Clinton: Junk NRC Legacy Issues

What caused this is the NRC shouldn’t never have a word like campaign contribution “legacy issue in” their NRC dictionary or anywhere in their regulatory regime…

 

What I see on the broad picture; is many plants don't have the energy, resources and money to understand what is going on in their plant.  

SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION – NRC SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2016008 ANDASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Your staff identified the primary root cause of the issue to be less than adequate legacy procedures used to develop plant modification change packages. Specifically, the legacy procedures contained an inadequate process to identify the need for further reviews and the level of design detail required by those reviews. In addition, your staff’s evaluations identified the apparent cause of the Division 3 SX pump failure to be a failure of those legacy procedures to maintain design control, resulting in application of a hardfacing material to the sleeves that lost integrity and delaminated under normal system operating conditions, causing greater sleeve to bushing friction, which increased temperatures and resulted in bushing failure. Your staff’s evaluations also identified the following contributing causes for the issue: (1) the original pump 1SX01PC had incorrect design specifications; (2) station management failed to provide effective corrective actions to address known equipment deficiencies; (3) suspended silt in the process fluid (lake water) that interacted with the pump internals resulted in higher operating temperatures and was anticipated to accelerate the effects of the apparent cause identified; (4) the operational profile that CPS used on the 1SX01PC pump contributed to fatigue and eventual delamination of hardfacing due to the frequent start/stop cycles; and (5) corrosion of sleeve materials may have contributed to crack propagation and hardfacing delamination.

Junk ANO: Massive NRC Inspection Discovers More Flooding Vulnerabilies

So this is the third one I mentioned last night. There just is no behavior changing deterrence going on here. It is just one special deal after another. Just remember, they had massive leaking flood barriers prior to the march 2013 event. The NRC did nothing to uncover the yellow finding on its own. They all had to wait for a 600 ton stator to  drop bursting a pipe for everyone to discover the leaking flooding seals. Bottom line, the NRC is complicit with campaign contribution insufficient oversight. How can they really hold Entergy fully accountable with oversight so broken. It is really a show trial or violation level. Remember it is highly likely the plants would have melted down if they would have had the design flood. Remember the deal here is to make Entergy spend a tremendous amount of money without any skin off the executives heads. What is really happening here, on a startling large level with tremendous amount money, the NRC is punishing the ratepayers and businesses with expensive 'recoveries" and financially weakening the industry. It is vastly cheaper to deal with leaking flood seals proactively instead of re-actively. 

You either use power as a tool of deterrence or create a bureaucracy that is so complicated that effectively their is no oversight.

What you are seeing at ANO is effectively a NRC show trial or slap on the wrist...it is collectively making the industry weaker and punishing the users of electricity.

I wonder how it works. Say the dropped stator and leaking seals cost $30 million dollars. Do they just charge the users of electricity $30 millions dollars plus a 12% rate of return? Imagine how much they can write off state and local taxes? It this just a money making venture in the big picture? 

So who pays, the scrap-goated little guy at the bottom who gets tagged with the violation and the users of electricity???

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51808
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR Region: 4 State: AR Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE NRC Notified By: RODRICK JOHNSON HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 03/19/2016 Notification Time: 22:51 [ET] Event Date: 03/19/2016 Event Time: 17:10 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP	Person (Organization): MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD CHALLENGE RHR EQUIPMENT DURING FLOOD CONDITIONS "Two (2) potentially degraded flood barriers at penetrations 0073-01-0034 and 0073-01-0063 were identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barriers are a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing, however, it is currently unknown if the aggregate of these two flood barriers could potentially overwhelm and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition. "Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern. "This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. "Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barriers. If required these seals can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE AT 0044 EDT ON 3/22/2016 FROM KEITH LEDBETTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * * "This is an 8 hour non-emergency supplemental notification to previously issued Event Notification number 51808. In EN 51808, two non-functional barriers were identified and reported, and during an extent of condition review, a third barrier has been identified that does not conform to expected flood barrier standards "A potentially degraded flood barrier at 'blockout' penetration 0073-01-9018 was identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barrier is a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing; however, it is currently unknown if this flood barrier could potentially be overwhelmed and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition. "Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern. "This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. "Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barrier. If required this seal can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified earlier in the evening that this event would be updated. Notified the R4DO (Haire).

Update:

I called the ANO senior resident. He said the 2013 findings haven't been cleared yet. ANO seemed to bring in a engineer to third verify all flooding violations were cleared. They don't know yet if the seals are degraded. The engineer discovered the three seals had absolutely no paperwork on them ever. ANO and the NRC never knew they were installed. The NRC never identified it. 

I asked, you had a battalion of NRC people in plant and doing massive inspections. How incompetent is the agency with not discovering it on your own. He says the NRC is investigating ANO and the NRC itself.      

I mean really, how can these guys have any credibility? Entergy spent massive resources on the plant over this and then the intensive inspection...then new failed flooding seals.

Don't tell me, the stator drop accident, it wasn't a accident, and the flooding multiple yellow findings, knowing these guys, they cleared out all the yellow findings...the new flooding violations are going to start with a clear state.

Did Entergy strategically push the discovery of the flooding violation to after  the close-out of the 2013 events?

March 21, 2016 CONTACT: Victor Dricks, 817-200-1128

NRC To Hold Public Meeting on Arkansas Nuclear One

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will meet in Russellville, Ark., on April 6 with representatives of Entergy Operations to discuss the 2015 safety performance of Arkansas Nuclear One as well as the results of a comprehensive inspection. The plant is located in Russellville.

The meeting, which will be open to the public, is scheduled to begin at 6 p.m. in the Reeves E. Richie Training Center, 1448 S.R. 333, Russellville. The public is invited to observe the meeting and will have an opportunity to ask questions or make comments after the business portion of the meeting is concluded.

A letter sent from the NRC Region IV office to plant officials addresses the performance of the plant during 2015. Current performance information for the plant can be found on the NRC website.

“By assessing each plant’s performance in a comprehensive manner, we are able to focus our inspection resources on those areas most in need of attention,” NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas said. “Overall, the plant operated safely in 2015. However, Arkansas Nuclear One is receiving the highest level of NRC oversight because of the significance of previously issued inspection findings.”

Specifically, in June 2014, the NRC issued yellow findings to Arkansas Nuclear One in connection with a 2013 heavy equipment handling incident at the plant. In January 2015, the NRC issued yellow findings associated with degraded flood protection at the plant.

Why should this plant even be running. Bet you the dropped 600 ton stator inspection team prodded Entergy to uncover this. So its three years after discovering the flooding vulnerabilities, now they keep uncovering more bun flooding seals.

They should have gotten a red finding and forced to shutdown for a year or more. Made them double check all the seals. The incentives to keep their plant according to plant licensing just isn't there...a tough  regulator who make the corporation's knees tremble in fear.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51808
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR Region: 4 State: AR Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE NRC Notified By: RODRICK JOHNSON HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO	Notification Date: 03/19/2016 Notification Time: 22:51 [ET] Event Date: 03/19/2016 Event Time: 17:10 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP	Person (Organization): MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD CHALLENGE RHR EQUIPMENT DURING FLOOD CONDITIONS "Two (2) potentially degraded flood barriers at penetrations 0073-01-0034 and 0073-01-0063 were identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barriers are a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing, however, it is currently unknown if the aggregate of these two flood barriers could potentially overwhelm and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition. "Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern. "This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. "Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barriers. If required these seals can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE AT 0044 EDT ON 3/22/2016 FROM KEITH LEDBETTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * * "This is an 8 hour non-emergency supplemental notification to previously issued Event Notification number 51808. In EN 51808, two non-functional barriers were identified and reported, and during an extent of condition review, a third barrier has been identified that does not conform to expected flood barrier standards "A potentially degraded flood barrier at 'blockout' penetration 0073-01-9018 was identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barrier is a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing; however, it is currently unknown if this flood barrier could potentially be overwhelmed and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition. "Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern. "This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. "Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barrier. If required this seal can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified earlier in the evening that this event would be updated. Notified the R4DO (Haire).

TVA Intimidating Control Room Employees

NRC Schedules Meeting with TVA to Discuss Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Work Environment

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has scheduled a meeting for Tuesday, March 22, with Tennessee Valley Authority officials to discuss the work environment within the operations staff at the Watts Bar nuclear power plant near Spring City, Tenn., about 60 miles southwest of Knoxville.

The NRC began a review into the work environment at the Watts Bar plant in late 2015 and found that some operations employees did not feel free to raise safety concerns. In addition, there were indications that licensed operators may have received undue influence and direction from TVA staff outside the control room.

“It is extremely important that all nuclear plant employees feel free to raise safety issues with their managers and with the NRC without fear of retaliation,” said NRC Region II Administrator Cathy Haney.

While the work environment issues did not lead to any events that affected worker or public safety, the NRC is still reviewing some actions to determine if any NRC regulations were violated.

The meeting is scheduled at the NRC Region II office, 245 Peachtree Center Avenue in Atlanta. The meeting will begin at 1 p.m. and it is open to the public.

During the meeting, the NRC will discuss with TVA its review of the work environment at the plant, and TVA officials are expected to discuss steps they have taken or are planning to address the issues.

The meeting is between the NRC and TVA, but the NRC staff will be available after the business portion of the meeting to answer questions or provide additional information.

Dems and Repubs: Drastic Decline of Favorability with Nuclear Power During Last Year

Excepts from the media so far:

"For the first time since Gallup first asked the question in 1994, more Americans oppose the use of nuclear energy to generate electric power than support it. More than half of those surveyed, 54%, oppose the use of nuclear power, compared with 44% that support its continued use."

"According to a new Gallup poll, 54 percent of Americans now oppose nuclear energy. This is up a startling 11 percentage points from just last year when 43 percent said they were opposed."

My bad, independents were polled by Gallup.

Submitted the the NRC blog:

You guys better knock off talking about unimportant happyland events like moving irradiators in Alaska. You need to start talking about the mindboggling enormous decline in Gallup’s public favorability with nuclear power within the last year and beginning in 2010. Most starling of all, your BFF the Republicans, the one year decline in their favorability to you is the most pronounced in a bad direction of the lot? They don’t poll the latest political affiliation of them all, the independents? How do you think they went? How are the politicians going to use this information to their advantage? 

How are the industry and NRC employees going to take advantage of this trend? Some say it is already beginning with the internal disagreements…The Arkansas Nuclear One “one” and the NRC “seven”? 

What kind of stampede event will it take to turn the rest of the good Americans away from your Industry? Is your risk significant system really going to protect you from this? You are fixated on the broken campaign contribution “risk determination system” as your ship is sinking? 

Guys, here comes the great re-regulations??? 

My evaluation on the Gallup poll? 

“Dems and Repubs: Drastic Decline of Favorability with Nuclear Power During Last Year” 

http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2016/03/dems-and-repubs-drastic-decline-of.html 

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH

I think its related to a drastic decline in favorability of our institutions. All the depressing news of plant shutdowns and plant problems. The people just don't trust and admire the industry. The plants don't reflect modernity and a bright future.

Check it out, the favorability changed the most in a negative trend in the last year is the Republicans. The fallacy in Gallup is they don't take in consideration the largest political affiliation in the USA the Independents. Which way do you think the Indipendants went?   

Check out the mindboggling decline of favorability beginning in 2010 from a very positive 64% to today of 44%? The decline in gas prices are a new phenomena. In 2010 when the decline of favorability  gas prices were startling high. Fukushima occurred in 2011. The acceleration to the dump is picking up speed.

I think a giant explosive device has been lit under the nuclear industry. We are just waiting for a sufficient incident to stampede the rest of the good people out of the industry.

It won't take long for the politicians to take advantage if this.

For First Time, Majority in U.S. Oppose Nuclear Energy

by Rebecca Riffkin

Story Highlights

• 54% of Americans oppose nuclear energy, 44% in favor
• First time in Gallup's trend that majority oppose nuclear energy
• Both major parties less likely to favor nuclear energy than in 2015

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- For the first time since Gallup first asked the question in 1994, a majority of Americans say they oppose nuclear energy. The 54% opposing it is up significantly from 43% a year ago, while the 44% who favor using nuclear energy is down from 51%.

 

Gallup asks Americans as part of its annual Environment poll if they favor or oppose the use of nuclear energy as one way to provide electricity. Each year from 2004 to 2015, a majority of Americans said they favored the use of nuclear energy, including a high of 62% in 2010.

In 2011, Gallup conducted its annual Environment poll a few days before the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster in Japan, and at that time, 57% of Americans were in favor of nuclear energy. The next time the question was asked in 2012, a similar majority still favored the use of nuclear energy. 

And although there have not been any major nuclear incidents since Fukushima in 2011, a majority of U.S. adults now oppose nuclear energy. This suggests that energy prices and the perceived abundance of energy sources are the most relevant factors in attitudes toward nuclear power, rather than safety concerns prompted by nuclear incidents.
Lower gasoline prices over the past year are likely driving greater opposition toward the use of nuclear power. As Americans have paid less at the pump, their level of worry about the nation's energy situation has dropped to 15-year-low levels. This appears to have resulted in more Americans prioritizing environmental protection and fewer backing nuclear power as an alternative energy source. 

Democrats and Republicans Less Likely to Favor Nuclear Energy 

Republicans continue to be more likely than Democrats and independents to be in favor of nuclear energy. Still, support for the use of nuclear energy among Republicans and Democrats has declined in comparison to 2015. A slight majority of Republicans, 53%, are in favor of nuclear energy, down significantly from 68% last year. One in three Democrats, 34%, favor it, down from 42% in 2015. Independents' support is essentially unchanged from last year, but is down from the high Gallup found in 2010.

In previous years, as many as three in four Republicans were in favor of nuclear energy, peaking at 76% in 2009. The percentage of Democrats favoring nuclear energy also reached its high the same year, at 54%. Independents have typically been less likely than Republicans to favor nuclear energy but have usually been more likely than Democrats to favor it, particularly in recent years. 

Bottom Line 

Gas prices have been relatively low over the past year, likely because of the sharp decline in oil and natural gas prices and the apparent glut of oil around the world. This seems to have lessened Americans' perceptions that energy sources such as nuclear power are needed. The increased opposition to nuclear power does not seem to result from a fear of it, as there have been no major nuclear disasters anywhere in the world since 2011. 

Nuclear power plants are expensive to build, often costing billions upfront, although they require relatively low maintenance costs once they are running. And nuclear energy has lower greenhouse gas emissions than other power sources, especially coal, so it is considered a clean provider of electricity. Still, nuclear energy is a bet that the cost over time of coal or natural gas to power an electric plant will be higher than the upfront cost of building a nuclear reactor. And at a time when oil prices are low, it seems Americans are not in favor of making that bet. 

Historical data are available in Gallup Analytics. 

Survey Methods 

Results for this Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted March 2-6, 2016, with a random sample of 1,019 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is ±4 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. All reported margins of sampling error include computed design effects for weighting.
Each sample of national adults includes a minimum quota of 60% cellphone respondents and 40% landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using random-digit-dial methods

Junk Plant Palisades Structured Normalization of Devience (NOD) With SG Cracks

New NRC Inspection report: "the licensee identified new tube degradation mechanisms and implemented adequate extent of condition...

Just think of the number deviances a end of life plant builds upon by the time of death. How about a host of plants like this. Steam Generators should be kept in new pristine conditions.

Palisades was commissioned in 1971. They replaced their defective SGs “21” years later in 1992. From 1992 to today is 24 years. It is clear as a bell they should be replaced.

Remember these guys are mostly behind feet of concrete most of their lives. They are in a self-created high radiation level. It is not like you could dissemble the SG and closely inspect the cracked tubes. Then replace the tubes at will. Right, we are really talking about an experiment here.

Right, if they had to replaced the SGs, they would shutdown the plant before they spent that kind of money.

I think we are heading for a tube break or worst. You get in a serious accident putting tremendous stress on the 40% cracked tubes and they would burst. Maybe more than one would burst. In the scheme of the condition of our nation, outsiders would consider it a core meltdown. For the industry in its fragile condition, it would be marginally less worse than Fukushima. It would turn into media circus. Remember the black hole organizations and governments surrounding the lead in the water in Flint Michigan. Basically the organization have so much corrupt power they can control all the information on the development of the issues. Basically we have all turned into unthinking slaves of the system. Is the nuclear industry like the walking dead government organizations surrounding Flint Michigan. You get it, basically infinite and unobtainable triplicate proof a danger point is approaching is needed for action. But no matter if damaged or dead children show up, it never enough proof lead is there and dangerous. It is a government and the population at large, who is too insecure and intimidated to act to protect themselves.    

***Over time, these cracks can be expected to become more and more extensive, necessitating more extensive inspections of the lower tubesheet region and more extensive tube plugging or repairs. Increasing the number of SG tubes plugged reduces the heat removal capability of the SGs, resulting in the potential for shortening the useful lifetime of the SGs.

This LAR is about lengthening the life of the steam generator, not increasing safety with the plant.

***The cracked and broken reactor coolant pump blades, I still worry about. It is all NOD. 

You get the gist of Flint Michigan and our rich elites: the governments walk around in a severely wounded condition.They are too terrified of the elites to acts. Like I have been saying for years, the rich elites are increasing regulating the NRC inspectors through the campaign contributions congress....basically self regulation for the bad actors.

Just think about in recent years how many botched CDRMs jobs there has been at this plant. I am telling in our national condition, I wouldn't trust any engineering evaluation.        

License Amendment Request - Revision to the Requirements for Steam Generator Tube Inspections and Repair Criteria inthe Cold Leg Tube Sheet Region

The industry need for steam generator (SG) alternate repair criteria (ARC) license amendments, for plants with Alloy 600TI tubing, started with the initial findings at Catawba Unit 2, in the fall of 2004. Other nuclear plants with Alloy 600TI tubing had found crack-like indications in tubes within the tubesheet as well. Most of the indications were found in the tack expansion region near the tube-end welds and were a mixture of axial and circumferential primary water stress corrosion cracking. Over time, these cracks can be expected to become more and more extensive, necessitating more extensive inspections of the lower tubesheet region and more extensive tube plugging or repairs. Increasing the number of SG tubes plugged reduces the heat removal capability of the SGs, resulting in the potential for shortening the useful lifetime of the SGs. To avoid these impacts, the affected licensees and their contractor, Westinghouse, developed proposed alternative inspection and repair criteria applicable to the tubes in the lowermost region of the tubesheets. These criteria, for CE SGs, are referred to as the C* criteria. The C* distance is the minimum engagement distance between the tube and tubesheet, measured downward from the top of the tubesheet (TIS), that is proposed as needed to ensure the structural and leakage integrity of the TTS joints. The proposed C* alternate repair criteria would exclude the portions of tubing below the C* distance from inspection and plugging requirements, on the basis that flaws below the C* distance are not detrimental to the structural and leakage integrity of the TIS joints.

Requests for permanent ARC amendments were proposed for a number of plants as early as 2005. PNP was part of this population, receiving an ARC amendment for the hot leg portion of the SG tubesheet on May 31,2007 (Reference 4). Subsequently, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, or the Commission) staff identified a number of issues, associated with H*…

***Add a SG tube inspection provision in TS 5.5.S that is applicable when the alternate repair criteria, proposed above, is implemented. This complements the proposed cold leg ARC by expanding the inspection population to 100% of the cold leg inservice tubes while limiting the inspection depth to the C* length of 12.5 inches below the bottom of the cold-leg expansion transition or top of the cold-leg tubesheet, whichever is lower.

 

***Add a SG tube inspection reporting requirement to TS 5.6.S for tube slippage monitoring, discovery, and corrective actions. This will provide defense in depth by continued monitoring to ensure that SG tube slippage is not occurring, as predicted by the C* analyses. Then, if unexpected slippage is discovered, the requirement ensures that a proper evaluation of the occurrence and corrective actions are taken.

Fiery Junk Plant Oconee Main Transformer, Switchyard and Lines

They will talk about the safety consequences, but they never really disclosed what strategy set the system up for failure? Is this guy giving us the real picture?

Remember the 'Andrea Gail' had to take bigger and bigger chances driven by poor catches and financial pressures.

"We just replaced the unit 2, spent some big bucks did a very good job, we are actually using the unit 2 as the spare,

Electrical Engineer
Oconee Nuclear Station

Sorry to hear about it.
Hopefully it is fixable and easy to implement.

I was noticing plants were cutting back $, manpower.  I was seeing them cutting corners and changing priorities.

My fear was they were cutting back on the safety systems.  And some of the worse part was what they were doing with the $ they saved.

:
Yep. That was us, huge deal, resources are thin, it has our focus."

Reposted from 3/7/2016

The Perfect Storm:


If Oconee and the NRC allowed the Oconee switchyard lines to swing in the breeze until failure, are they treating similar equipment in the same manner?

This is going to start as a NRC Special Inspection.

Because of the unprecedented 2.206 by NRC electrical engineer officials, do you think for one moment this facility is going to be treated normally?

In the vernacular, this is called extremely infrequent Perfect Storm...    

Power Reactor	Event Number: 51770
Facility: OCONEE Region: 2 State: SC Unit: [1] [2] [3] RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP NRC Notified By: ARCHIE NEWBERRY HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	Notification Date: 03/06/2016 Notification Time: 16:09 [ET] Event Date: 03/06/2016 Event Time: 15:20 [EST] Last Update Date: 03/06/2016
Emergency Class: ALERT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL	Person (Organization): CATHY HANEY (R2RA) BILL DEAN (NRR) BILL GOTT (IRD) MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
3	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY DECLARATION DUE TO FIRE/EXPLOSION IN THE MAIN TRANSFORMER At 1512 EST, a fire/explosion occurred in the Unit 1 Main Transformer which resulted in a reactor trip. At 1520 EST, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event. Offsite assistance was requested. At 1633 EST, smoke and flame were no longer visible. Fire brigade personnel were applying additional foam to prevent a re-flash. No personnel injuries occurred. Offsite assistance was requested with three local fire departments responding. All rods inserted on the trip. Steam generator feed is by the normal path. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWS and Nuclear SSA via email. * * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1711 EST ON 03/06/16 * * * At 1658 EST, the licensee declared an Alert based on EAL Alert A.1. The cause of entry was that the fire damaged an overhead power line that supplies emergency power to all three units at Oconee. Offsite power is still available to all units. At 1708 EST, the fire is declared out. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email. * * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1805 EST ON 03/06/16 * * * The licensee made notification of the RPS actuation as a result of the transformer fault. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes). * * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2026 EST ON 03/06/16 * * * At 2016 EST, the licensee terminated all emergency declarations. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Morris), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email.

Indian Point 2.206: Runaway Main Steam Safety Valve Breakdowns Beginning In 2009

I wonder what happened to it? Did I miss the notification in my heavy e-mail traffic. It would be the first time ever I made that mistake. Maybe it just hasn't gone through the beast yet.

Reposted from Feb 4, 2016

Feb 04, 2016

Victor M. McCree

Executive Director for Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: Runaway Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Tech Spec lift Setting Failures at Indian Point since 2009. 

 

Dear Mr. McCree, 

Why is the NRC sleeping at the switch? I request a 2.206 petition at Indian Point.  

Why has there been an astonishing increase in Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint drift testing failures beginning in 2009? There seems to be none before 2009. Why did these failures begin in 2009…considering all corrective actions and processes at the site.  It continues today unabated. It is like they caught some mysterious disease and there is no cure. These valves being opened cool the core and control steam generator pressure.

Shearson Harris mysterious began having similar failures. Two valves fail in 2013 and in the most current LER five valves failed. They have a similar clean record before 2013.  Why has this mysterious problem popped up from nowhere and the failure rate has been drastically increased as time goes on? Why can’t these two plants get control of this problem?

There seems to be vibrations issues. An odd assortment of internal parts degradations seems to be the culprit. What new has changed in both these plants to cause the internal parts to fail? I am particularly irked by pressurizer safety internal coil or spring being stretched. It reminds me of the test stand damage seen a Pilgrim before installation. It is known, when most of these guys fails lift setpoint and out of federal tolerance, they just adjust the setting back to acceptable Tech Spec limits. They don’t do any further inspection or proactive or preventative maintenance?    

No doubt this in happens at many plants.

What is the concern to me the most, is there is no new “Information notices” on SRVs, MSSVs and pressurizer valves degradation or failures? We know the LERs really only capture-report on a small proportion of the valve problems. Your industry wide trends and information are not being kept up to date on these components. Your NRC notices are grossly out of date (most of them a decade out of date or more) on the components and these licensees are constantly referencing these grossly out of date notices in the current LERs.  

You would think a nuclear plant having problems like this would go the market to get a better/ reliable design and up to date components new. Is Indian Point have problems with component replacement and can they buy sufficient valve new internals?  

1)      Request an immediate special inspection on the magnitude of the valves involved and the constant recurrence of these failures. These guys have constantly said in each LER the problem is solved. If they can’t keep these valves operable, then both plants shouldn’t be operating. I am sure NY state would agree with me.

2)      Please create a new NRC Information notice on the failures of the valve and the organization.

3)      I request Indian Point immediately eradicate any problems with their MSSV up to and including a shutdown. They are controlled by technical specifications.  

    

The involved LERs at Indian Point below. Why did it start in 2009…what has changed?

LER 2015-002-01

LER 2012-003-02

LER 2012-005-01

LER 2011-004-00

LER 2010-002-00

LER 2009-002-00

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan

Hinsdale, NH

16032094206

steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

cell 1-603-209-4206

NEISO Electricity Cost $-150 Dollars this Morning

I wonder if it is related to daylight savings. Certainly Sunday is a low load day and  we've been have abnormally warm weather in the last few weeks.

It is like a gas station will pay to you $15.00 dollars a gallon to put their gas into your car?

Junk Nuclear Safety Authority: Court Orders Shutdown of Plant

Court Orders One of Japan’s Two Operating Nuclear Plants to Shut Down 

By JONATHAN SOBLEMARCH 9, 2016 

TOKYO — A court in Japan ordered one of only two nuclear power plants operating in the country to shut down on Wednesday, citing insufficient safety measures put in place after meltdowns at a facility in Fukushima five years ago.

The plant, Takahama Nuclear Power Plant, had been back online for only two months after an extended freeze on atomic power in Japan in the aftermath of the March 2011 Fukushima disaster. 

Japan’s government and its power companies have struggled to get the nuclear industry back on its feet. Despite new safety standards introduced in 2013, much of the public remains wary. Only a handful of the more than 40 operable reactors in the country have met the new rules, and lawsuits have made it difficult to restart them. 

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government sees a revival of nuclear power as critical to supporting economic growth and slowing an exodus of Japanese manufacturing to lower-cost countries. Electricity prices have risen by 20 percent or more since the Fukushima disaster because of increased imports of fossil fuels, though the recent drop in oil prices has taken some of the pressure off. 

The court ruling on Wednesday added a new twist to the legal battles over nuclear power. 

Judges have enjoined idled plants from being put back into service, but the judgment against Takahama was the first in which a facility that had successfully been restarted was ordered to shut down. Takahama’s owner, Kansai Electric Power Company, brought one reactor at the facility back online in January and another last month. 

The court, which is in Otsu, Shiga Prefecture, said neither restart should have happened. It was responding to a request for an injunction filed by residents, who said the plant’s owner had underestimated the size of earthquakes that could strike the plant and had not made adequately detailed plans to evacuate people living nearby in case of an accident. 

Government safety regulators say Takahama meets Japan’s new safety guidelines, which address such issues. But the court ruled for the plaintiffs, saying there were “points of concern in accident prevention, emergency response plans and the formulation of earthquake models.”

Kansai Electric said it would appeal. It has won previous appeals against injunctions issued against its plants, including Takahama. The company overcame a separate lawsuit to bring the plant online in January. 

Takahama is in Fukui Prefecture, a stronghold for the atomic power industry that is home to 13 commercial reactors and that has earned the nickname Genpatsu Ginza, or Nuclear Alley. But the latest lawsuit was filed by residents of the neighboring Shiga Prefecture, who said they would be affected by radiation from a serious accident at Takahama. 

Radiation releases from the plant in Fukushima affected a wide swath of northeastern Japan. More than 100,000 residents were evacuated, and many are still unable or unwilling to return. 

A version of this article appears in print on March 10, 2016, on page A8 of the New York edition with the headline: Court Orders Nuclear Plant in Japan Shut Over Safety. 

Junk NRC Safety Culture: Whole NRC Electrical Dept Don't Trust Their Own Agency

Oconee is the "straw that broke the camel's back" plant event that made the "NRC seven" step out of the shadows. Personally I think the open short events emerged out of the poor design of the high voltage switchyards. Some switchyard lines and components are so important they can't be taken down for maintenance without disrupting plant safety, grid reliability or plant operation. Often we call this insanity. So the proper design of a switchyard would consist of every line and component in the switchyard having a secondary full capacity pathway of electricity, such that "disrupting plant safety, grid reliability or plant operation" is never a concern. So you could take down any component(deenergized it)on any whim and never be concerned by any time limit.

(I had the wrong link...its fixed now)

Brand New: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2016008AND 05000287/2016008

What is special and historic about the Oconee plant? If we listened to the leaking head issue (prior to Davis Besse) at this facility, we never would have had the Davis Besse "hole in the head" near miss. I am sure the "NRC seven" are sensitized about this event and its symbolism to the nuclear industry. I am sure they are thinking "never again" will we allow the NRC to slide down this low again.

The open short issue is all a function of the nuclear plants not being specifically designed for the extremely high capacity factors and the super short refueling outages. Chasing dollars on a poorly designed switchyard across a broad swath of power plants.

Personally I don't think core melt is going to come from a open short. This switchyard problem is all part of the higher level problem of organizationally structured and approved Normalization Of Deviance. It is going on all over the nuclear industry.     

Man, would this be a cool 2.206 pre-hearing to listen in on. Hope they publish the date and time. It would be way educational.

Why didn't these NRC professional engineers use these internal processes. I bet because these processes are't publicly transparent.

• Non-Concurrence Process

Employees may choose not to concur on any part of a document in which he or she has disagreed. In addition, employees may choose to use the Non-Concurrence Process and not concur on any part of a document undergoing review in which he or she has disagreed. The process allows employees to document their concerns early in the decisionmaking process, have their concerns responded to, and attach them to proposed staff positions or other documents to be forwarded with the position as it moves through the management approval chain.

• Differing Professional Opinions Program


The Differing Professional Opinion Program is a formal process that allows employees and contractors to have their differing views on established, mission-related issues considered by the highest level managers in their organizations, i.e., Office Directors and Regional Administrators. The process also provides managers with an independent, three-person review of the issue (one person chosen by the employee). After a decision is issued to an employee, he or she may appeal the decision to the Executive Director for Operations.

..................................................

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Executive Director for Operation

Washington,. DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: 2.206 Petition on Current Operating Nuclear Power Plants - Open Phase Conditions in Electric Power System Which Lead to Loss of, Safety. Functions Of .Both

Off sites and Onsite. Power Systems. (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)

I. SPECIFIC ACTIONS REQUESTED

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206 we are Submitting this Petition to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requesting immediate enforcement actions against the. Licensees of current operating nuclear power-plants. Specifically, we are requesting either (i) the-NRC issue Orders which require immediate corrective actions including compensatory measures to address the 'operability of Electric Power Systems in accordance with their Plant Technical Specifications, and to implement Class i E plant modifications in accordance with current NRC regulatory requirements and .staff guidance provided in .the references below; or (ii) issue Orders to immediately shutdown the operating nuclear power plants since the licensees are operating their facilities without addressing the significant design deficiency identified in NRC.

Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electric. Power System; and with inoperable, electric power systems in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.81 (typical).

11. BACKGROUND

Based on the Byron Station operating event, the staff issued U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Information Notice 2012-03, "Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System.," dated March 1, 2012. On July 27, 2012, the staff issued NRC Bulletin 2012-01,"Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System," to confirm that licensees comply with Title 1.0 of the Code of Federal Regulations, (10 CFR) Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing. of Production and Utilization Facilities," General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, "Electric Power Systems," or principal design criteria specified in the updated final safety analysis report, 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2), and 10 CFR 50.36. Specifically, the NRC requested licensees to provide •information by October 25, 2012, regarding (1) the protection scheme to detect and automatically respond to a single phase open circuit condition or high impedance ground fault condition on offsite power circuits,, and (2) the; operating configuration of engineered Safety features buses at power. The NRC staff has reviewed the information that NRC licensees provided and .the details of this review is documented in a Summary Report dated February 26, 2013. The staff determined that all nuclear facilities are susceptible to this design vulnerability except one plant and recommended that NRC takes prompt regulatory action.

III SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

At Byron, a failure to design the electric power system's protection scheme to sense the loss of a single phase between the transmission network and' the onsite power distribution system resulted in unbalanced voltage, at both engineered safety features. (ESF) buses (degraded offsite power system), trip of several safety-related pieces of equipment and the unavailability of the onsite electric power- system. This situation resulted in neither the onsite (emergency diesel generators) nor the offsite electric power system being able to perform its intended safety functions (i.e., to provide electric power to the ESF buses with sufficient capacity and capability to permit functioning of structures, systems and components (SSC) important to safety). buses. As a consequence, neither the onsite (emergency diesel generators) nor the offsite electric power system was able to perform its intended safety functions (i.e., to provide electric power to the ESF buses with sufficient capacity and capability to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety) to support safe shutdown of the plant.

The Byron event identified a vulnerability in the design of US and international, operating plants. The current design requires an accident signal to automatically connect the emergency core cooling systems to the preferred power source to mitigate the consequences of a design basis event. As such, if the preferred power source, has an undetected open phase-condition, redundant trains of electrical equipment (electric motors that drive the pumps and valves).could burn out in few minutes and therefore will not be available for safe shutdown, even after restoration of an operable power source. In some cases, individual protective schemes for specific loads may isolate the load. In such cases, manual actions, outside of control room, may be required to reset the protective device(s) and start the specific loads thereby delaying the response time assumed in accident analysis. Since a common degraded offsite power source can potentially degrade or disable both trains of the emergency core cooling system, the protection scheme must automatically initiate isolation of the degraded offsite power source and transfer the safety buses to the onsite or back up power source within the time period assumed in the accident analysis in accordance with codes and standards specified in NRC requirements 10 CFR 50.54 (jj) and 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) or 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3).

To-date, thirteen open phase events have been identified over the last fourteen years (both US and international). The most recent events occurred at Oconee Nuclear Station in December 2015 where two separate transformers required for safe shutdown, of three operating nuclear units were identified with open phase conditions. Since the transformers are common to one onsite and one offsite power source, both, power sources were rendered inoperable indicating that the lessons learned and manual compensatory actions implemented after the Byron Event were ineffective.

The NRC's Accident Sequence Precursor analysis for the. Byron event indicated the risk, Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP), as 1x10-4.

Operating experience indicates that open phase condition is a highly probable event with high consequence that results in common cause, failures of multiple accident mitigation systems and barrier integrity systems. It is a significant: safety concern since a design basis event concurrent with an open phase condition would in most cases result in the plant exceeding criteria Specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.46, “acceptance Criteria for emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors.”… 

…Therefore, both GDC .and pre-GOC nuclear power plants' current licensing basis require an onsite power system and offsite power system with adequate-capacity-and capability to mitigate design basis events, conditions, and, accidents. It also requires that if the offsite (preferred) power System cannot perform its intended safety function, the plant design is required to automatically transfer the. ES F buses and loads to the onsite power, system within the time. specified in the accident analysis (i.e., this is protective function and it has to meet the provisions of IEEE 279 or 603 as stated, before). The onsite power system is Class lE (safety-related), therefore, the current licensing basis for operating nuclear power, plants requires meeting single failure, redundancy, separation, and independence criteria. Any failure that causes failure or degradation of the offsite power system such open phase, undervoltage, and degraded voltage must be monitored, by the ESF bus and take automatic protective action to meet the Chapter 15 accident analysis assumptions. In addition, the onsite power system must also meet the protection system requirements, specified in NRC GDCs 20-24 or equivalent" principle design criteria specified in the UFSAR for pre-GDC plants.

As of this filing, the NRC has not informed licensees that they are not in compliance with applicable: regulatory requirements and their licensing and design basis for electric power systems.

Therefore, the licensing bases and design bases for all U.S nuclear power plants require that" both power offsite and onsite power systems must be operable and capable of supporting all design bases functions. In short, any failures in an offsite power system or onsite power system must not disable the safety functions of emergency core cooling and vital safety systems to protect the health and safety of the public, in addition, the onsite power system must be in compliance with the single failure criteria, redundancy, separation., and independence criteria :in accordance with NRC requirements 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) or (h)(3), and the codes and standards, requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.54 (jj).The actions requested by this petition will rectify the open phase design vulnerability identified in Bulletin 201.2-01 and provide reasonable assurance of public health and safety in accordance with the current NRC requirements.