Friday, January 29, 2016

Columbia Nuclear Plant and their new Whistleblower

(work in progress)

Honestly you want me to start talking to my buddy NRC inspectors? 
Mr. Sickinger,
The NRC heavenly monitors my blog looking for emerging problems at nuclear plants and they highly favor my advice.
 NRC: Proof I instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection”

“Columbia Nuclear Plant and their new Whistleblower”
I am a highly influential person with the NRC. The agency has created large inspections over just my say and I was heavily involved with the recent Pilgrim Plant problems heading towards a permanent plant shutdown. I live 2 miles from Vermont Yankee and they blame me for permanently shutting down the plant. I am pro-nuclear as strange as it sounds. The agency is really frightened I can see the big picture. I have many relationships with many NRC inspectors and higher NRC officials.
I saying if you get my name in your paper most likely the NRC will throw a big inspection at Columbia. Isn’t that in everyone’s interest?  The NRC knows I can read behind the line of Columbia’s NRC documents and I can make the agency miserable if I get involved in the agency’s process.   
I going to throw you a telephone call. You can call my anytime.
Sincerely
 
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH
cell
***1-603-209-4206

The danger to the NRC is with Columbia's whistleblower letter and what was documented in NRC 's inspection activities...you can contrast the differences. This is extraordinarily dangerous for the agency.  


This implies there has been a catastrophic breakdown in NRC regulatory oversight. Columbia is in region IV and  severely infected by the southern and western republican teabagger government hatters.  We got the gross failure of regulatory oversight in San Onofre and prolonged shutdown Fort Calhoun.

Outside safety experts like me have always been concerned with troubled plants drawing attention away from emerging troubled plants. The NRC withdrawing resources from the perceived good plants (but severely declining) to deal with other troubled plants. Improper NRC priorities and insufficient NRC resources leads to the NRC increasing becoming blinded and this impairment not seen by anyone. You can only see this  NRC impairment after a terribly destructive plant event. Davis Besse was this kind of accident. In the post accident investigation it was seen effectively the on site inspector became blinded to the decline of the plant. We all know post accident investigation FirstEntergy was managing Besse horrifically. What can blind the corporation and the NRC to a catastrophic industry credibility event like Davis Besse or San Onofre? I think this all comes a severely enforced particular corporate and NRC financial and self-interested ideology. Money and glory about safety. The population of the USA has become our enemies and our families and self survival are at stake. We for survival sakes have to do whatever it takes to keep our families many flowing.

Ongoing events in the industry. Their in a process of blinding themselves and us.
  • The natural gas fracting miracle. It is deflating the price of electricity and demand in general has been sluggish. Highly subsidized green electricity is doing the same. We are in once every hundred year storm over deflated electric price on the grid. These deflated prices are going to continue for decades.
  • The NRC is severely resourced restrained and undergoing profound budget cutting. This is drastically going to jack up their priorities systems. We think the corporations are politically and intentionally blinding NRC with this and making a lot of rules non-enforceable. We just don't have enough money to enforce all the rules. We don't have enough power to make a plant and corporation behave in the greater interest of our great nation.
  • Here is the industry's campaign contribution  and political arm (Nuclear Entergy Institute NEI) beginning to enforce a 30% industry wide budget cut. It is like they are blinding you in one eye. You get it, the nuclear industry and NRC are simultaneously undergoing profound and severe budgets cut. This is not going to end good. It is a process of blinding themselves. Inappropriate priorities, budget cutting and resource starvation is at the root of all the accidents in this industry. Gold dollars in the eyes of all the industry executives is at the bottom of this all.
I recently spoke to the new inspector at Fort Calhoun over their new inspection report. Basically they had water leaks damaging their emerging diesel generator through concrete ceiling and wall cracks. This went on since 2006. I can't see all the wasted resources and bureaucracy writing all the NRC inspection reports, internal work orders and bum corrective actions. These plants have in excess five million mechanical, electrical and electronic  components in the plant. Their procedures, licencing and bureacrocy is amazing complex. This is a massively complex machine. Increasing now a lot of the components don't have are a repair parts stream. The nuclear parts supplier and manufacturers   have long gone out of businesses. These guys are increasing dependant on reversing-engineering obsolete parts and the others are manufactured in the black hole of China. Basically in the prolonged leaking ceiling event at Fort Calhoun damaging a DG. This event eats a lot of bureaucracy. Survival in a massively complex machine is wholly dependant on a fixing a problem early and right the first time. You don't want to eat up bureaucracy by producing paperwork unproductively over keeping tract of degraded components. Right, five million components and parts in a nuclear plant with insufficient upkeep and maintenance, you end up with the magnitude of the new paperwork overwhelming the bureaucracy (the paperwork is electronic nowadays). It is a process that increasingly blinds the organization and  is creates massive disillusionment with all the troops. This is when large numbers is good employees lose tract of real reality and everyone then has a degradation or loss of plant "situation awareness". A nuclear plant then runs out of control.

I pushed the new Fort Calhoun NRC resident inspector...why didn't the NRC force Fort Calhoun to fix their leaking ceiling damaging a emergency diesel generator in 2006, 2009, 20014 and 2015. I told the inspector I pitied him as our congress and NRC doesn't give you the proper  tools and power to turn the bad actor licensees behavior around. I push him hard and the NRc should be given great credit for allowing me to speak to these inspectors. Remember massively complex machines and their bureaucracies. He reminded me the NRC is a sampling agency. It is the NRC's go-too excuse for not caring. The NRC inspector told me the NRC basically has only very limited onsite resources, so they only get a miniscule picture of the goings on in their plant (massively complex machines and bureaucracies). If the licensees hide problems to them it is only worst. In the tragic shutdown of San Onofre, in the after permanent shutdown of the two unit plant of the NRC over the defective steam generators...the plant inspectors and all the higher NRC executives spoke again and again about the "federal regulatory sampling philosophy" and their severe lack of regulatory resources at San Onofre. If we had money maybe we could have caught the defective steam generators before installation.

In some ways Fort Calhoun is worst than the average plant. The plant is owned  by tiny Omaha Public Power District and post NRC mandatory shutdown in 2011 the plant is managed and operated by Exelon. Can you begin to even imagine how how massively complex these two bureaucracies are? In many ways over this ceiling leak, I consider this a "cry for" help by the NRC staff at Fort Calhoun.

The NRC Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) has been using tremendous NRC resources  in recent years, They dropped a 600 ton stator in their turbine building and this killed one and injured eight. I believe they got three unprecedented yellow findings. Right now 50 NRC inspectors are at ANO doing the follow up inspection to the early 2013 event. Two of the yellow findings were over secretly covered-up..."we are a sampling agency"...flooding deficiencies  and violation discovered by accident with a the 600 ton stator severed service water pipes. It flooded the plant and flooding seals leaked like sieve. The NRC only enforces a small percentage of the known federal violations at a plant. Did the problem at Fort Calhoun (2011) and San Onofre 2012 steal NRC oversight resource from Columbia. I could make the case San Onofre stole NRC oversight resources from ANO causing the stator drop accident. Then San Onofre,ANO and Fort Calhoun stole or exhausted NRC oversight resources causing Columbia's present condition. Its like miniscule pellet particles through leaking fuel rods "flees" jumping serially from one employee to another employee( Insiders with massive fuel pin leaks will get what I am saying. Its an insider joke)    

In 1992 I was a licenced operator at Vermont Yankee. Vermont Yankee is very similar to my condition as Vermont Yankee. We had runaway budget priority problems and everyone including me had to tell lies to survive. The NRC was giving the plant way above  average grades and they had a pretty good capacity. I told the NRC VY is in deep trouble, the NRC brushed me off saying the NRC sees VY as a above average plant. All my plant buddies were talking how dangerous the plant was becoming. We had leaking fuel for many years and everyone was lying about the condition of safety equipment.  I got fed up with them all and god help me I was thinking about my young family. I wrote my concerns about the failed fuel and the increasing unreliable core cooling system. Said we are heading for a very serious accident if outsiders don't get involved. Sent my anonymous  concerns to the NRC, Vermont Govern Kunin and the head of the Vermont Public Service Board.Two months later I still anything at the plant from the NRC. Kunin and Vermont were supposed to be very liberal and anti-nuclear. It is all a facade. This when you begin to learn as a whistleblower, your friends and family can/are going to hurt you the most. The corporation can only fire and blackball you. So I came up with the bright idea of talking with the local anti nuclear. I told them I am a Vermont Yankee employee, I am a whistleblower...the plant is in a very dangerous condition. I said the employees are lying about the condition on a safety pump. I wrote a letter to the governor and she is siting on my information. I trust no one except you. They asked my how can they help. I said you need to accuse the governor of nuclear safety corruption for sitting on my letter I sent her. In a few days she was out on a podium speaking about receiving a anonymous letter from Vermont Yankee. The pump was stated in documents it was perfectly operable and functional, but Vermont discovered it actually was completely broken. I quickly was the talk of the news media and with my employee buddies at the plant. I told no one at the plant. The Governor demanded a NRC inspection...the agency denied her request at first. We then get a massive plant investigation, the state became heavily involved in VY and finally the NRC did their own investigation. A lot of investigative noise by governmental officials pressured by the news media and the plant was still perilously getting more dangerous during this process right under out feet. Believe me, I was the talk of the employees in this anonymous. They nicknamed the "anonymous alligator" who could jump out and eat their careers and family at any moment. About a year later we had the worst accident in the history of the plant. We got a plant scram, quickly got disconnected from the grid (LOOP)...then had a severe disturbance to the cooling water to the only remaining source of electricity to the plant. Both diesel generators had engine cooling water severely throttled to them. It scared the pants out of everyone at the plant.  A host of safety equipment broke or was discovered degraded in this LOOP. The control room crew was overwhelmed by the problems. That is when they set up the huge lying machine. They were so brazen with deception and and lying I became concerned my life was in jeopardy.  
Columbia Nuclear Plant And Their Whistleblower
The executive board of the region's only nuclear power plant agreed Wednesday to hire an independent investigator to look into whistleblower allegations that the plant's performance has steadily declined, that it ranks among the worst in the country and that management has been hiding those results from employees, the board and members of the public.
An anonymous letter attributed to employees was circulated to several board members and The Oregonian/Oregonlive in recent weeks. It suggests managers have been glossing over operational and potential safety problems at the plant and pushing to keep it online "at all costs."
The Columbia Generating Station is a 1,200-megawatt reactor located north of Richland, Washington. It is owned and operated by Energy Northwest, a public corporation that sells power at cost to public utilities in the Northwest.
Mike Paoli, a spokesman for Energy Northwest, said the industry performance scores referenced in the letter are proprietary, so he couldn't confirm or deny any specific information in the letter.
"Our performance is not at the bottom. The letter only provides a look at select measures," he said. "In some areas we are among the poorer performers. That was sent to you via the letter. In other areas, some just as important, we are among the top performers. In some areas we're in the middle."  
Critics have argued for years that Columbia Generating Station is an aging plant that poses safety risks to the region and no longer makes economic sense to operate given other sources of cheap power. The Bonneville Power Administration, whose public utility customers buy the plant's output, has said it continues to believe the plant is well-run and economical. In 2012, it was relicensed for an additional 20 years by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The reactor does have have a history of operational problems. It experienced a series of unplanned shutdowns in 2008 and 2009, and was subsequently rated as one of the two worst performing nuclear plants in the country by an independent, industry-funded group that tracks various operational and safety measures in the nation's nuclear fleet.
That review found deficiencies in human performance, leadership and equipment reliability, prompting the replacement of its management team and an aggressive push to improve performance.
For some time, the plant's ranking did apparently improve. But according to the anonymous letter, its electricity production relative to its capacity now ranks 91st out of 99 plants in the country. The letter says the plant's equipment reliability index, is the lowest or second-lowest in the industry. And despite a spate of recent problems, including a stuck valve in the reactor that may have contributed to fuel leaks in the fall, the letter said management has pushed to keep the plant running "at all costs," when the "conservative and safe decision would have been to shut the plant down and fix it correctly and safety."
The authors of the letter said the plant's overall score had slipped back into the bottom quartile in the ranking, and could now be near the bottom of that. 
 "Senior management continues to tell the organization and public how we are an excellent performing nuclear power plant while ignoring the precipitous fall of our industry standing by measures of reliability, equipment health and radiation protection," said the letter, which was circulated to various members of the board and became the center of board meeting discussion at its meeting in Lacey, Washington, on Wednesday.
Paoli said the author or authors of the letter were cherry picking statistics. "That's why context is needed, but it's protected, and it's not our information to give to the public. We are allowed to share it with employees, but we don't own it."
He said the plant had gone six years without an unscheduled shutdown, that it broke its monthly electricity-generation record in December and achieved a new record for continuous generation – 683 days – before entering its last refueling outage in May.
Some board members expressed frustration at Wednesday's board meeting that they were not informed of the deterioration in the plant's performance scores, however.
"It's a legitimate criticism that managers continued to say things were fine when they weren't," said Jim Malinowski, a board member and commissioner at Clark Public Utilities. Malinowski said he still has confidence in management and that he'd been assured by federal nuclear regulators that the plant was well operated. The real test would be whether managers could get the performance scores back into the first or second quartile and keep them there.
"It's good that members of the staff are asking these questions, and it's good that it's getting out on the table," he said. "Hopefully it will produce a good result."
Paoli said it became apparent at the board meeting that not all members fully understand the measures and charts being used by the chief executive and chief nuclear officer in briefings. But he said the
the executive board's decision to hire an independent investigator was not a validation of the issues raised in the letters they received.
"It's an endorsement of our nuclear safety culture that allows any employee to raise concerns with the certainty that their concerns will be taken seriously and fully addressed."
- Ted Sickinger 
tsickinger@oregonian.com

Thursday, January 28, 2016

Flint Mich Drinking Water: Quintessential Cascade Event


Image result for avalanche

This is what happens in an increasingly fragile system or systems with tremendous forces building up unseen and unperceived . You got maga tons of snow building up on a steep mountain incline and forces holding the snow flake glued to each other and the mountain are secretly weakening. An infinitesimally small force begins placing the massive pent up energy in motion and no power on this planet can stop the developing avalanche. It's the bane of all large hierarchical and centralized organizations. These avalanches go up hill.

Was Fukushima really a cascade accident?

No doubt the inflexibility of the Michigan Republican Conservative ideology played a role in the avalanche of many avalanches. And the indifference of the poor and weak themselves about themselves?

How do you explain the lack of actions by the feds and Obama?
When the Water Turned Brown
By ABBY GOODNOUGH, MONICA DAVEY and MITCH SMITHJAN. 23, 2016
FLINT, Mich. — Standing at a microphone in September holding up a baby bottle, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a local pediatrician, said she was deeply worried about the water. The number of Flint children with elevated levels of lead in their blood had risen alarmingly since the city changed its water supply the previous year, her analysis showed. 
Within hours of Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s news conference, Michigan state officials pushed back — hard. A Department of Health and Human Services official said that the state had not seen similar results and that it was working with a much larger set of data. A Department of Environmental Quality official was quoted as saying the pediatrician’s remarks were “unfortunate,” described the mood over Flint’s water as “near-hysteria” and said, as the authorities had insisted for months, that the water met state and federal standards.
Dr. Hanna-Attisha said she went home that night feeling shaky and sick, her heart racing. “When a state with a team of 50 epidemiologists tells you you’re wrong,” she said, “how can you not second-guess yourself?” 
No one now argues with Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s findings. Not only has she been proved right, but Gov. Rick Snyder publicly thanked her on Tuesday “for bringing these issues to light.” 
Nearly a year and a half after the city started using water from the long-polluted Flint River and soon after Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s news conference, the authorities reversed course, acknowledging that the number of children with high lead levels in this struggling, industrial city had jumped, and no one should be drinking unfiltered tap water. Residents had been complaining about the strange smells and colors pouring from their taps ever since the switch. 
Already this month, federal and state investigations have been announced, National Guard troops were distributing thousands of bottles of water and filters, and Mr. Snyder was calling for millions in state dollars to fix a situation he acknowledged was a “catastrophe.”…
It's the anniversary of the explosion in the space shuttle Challenger. This cascade accident cascaded into destroying the space shuttle Challenger. Basically these were obsolete ships being placed under increasing burdens with insufficient budgets. Basically our misplace priorities destroyed these ships. "Look up "Normalization of deviance"?  

It is basically a severe and a fatal organization mental disease. It numbs all the minds in the organization to reality. 
Fiery blast destroys space shuttle Challenger
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- The space shuttle Challenger exploded into a huge fireball moments after liftoff yesterday morning, killing all seven crew members, including Christa McAuliffe, the New Hampshire high school teacher who was to be the country’s first private citizen to orbit the Earth. 
As Challenger rose spectacularly off its launch pad into clear blue skies at 11:38 a.m., all appeared normal, and a crowd that included McAuliffe’s husband, two children and parents roared its approval.
Then, 75 seconds into the flight, as Challenger achieved full engine power for the thrust that would carry it into orbit, the spacecraft inexplicably exploded…

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

Fort Calhoun: Complete Breakdown in NRC Oversight Again

So here is the LER on this. With all these bum corrective actions and new ones, in 2014 and 2015 they discovered the floor coating twice cracking and a brand new leak in 2015. They are quailified running a nuclear.

Tell you how much value is a non cited violation, the NCV makes their knees tremble. 

How come no new LER on the new 2015 leak???

Licensee Event Report 2013-015-01: 
Unqualified Coating used as a Water Tight Barrier in Rooms 81 and 82 
On September 23, 2013, it was identified that the floor structure in Rooms 81 and 82 may not maintain its integrity during a high energy line break environment allowing water to migrate into the rooms below that houses the diesel generators and safety related switchgear. This was reported on September 23, 2013, under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition (Event Notification 49378). Fort Calhoun Station was shutdown in MODE 5 when the condition was identified and entered into the station's corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-18103. 
Inspection report 
***September 23, 2013, CR-FCS-2013-18103: During periodic coating inspections, the licensee identified yet again that the coating in Room 82 had degraded during a routine walkdown. The licensee performed another Apparent Cause Analysis and determined that the 2009 RCA was inadequate.
***October 18, 2014, CR-FCS-2014-12894: A building operator identified several cracks and chips in the Room 82 floor coating. Work Order 552343 was generated to recoat the floor, but was never completed. 
***January 21, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-0874 and CR-FCS-2015-0883: During a routine walkdown of Room 82, a design engineer identified additional cracks in the Room 82 floor coating. In addition, the engineer identified a piping penetration seal in the Room 82 floor that was degraded. Work Request (WR) 220667 and WR 220668 were generated to repair the penetration, and WR 220618 was generated to recoat the floor. 
***October 14, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-11976: Maintenance personnel identified a water intrusion into Room 63. Water had been dripping around the primary starting air compressor. The leak was identified to be from an auxiliary steam system leak in Room 82.
These guys thinks just throwing in the paperwork in the system mysteriously fixes the problem without using money and organization. If you pray to the gods to fix a problem god always come through. The inspector went to the agency's best go-to excuse...the agency is only a sampling regulator and we see only a limit view of the problems in the plant. So the NRC documents Fort Calhoun's eight or nine failed attempts to fix this safety related roof or ceiling leak in this inspection report. It first was a non sited violation in 2006 when the leak was first documented. Then eight fail attempts or more to fix it over almost  over a decade threatening the operation of a emergency Diesel Generator, it is still a non sited violation 2016. The NRC's violation or risk determination system is broken down. The repeated nature as this, the NRC's risk determination system doesn't capture the threat...appropriate feedback to change corporate behavior...with having such a chaotic organization running the plant.     
You know what this reminds me of; the fire water piping leak in Indian Point unit 1 over many years leading to a huge flooding event. They stuck the very small piping leaking problem into their paperwork or computer problem documentation system repeatedly. The small leak kept getting lost in their monsterous bureaucratic system and their godzilla priority system until the huge pipe completely burst. I believe the pinhole leak was spinning in the bureaucracy uncorrected for a decade. Hierarchical bureaucracies are supposed to be highly efficient and effective at identifying and fixing problems. They are not designed to highly efficient at burying and hiding problems.     
I talked to the new Fort Calhoun inspector yesterday about this problem. Its the "black swan" event proving either the site is severely backsliding or the correction coming out of the NRC 's mandatory plant shutdown in 2011 wasn't deep enough.

 I asked why hasn't  the NRC warned Fort Calhoun once say in 2006 or 2009, then if they came upon it again, then violating them and severely jack up the violation level. The new inspector told me they severely punished Fort Calhoun by shutting down the plant. You get it, the agency is siloed by congress to be severely reactionary. Only hammer the plant once it's in the news with a big event. I told him I expect the NRC to prevent a 2011 Fort Calhoun. I pay you to prevent events like this. 
I asked the inspector, is cracking concrete walls and floors acceptable in plant licensing and USFAR. He laughed saying, I am not a licensing expert. I don't know. Not, I'll get back to you mike.
He scoffingly told me, normal buildings are filled with concrete cracks. I've seen concrete building with a lot more cracks. So is telling me his opinion...not a engineering fact. Where is his evidence and codes where it is acceptable with a foundation to have a lot of cracks? These guys advocate for the industry not needing any facts to back him up when they talk off the cuff. I seen a lot of building concrete foundations without a single crack in them. A good quality concrete foundation or building never has a crack in the crack on the concrete.        
Generally NRC officials talking to outsiders like me, they get quickly into defending the industry interest. They rarely stay in the government regulatory neutral role.
By the way, the inspector was very talkative to me yesterday and he respected me. He knew my name before I said it, he reminded me I had talked to him more than once before.   

April 30, 2009 





Findings
Introduction. A Green self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” was identified for the licensee’s failure to take prompt corrective measures after identifying that water could penetrate cracks in the turbine building concrete floor and adversely impact the operability of an emergency diesel generator and safety related switchgear. Cracks in the floor of turbine building mechanical equipment room were identified in February 2006, when water was observed
I think it is a huge threat when any water is leaking from the ceiling or through a wall...its alway should be a rather large violation because this piece of equipment is so valuable. Almost a decade to fix this? These guys should be responsible for completely fixing it right on the first leak...taking more than one bite out the apple, it indicates serious organization dysfunction.

***Maybe in the 2009 or the Feb 9, 2011 leaks, the NRC should have severely hammered the hell out of Fort Calhoun over these leaks. This should have cued the NRC into looking more closely into the site organizational problems. They would have found a lot of serious problems. Then rock the organization with a severe violation level into having a change of heart....fundamental reform. Then the summer of 2011 events won't have happened. 
____________________________________________________________

You get it, often looking underneath a perceives insignificant problem leads to discovering huge organization problems under the iceberge.

The IAEA inspection team urged the Nuclear Regulation Authority to enhance inspection competence and the government to amend its nuclear safety law to make on-site safety checks more effective and flexible.
Mission leader Philippe Jamet, a French regulatory commissioner, said Japan's inflexible inspection rules do not allow inspectors to move freely at nuclear facilities or respond quickly when there is a problem.
This inspection process is severely flawed in USA nuclear plants. This is similar to the recent IAEA report finding on the Japanese nuclear regulatory authority. NRC regulations severely restricts an inspector from getting into the business of the plant like Fort Calhoun. This is how political campaign contributions influences federal regulations. I proposed an additional area of inspections:1) Inspection report areas defined by NRC regulation. 

2) An NRC inspector or official reported observation of events at the plant. These professional observations in inspection reports would be unconstrained from the typical NRC regulations and would be protected areas from intimidation to the inspector and other NRC officials. These are my observation of important or emerging issues at the plant(either in house use or for the industry in general as a mean of drawing attention)needing attention. These inspector or official "observations" would be totally disconnected from any violation or penalty to a licencee. Just a general comment or warning and a inspector's ability to speak totally free without repercussion or restrains.
_________________________________________________________

leaking into the Diesel Generator 1 room (Room 63). The licensee took no immediate corrective actions to evaluate or repair the cracks. In February 2009, water was again observed leaking into Room 63, resulting in unexpected tripping of breakers associated with the Diesel Generator 1, secondary compressor motor starter.

Description. On February 11, 2009, maintenance workers were removing tags for maintenance on Diesel Generator 1, and determined that three breakers associated with the secondary air compressor had tripped. Investigation revealed that arcing on the power leads had occurred due to the introduction of water into the breakers from the ceiling of the Diesel Generator 1 room (Room 63). The source of the water was standing water on the floor of the turbine building mechanical equipment room (Room 82), which is located directly above Room 63 (as well as the Diesel Generator 2 room, and the east and west Switchgear rooms). After the water was removed from the floor of Room 82, several cracks were evident in the floor, which provided a path of water from Room 82 to Room 63.
I suspect the cracks are moving as the building and concrete is heated up or cooled off. I'll bet you the concrete foundation at Vogtle or other new construction nuclear plant doesn't have one crack in it. 

The inspectors’ review of corrective action documents determined that a condition report was created (CR 200600399) which documented an event that occurred on February 1, 2006. That event also involved water flowing through the ceiling of Room 63 near the area of the starting air compressors. The condition report was classified as a Condition Level 6, which was the lowest condition report classification. The condition report was closed to a work request since “equipment is not an SSC [structures systems and components].” The resulting work order applied caulking to certain areas of the floor in
***Careless repair of a concrete crack in caulking without understanding the fundamental mechanism causing the crack.Painting it is so unprofessional... 
Room 82, but did not address all of the floor cracks or the
Need a extent of condition or cause on all concrete cracks at Fort Calhoun plant...

Did any building settle as result of the flooding at Fort Calhoun? 
potential impact on safety-related equipment. The licensee’s failure to recognize that cracks in the floor of Room 82 could impact the operability of the diesel generators resulted in an improper classification of the condition report, limiting the review and depth of subsequent corrective actions. The corrective actions that followed were inadequate to ensure a watertight surface between Room 82 and all the rooms located below it.



Analysis. The inspectors determined that the failure to take prompt corrective actions to address a condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because the failure to perform adequate corrective actions on the turbine building floor, if left uncorrected, could become a more serious safety concern. Specifically, water could seep through the floor and render the emergency diesel generator and/or safety related switchgear inoperable. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, “Significance Determination Process,” Attachment 4 “Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,” this finding was of very low safety significance because it: 1) was confirmed to result in a loss of functionality of the secondary compressor motor starter; 2) did not represent a loss of safety function; 3) did not result in a loss of a technical specification required train for more than its allowed outage time; 4) did not result in a loss of risk significant equipment for more than 24 hours; and 5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the performance deficiency was aged and not indicative of current licensee performance.

Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, in February, 2006, the licensee failed to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality (cracks in the turbine building mechanical equipment room floor). The cracks were a condition adverse to quality because they permitted water to leak on to safety related equipment, which could challenge safety related equipment operability. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-0687.

Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-0687, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000285/2009002-01, Failure to Implement Adequate Corrective Action for Floor Cracks.
January 21, 2016 

Findings
.a Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition of a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generator Room Water
Intrusions

Introduction. The team identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” for the licensee’s failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, since February 2009, the licensee failed to prevent repetitive water intrusions from the Auxiliary Building HVAC room (Room 82) into the number one Emergency Diesel Generator room (Room 63).

Description. On February 11, 2009, the licensee had documented a significant condition adverse to quality due to water intrusion from the Auxiliary Building HVAC room (Room 82) into the number one emergency diesel generator room (Room 63), located below. The water intrusion had caused water to leak onto the secondary air compressor motor starter in Room 63 and tripped the associated breakers. This electrical transient then caused the number one emergency diesel generator, which was running for surveillance purposes, to trip. The licensee initiated Condition Report CR-FCS-2009-0687 and subsequently determined that an unanalyzed condition had existed by which an auxiliary steam leak in Room 82 could potentially result in water entering both diesel generator rooms through the floor of Room 82. This condition had existed at least since February 1, 2006, when CR-FCS-2006-0399 was written to document water dripping from the same crack in the ceiling of Room 63 above the secondary air compressor. This event was documented as a Green NCV in NRC
Inspection Report 0500285/2009002 (ML091200069).
Why wasn't this a LER?
The licensee performed a root cause analysis (RCA) following the event in 2009. The analysis determined that the root cause was a failure to document, in the licensee’s USAR, the implicit assumption that the floor in Room 82 shall not leak. As a result, a program was not established to assure the integrity of the flooring. Licensee corrective actions included the following:
  • •Coating the Room 82 floor.  
  • •Revising the USAR to document the implicit assumption that floors of rooms analyzed for medium and high energy line breaks are leak tight.  
  • •Revising the periodic structural inspection of the Auxiliary Building to ensure all ceiling cracks, for rooms that are susceptible to internal flooding, are documented and evaluated.
Following implementation of the above corrective actions, recurrent leaks into Room 63and identified examples of inadequate Room 82 floor coating were identified by the licensee and documented in the licensee’s corrective action program, these included:
  • •January 9, 2011, CR-FCS-2011-0156: The licensee identified water leaking into Room 63 at approximately 3 drops per minute. The licensee performed an evaluation and determined that this leak was from a previously identified ceiling crack, and that the drip would not impact the operability of any equipment in this location.
Flooding and switchgear breaker two year shutdown. You would think by Fort Calhoun getting punished with the two year shutdown and all their mandatory corrective actions...the new conscience of the plant....they could fix it right the first time. Why didn't the intense NRC inspection during the recovery catch the water leaking into a diesel generator room.  
  • •October 6, 2012, CR-FCS-2012-14958: The licensee identified water dripping into Room 63 while placing Room 82 auxiliary steam in service. On October 12, 2012, the licensee generated Work Order 461213 and made repairs to the Room 82 floor coating where chips and cracks were identified. The licensee then performed an
But why in the above?
  • Apparent Cause Analysis, and determined that the floor coating previously installed was not adequate for Room 82. The licensee generated Engineering Change (EC) 62082 to modify the floor coating to a more suitable material. This EC was implemented on October 22, 2013.
  • •September 23, 2013, CR-FCS-2013-18103: During periodic coating inspections, the licensee identified yet again that the coating in Room 82 had degraded during a routine walkdown. The licensee performed another Apparent Cause Analysis and determined that the 2009 RCA was inadequate.
  • •October 18, 2014, CR-FCS-2014-12894: A building operator identified several cracks and chips in the Room 82 floor coating. Work Order 552343 was generated to recoat the floor, but was never completed.
  • •January 21, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-0874 and CR-FCS-2015-0883: During a routine walkdown of Room 82, a design engineer identified additional cracks in the Room 82 floor coating. In addition, the engineer identified a piping penetration seal in the Room 82 floor that was degraded. Work Request (WR) 220667 and WR 220668 were generated to repair the penetration, and WR 220618 was generated to recoat the floor.
  • October 14, 2015, CR-FCS-2015-11976: Maintenance personnel identified a water intrusion into Room 63. Water had been dripping around the primary starting air compressor. The leak was identified to be from an auxiliary steam system leak in Room 82.
Following the water intrusion event on October 14, 2015, the licensee recoated the floor per an existing WO 552343 and cancelled the work requests associated with the degraded floor penetration (WR 220667 and WR 220668), since work planners had assumed that all repairs had been made. 
Really an act of a employee falsifying internal documents and impairing the NRC oversight?
The inspectors performed a walkdown of Room 82 following repairs to the flooring on November 18, 2015, and noted that the degraded pipe seal had not been fixed, and that water intrusion via this piping penetration was still a vulnerability to the rooms below. The inspectors informed the licensee, and at this time, CR-FCS-2015-13151 was generated to repair the degraded fire seal.

Analysis. The team determined that the licensee’s failure to implement adequate corrective actions to prevent repetitive water intrusions into Room 63 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, water intrusion events from Room 82 into Room 63 could challenge the reliability of the emergency diesel generator when relied upon during a loss of offsite power. Using Inspection Manual Chapter
A broken Significance Determination Process...
0609, Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,” Exhibit 2, “Mitigating Systems Screening Question,” dated June 19, 2012, inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee’s maintenance rule program. The finding has a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect within the resolution area because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance [P.3].

Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” requires, in part, for significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Contrary to the above, between February 2009 and November 2015, measures established by the licensee to correct a significant condition adverse to quality did not assure that corrective actions were taken to preclude repetition. Specifically, corrective actions taken to address water intrusion from Room 82 into safety related emergency diesel generator Room 63, a significant condition adverse to quality first identified on February 11, 2009, were not effective to prevent recurrent water leaks. Immediate corrective actions to correct this condition included evaluating the Room 82 flooring for operability and recoating it. This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR-FCS-2015-11976 and CR-FCS-2015-13151. NCV 05000248/2015009-01, “Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition of a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Emergency Diesel Generator Room Water Intrusions.”

Millstone-Dominion Still Has Junk Engineering Organizations

The greatest sin here was Millstone was situationally unaware of the responses in their switchyard and grid system. They didn’t know how or gain an accurate picture of these interacting systems. They were hyper focused on dumping of the SLOD safety protection system instead of understanding the interaction and function of these giant systems.
What really what caused this is a broken and unenforced 50:59 NRC process. Its turned into a voluntary system. Basically the game goes across all utilities, the NRC says all rules associated with the 50:59 are optional depending on the needs of CEO bonuses. You can ignore the rules at your own peril...our inspectors would never question you on these intentional NRC rule and plant licencing violation . If you guess right and nothing happens to the site associated with a design change to the facility...you are free and clear. If you create a nasty public relation(say, a dual plant trip) event, then we will retroactively harmlessly violate you for not requesting a 50:59.   

If Millstone would have submitted a 50:59 or the NRC would have enforced a 50:59 in 2001 when this boondoggle began leading to a preventable dual plant LOOP,  these NRC Jan 2016 questions would have been asked and answered before the project even began in 2001.  

The idea at this point, Millstone engineering is still highly dysfunctional, in that the NRC had to prod the utility to understand the grid response in with a dual plant trip.

It is totally disgraceful and unprofessional on the nuclear safety and Dominion’s grid responsibility, the agency had to prod them with these questions.
Jan 13, 2015 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF SEVERE LINE OUTAGE DETECTION FROM THE OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-336 & 50-423 (TAC NOS. MF6430 AND MF6431)
By letter dated June 30, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML15183A022), Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (the licensee) requested a license amendment request (LAR) for Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3 (MPS2 and MPS3).
The proposed amendments would revise the MPS2 and MPS3 Final Safety Analysis Reports(FSARs) to: 1) delete the information pertaining to the severe line outage detection (SLOD) special protection system, 2) update the description of the tower structures associated with the four offsite transmission lines feeding Millstone Power Station (MPS), and 3) describe how the current offsite power source configuration and design satisfies the requirements of General
Design Criteria (GDC) 17, "Electric Power Systems" and GDC-5, "Sharing of Structures…
This below link is my blog write up of the dual plant trip...the NRC answers my question fromn this post in their 2016 questions to Dominion.   

What the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Says About the Nuclear Industry's Death Spiral

Originally Published on 12/8/2015:

I wonder where the 30% come from? This indicates a national financial crisis in the nuclear industry never seen before.Everyone is winging it.   

You notice here on the NEI website, they don't say the NRC is involved in this, while the platts article says they are involved? 
  • I will just say across the board the maintenance and quality of maintenance at these plants are dissonant and chaotic. Too much rework as the primary symptom. You'd cut 50% of your overhead if all maintenance was highly centralized throughout the industry. One large company doing all the maintenance.
  • I'd also cut the NRC's budget by half. That way it will be a lot easier on profits if it becomes basically voluntary to follow all rules and plant licensing.
The NRC is undergoing a massive multiyear downsizing initiative (budget cutting)and now the industry at all the plants are even thinking of a bigger percentage initiative. Two giants organizations undergoing a simultaneous reorganization in this amazedly complex endeavor...not a chance this is going to go smoothly...    
  • Same thing if one company ran all the the nuclear plants. You'd have to have a contract making sure the prior parent company paid their fair share and keep up with decommissioning.  
The NEI's spin:  
WASHINGTON, D.C.—America’s nuclear energy facilities are launching a multiyear initiative to safely generate the electricity that the nation uses more efficiently and economically. The initiative was announced today by the Nuclear Energy Institute, which is coordinating the multifaceted effort in tandem with member electric utilities, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and the Electric Power Research Institute.
The initiative comes with nuclear energy facilities operating at sustained high levels of safety—as documented by an array of performance metrics—but earning less revenue during an unprecedented era of low natural gas prices and subsidies for other electricity sources.
As part of the initiative, the industry will analyze cost drivers common to all nuclear power plants and recommend programs and processes to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. The goal is to provide companies with innovative solutions that enable a significant reduction in operating expenses at the nation’s reactors by 2018.
“We want to encourage bold ideas, not just tweak current processes,” said Maria Korsnick, NEI’s chief operating officer. “We are operating in markets with a glut of natural gas at historically low prices, concurrent with low growth in electricity demand nationally. We are seeking to redesign fundamental plant processes to significantly improve operational efficiencies and effectiveness, and in the process make nuclear energy facilities more economically viable.”
Nuclear energy facilities operating in 30 states provide electricity to one of every five U.S. homes and businesses. They provide 63 percent of the electricity that comes from zero-carbon sources.
Despite excellent operating performance, reactors in Vermont and Wisconsin have been retired prematurely in the past two years for economic reasons. Two more reactors in Massachusetts and New York will be shuttered prematurely over the next two years, largely due to financial losses.
More broadly, total electric generating costs at U.S. nuclear plants have increased 28 percent—to an industry average $36.27 per megawatt-hour—over the past 12 years.
“A ‘business as usual’ approach will not successfully address the challenges of rising costs and inadequate revenue for our reactors,” Korsnick said. “Part of this effort will be aimed at gaining full recognition in electricity pricing for the value of nuclear energy in electricity markets and as a uniquely reliable source for meeting environmental requirements, such as the Clean Power Plan.
“This is an initiative to reduce our operating costs, without question, but advancing safety and reliability are foundational aspects of this plan.”
The initiative’s name is “Delivering the Nuclear Promise: Advancing Safety, Reliability and Economic Performance.”
Teams of industry experts are examining areas such as engineering, work management and corrective actions programs to identify more efficient and effective means to accomplish their work. Chief nuclear officers from across the industry are aligned in their commitment to implement the strategic plan and its goals, with governance by utility chief executive officers. The teams will be assisted by working groups from the industry, in coordination with the Electric Power Research Institute, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and NEI.
“The U.S. nuclear industry excels in providing reliable electricity with world-class safety performance. This plan will ensure that safe and reliable operations continue to be the first and most important focus of all electric companies with nuclear energy technology,” Korsnick said.