related.   You notice the NRC never gets to the bottom of it...public disclosure.. what was the ultimate rationale or justification with why Entergy was operating these components to damage outside the manufacturer’s recommendation.

The research concluded that the cause of the failures is fatigue-related effects from the operation of the pumps in conditions beyond the maximum flow rates and below the minimum net positive suction head recommendations as described in the UFSAR and other design documentation. These conditions are present when operating only one or two PCPs during reduced temperatures and pressures (typically during startup and shutdown activities). Cyclic pressure pulses and stresses are created under these reduced pressure conditions that act on the leading edges of the impellers, which can ultimately lead to vane cracking and the release of impeller fragments. The licensee noted, based on metallurgical examination of a previous fragment, previous pump inspection findings, 18 Enclosure and the mechanism by which the cracks propagate, that weld-refurbished impellers were particularly susceptible to degrading to a point where a piece could be released. Currently, none of the PCPs contain any remaining weld-repaired impeller areas (ones that did are postulated to have released pieces already). Also, at normal operating temperature and pressure, there is adequate net positive suction head on all PCPs, so these additional stresses are not present.

In response to the discovery of two pieces that resembled the PCP impeller composition during reactor vessel inspections in 2007, the licensee conducted an apparent cause analysis. The conclusion was that the pieces were most likely from the ‘D’ PCP. Additionally, the analysis explored the history of Palisades’ PCP impeller conditions which included repeat occurrences of cracking having been identified and an instance of “heavy recirculation damage,” which rendered an impeller unfit for continued use. The pump manufacturer, Flowserve, also released a Tech Alert due to the Palisades PCP vane cracking history. The apparent cause analysis implied that the pieces were fatigue generated and that additional vane breakage was possible. Despite this, the PCPs were not declared as non-conforming nor were any compensatory measures taken. When the ‘D’ PCP was later inspected after removal during the 2009 refueling outage, it did not have any pieces of impeller missing. Inspections of the other PCPs, which were recommended in the apparent cause and had been planned to be executed if the ‘D’ PCP was not the source of the 2007 pieces, were cancelled. The cancellations were based, in part, on thoughts that the pieces may have originated elsewhere.

Engineering certainty/uncertainty gaming...pernicious engineering language corruption. 

However, vessel inspections done in 2007 revealed no deficiencies that would infer the pieces were generated somewhere within the reactor vessel, and the 2007 apparent cause analysis had essentially ruled out other sources.

In response to the October 2011 event and subsequent research conducted to better understand the phenomena affecting the PCPs, the licensee has instituted a monitoring plan, changed the preferred sequence for starting/stopping PCPs during startups and shutdowns, and has corrective actions to explore further procedure changes regarding operation of the PCPs and the resultant impact on other aspects of plant operation.

Yet here we sit in 2014 with a broken impeller and a blade stuck in the vessel.

Since the licensee was intending to have this non-conformance on the C pump (missing impeller pieces) the entire cycle, the inspectors (including experts at the Offices of Research and NRR) reviewed the impact of this non conformance on the PCP safety functions. Key safety functions of the pump are to provide a coolant pressure boundary and ensure an adequate coast down of flow. The review indicated there were no current safety issues with this non-conformance. The inspectors are evaluating the monitoring plan to determine its long-term effectiveness.

COVERT TOWNSHIP, MI — A piece of metal from a broken impeller blade has lodged in the reactor vessel at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant. Workers discovered the issue during the nuclear power plant's scheduled refueling and maintenance shutdown, which began Jan. 19.

The metal is 5 inches by 12 inches long, said Lindsay Rose, spokeswoman for Entergy Corp., which owns Palisades. The piece is wedged into the reactor vessel between the vessel wall and the flow skirt, inside the vessel.

They know where to look (2011)..."aadditionally, pieces suspected to be from impellers were discovered in the bottom of the reactor vessel in 1984 and 2007".

"It's physically separated from the fuel," Rose said in an interview with the Kalamazoo Gazette. "It's not a loose piece floating around. It's firmly wedged into place."

Efforts to remove the metal have proved unsuccessful. At this point, Entergy plans to leave it in place, saying it does not pose a safety risk.

"We took steps to remove it. We've thoroughly analyzed it and we've determined that, based on the location of where it is, it's not going to have any impact on safe operations. We do not believe it is going to move from its location," Rose said. "It has not compromised safe operations and it is not expected to."

Rose said she did not have any information about when the metal piece might have broken off the impeller, which has been replaced. An impeller is a rotor that is used to pump water within the reactor.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is aware of the issue and its on-site inspectors are monitoring the situation, NRC spokeswoman Viktoria Mitlyng said.

"We are aware that there is a small piece of metal that is stuck in the reactor. The company has tried different methods for removing it and it is wedged really tightly," said Viktoria Mitlyng, senior public affairs officer for the NRC, in a phone interview. "With some of the more intrusive methods that could be used, there's a danger of actually damaging the vessel. We don't know what the resolution is going to be, but we're following this issue."

Entergy Corp. bought Palisades from Consumers Energy in 2007 for $380 million. The one-reactor plant, which is located along Lake Michigan in Covert Township, supplies about 20 percent of Consumers Energy's power. The facility came online in 1971 and its license runs until 2031.

The plant has shut down at least 10 times since 2011 for repairs, including a month-long shutdown in 2013 to replace the bottom of its safety injection refueling water tank. That shutdown came after approximately 80 gallons of highly diluted radioactive water leaked out and made its way into Lake Michigan in May.

The NRC will have the final say on whether the metal represents a safety-significant issue, Mitlyng said.

"If they propose to leave the metal in the reactor core, they have to provide analysis and justify to the NRC that leaving that in there would not have an impact on the safe operation of the reactor," she said.

Mitlyng said plants have been able to operate with "similar matter" in the reactor.

"However, licensees are required to evaluate the nature of the material and determine whether there will be an adverse impact on safety," she said.

The NRC and its experts will then review the evaluation to determine whether the plant can continue to operate safely.

While he did not have firsthand information about the specific situation at Palisades and could not comment on it, there have been at least three other instances in the U.S. of reactors that operated with metal debris inside, said David Lochbaum, director of the nuclear safety project at the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Lochbaum said he experienced one of those instances first-hand.

When he was stationed at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama in January 1980, workers kept track of fuel bundles by moving metal squares on vertical wooden boards.

While one of the three reactors at the plant was shut down for refueling, "the tag board was knocked over twice, dumping dozens of metal tags into the spent fuel pool and onto fuel bundles to be reloaded into the reactor core," he said in an email. "The metal tags were just large enough to block off flow through a bundle. We looked for but did not find all missing tags, and had to analyze the 'what if' scenario if a tag got carried into the reactor vessel. Because it would only have caused overheating damage to one fuel bundle, an outcome within the design of the plant to withstand, we were allowed to restart. The missing tags were never found, but they never caused problems wherever they went."

Quad Cities Generating Station in Illinois also encountered loose metal parts with minimal problems, Lochbaum said.

However, in 1992, the Connecticut Yankee nuclear plant experienced more serious damage when workers removed the thermal shield, a metal plate that was designed to act as insulation but was found to be unnecessary. When cutting through the plate, the workers created metal slivers and flakes that were not fully removed before the reactor started, Lochbaum said.

"It damaged the metal fuel rods either by direct impact or by lodging against some of the framework holding the fuel rods. Water flowing past vibrated the debris against the fuel rods, wearing it away. Workers had to shut down the reactor and inspected each and every fuel rod for signs of damage — replacing the damaged fuel," he said.

Until the NRC is satisfied with Entergy's evaluation of the situation, Mitlyng said, Palisades will not be allowed to restart.

"Our inspectors are evaluating the activities as they unfold," Mitlyng said. "What I can tell you is that we will have to be comfortable with the analysis and their proposed solutions before the reactor can return to power."

Yvonne Zipp is a staff writer at the Kalamazoo Gazette. Email her at yzipp@mlive.com or follow her on Twitter.

NYT Report: The Collapse of the Anna Hunt Marsh and Charles Dana Bridges

All the the factors are here as spoken in the video...but a much older bridge and the ingredients are much more intensified in a much smaller state.

I got pictures of our bridge frozen roller blades...

Right, the 1967 Minneapolis I 35 bridge was rated in poor condition for 17 years...while the dilapidated and massively corroded 1921 Hinsdale bridge has never been rated in a poor condition. What is wrong with this picture?

The integrity of NH bridge inspections and their rating system has been severely corrupted. Our budget problems has caused this just like the I35 bridge.

For our area population density, it is also a "bridge-buster bridge". There has always been some sort of ideological war going on trhese state. NH doesn't want to pay full freight and Vermont doesn't want pay half the cost. So everyone is play bridge collapse chicken!

 

All along I predicted our bridge collapse will occur on a hot summer afternoon!  

I Plead Guilty to Damaging the Hinsdale Route 119 Bridge

My Hinsdale Bridge legal troubles are over.

So these were the charges:

Bridge protester arrested in Hinsdale

By DOMENIC POLI / Reformer Staff

Posted: 08/06/2013 03:00:00 AM EDT | Updated: 7 months ago

The bridges over the Connecticut River between Brattle­boro and Hinsdale, N.H. (Reformer file photo)

Tuesday August 6, 2013

HINSDALE, N.H.-- A local man familiar to area residents for his public demonstrations against the two bridges linking the town to Vermont was cited for allegedly causing damage to the pedestrian portion of one of them Friday.

Michael Mulligan, 60, was cited with reckless conduct, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief (two) and littering, according to Hinsdale Police Lt. David Eldridge. Reckless conduct is a felony.

Mulligan was released on $5,000 personal recognizance and is scheduled to be arraigned in 8th Circuit Court District Division in Keene on Thursday, Oct. 3.

Eldridge said part of Mulligan's bail conditions mandate that he not walk within a mile of either side of the Charles Dana Bridge or stop any vehicle within 100 yards of it. The lieutenant said witnesses saw Mulligan pulling up some of the bridge's boards.

Mulligan's arrest came one day after he appeared at a public meeting hosted by the Federal Highway Administration, the New Hampshire Department of Transportation and the Vermont Agency of Transportation. The meeting, held in the Brattleboro Union High School Multipurpose Room, was held to discuss the draft environmental assessment that had been released and was used to gauge local support for a project to rehabilitate the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges and construct a new one to span over the nearby railroad tracks in Brattleboro and touch down near the stop light at the former Walmart location.

Mulligan, who brought with him pieces of rust he had chipped off the bridges, said he feels the environmental assessment contains gross inaccuracies and said he fears the bridges are in danger of collapsing. He said the assessment overestimates "by many magnitudes" the bridge's integrity, even though those who put together the assessment consider it "functionally obsolete."

Mulligan, wearing a homemade halo, also referenced movies in which an angel lurks near a bridge before it collapses and said he is that angel for the Charles Dana and Anna Hunt Marsh bridges.

Domenic Poli can be reached at dpoli@reformer.com, or 802-254-2311, ext. 277. You can follow him on Twitter @dpoli_reformer.

Just saying, did the Hinsdale police over-charge me or what? I hold nothing against the Hinsdale Police department...I forced their hand.  

I plead guilty to a Class B misdemeanor of Criminal Mischief today. They made me pay $1300 dollars to the state for restitution. I was also also fined $1000. Don’t have to pay it as long as I stay outside 100 feet of the bridges except for normal traveling and refrain from committing serious crime for a year.  

The NEI's Numbers and Excuses!

They should add, how about the 100's of millions of dollars wasted through maintenance negligence all throughout the nuclear industry.

Crystal River and San Onofre are in the category.

 

Take Pilgrim's defective new SRVs that cost so much capacity?  

NEI Lays Out the State of Nuclear Power (With Reactor Construction Photos)

Nuclear Street News Team               

 

Wed, Feb 26 2014 11:27 AM

 

Last year offered a mix of good and bad for the U.S. nuclear power industry. Four new reactors rapidly took shape in the South and performance remained high among the operating fleet, while some single-unit plants struggled to compete with low natural gas prices.

In a presentation for financial analysts, the Nuclear Energy Institute recently laid out the trends facing the industry in 2014.

Performance

U.S. reactors' 2013 capacity factor increased 4.5 percentage points over the previous year to 90.9 percent. That includes two units at San Onofre that did not operate at all, as well as the Fort Calhoun plant that was shut down for most of the year. Excluding those units, the capacity factor was 92.1 percent in 2013, which saw 51 refueling outages.

Price

The NEI also broke down generating costs for 2012. Across the U.S. reactor fleet, excluding Kewaunee and the units offline for major repairs, costs averaged $44.17 per megawatt hour. Multi-unit plants enjoyed a significant advantage, with costs averaging $39.44 per MWh, compared to $50.54 at single-unit plants. Average costs have grown steadily and outpaced inflation in the last decade. They increased from 39.69 per MWh in 2010 and 41.85 in 2011. Nonetheless, the NEI was quick to point out that among capital costs, more than half of the expense in 2012 went to power uprates and license renewals that add value to the plants.

Competition

Three reactors closed last year at San Onofre and Crystal River because of costly mechanical problems. But a fourth reactor at Kewaunee was closed solely for market reasons, as will the Vermont Yankee at the end of this year. According to the Energy Information Administration, natural gas prices reached a monthly low for 2013 in August at $4.03 per thousand cubic feet. Last year's prices were well above 2012's low of $2.81 but still made natural gas generation a cheaper alternative to some single-unit nuclear plants. By NEI's estimates, a new combined-cycle gas plant can generate power at $50.10 per MWh when gas costs $4.

NEI CEO Marvin Fertel, though, argued that recent years' power pricing in unregulated markets did not factor in the long-term benefits of grid stability or the smaller carbon footprint nuclear plants offer.

“The decisions to close Kewaunee and Vermont Yankee were perfectly rational business decisions for the companies operating the plants in those markets. But from society’s point of view, these were not rational decisions,” Fertel said in prepared remarks.

“There was nothing wrong with these plants. There is something wrong with the design and operation of the markets in which they are operating. They do not value base load capacity that can be dispatched when needed, do not provide value for fuel and technology diversity, and do not recognize the other attributes of a nuclear power plant.”

Investment

Elsewhere in the industry, though, things are looking up. Leaders from Southern Co. and South Carolina Electric & Gas also joined the event to summarize the progress they've made on new Westinghouse AP1000 reactors at Plant Vogtle and V.C. Summer in 2013. The following graphics illustrate some of that work:

(Plant Vogtle

Rt 119 Hinsdale Bridge: Feeling Abandoned Today!

Now they are thinking about closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.



View Larger Map

Officials discuss funding for N.H.-Maine bridge 

Associated Press 

Saturday, February 22, 201 

(Published in print: Saturday, February 22, 2014 

New Hampshire says replacing a 75-year-old bridge connecting the state to Maine is a priority, but work is still being done to find the funding sources. 

Members of New Hampshire’s House Public Works and Highway Committee on Thursday visited the Sarah Long Bridge in Portsmouth, the state’s No. 1 red-listed bridge. 

Work on the $160 million replacement bridge is expected to begin in 2015, with completion in 2017. Maine and New Hampshire co-own the bridge. Each has committed $80 million. 

Federal Highway Administration funding will pay for the bulk of the project, but lawmakers said the states are looking to apply for the next round of federal Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery, or TIGER, grants. 

The two states were unsuccessful in securing a $25 million TIGER grant last fall.

Officials discuss funding for N.H.-Maine bridge

 

Is the real villain here Vermont...should I be really protesting against Vermont! There is no state deal splitting the cost of a bridge between Vermont and New Hampshire on the Connecticut River. 

Well, the Hinsdale Bridge is 91 years old and the route 1 bypass Sara Long Bridge is 75 years. Parts of the route 1 Badger bridge...Memorial Bridge... a half a mile east of the Long Bridge is new. West a half mile is the I 95 bridge...Blue Star bridge. Transportation wise, there is no need for a new Sara Long 180 million dollar bridge other than for jobs and votes.

 

If I remember right, this area is economically depressed! 

 

...Right, it all about votes, not a fair rule or a criteria of new bridge replacement. It would be devastation if we lost our bridge...there is absolutely no community outcome if the Sara Long bridge collapses. 

Pilgrim's Junk Safety Relief Valves

Basically the valves are of a poor quality and they weren't designed and tested for their safety duty.

So they say the resonant frequency of the main steam line is the cause for the SRV failure. How do we know if something dangerous is going on with the MSL causing abnormal vibrations. If might be a crack developing or maybe even damage with the loop vibration snubbers. Maybe nothing is wrong with the SRVs...except the main steam lines are vibrating a lot more than they have been in the past. Are we setting ourselves up for a MSL break before the MSIVs?   

I guess the rule are, you got to prove those valves were unsafe behind a barrier, instead you prove to the community these valves are safe.

These new valves were allowed to operate with a common mode failure due to design and poor quality components.

All this secrecy with this from the beginning was predicated on the fear the poor quality components in the SRV effecting the operability of other plants with target rock srvs. Remember within a month with the new valves one started leaking...

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station LER: SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

Submitted by NUCBIZ on February 20, 2014 - 14:18  

On Sunday January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (RMSS in RUN), PNPS declared SRV-3B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 requiring an orderly re- actor shutdown such that reactor coolant pressure is less than 104 psig within 24 hours. On Monday January 21, 2013, at 1300 hours (16 hrs and 10 minutes) reactor coolant pressure was lowered to less than 104 psig. SRV-3B had been declared inoperable consistent with PNPS procedures that state an SRV is inoperable if the first stage pilot thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature. This LER Supplement provides the determination of cause for the leakage. The cause of the SRV leakage was that the natural fre- quency of the pilot assembly was close to a resonant frequency of the valve assembly when installed on the PNPS main steam line, that had failed to be considered in the design of the SRV. A contributing cause was wear and looseness of parts in the main stage of RV-203-3B.
The reactor was depressurized and a new pilot valve assembly was installed on SRV-3B. On January 22, 2013, at 1015 hours reactor restart was commenced. On January 24, 2013 at 0312 hours 100% core thermal power was achieved. 

This LER also reports the as-found setpoint of one SRV pilot valve tested was less than the minimum pres- sure required by TS 3.6.D.1.  

This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

So this is how Pilgrim explained it in the first LER with these new SRVs.

The enclosed Supplement Licensee Event Report (LER) 2011-007-01, "Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage

There was no evidence of a design defect that could be the root cause for the onset of leakage. The basic design of this 3-stage valve is mature and had been in operation since 1970.  

The newest frames it like this.

Licensee Event Report 2013-002-01, SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

The industry has experienced numerous instances where SRV leakage has occurred at other plants with other Target Rock Model three stage safety relief valves.

What I have seen over the years is truthfulness and integrity is totally unregulated with license Event report. They generally must submit one, god help you if you don’t...but the substance of the LER can be falsified at will and the NRC will never call a utility on it.

They will tell any any mistruth in order to protect saying up a power with defective nuclear safety componets.

SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift
 

On Sunday January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (RMSS in RUN), PNPS declared SRV-3B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 requiring an orderly reactor shutdown such that reactor coolant pressure is less than 104 psig within 24 hours. On Monday January21, 2013, at 1300 hours (16 hrs and 10 minutes) reactor coolant pressure was lowered to less than 104 psig.
 

SRV-3B had been declared inoperable consistent with PNPS procedures that state an SRV is inoperable if the first stage pilot thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature. This LER Supplement provides the determination of cause for the leakage. The cause of the SRV leakage was that the natural frequency of the pilot assembly was close to a resonant frequency of the valve assembly when installed on the PNPS main steam line, that had failed to be considered in the design of the SRV. A contributing cause was wear and looseness of parts in the main stage of RV-203-3B.
 

The reactor was depressurized and a new pilot valve assembly was installed on SRV-3B. On January 22, 2013, at 1015 hours reactor restart was commenced. On January 24, 2013 at 0312 hours 100% core thermal power was achieved.
 

This LER also reports the as-found setpoint of one SRV pilot valve tested was less than the minimum pressure required by TS 3.6.D.1.
 

This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

BACKGROUND:
 

As background, the pressure relief system includes four (4) SRVs and two (2) spring safety valves (SSVs). During Refueling Outage (RFO-1 8), in April/May, 2011, the four SRVs were replaced with Target Rock Model 0867F 3-stage SRVs. The SRVs discharge through their individual discharge piping, terminating below the minimum uppression pool (torus) water level. The four SRVs are installed on the main steam piping in containment between the reactor pressure vessel and the flow restrictors.
 

The 3-stage SRV contains a pilot (also called the first stage), a second stage, a main stage, and an air operator.
 

To monitor these valves for leakage, Pilgrim installed thermocouples at the pilot (first stage), at the second stage, on the tailpipe near the valve (4.5' to 6' away), on the tailpipe far from the valve (-20' away) and at the pilot bellows. Procedure 2.2.23, "Automatic Depressurization System", provides guidance for interpreting the thermocouple data and determining valve operability based in part on testing performed by Target Rock.
 

Subsequent to installation in RFO-1 8 and prior to this event, Pilgrim experienced minor second stage pilot valve leakage from SRV RV-203-3C on May 18, 2011 and November 25, 2011. Also, on December 26, 2011, SRV RV- 203-3D first stage pilot valve experienced leakage while operating at full power. The SRV was declared inoperable and the plant was shutdown on December 26, 2011 in accordance with TS 3.6.D.2 and RV-203-3C was replaced entirely, and the RV-203-3D pilot assembly was replaced (LER 2011-007-00).
 

EVENT DESCRIPTION:
 

On Sunday January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (RMSS in RUN), PNPS declared SRV-3B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 requiring the initiation of an orderly reactor shutdown such that reactor coolant pressure is less than 104 psig within 24 hours. On Monday January 21, 2013, at 1300 hours (16 hrs and 10 minutes) reactor coolant pressure was less than 104 psig. SRV-3B had been declared inoperable consistent with PNPS procedures that state an SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature.
 

While at full power, indication of a steam leak across the first stage pilot of RV-203-3B was identified. The leakage was evaluated and in accordance with criteria specified in procedure 2.2.23, specifically, if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 35 degrees F below its baseline temperature (with a smaller decrease at the second stage thermocouple) and cannot be explained by a corresponding downpower, the SRV is inoperable. The safety relief valve was subsequently declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 was entered. Per TS 3.6.D.2 the plant was shutdown and reactor coolant pressure was below 104 psig within 24 hours.
 

CAUSE:
 

The SRVs were purchased new, installed, and tested for the first time in April/May 2011 during RFO-1 8.
 

Following an extensive investigation, it was determined that the cause of the SRV leakage was that the natural frequency of the pilot assembly was close to a resonant frequency of the valve assembly when installed on the PNPS main steam line. This was not considered in the Entergy specification or the Target Rock design of the valve.
 

A contributing cause was wear and looseness of parts in the main stage of RV-203-3B.
 

EXTENT OF CONDITION:
 

This condition potentially applies to all four three stage SRVs that were installed in RFO 18. During Cycle 19 operation,Pilgrim has observed leakage from RV-203-3B, 3C, and 3D.

• On May 18, 2011 and November 25, 2011, SRV RV 203-3C second stage pilot valve minor leakage was observed. This condition did not cause inoperability of the valve. SRV RV-203-3C was replaced during the December 26, 2011 shutdown.

• On December 26, 2011, SRV, RV-203-3D first stage pilot valve experienced leakage that exceeded the operability criteria while operating at full power. The plant was shut down as required by TS 3.6.D.2, RV 203-3C and 3D were repaired and the plant returned to full power operation. The cause of the pilot leakage was later determined to be a combination of the natural frequency issue and weakening of the pilot bellows spring. This bellows spring had a through wall failure during testing at an offsite test facility in March 2013. This failure was the subject of a Target Rock 10 CFR, Part 21 (Reference 1).

• On January 20, 2013, Pilgrim experienced the event described in this Licensee Event Report, first stage pilot valve leakage of SRV, RV-203-3B. The plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.D.2. The pilot valve was replaced with a refurbished pilot and the plant was returned to full power operation.

• On February 3, 2013, RV-203-3B first stage pilot valve leakage was identified while at full power. Reactor power was lowered to 80% and at 1000 psig pressure, the pilot was reseated. An Operability Determination with a compensatory measure was implemented to maintain the reactor power at 80% and reactor pressure at 1000 psig. An Operations Decision Making Issue (ODMI) was implemented to monitor and take corrective actions. During the forced outage on February 8, 2013, caused by a loss of offsite power due to a major winter storm, RV-203-3B first stage pilot valve was replaced with a new pilot valve and the plant was returned to power operation. The cause of the pilot leakage was determined to be a combination of the natural frequency issue and weakening of the pilot bellows spring. This bellows spring had a through wall failure during testing at an offsite test facility in March 2013. This failure was the subject of a Target Rock 10 CFR, Part 21 (Reference 1).

The removed RV-203-3B pilot valve was sent to Wyle Laboratory for testing.

 

As-found test results for the SRV, RV 203-3B pilot valve were:

Pilot S/N SRV Position As-Found Deviation  23 RV-203-3B 1112 psig (-)3.8% 

Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 requires the as-found setpoint to be within 1155±34.6 psig (1120.4 psig to 1189.6 psig). The as-found setpoint was less than the minimum pressure specification required by TS 3.6.D.1. This test result was entered into the corrective action program as a separate event, and is included in this LER since the condition was discovered within 60 days from the initial discovery of pilot leakage. Accordingly, this as-found value being out of Technical Specification setpoint is reported in this LER pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

 

The third pilot on RV-203-3B began leaking on February 26, 2013. Leakage was controlled by reducing power and pressure per the ODMI. This pilot was replaced during the Spring 2013 RFO. The cause of the pilot leakage was that the pilot assembly had a natural frequency that was close to a resonant frequency of the valve assembly when installed on the PNPS main steam line.

 

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

 

The following corrective actions were taken to address this event related to leaking RV-203-3B:

• The SRV-3B pilot was replaced with a refurbished and tested pilot.
•  
• PNPS Procedure was revised to reduce reactor power and pressure to stop leakage per an ODMI as described in "Extent of Condition."

The following corrective actions are being taken to address the results of review of Extent Conditions:

• To minimize the possibility of further pilot leaks, all currently installed pilots (and replacements if necessary until the long term corrective action can be taken) have been set at the high end of their allowed set pressure band.

• The recommendations of the Target Rock 10 CFR, Part 21 are being followed.

• The only PNPS pilot with a bellows spring from the same material and heat treatment certifications as the failed bellows was removed from the plant. Detailed metallurgical analysis did not identify any intergranular cracks such as those identified in the failed bellows.

• PNPS has ordered new pilot assemblies with enhancements designed by Target Rock to raise the natural frequency of the pilot and make it more resistant to steam system vibration (References 2 and 3). These pilots include the bellows replacement recommended by the 10 CFR, Part 21. PNPS plans to install these pilots during the spring of 2015 RFO.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:

The leaking SRV pilot valves and the plant shutdown to repair the SRV in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.D.2 posed no threat to the public health and safety.

All leakage from the valve was collected in plant systems, the suppression pool (torus), and processed in accordance with normal station practices.

Pilgrim has installed temperature monitoring to provide sufficient indication of SRV leakage to ensure that timely actions can be taken to ensure that the plant is maintained in a safe condition. Procedure 2.2.23 provides the instructions and guidance for interpreting and responding to SRV temperature indications. Based on these instructions, the plant was shutdown. The SRV would have been able to respond if needed to meet its core cooling or reactor pressure vessel over protection functions. As a result, the plant safety was maintained. The risk of operating with a leaking SRV is characterized by an increased chance of having an inadvertently opened SRV with increased chance of that valve failing to reclose. Assuming the plant operated for 24 hours with this condition, this results in a change in core damage frequency of less than 1.OE-7. The impact of setpoint drift (0.8% below the 3% tolerance) is considered to be bounded by delta change in core damage frequency of less than 1.OE-7.

PREVIOUS EVENTS:

Prior to Cycle 19, there were no leakage or setpoint drifts occurrences with three stage safety relief valves since the new design was installed in April/May, 2011, during Refueling Outage 18 for all four safety relief valves.

During Cycle 19, Pilgrim observed minor leakage from the second stage pilot valve of RV-203-3C. Also, first stage pilot valve leakage was observed from RV-203-3D which was confirmed, plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.D.2, and first stage pilot valve was replaced. This event is described in LER 2011-007-00. During the outage for RV-203-3D, the entire RV 203-30 was replaced with a new valve assembly.

The industry has experienced numerous instances where SRV leakage has occurred at other plants with other Target Rock Model three stage safety relief valves.

OE33766 - Three Stage Safety Relief Valve Pilot Leakage just below Normal Operating Pressure - Plant Hatch. The plant Hatch installed the same model 3-stage SRVs in Unit 2 in April 2011. Hatch experienced numerous pilot leaks during 2011. On some occasions, leakage was reduced by power and/or pressure reductions. Hatch Unit 2 had some success through power and/or pressure reductions and operating for several months after reseating the first stage pilot valve through power and/or pressure reductions.

OE26394 & OE26892 - Planned Shutdown due to a three stage Safety Relief Valve Leak - Peach Bottom Unit 3

OE32805 - Safety Relief Valve Temperature Phenomenon – Fitzpatrick

OE34730 - Target Rock 3 Stage Main Steam SRV Bore to Seat Misalignment - Limerick 2

OE19219 - Plant Shutdown Due to Increasing Tailpipe Temperature - Duane Arnold

ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) CODES:

COMPONENTS CODES

Valve, Relief RV

SYSTEMS

Main Steam SB

REFERENCES:

 

1.    Target Rock Letter NID#13307, "10 CFR Part 21 Report, Notification of a Defect, Bellows Failure," June 17, 2013. 

2. Target Rock Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items TERI 075, "Technical Evaluation of Pilot Assembly 304095-1 Replacing Pilot Assembly 303977-1 for 0867F-001," Target Rock, Revision A, January 14, 2013.

 

3.    Target Rock Letter SRP1 3003, "Enhancements to Primary Pilot Design," Target Rock, January 21, 2013.

4. Condition Report CR-PNP-2013-0378, Safety Relief Valve RV-203-3B, Pilot Leakaqe.

Nuke Plant Meteorological Tower problems...Poor Evacuation Plans

Pilgrim and NRC BlewAccident Reportability Requirements In Blizzard!

 

My complaint to the NRC.

Meteorological Tower problems...Poor Evacuation Programs.

Pilgrim’s meteorological tower now has become a national problem. A dead tower means a plant has an impaired radiological evacuation plan.The opaque NRC system has kept these issues hidden...

This idea of becoming dependent on the national weather service gives permission for a utility to not keep their metrological towers system up to date and reliable.

SUBJECT: D. C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2013005; 05000316/2013005

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) or Severity Level IV was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a NCV.

•Sub-paragraph 50.36a (a)(2) of 10 CFR Part 50, requires the licensee to submit a report to the Commission annually that specifies the quantity of each of the principal radionuclides released to unrestricted areas in liquid and in gaseous effluent during the previous 12 months, including any other information as may be required by the Commission to estimate maximum potential annual radiation doses to the public resulting from effluent releases.

The NRC Safety Guide 23 “Onsite Meteorological Programs” states that knowledge of meteorological conditions in the vicinity of the reactor is important in providing a basis for estimating maximum potential annual radiation doses resulting from radioactive materials released in gaseous effluents. The Safety Guide also described a suitable onsite meteorological program to provide meteorological data needed to estimate potential radiation doses to the public as a result of the routine or accidental release of radioactive material to the atmosphere and to assess other environmental effect. The Safety Guide states that meteorological instruments should be inspected and serviced at a frequency which will assure at least a 90 percent data recovery and which will minimize extended periods of instrument outage.

Contrary to sub-paragraph 50.36a (a)(2) of 10 CFR Part 50, the licensee failed to submit information required by the Commission to estimate maximum potential annual radiation doses to the public resulting from effluent releases. Specifically, the licensee was not able to maintain Meteorological Tower instrumentation so that data recovery remained above 90 percent for the calendar year 2012, information that the Commission required to estimate maximum potential dosesto the public.

After identifying the error, the licensee took corrective action to prevent further loss of meteorological data due to equipment failure by troubleshooting and repairing Meteorological Tower instrumentation and instituting additional data recovery efforts in 2013. The license’s corrective actions were entered into the CAP as Condition Reports AR 2013-12764 and AR 2013-15116. Because the licensee identified the failure to properly recover data, the inspectors determined that the violation met the requirements of a licensee identified NCV.