NE Grid Is Huffing And Puffing Over Our Historic Cold

Prices are around $240?

Vogtle: Not Appropriate Engineers Working At Vogtle

Update 

Is The Same Going On In Vogtle, as in VC Summer?

I got a NRC investigation on same issue...

Anti-nuclear group files complaint over construction drawings for Vogtle project in Georgia

Dec 14, 2017

By Andrew Brown abrown@postandcourier.com

COLUMBIA — Just like South Carolina, a complaint has been filed in Georgia over Westinghouse's decision not to use licensed engineers to oversee and approve the designs for two unfinished nuclear reactors. 

Nuclear Watch South, an anti-nuclear group, filed a formal complaint with the Georgia Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors earlier this week, as state regulators continue to discuss whether construction on two reactors at Plant Vogtle near Augusta should be finished. 

The group asked the state regulatory board to determine whether Westinghouse and Georgia Power violated state law by allowing construction drawings for the reactors at Vogtle to be used without being vetted and signed by professional engineers...

Junk Plant Cooper Is Mightily Troubled

What do they call these kinds of problems (configuration}. It is as clear as a bell, the NRC doesn't give these plants enough incentives to clean up their problems quickly.

It looks like a severe deterioration of both organizations...  

Licensee Event Report 2017-001-01

Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow Valves Out of Position Results in Loss of Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On February 5, 2017, during a quarterly sealed valve log audit, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Valves RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were discovered sealed closed. Normal configuration for these valves is sealed opened. Consequently, Operations declared RHR pumps A and C Inoperable at 0756 hours and entered Technical Specifications (TS} Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

Subsequently, the operating crew opened RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, independently verified the position of the valves and applied seals to the valves. As such, RHR pumps A and C were declared Operable at 1041 hours on February 5, 2017, and TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A were exited.

The root cause is Operations Department standards related to Operator Human Performance and Configuration Control are inadequate and do not meet industry expectations. Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators completed training focused on Standards and Expectations related to attention to detail and configuration control. To prevent recurrence, expectations will be established and institutionalized for Operations Leadership to reinforce consistent application of operator fundamentals and to identify and correct performance gaps for the operating crews.

BACKGROUND

The safety objective of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system [EIIS:BO] is to provide core cooling, in conjunction with other Emergency Core Cooling Systems, and to provide containment cooling as required during abnormal operational transients and postulated accidents. The RHR system consists of two heat exchangers [EIIS:HX], four main system pumps [EIIS:P] in two divisions, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation.

The motor-operated minimum flow valves automatically provide the necessary flow through the pump in order to prevent pump overheating. The manual isolation valves for the motor-operated minimum flow valves, RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60, are normally configured open and sealed.

RHR pumps A and C provide RHR Loop A safety functions associated with Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) and Containment Cooling. These pumps also provide RHR Loop A Shutdown Cooling (SDC) function during outage conditions. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 29, 2016, during Refueling Outage 29 (RE29), RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were closed and danger tagged in accordance with a clearance order to support the RHR Loop A Maintenance Window.

On October 7, 2016, the danger tags for RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were released and the clearance order directed that both valves be restored to their normal configuration. The danger tags were removed and seals applied to the valves. However, the valves were not opened before placing the seals. Second verification incorrectly verified that the valves were sealed open, when they were sealed closed.

A quarterly sealed valve log audit was performed on November 29, 2016, and the seals were verified to be intact. The audit required only that the seals be verified, the audit did not require the valve configuration be checked.

On February 5, 2017, during a quarterly sealed valve log audit, it was discovered that RHR-V-58 and RHR-V-60 were sealed closed. Consequently, Operations declared RHR pumps A and C Inoperable at 0756 hours and entered Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition A, LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A, and LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

03/14/17 - Condition Report written to document incorrectly installed seals on two service water valves (SW-V-105 and SW-V-124) that occurred in late February 2017. 01/30/17 - Fuse was installed incorrectly. I 01/10/17- Incorrect bulb installation caused light for Local Power Range Monitor downscale to remain on. I

01/14/17-Augmented Off-Gas +34 Glycol pump/compressor switches found in an incorrect position.

LER 2016-009-00- On December 7, 2016, a Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan was removed from service due to human error resulting in a loss of safety function.

12/02/16 - Setpoints verified on the Normal Range Kaman instead of the High Range Kaman.

11/21/16 - Incorrect log entry resulted in missed surveillance.

10/15/16 - Relay was found not reset.

10/03/16 - Control Rod Drive high cooling water differential pressure was noticed while making preparations to hang tags. Upon investigation, it was noticed that 75 Hydraulic Control Units (HCUs) were isolated, which left 62 in service for cooling. This is contrary to a precaution statement in a procedure which requires 70 HCUs to be in service.

09/30/16 - A CNS Operator and an Entergy Operator entered the steam tunnel to hang tags and inadvertently severed and extracted tubing being used for Local Leak Rate Testing.

09/28/16 - While performing rounds, the on watch non-licensed plant Operator adjusted air load pressure to the specifications in their logs, not per the procedure for the current plant condition. This caused Control Room indicators to show a lower Reactor Pressure Vessel level than actual. LER 2014-001-00 - On January 6, 2014, a differential pressure transient occurred in the reactor building due to a non-licensed plant Operator inadvertently opening the wrong drain valve while hanging tags.

NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)

Nuclear Plant: Deep Cold Spell Going On

I be looking at power history all over the USA to see how reliable they are during the deep cold???

Doing well so far!!!

Abuse of Police Power Within The Hinsdale NH Police Department

Update Dec 28

Is it good the selectman didn't call yet? 

Comments To Me From The Police Chief 

"Even if this wasn't according to the ordinance, I could have towed your car and ticketed you on at least "six" state laws."

"If the department was really after you, we could have ticketed and towed your car. It would have really cost you then."

The nice police officer just came to my house and asked me to move my car, or be towed? right.

Update

The selectman's office

So I give the office secretary my shortened spiel. The first thing she implied in this it is a police matter. The first thing the police chief said in the police station window to me is, this is a selectman's issue. Freakin bureaucrats? 

I posed the question to the selectman secretary as succinctly as I could. She was by now taking notes. She asked me if I looked up the ordinance. I said four times, one reading it real slowly. She had opened up her computer to the snow emergency plowing/towing ordinance. She read the ordnance for two or three minutes. I popped up saying, "just show me where it clearly states the police can tow or ticket cars in a snow emergency during the daylight hours between 6 am and midnight"? I am sure she felt she could show me the wording quickly. Then I get a, "well, I will have to take this to the selectman. She never admitted to me she couldn't find the wording, just like the police chief. I hate this excessive organizational self protection. That is when I tell her my blog address. I am a blogger!. Told the secretary, "This is my interpretation and analysis of events here". I wrote it up on my blog so the selectman could know clearly in writing what I was  thinking.  

It is very risky me going off on an events and interpreting rules and ordinances like this without all my ducks in a row. This all is basically a information gather tacit and engaging the organization to starting thinking about my issue. I find it very painful to me when police come to my door with their duck not in a row. I might miss a few words or misinterpret a rule or laws. I have little training and contacts with these systems. I got a big chance I might be wrong. Especially the police chief, he has tremendous legal training and experience with the system, as with the regular police and selectmen people. 

My impression with the selectman's secretary, she couldn't find the clear wording saying the police have the political authority to ticket or tow cars in a snow emergency. 

I think the best way to handle this is just to ask the car owners to take their cars off the road for the good of the community and help the plow drivers. I think 99% of the community population would do as the police wanted. Why does the police always go to the intimidation route? 

I just wanted to talk abothe beyond ut this with the police. I want him to sit down with me and go over the ordinance word by word. I wanted the police to be more commutative to outsiders and explain how they operate. I though he was dismissive when he said, if I find something wrong with the ordnance, I will change it. It wasn't, we will then talk more about your concerns. These guys are always minimizing their profile. I just want communications, openness and transparency with the police. I want the police to know me, and me to know the police...we trust each other when the shit hits the fan. This applies to everyone(not just the police)in my community and the beyond in the USA. These police have always been overwhelmed with crime problems and severely poor public funding.        

Update Dec 27

My issue was our elected officials dictated by ordinance cars can only be towed during a storm and between the midnight and 6am.That is the way the rules are written according to my interpretation. He said even if we are outside the town rules, we got at least five state laws where we can ticket and tow your car parked on the side of the road. I asked him, did you read the ordinance? He gave me a weak yes. He promised me he would take a look at the rules. If he finds the rules unclear, he will get it changed. I was disappointed he didn't say, he would get back to me and we can have a further talk about it. There are bigger implications here. As far as all the state laws he could have used in this particular case, yea they maybe there, but the prosecutor and judge would laugh them out of court.   

Why don't the police officers have pre season training on it? If I am right, why didn't a police officer speak up saying the ordinance don't give us a right to tow cars during daylight. It not right threatened emediately we will tow you car, when we don't have a right to do that. By the way, the chiefs first swipe at this was, it is the way we always worked in the winter. Why didn't a cop say, we got to clear up the ordnance, or I won't participate with unethically towing strategy.       

I extensively questioned my wife about the tone of the police officer and who he was? My wife picked up my troublesome vibes...she didn't want me to get in trouble again with the police department. We talked at length with the our interpretation of this encounter. Was the cops picking on me and were they professional? By the end of the ride home, we concluded this was a innocent occurrence and I was a bit paranoid. The cop was just doing his job and no harm what so ever. I have a abnormal curiosity, so I decided to just check our  the  snow ordinance.  I concluded our elected politicians only allowed towing cars and fines during the night. The implication are bigger than me, what if i am right? What do they owe to the people who got their cars towed or fined with this unauthorized police activity? 

You want people like me pinging on the police department and always testing them, making them stronger...           

Update:

When My wife called to notify me of the police visit, my wife and son emediately picked up the car and brought it back home.

It is Christmas Today. I got a beautiful new heavy duty winter coat. I spend an enormous amount time in the woods and trails in our area. I use a mountain bike and hike. I got diabetes...this is my exercise to counteracts my disease. But it is much more than that. I consider being next to our locale nature and weather as a spiritual or religious experience. Being out their exhausting myself calms me for days. As far as a winter experience, out there in a raging snowstorm or blizzard...I feel there is no better spiritual experience anywhere. It is so freeing out there being isolated from the societal experience. I have been traipsing out in these winter storms for many years now. I am usually out in the woods for six to eight hours. I always have a cell phone with me for safety. I gotten bumps and scraps out there, but no big accident. I am pretty conservative with my safety, I don't want to get hurt out there to keep me from my biking and hiking for any time.

So today I am parked (car) on the Taryn Ln entrance to the power lines trails and snowmobiling area. I have been hiking for about hour. I get a cell phone call from my wife. She says the Hinsdale cops just came to the door. The cop says, "your husband's car is impeding snowplowing". "If he doesn't get his car off the road emediately he is going to get towed". The cop irked said, "He has been warned about this many times before". His tone was very polite to my wife and he wished her merry Christmas.

This call happen about 2pm. But I call it a gross misuse of police power and intimidation. Clearly, according to the Hinsdale ordinances, he had no police power to tell me to get off the road or to tow my car. It is not plausible he doesn't understand the winter emergency towing/ plowing ordinances. My best guess is the police department just takes the lazy and most effective way out, just unjustly threatens his poor citizens with a $200 towing fine. It is outside the court's punishment type a thing.

As far as the storm plowing philosophy, I think it goes like this. You keep the roads open plowing during the daylight hours. You don't do really detailed plowing. During the first or second night after the storm, you go back over all the roads doing the detail plowing. This is when they should catch the area of snow buildup area around where I parked my hour. The priority is not disrupt the public interest, recreation or business interest during the storm. The storm does enough damage on their own.

So my big question is how many cars have you towed for the last five years during a winter storm not ordinance authorized period of midnight to 6am. It is a illegal action.

I am really irked the cops are passing around bogus information  concerning me... I am a snowstorm emergency habitual parking on the side of road ordinance violator. It is not based on any law or ordinance. I am appalled the police doesn't understand this.

2016

***Accosted be Ex Chief Gallagher in 2016. He was acting as a town selectman chairman and police officer within this encounter simultaneously. 

Taryn Ln is deep in a small neighborhood. It doesn't have a lot of traffic. It is in a isolated section of the road, 

1) About noontime. The same place as above on Taryn Ln road near the power line as in today's encounter above. I was basically plowed in and stuck in the snow as the same place as today on the side of the road. It was in one mother of a blizzard. I was shoveling out my car in a stuck condition. Gallagher stopped and got out. I was just about shoveled out. I told him I had been hiking out in the woods. I got in my car and it came right out from the snow bank. I took this first encounter as a good police officer just trying to be helpful to his citizen. Rather impressed you know.

2) Same storm...about six hours later. I was hiking in and around the area of the Vernon Dam of cource on the Hinsdale side. It was the worst  blizzard of 2016. The wind was howling and it was still snowing hard as hell. About 4:30 pm. It was a raging storm all day. I didn't want to get stuck in the storm again, so I parked aside the sewer plant on River road. I am walking about 500 feet before my car when I see a police car ahead of me. I am tired as hell, the snow was still raging and the wind was howling. Gallagher asked me, "what are you doing here? Said hiking up by the dam all afternoon. It was the ending of a spectacular blizzard day. He replied irked, "you are interfering with town plowing operations". I didn't want to create any scenes there. I just said OK. Lets just say, Gallagher was the selectman chairman when I was protesting about the Hinsdale/ Brattleboro dilapidated bridge, and my arrest. I had made a complaint to the selectman that the police department wasn't getting adequately funded and manned in this timeframe. So you see, we had issues.

So far, I don't think this is related to the bridge protest, my arrest or my police complaint... It is too far in the past. But these small NE town's people have a reputation of never letting go of a grudge...

 

Ordinances & Regulations

TRAFFIC CONTROL OR..DINANCE

AUTHORITY

In accordance with an under the authority of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, Chapter 41, Section 11 and Chapter 47, Section 17, VII and VIII, authorizing the Board of Selectmen to enact ordinances governing the use of public ways and traffic devises and signals, the following Ordinance is adopted by the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Hinsdale.  This ordinance repeals and replaces the Parking Ordinance.

III. Between November 1st and April 1st from 12:00 A.M. to 6:00 A.M., no vehicle shall be parked beyond the boundaries of the public way within the Town so that it interferes with the removal of snow from the highways and parking lots.  This shall not apply to vehicles parked in designated areas except between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.  However, the Historical Society lot shall be designated as an overnight lot for emergency purposes only and vehicles must be removed by 7:00 a.m.

I generally park off the tar on the side of the road or as close to the snow bank as possible.   

V. Any vehicle parked contrary to this ordinance may be towed at the owners’ expense, in the following manner: A. Any Police Officer may authorize towing for any violations of this ordinance.  

B. The Supervisor of the Hinsdale Highway Department or his designee may order vehicles towed for violations of Section III when said violator is impeding the plowing or removal of snow.

C. Any person(s) whose vehicle is towed pursuant to this ordinance shall be liable for all costs of such towing and storage, but shall have a right to a hearing upon the same terms and conditions as set forth in RSA 262:33 II and III.

The Vogtle Decision: Southern's Stock Price Down 1% Yesterday

Update

Now down 1.3%. I just don't understand why the stock hasn't gone up on the news. So late this afternoon, it is done 1.8%?

**Did Vogtle really get the all clear signal yesterday with the PSC?

You would think Southern would get a nice pop yesterday. I think storm clouds are still building all around this plant.

Clinton Gets A Special Inspection

NRC Launches Special Inspection at Clinton Nuclear Plant  

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has launched a Special Inspection at the Clinton nuclear power plant to review the circumstances surrounding the failure of a transformer and a subsequent manual shutdown of the reactor on Dec. 9. The two-member inspection team arrived onsite Monday to better understand the event, review the operation of equipment and evaluate the plant’s actions in response. NRC inspectors, who will spend time both on and off site, also plan to review the corrective actions taken and the extent of condition evaluation, as a similar event occurred in 2013 on another transformer. The event did not impact public health and safety. As part of the inspection, the NRC team will independently review the technical details regarding this operational failure, and the plant’s response to the previous event. Following the inspection, a report documenting the team’s findings will be made publicly available. When the operational failure occurred, operators in the control room received numerous alarms indicating a transformer failure, which resulted in a loss of power to certain safety related equipment. Redundant safety systems remained available and operable. Other plant systems responded as expected. Workers installed a new transformer before the plant restarted operations. The single-unit plant is operated by Exelon Nuclear Generation Co., and is located in Clinton, Ill., about 23 miles southeast of Bloomington, Ill.
 

Junk Plant Waterford: Startling Number Of Components Broke in Event

All the Entergy plants in region IV are very Troubled!!!

December 20, 2017

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 – NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2017011

Vogtle Nuclear plant: NRC Showing Comtempt For the Staff's Technical Ineptness

Vogtle PEmails 

From: Gleaves, Bill Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 12:07 PM To: Vogtle PEmails Cc: Gleaves, Bill Subject: Vogtle Units 3&4 - LAR-17-010 Additional Information to Supplement the December 1, 2017 Supplement 4
From: Chamberlain, Amy Christine [mailto:ACCHAMBE@southernco.com]  Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 1:12 PM To: Dixon-Herrity, Jennifer <Jennifer.Dixon-Herrity@nrc.gov> Cc: Gleaves, Bill <Bill.Gleaves@nrc.gov>; Grant, Eddie <X2EDGRAN@SOUTHERNCO.COM> Subject: RE: Question regarding your 12.1.17 LAR-17-010 Response

Hi Jennifer,

To follow up on our phone call from this morning and the question below.  Based on the physical arrangement of the system, the system components, and the flooding scenario described in the LAR, there would be no breach of the WGS system to allow moisture incursion into the system.  There is no controlled valve that allows a bypass of the WGS Charcoal Delay beds, and the valve which isolates the normal system release (post-delay bed) is both (a) fail closed and (b) controlled to close on a high-high radiation signal (WGS-PL-V051, non-safety valve).  We are not postulating flooding of PLS cabinets, so a spurious control signal is not postulated as a consequence of this event.  There are no other valves that could cause a spurious release due to the flooding described in the LAR.  

 Amy Chamberlain, P.E. Interim Licensing Manager Nuclear Development - VEGP 3&4 Construction Office: (205) 992-6361 Cell: (205) 603-1240 ***New*** acchambe@southernco.com


From: Gleaves, Bill [mailto:Bill.Gleaves@nrc.gov]  Sent: Tuesday, December 5, 2017 12:13 PM To: Chamberlain, Amy Christine <ACCHAMBE@southernco.com> Cc: Dixon-Herrity, Jennifer <Jennifer.Dixon-Herrity@nrc.gov>; Stutzcage, Edward <Edward.Stutzcage@nrc.gov>; Burkhart, Lawrence <Lawrence.Burkhart@nrc.gov>; Lavera, Ronald <Ronald.LaVera@nrc.gov>; Eddie Grant (x2egran@southernco.com) <x2egran@southernco.com> Subject: Question regarding your 12.1.17 LAR-17-010 Response

Amy,

Our concern has not changed…it has always been about the potential for radioactive gas release due to the submergence of the system (a scenario for which the system was not designed).  We stated that in the call two weeks ago and believed it to be clear in the RAI.  Although it may have been discussed, the NRC was not making any assumption about the specific scenario that you should address, e.g., the pressure of the gaseous waste system in comparison to the pressure due to the depth of the flood water.   We discussed water infiltration – yes – but this could be water infiltrating a control system or motor operated valve that could cause
2
the system to malfunction and perhaps release gases to the ventilation system or environment.  We asked how submergence of these systems could adversely affect its function and could there be a release.  

We talked about physical integrity of the system OR other system of component failure mechanisms that may lead to a release.  SNC addressed the physical integrity part but not how the system could fail that could result in a release.

So we believe that the concern is the same as expressed in the RAI.

“Please provide additional information to enable the staff to reach a reasonable assurance finding that the worst case flooding will not result in a significant release from the gaseous waste management system. The charcoal guard bed and delay beds are located in Room 12153, which are on the bottom floor of the building. Table 2 in response to Question 7.a indicates 168" of flooding in that room. The concern is that potentially the water could damage the system or the beds or that water could infiltrate the beds and cause them to loose there adsorption ability, resulting in a significant release of the content of the beds (physical integrity of the rad waste system or other system or component failure mechanisms that may lead to a significant release of gaseous activity, etc.).”

We believe that SNC did not provide sufficient information about completely evaluating if and how submergence of the gaseous waste management system could result in a release of gaseous radioactivity.

If the SNC cannot provide reasonable assurance that the flooding will not result in a release from the gaseous waste management system, then SNC should document the results of its evaluation of the dose consequences and acceptance criteria for a release of radioactive material.

Billy William (Billy) Gleaves Senior Project Manager Licensing Branch 4 Office OWFN 8H17 US NRC, Office of New Reactors The contents of this message may be sensitive.  If this message has been received in error, please delete it without reading it. Your receipt of this message is not  intended to waive any applicable privilege. Do not disseminate this message  without the permission of the author. Communications by this author are not  binding on The Commissio

Junk Plant Grand Grand Gulf: Crashes to 27%

Update Dec 22 

40%

Update Dec 21

Startling increase of power from yesterday...three times the rate of increase from yesterday. Now we are on the way. Increasing three percent to 30% power. 

Update Dec 20

A day later, a 1% increase in power. 

Been mostly stuck at 60% power for the last few days, then crashes to 27%. Just came out of a outage?

Junk and Dangerous Grand Gulf: Screaming Up In Power To 25% Today

Dec 13: NRC Senate Hearing

Update: 

Tom Carper Admitted to Hitting His Wife in 1998 Interview

Senate Hearing

For years, the NRC was the Best Place To Work . Today eleven agencies are better than the NRC. It is a dramatic decline.

In last two years, NRC employees declined by 12%. Is the "Best Place to Work" decline related to this?

USC report on NRC's safety Culture.

Project Aim terminating early? Right sizing (secret deregulation).

Low wholesale price of electricity causing most of the troubles in industry.

( Waiting for the, what happened to the Summer construction plant and it Vogtle plant going to sink like them )

(I feel information to the Commissioner are stoved piped and controlled. All these guys are is politician and have very little experience and knowledge. So why doesn't the senate hear testimony from the EDO, region heads and resident inspectors. I feel the senators are so frighten of the utilities, they gild the lilies with allowing real sharing of information. So everyone's interest is to soften the testimony.)

(I find it horrible the commissioner weren't ready to talk fully about the Clinton Uranium issues. We pay these guys to stay abreast of current issues.)

Aim and budget cuts have effected NRC moral. (Baron) It has been a challenging times.

GAO: NRC has two sets of budgets? One for public consumption and other internal.

What a joke question? Did Fukushima cost in USA cause the end of Summer? Did the low cost of natural gas cause the failure of Summer? Why didn't Carper ask if the NRC was implicated in the demise of the Plants? (Carper)

Carper: Is their anything we (committee) can do here the to help you do your jobs better. Then nothing but stroking the committee.

Clinton's Loss Of Their Div 1 Safety Bus..Identicle To Grand Gulf?

Another Div 1 transformer killing an important safety bus. It is the same bus and transformer as Grand Gulf. Is this a coincidence. If Grand Gulf was at 100% with their loss of  the Div 1 bus, they would have had a scam. They were just lucky to be a low power.

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION
 December 13, 2017
 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-III-18-001
 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance.  Some of the information may not yet be fully verified or evaluated and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.
 Facility Clinton Power Station, Unit 1  Exelon Generation Co., LLC Clinton, IL Docket No.: 05000461 License No.: NPF-62 Licensee Emergency Classification       Notification of Unusual Event       Alert       Site Area Emergency       General Emergency   X  Not Applicable

SUBJECT:   UNPLANNED SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO THE DIVISION 1 480 VOLT ALTERNATING CURRENT (VAC) BUS

On December 9, 2017, at 1347 CST, the Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, received numerous alarms in the control room indicating a loss of power to the Division 1 480 VAC bus.  Plant operators responded to the alarms and indications for the loss of power and scrammed the reactor in accordance with their procedures. 

The Division 1 480 VAC bus provides power to numerous safety systems at the plant.  The redundant Division 2 480 VAC bus remained available and operable throughout the event.  The plant is currently in a stable condition.  There was no impact on public health and safety.  

Following the plant shutdown, licensee personnel began investigation to the cause of the event and identified a ground fault in the Division 1 480 VAC transformer.   The licensee plans to start up the unit later this week after the faulted transformer is replaced.

The resident inspector responded to the control room to monitor plant parameters and licensee actions.  The NRC resident staff continues to monitor licensee actions of the repair activities.

The State of Illinois has been informed.

This preliminary notification is issued for information only.

The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee, and is current as of 4pm on December 12, 2017.

Dangerous Junk Plant Grand Gulf: Another Delayed Startup, A Host Broken Equipment and Chaos In The Control Room

Update

Dec 11 4% power: came out of refueling outage.

Dec 12 19%

Dec 13 14% core cooling safety bus failure and multiple equipment problems. 

***Basic licensed training cautions us from prolonged operation at low power levels(1-100%). The moderator void coefficient is less efficient in the low power area, than up at 100%. In other words, in the low power area, there will be less of a designed automatic feedback fuel protection mechanism than in the high power area.   


It seems a core cooling safety transformer or breaker failed beginning at 9:18. 

Then an additional core cooling system (RCIC) failed over valve issues.  

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53115
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: RYAN MEYER HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 12/12/2017 Notification Time: 17:40 [ET] Event Date: 12/12/2017 Event Time: 09:18 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	16	Power Operation	16	Power Operation

Event Text

AUTOMATIC START OF EDG DUE TO LOSS OF ESF TRANSFORMER "At approximately 0918 CST on Tuesday, December 12, 2017, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a loss of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Transformer 11 which was powering the Division 1 ESF bus. Subsequently, the station experienced an automatic start of the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG], partial isolation of the primary and secondary containment buildings and the isolation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System [RCIC]. "It is not currently understood why the RCIC system isolated during this event. A team is investigating this issue separately from the loss of the ESF 11 transformer. "The cause of the event is under investigation at this time. "No other issues or unexpected events occurred. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

Then approximately 4 hours later a div 3 safety battery is questioned over connectivity issues. My guess this came from a annunciator alarm in control room. I wonder if the div 3 charger was power from div 1bus. I think the div 3 charger is powered from the div 1 bus. Basically I think losing the div 1 bus took out the div 3 charger when the transformer failed that went unnoticed for four hours. This made core spray broken.

The gist of this is look at all the safety systems we lost in a short time

A enormously important bus and transformer.

A host of important primary and secondary partial isolations.    

RICI 

and one side of core spray

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53117
Facility: GRAND GULF Region: 4 State: MS Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: WESLEY MARSHALL HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 12/12/2017 Notification Time: 20:34 [ET] Event Date: 12/12/2017 Event Time: 13:30 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/12/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	15	Power Operation	15	Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE "At approximately 1330 CST on Tuesday, December 12, 2017, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station declared Division 3 'C' Battery inoperable due to questions concerning battery terminal connection continuity. Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating, Condition E, Required Action E.1, requires the station to declare the High Pressure Core Spray System inoperable immediately. The Division 3 'C' Battery and High Pressure Core Spray System was declared operable and the LCOs [Limiting condition of operation] were declared met at 1731CST on Tuesday, December 12, 2017. Based on field measurements of terminal torque and resistance, the as-found and as-left terminal resistance micro-ohm readings indicated satisfactorily all times. Formal evaluation of the as-found condition of the battery is in progress. "This report is to notify the NRC of a loss of safety function on the High Pressure Core Spray System." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

Junk Plant Watts Bar 2 Fortuitous Scram Report Today

So why is a northern boy interested on this particular plant and at this point and time? The below document was not publically available until this morning. 

My two Watts Bar 2 blog articles were written about at 5 and 6pm yesterday. 

The trip also occurred yesterday at 8:59am.

The official big dogs are closely going to be securitizing the timing of this all. Either I am a prophet or somebody called me up?

I called the two officials (NRC/TVA) identified in the document Watts Bar Unit 2 MSPI Effectiveness Date submitted on my blog. Explained my problems. The MSPI document is Watts Bars trying to be exampled from the ROP performance Indicator system because they are a new plant. Generally they blame initial startup issues on getting the bugs out of a new plant (bathtub curve). My theme is all the plant trips, scrams and down powers comes from construction related incompetence, poor quality workmanship and components. The Plant and TVA needs another kick in the ass to straighten up. They need the full force of the ROP and MSPI to be applied to the plant and it's resultant documentation and inspections.

My theme is TVA is trying to fraudulently gain exemption from the MSPI to April 1, 2018. As example, TVA blames the collapse of main condenser as construction issue in the 1970s, implying our new construction guys and quality processes are exempt from accountability leading to plant operations today.  

As far as the Fort Calhoun simulations justifying this all, none of this is facts or science based. It seem this guys can come up with any computer crack pot simulation based on nothing justifying anything they want.

The nice Watts Bar 2 senior resident reminded me the main condenser is not a safety related system. "We don't spend much time on these systems", he said. But is it really a balance of plant system, it is more a intermediate system between safety and balance of plant non safety system. If the main condensers is available, then you don't test the safety cooling system. I'll make the case TMI emerged from broken or degraded non safety systems that cascaded into a nuclear event.      

Power Reactor	Event Number: 53112
Facility: WATTS BAR Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 12/11/2017 Notification Time: 11:06 [ET] Event Date: 12/11/2017 Event Time: 08:57 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/11/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	M/R	Y	97	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP IN RESPONSE TO INDICATION OF MULTIPLE DROPPED CONTROL RODS "While operating at 97% power, the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped at 0857 EST on December 11, 2017 due to multiple dropped control rods. All control and shutdown bank rods inserted properly in response to the manual reactor trip. All safety systems including Auxiliary Feedwater actuated as designed. The plant is stable with decay heat removal through Auxiliary Feedwater and the Steam Dump System. "The cause of the dropped rods is being investigated. "The manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is being reported as a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified for this event."