Pilgrim: Letter to Gov Baker About Defective 2 Stage In Plant Now

Updated 10/24

Gov Baker is pulling a Gov Douglas of Vermont just before Vermont Yankee blew up. I'd say based on the history of the 2 stage, a leak is right around the corner. It could be leaking right now and they wouldn't tell us. He si painting himself in the corner. Maybe Entergy learned their lessen. Their interest always trump a sitting governors political interest. Wait till Baker figures out Entergy without a whim is going to screw him in the corporate interest. Entergy interacts with a lot of governors across the nation...I think this huge corporation hates all governors and politician whatever their political stripe.   

The NE ISO with their extraordinary low market priced electricity for a year now is a indication we are over supplied with electricity. The real scandal is, why is your home electricity price so high. Is he blocking natural gas into Massachusetts. All these sources of electricity make too much profits. They spend enormous resources politically and regulatory sabotaging each others interest. The whole market of electricity and its energy sources is corrupt as hell. The outcome of sabotaging each other is high price electricity. They all make more profits per unit of energy. It is collusion!      

Activists challenge Baker's response on plant closure

"We need to be in constant communication with ISO, which is the enterprise that oversees the New England energy grid, and make sure whatever it is that happens here happens as quickly and as appropriately and as safely as it possibly can," Baker said. "I am completely with people on that, but we also need to make sure that we don’t end up doing something that translates into rolling brownouts or, God forbid, blackouts here in the New England region.”

Now is the time for Massachusetts to plan, he said, to make sure an adequate flow of energy continues. "In the end, the NRC and ISO are going to have as much to say about when we actually shut down Pilgrim as anybody in our administration is," he said.

***October 22, 2015

MA Statehouse      

Second Open Letter and Appeal to Governor Baker to Intervene and

Call for Immediate Closure of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant

Citizens Across the Commonwealth Call for Exercise of Executive Action to Preserve Public Safety.

Dear Governor Baker,

With  their recent comments and the final decision by Entergy to close the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant in 2019, a new set of urgent considerations have become paramount. Your administration reacted quickly to proactively develop proposals to expand production of clean, renewable power.  Put in perspective, Pilgrim "offers 680 megawatts of the 31,000 available in New England" (Patriot Ledger).

Attention has also been focused on worker retraining, minimizing economic impact, and securing what the Boston Globe editorialized recently as "The Nuclear Graveyard", the nuclear waste dump at Plymouth.  You also have spoken of challenges and opportunities to chart a new course. The future is bright if the right choices are made.

But your silence on the continued operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant for almost another four years is deafening and confounding.  All that citizens hear is a Pilgrim "death rattle" at the beleaguered facility. 

The Commonwealth is confronting a very real, public safety crisis, with five million citizens in harm's way.  The primary issue surrounding Pilgrim is neither energy nor economics. It is public safety. Thus, it is a grievous mistake to keep Pilgrim operating in its dangerous, perilous state.  Pilgrim needs to be closed immediately for an orderly shutdown, not in reaction to another emergency or disaster.

Let's be clear. Pilgrim still retains the lowest "degraded rating" of any USA nuclear plant, operating with the same depleted assets and poor management  Entergy has officially written off the Plant on their balance sheet, refusing to fund required NRC safety improvements.  As the storm clouds of danger continue to gather, we are at an impasse.  Why?  Nothing has been fixed and systemic failure is accelerating as closure looms. The recent trend for Pilgrim has been a downward spiral.  Do any of the following events inspire confidence?

* A 22 year old fire code violation was recently discovered and the NRC has ordered a fire watch patrol in the nuclear control room (24/7) to sniff out smoke.  Where was the NRC? 

* The meteorological towers to detect the direction of nuclear releases, wasout repeatedly for three years.  Never maintained.  Still notfixed.  Where was the NRC?

* The failed and broken electric switchyard, never fixed, repeatedly cited, and still on the brink of collapse with the next blizzard.  Where was the NRC?

* After the Juno storm of 2015, failed safety relief valves (SRVs) were replaced with refurbished valves of a type previously removed by Pilgrim in 2010 for being defective and prone to leaking (More)

* With the news of the closure, the talent pool at Pilgrim is evaporating as resumes seek out new destinations.  Those site specific skill sets at Pilgrim are weakening.

* Entergy's mindset to intensely minimize their expenses will be not be altered.  If history is any lesson, only a steep decline in focus and resources can be expected to closure date.

Operating a nuclear reactor in this environment, to eke out any marginal benefit, is folly.  When the next emergency shutdown strikes, assuming no fatalities/injuries, do you "press" the bet again?  It is like the Commonwealth running a high wire act with the NRC as an unreliable and slow to respond "spotter"- who can't prevent the big fall. 

You have publicly stated your trust in the NRC experts.  Your trust has been sadly misplaced with the belated disclosure of long standing and unreported failings, and lack of enforcement at Pilgrim.  

Citizens across the State truly understand the gravity of the situation.  We petition and implore you, once again, as Chief Safety Officer for the Commonwealth and the responsibilities invested in you, to respond to this petition as the evidence demonstrates a very clear and present danger to the people of Massachusetts and beyond.  We need decisive and strong leadership immediately to provide to us the protection the situation demands.  Demand the NRC to CLOSE PILGRIM NOW.

God speed in your deliberation. 

Sincerely,

On Behalf of MA Downwinders

Diane Turco, Cape Downwinders,  Harwich/Cape Cod           tturco@comcast.net
Guntram  Mueller, Boston Downwinders, MA Peace Action, Newton/Boston                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           guntrammueller1@gmail.com                                                                                                     Sheila Parks, On Behalf of planet Earth  Watertown/Boston  sheilaparks@comcast.net      John Gaulley, Occupy Hingham  South Shore      quillena@glastonburyabbey.org             Bruce Skud, No More Fukushimas Newburyport/ North Shore  bskud@verizon.net            Yvonne Baracos, Down Cape Downwinders  Wellfleet/Outer Cape  abilyoyo1@aol.com

cc

Senate President Stan Rosenberg

Senator Daniel Wolf Representative Sarah Peake

Senator Vincent DeMacedo

Secretary of Energy and Environment Matt Beaton

MEMA Director Kurt Schwartz

Attorney General Maura Healey

Senator Edward Markey

Senator Elizabeth Warren

First Governmental Declared Luekemia In Fukushima

This could be just a normal presentation of leukemia...

On the other hand, this guy is young and this disease popped up quickly after his exposure. The Japanese are notorious with not monitoring radiation accurately on there nuclear employees. Usually radiation leukemia takes in excess of twenty years to develop. This is the first time a major nuclear accident happened in  modern democracy. We would openly acknowledge Fukushima leukemias and cancers.

If this Leukemia is caused by Fukushima, then there will be a enormous population of new leukemias following this poor guy. It will have a profound shadow over the nuclear industry world wide.

They got accurate epidemiological radiation model available...one or a few data points could get you to know the magnitude of the estimation cancers caused by Fukushima. Forty thousand radiation worker during this so far.

 

Fukushima No. 1 worker’s leukemia officially deemed a work accident

KYODO

The health ministry Tuesday certified a man with leukemia as having suffered an industrial accident and being entitled to benefits after he was exposed to radiation as a construction worker at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, though it did not confirm there was a link between the radiation and the cancer.

The man, now in his early 40s, is the first person involved with working at stricken facility to receive the certification for developing leukemia.

He installed covers for the damaged reactor buildings at the plant between October 2012 and December 2013 before being diagnosed with leukemia, according to the ministry. He developed the disease while in his 30s…

What It Would Cost To Shut Me Up?

Update 10/25

I got to get more realistic here. I am seriously considering Cadillac 2016 CT6 SEDAN. It not yet out. It's 4 wheel drive.  

A loner 2016 CTS-V SEDAN sitting in my driveway with the keys in the ignition and a credit card loaded with $50,000 dollars would be a show of good faith? I’d want to choose the car myself later, maybe with a few add-on trinkets.  

We’d sign the documents shortly after I hire a lawyer. We could cycle through this pretty quick and I would never acknowledge this deal.         

Just magical thinking.

Ok, somebody asked what it will take to shut me up.

A new company Cadillac(lease)of my choice(<$100,000) with a new car ever two years for life. Insurance, upkeep and gas included...4 city / 21 highway MPG, 640 turbocharged HP and 6.2L V8.(it's non-negotiable). I got my eyes on a stellar black metallic 2016 CTS-V SEDAN.

Or the pro safety forces would pay me a decent wage to keep on doing what I am doing...or stepping it up to the next level.     

Full medical for life on my wife and me. We won’t need it for about another decade.

I got fired in around 1992 till about 2015…$200,000 per year for 23 years give us about $4.6 million. I really don’t blame this on a particular company, but on collusion with them all overpowering the regulator. I think all the nuclear companies should chip in.

I am not going to charge you with pain and suffering. There was a lot in the beginning and in the last three years of work was horrible. I consider the outcome of pain and suffering as a gigantic positive…it made me a much better person.

A pension for life based on $200,000 and 35 years of service.  

Knowing my addictive life with all this money, it will quickly kill me.

I would just disappear, I would a sign non disclosure contract to not say anything…   

If you have a conscience…set me up in nuclear safety foundation. I’d be the “The Rockford Files” for the nuclear industry. Special projects and investigations. Pay me as a contractor too and expenses. As long as I have access to high corporate and NRC executives, I’d be happy not talking to outsiders. I’d need a date stamp non-erasable electronic log where I could log my investigative issues…where I could later throw it in your faces when I was right.  

I paid my dues and I made an impact…I’d be happy to just disappeared into the sunset never publically saying another word about the nuclear industry.

But my name could carry a credibility none of you got…

So you know what happened if I just disappeared and ended up on Miami Beach dead drunk without a family.  

You are dam right I'd buy a travel trailer with expensive bicycles inside and go all over the county. I put more miles on my bikes than the travel trailer.

You know what, all this money would just yank me away from my beautiful family and my extraordinary beautiful life of bicycling in Hinsdale NH and surroundings.

You know what I'd like most, telling my son I'd pick up the tab on any college of your choice. I'd like my son to finally admire something great I did for him.

Of course, being a available father entrained in healthy multi gender and identity relationships is the best gift you could ever give your son. The normal tussling of relationships in the give and take of life...

Would The Dems Have A Rout if We Had Our Young "Justin Trudeau"?

How could you not vote for this attractive young couple and their clutch of cute children. I tired of seeing old faces and the wreckage of our past lives.

What happened to our 44 year olds? Where did they go?  

 

Justin Trudeau, Following in His Father’s Footsteps

Justin Trudeau, the leader of the Liberal Party, will become Canada’s second-youngest prime minister and the first to follow a parent into office.

•Born in Ottawa on Dec. 25, 1971, to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canada’s prime minister at the time, and the former Margaret Sinclair.

•Raised in Ottawa and Montreal.

•Married Sophie Grégoire, a childhood friend and former television host. The couple have three young children.

Mr. Trudeau grew up in the spotlight of his father’s political career, as well as his parents’ intensely publicized marriage and then its equally public disintegration. His childhood, he said in an interview in 2013, was a mix of privilege and the plebeian. He lived at the prime minister’s official residence and took a school bus to a public elementary school in Ottawa…

 

Farley Pressurizer Safety Valve Troubles

I didn't find any other  problems on their PORVs, but problems with their turbine driven aux feed pumps are a train wreck.  

You see how much higher the pressure is in PWRs.

 

October 9, 2015

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 LicenseeEvent Report 2015-004-00 Pressurizer Safetv Valve Setpoint Pressure Outside of Technical Specification Tolerance Band

On 8/11/15 Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 discovered that a pressurizer safety valve (PSV), which had been removed during the May 2015 maintenance outage and shipped offsite for testing, failed its as-found lift test below the Technical Specification (TS) allowable value. The cause of the test failure was attributed to the seat leakage of the valve that occurred during and after startup from the Spring 2015 Refueling Outage (1 R26). This failure constitutes a condition that is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." The 18 pressurizer safety valve was replaced during a May 2015 planned maintenance outage.

Leak began upon startup on 5/4/2015.

Shutdowned plant to fix leak on 5/26/15

They assumed they could manage the leaking for the next two years. You see how far off their engineering instinct are…they should have shutdown on the start-up and fixed the valve. You see how deep this mental disease is in the nuclear disease.  

You see how lenient the NRC is with not requiring Farely to disclose why the valve leaked? This LER doesn't disclose it. This plant is deep into Republican land...they use the rules differently than anyone else.    

The moral of this story is anytime time a nuclear plant safety relief valve leaks they are intentionally aiming at violating tech specs with them demanding an immediate safety shutdown. Basically we are intentionally entering a immediate shutdown requirement and we are going to knowingly ignore it with the knowledge the component is not work as required. 

 

These guys got safety culture problems... 

On 8/11/15 during testing at an offsite facility the as-found lift setting for the Unit 1 1 B pressurizer safety valve (PSV) (EllS Code RV) was discovered to be 2425 psig which is outside of the Technical Specification (TS) allowable lift settings of ;:: 2460 psig and s 2510 psi g. On 5/4/15 during startup from 1 R26 with the plant in Mode 3, it was determined that the 1 B PSV was leaking into the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) based on elevated tailpipe temperatures. On 5/8/15 the tailpipe temperature leakage indication stabilized with average PRT in-leakage at 0.12 gpm. Compensatory actions were established which included increased monitoring of leak rate, PRT parameters, radiation levels, PRT venting, and decision points for re-evaluating the need to replace the valve. Based upon the continued leakage Unit 1 entered a planned maintenance outage on 5/26/15 to replace the 1 B PSV. The valve was then shipped to an offsite facility for lift testing and valve disassembly and inspection.

FitzPatrick: Entergy Blackmailing New York

Yea, a Republicans Ideologue company in Republican land cleaving to skirts of regulated market governmentalism.

The haters of the merchant fleet...

I guess if the if you control government, then it is not too bad?

Well, until the fanatical teabaggers take you out...  

Entergy fires back after Cuomo remarks; Fitzpatrick nuke talks shaky

While we have been unsuccessful to date, our discussions are continuing as we approach a final decision. Quite frankly, our desire has been to engage in meaningful discussions regarding continued operations of Fitzpatrick without first having to provide formal notification of a Fitzpatrick shutdown decision to the State of New York, as some have indicated is necessary. Most recently, we have heard inaccurate claims that we are "holding employees hostage" or "only seeking to improve our bottom line." That is simply not the truth. We are facing substantial financial challenges at Fitzpatrick and have been negotiating in good faith with New York State over the last several months to obtain certainty for this facility. We have a very short window of time remaining to come to a successful resolution with New York State and will be doing everything we can to achieve this. Waiting until the last minute does not serve anybody's interests.

10/19

Cuomo first issued his statement to Capital Tonight. Here is his statement in full:

‎"I have heard Entergy's public statements regarding the future of the Fitzpatrick nuclear plant and we are reviewing the economic issues company officials have raised.

This is a serious matter and a cause of anxiety not only for the more than 600 Central New Yorkers who depend on the facility for their livelihood , but also for the communities served by this plant. 

I strongly caution Entergy not to use the threat of job losses as a means of prodding economic relief to help their bottom line. This tactic has been attempted by others i‎n the past and has been unsuccessful. In this state, an entity called the Public Service Commission has oversight over services deemed to be in the statewide public's best interests.

Entergy should keep that in mind. Any decisions will be made on the merits."

Entergy has not provided the PSC with any formal notification that it intends to close FitzPatrick. Power plant owners must give the PSC six months' notice to give state officials time to evaluate the impact of a shutdown.

River Bend: Unreliable Nuclear Plant instrumentation Power Supplies

One is safety related instrumentation power supplies and the other one is a so called non safety instrumentation power supplies. Either way, it effects plant reliability. I believe any plant scram prematurely wears out safety equipment.

 

Basically these two LERs are the ones on the last two plant scram.

Licensee Event Report 50-458 /2014-006-00 

The Christmas plant trip: Power was lost when the output breaker on the RPS motor-generator (MG) in the Division 2 subsystem tripped. The mostly likely cause of the output breaker trip was an intermittent failure of the MG field flash card due to a degraded capacitor. The capacitor was replaced, and the MG was tested and returned to a standby condition as a backup power supply. The alternate power supply will remain in service carrying the bus until completion of a modification to eliminate the field flash card as a potential source of recurrence of this problem

Licensee Event Report 50-458 /2015-005-00

On June 1, 2015, at 9:09 p.m. CDT, with the plant operating at 90 percent power, an unplanned automatic reactor scram occurred due to low reactor water level. This event resulted from the loss of a non-safety related instrument power panel, apparently caused by an internal electrical transient in a 125-volt AC / DC inverter. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)as the automatic actuation of the reactor protection system.

Look What my Complaint DId/ Discovered at River Bend: Simulator Fidelity

Update 10/19

This is very troubling. Why did it take a plant spinning wildly out of control to find grossly inappropriate training? Why didn't inspection activities pick this years ago? What else could the agency miss? You notice, nobody gets to ask the agency why this missed this and the NRC be compelled to be honest and fully truthful?   

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT

NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION

 

Subject: ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

This is to inform the Commission that a Notice of Violation will be issued on or about September10, 2015, to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding identified during an inspection of River Bend Station.

This White finding, an issue of low to moderate safety significance, involves the failure to maintain the simulator so it would accurately reproduce the operating characteristics of the facility. Specifically, the River Bend Station simulator failed to accurately model feedwater flow and reactor vessel level response following a scram, failed to provide the correct alarm response for loss of a reactor protection system motor generator set, and failed to correctly model the operation of the startup feedwater regulating valve.

A Notice of Violation is included based on Entergy’s failure to meet 10 CFR Part 55.46(c)(1), “Plant-Referenced Simulators,” which requires, in part, that a simulator, “…must demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond.” In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NOV is considered an escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.

 

***I was shocked it took a nit-wit like me to make Entergy and NRC come to terms with vessel control in this response to a notice of violation. They were grossly mis-training their operators and it severely lead to the River Bend staff's repetitive inability to control reactor water level. My complaint led to the discovery of the simulator fidelity issue and forced them to fix their site. I even postulated to the inspector making my complaint, they got simulator fidelity issues. They weren't using their simulator properly or professionally.

NRC: Proof I Instigated The 2014 Christmas River Bend plant Scram Special Inspection

Post this special inspection(actually two), they had one additional plant trip. As far as I am concerned, they bungled it again. We will be closely watching them in the future with how they control vessel level on plant trips.

They problem I see is, they need a program like tuning the system up in a new plant start up program. They'd have to start-up and scram a few times...tuning all the system as they go. Then getting a perfect vessel control scram.  

Statement of Violation

10 CFR Part 55.46(c)(1), "Plant-Referenced Simulators," requires, in part, that a simulator "...must demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond."

Contrary to the above, as of January 30, 2015, the simulator failed to demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond. Specifically, the River Bend Station's simulator failed to correctly model leakage flow rates across the feedwater regulating valves; failed to provide the correct alarm response for a loss of a reactor protection system motor generator set; and failed to correctly model the behavior of the startup feedwater regulating valve controller. These simulator modeling issues led to negative training of operators. This subsequently complicated the operators' response to a reactor scram in the actual plant on December 25, 2014.

This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.

Reasons for the violation

Entergy agrees that a performance deficiency exists and has performed a Root Cause Evaluation. The Root Cause shows that there are programmatic gaps in the plant processes to identify and communicate differences between the simulator and the operating characteristics of the reference plant. The root cause resulted from plant equipment issues not being elevated for incorporation into the simulator model. In addition, there was no process for capturing post transient alarms and submitting them to training for evaluation.

This is supported by:

* Failing to recognize, through the Corrective Action Process (CAP), the impact on operator's ability to regulate water level

• No process exists for capturing alarms received during a plant transient and submitting to training for evaluation

* Conditions were not identified as an Operator workaround or burden

* The checklist in Training Policy 97-02, "Training Simulator Configuration Control," does not contain a review of the Operator workaround or burden list for impact on Training.

• Removal of ten demineralizers from service resulted in the inability to obtain post SCRAM feedwater level trends which are used during Post Event Simulator Testing (PEST) to validate simulator configuration

Corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved

1. Simulator Deficiency Requests were completed to correct the following simulator fidelity issues:

* Feedwater Regulating Valves modeled with no leakage * Startup Feedwater Regulating valve does not operate the same as it does in the plant (plant has up to an 8-minute delay in opening)

* High drywell pressure and Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) High pressure alarms do not actuate on a loss of RPS bus

2. Training was developed and administered to the oPerating crews on the changes implemented in the Simulator.

3. GOP-0005, "Power Maneuvering" was revised to include actions to freeze Emergency Response Information System (ERIS) / Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Transient Recording and Analysis (TRA) data and collect alarm typer data for Simulator evaluation following a transient.

4. Defined "transient" to set boundaries for evaluation to support revision to GOP-0005, "Power Maneuvering".

5. Revised OSP-0022, "Operations General Administrative Guidelines" to include guidelines for:

a. Capturing post transient alarms

b. Submitting post transient alarms to training for evaluation

c. Submitting all EN-OP-i117, "Operations Assessment Resources" transient snapshot assessments to Training for evaluation

6. Revised Training Policy 97-02, "Training Simulator Configuration Control", to include a review of the Operations Aggregate Index.

7. Reviewed Surveillance Test Procedures (STPs) performed during Simulator Annual Operating test for completeness. Based on the review, the following STPs were added:

a. STP-601 -6301, "RWCU Valve Operability"

b. STP-000-6304, "Auxiliary Building and Annulus Pressure Control Quarterly Operability"

Results were evaluated and approved by the Simulator Review Board.

8. Performed a snapshot assessment of equipment issues that could lead to Simulator differences and result in potential negative training. Assessment included licensed operator interviews and a review of the Operation's Aggregate Index.

9. Reinforced the requirements for Operation's Senior Reactor Operators to initiate a Training Evaluation Action Request (TEAR) for simulator support to run the transient on the Simulator to evaluate accuracy against real plant response per EN-OP-i117, "Operations Assessment Resources."

The results of these actions are:

* Simulator correctly models plant for identified issues,

* Operators are adequately trained on the changes made to the Simulator, and

* Process is in place for operators to capture transient information for training evaluation.

Corrective steps that will be taken

1. Develop case study on the lessons learned for not identifying the Feedwater Regulating valve seat leakage as an operator workaround. Case study will be presented to the

Condition Review Group (CRG) members, all Operations Instructors, and at Supervisor training. Corrective action is due 9/28/1 5.

Date when full compliance will be achieved River Bend is currently in full compliance with the regulations based on the completed corrective actions discussed above. Additional actions are being taken to address the Extent of Condition. These actions will be completed by September 28, 2015.

Exelon’s And Pentas Controls’s Fake Nuclear Plant Parts

I doubt he would do this without instructions from Peach Bottom and Brunswick.   

Misrepresentation – Display Serial Numbers - Pentas Controls, LLC (Pentas) - In 2010, the owner/president of Pentas directed one of his employees to switch a broken display on a Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station steam leak detector monitor with a working display unit from the Brunswick Nuclear Plant site. Before its shipment, the owner/ president also instructed an employee to file down the serial number on the substitute display to conceal its identity and to ship the working display to Peach Bottom without informing that site of the switch. On March 15, 2011, the owner/president made false statements to NRC investigators by repeatedly denying that the unrepairable Peach Bottom display had been substituted with a working display from Brunswick site.

Because of the egregiousness of the owner/president’s actions, the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted the case in Federal district court in Phoenix, AZ. The president pled guilty to making false statements to NRC investigators, a felony, and was sentenced on February 11, 2013. In exchange for his guilty plea, the president will serve a 5-year probation during which time he will complete several conditions that the NRC developed and included in the DOJ’s global settlement agreement. The NRC will monitor these conditions. As part of the agreement, the owner/president was required to notify his employees of his violation and its consequences and Pentas was required to conduct training on safety-related activities and hire an outside contractor to conduct employee protection training. The owner/president was banned from safety-related decision making for 1 year and from quality-assurance oversight activities indefinitely. Additional information is available in Judgment in Department of Justice prosecution of President of Pentas Controls, Inc., including Terms of Probation (ADAMS Accession No. ML13213A376) and in the NRC Enforcement Program Annual Report, Calendar Year 2012, on page 16; (ADAMS Accession No. ML13079A446).

"The company specializes in nuclear reactor and power plant equipment repairs and refurbishments."

 

This is the model of these monstrous nuclear repair parts/refurbishment vendors or contractors. They sand papered the serial numbers of the nuclear plant component and a whistleblower brought it to the attention of the NRC.

I give you an example in the Brunswick nuclear power plants with their Nordberg DG manufacturer. Their emergency Diesel Generators are no longer supported by a large manufacturer. Nordberrg has long gone bankrupt. Duke has purchased the paperwork ruminant of Nordberg. They got them patents. The major repair parts, parts refurbishment partial owner or vendors basically goes to the commercial ship fleet graveyard where many obsolete Norberg diesel generators now reside. These dgs propelled the screws of the ship. We are talking WW II vintage here. It is a really dirty business. These venders collect parts of the obsolete dgs and refurbish them into nuclear grade parts. They had a lot of troubles with these parts. Duke planed to replace all eight emergency diesel generators on the two plants...but the project was cancelled. The DG job at the two plants was more expensive than actually the value of the two sites. I believe these guys are two plant sites...meaning at least eight diesel generator. Duke thought these guys needed to be replace, but the value of the sites and price of electricity got them backed into a corner nobody wants to be in.
      
Basically the utilities are pretty tough on these small companies. Its provide us what we need or perish. It is a dirty business. In the old days their own employees would do this dirty work. Getting a private company to do it, its a barrier that protects the nuclear plant credibility with the NRC.    

  Originally post on 12/7/12

What a disgusting April 30 letter the NRC wrote to the Pentas president...the letter included at the end of this article.

Can you believe this guy ever had the trustworthiness to work on critical nuclear safety equipment... 

And "United Controls International inc" of Tucker Georgia is all wrapped up in the South Korean fraudulent certification of nuclear power plant replacement parts...

 

This guy wasn't a low level guy...he was the owner of the company. ..you can assume he taught all his employees how to lie to high up NRC officials. Sounds like he was use to getting away with NRC lying?

Phoenix business owner pleads guilty to lying about nuclear power plant repairs

Phoenix Business Journal by Mike Sunnucks, Senior Reporter

The owner of a Phoenix company faces prison time and a $250,000 fine after pleading guilty to making false statements to federal investigators regarding repairs to a Pennsylvania nuclear power plant.

Kevin A. Doyle, 47, of Scottsdale, owns Pentas Controls LLC. The company specializes in nuclear reactor and power plant equipment repairs and refurbishments.

Doyle entered his guilty plea Nov. 30 in federal court in Phoenix.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for Arizona said Pentas was not able to repair measurements display equipment at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in southeastern Pennsylvania.

Federal prosecutors said Doyle then lied to investigators from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about the repair and the shipment of a substitute display panel from the Brunswick Nuclear Generating Station in North Carolina.

Nuclear power plants have a wide array of rules, regulations and laws governing their owners, operators, contractors and repair firms.

Doyle will be sentenced Feb. 11. He faces as much as five years in federal prison and a $250,000 fine.

Pentas Controls

Constellation Nuclear
Tennessee Valley Authority
Duquesne Light
Progress Energy
Texas Utilities
Niagara Mohawk
Exelon
Entergy
Florida Power & Electric
First Energy
Union Electric
Pennsylvania Power & Light
Carolina Power & Light
South Carolina Electric & Gas

Progress Energy

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

IES-Duane Arnold

Texas Utilities.

 

Kevin Doyle

General Manager

Value added services to the  Nuclear Power Utilities Industry 

Pentas Controls was founded in 1992 with the specific objective of supplying quality printed circuit board replacements to the nuclear, fossil fuel, and hydro-electric utilities as well as other industrial customers. Pentas has since developed the specialized capability to troubleshoot, reverse engineer, perform failure analysis, manufacture, repair/refurbish and thoroughly test instrument modules and power supplies as well as printed circuit board assemblies.

Pentas' combined nuclear engineering management experience exceeds 80 years. This, coupled with our in-house assembly and troubleshooting, testing and manufacturing capabilities positions Pentas to handle all customers' needs for refurbishing/repairing or replacing like-for-like instrument and control boards, instrument modules, power supplies and other control devices.

One example of this support would be the total refurbishment of 39 Bailey Modules. This project included replacement of all aluminum electrolytic capacitors (including 100% component receipt testing, Substitution, Evaluations, 48 hour burn-ins, Full Functional Testing and all supporting documentation). This project was completed in 6 days from receipt to the ship date. The utility furnished Pentas all the applicable bills of material, test specifications and Model type/quantities. With this data Pentas was able to order the applicable components and perform receipt testing prior to the Module receipts. This particular project required continuous communication with the utility prior to the start of the project and continually throughout the project. A COMPLETE SUCCESS!!!!!

PENTAS CONTROLS QUALITY IS #1.

Pentas demands quality and integrity in all its interactions, internal and external, to maintain the highest possible reputation within the business community and to promote inter-company unity. Each person is individually responsible for and is expected to maintain quality, integrity and ethics in all corporate activities.

"10CFR50" Appendix B Qualified

Pentas Controls has successfully passed 10CFR50, Appendix B audits and quality servers performed by Progress Energy, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, IES-Duane Arnold, and Texas Utilities.

Pentas Controls can assist you in lowering your maintenance cost.

With today's rapid growth and advancements in the electronics technology and manufacturing methods can renders many instrument designs obsolete shortly after production is complete. This situation presents a unique challenge, especially to industries that require strict control of configuration to maintain equipment qualification or who are trying to contain costs. Often, circuit board and instrumentation and control devices are obsolete long before the life expectancy of their host equipment. At best, new replacements are expensive and require long lead times. In some cases, equipment owners are forced to complete expensive modifications, redesign, and document updates to accommodate the new replacement parts and keep the equipment and/or plant operable. As a result, Operations and Maintenance costs increase significantly.
 

Pentas controls can help you meet your repair and refurbishment requirements.

Pentas can assist our customers in becoming more cost competitive. Pentas' utility or industrial customers can no longer afford to continue paying the high costs demanded by the Original Equipment Manufacturers (if they are still in business) for printed circuit board assemblies or electronic modules, controllers, power supplies, etc. or the costs associated with system or component modifications (i.e., equipment costs, technical specification/procedure changes, downtime, re-training, etc.) By maintaining the existing system configurations, Pentas will lower our customers' Operating and Maintenance Budgets significantly.

About Us

Our Engineering Experience

Pentas' combined nuclear engineering management experience exceeds 80 years. Our in-house assembly and troubleshooting, testing, and manufacturing capabilities position Pentas to handle all customer needs for refurbishing, repairing, or replacing like-for-like instrument and control boards, instrument modules, power supplies, and other control devices.

Our expertise encompasses all areas relevant to electronic device manufacturing and repair for nuclear and commercial industries. Our many years of nuclear experience include dedication testing of various commercial grade electronics for use in safety-related applications; performing numerous equivalency evaluations, developing dedication testing plans for circuit boards, power supplies, and instrumentation and control devices; and performing component and system level troubleshooting and start-up evaluations.

Additionally, our personnel have served on various Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Plant Support Engineering (PSE) and Nuclear Management Resources (NUMARC) committees. Pentas Controls has successfully passed "10CFR50," Appendix B audits, and Quality Surveys performed by Progress Energy, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, IES - Duane Arnold, and Texas Utilities.

Our customer base includes the following electric utilities:

Constellation Nuclear
Tennessee Valley Authority
Duquesne Light
Progress Energy
Texas Utilities
Niagara Mohawk
Exelon
Entergy
Florida Power & Electric
First Energy
Union Electric
Pennsylvania Power & Light
Carolina Power & Light
South Carolina Electric & Gas

David Hignite
QA Manager

· The Quality Control Program of Pentas Controls LLC. meets Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants" audit has successfully undergone Quality audits."

· The intent of the Program is to also meet the requirements of the International Standard (ISO) 9001 "Quality Systems - Model for quality assurance in design/development, production, installation and servicing."

· Pentas Controls, LLC. intends to strictly comply with the Quality Control Program and all lower tier documents to assure our customers the highest standards of quality and integrity.

Pentas demands quality and integrity in all its interactions, internal and external, to maintain the highest possible reputation within the business community and to promote inter-company unity. Each person is individually responsible for and is expected to maintain quality,integrityand ethics in all corporate activities.

RICHARD HENNE
Director of Engineering Services

Pentas Controls - Mission Statement:

"To Assist our Customers in achieving Maximum production output while Minimizing Operating and Maintenance Expenses." 

Achievable by:

Supporting our customers in maintaining existing systems to facilitate the customers needs to be more cost competitive by reducing maintenance costs. 

Enter into long term strategic alliance or partnership arrangements to maintain existing plant configurations throughout plant life.

Partake or assist in any possible future system needs (i.e., new design, enhancements, modifications, etc.). 

Assist in areas of Inventory Control and Warehousing to minimize excessive costs of maintaining inventory and any associated costs ultimately passed on to O&M budgets.

Director of Engineering Services Pentas Controls - Mission Statement: "To Assist our Customers in achieving Maximum production output while Minimizing Operating and Maintenance Expenses."

Achievable by: Supporting our customers in maintaining existing systems to facilitate the customers needs to be more cost competitive by reducing maintenance costs. Enter into long term strategic alliance or partnership arrangements to maintain existing plant configurations throughout plant life. Partake or assist in any possible future system needs (i.e., new design, enhancements, modifications, etc.). Assist in areas of Inventory Control and Warehousing to minimize excessive costs of maintaining inventory and any associated costs ultimately passed on to O&M budgets.

Products

 

All reverse engineering manufactured for identical fit, form and function to original OEM product specification.

Please request Quote for pricing.

Power Supply
Reverse Engineering
PCI-2-04-A

Reverse engineering of Lamda LCS-2-04 Power Supply.

 

Sub Assembly

Reverse Engineering

PCI-101070506-A

Reverse engineering of Yusa Exide Current model.

PCI's in stock and Quick Turn PCB's

Many in stock replacement PCB's and Quick turned manufactured PCB's.

 

Services
 

Value added services include:

Ability for customers to maintain existing system configurations. Repair and refurbishment of printed circuit board assemblies. Repair and refurbishment of power supplies, instrument modules, controllers, etc.

Repair and Refurbished parts OEM's to include:

ABS/PCI	ACDC Electronics	Acopian	Adtech Power
Aipax	Alison Controls	Altec Lansing	AMG Electronics
Analog Devices	Armistead	ASI	Astec
Bell & Howell	Bentley-Nevada	Berkleonics	BW/IP
C & D	Calex	Canberra	CE
CE ACDC Electronics	Chemetron	Computer Products	Condor Inc.
Controlotron	Cooper	Cooper Electronics	CPI
Deltron	Devar	Diamond Electronics	Dressen-Barnes
Eaton	Ederer	Electro Devices	Electronique
Encore	Encore Elec.	ESFAS	Esterline Angus
F & P	Factron	Federal Signal Corp.	Fiber Options
Fire Systems Inc.	Fluid Components	Foxboro	GA Technologies
Gamma-Metrics	GE	GEMAC	General Atomic
Gulf Electronics	Hathaway Corp.	Hathaway/PCI	HC Power Inc.
Honeywell	HV	Hydro Products	Ingersoll-Rand
ITT Barton	Kaman	Kaman/AIS	KaY-Ray
Kemco	Kepco	L & N	Lambda
LH Research	Louis Allis	Love Controls	National Sonics
Newport	Nine Mile	NLI	NMC
NRC	Optron	Panalarm	Pentas Controls LLC
PCI/ASI	PCI/Hathaway	PCI/National Sonics	PCI/Teledyne
Pentas Controls/Teledyne	Pioneer Magnetics	PMC	Polyphase Instruments
Power Design	Power One	Pyrotonics	RFL
Riley	RIS	Robicon	Ronan
Rosemount	RTP	S & K	Schlumberger
SCI	S-E-Co.	Sentry	Sentry Equi, Inc.
Seimens	Simmonds	Percesion	SIMPLEX
SKF	Sola	Solidstate Controls	Sorrento
Speedomax	SPS	Struthers-Dunn	TEC
Technical Novations	Thermon	TI	Todd
Topaz	Tracor Westronics	Transistor Devices	Transmation
Triumph Controls, Inc.	Trygon	Validyne	Victoreen
Vitro Corp.	Wanless	Weathermeasure	Westinghouse
Westronics	Woodward	Yuasa Exide	Zenith

Failure Analysis Capabilities:

Pentas Controls can provide all levels of module, PCB and component level root cause failure analysis reporting. Pentas Controls possesses the ability to analyze and test almost any electrical component, PCB assembly or Module assembly.

We have a multi-million dollar laboratory at our disposal to analyze performance, root cause of failure, or operating characteristics of circuit board assemblies or electronic modules, controllers, power supplies, etc., as well as their component parts

Sophisticated test equipment allows us to directly observe electrical device semiconductor junctions and additional capabilities range up to and include layer-by- layer die analysis to determine cause of failure in integrated circuits.

Our laboratory is also capable of performing material analysis and testing.

With access to these formidable capabilities, Pentas Controls can determine root cause of failure for frequently replaced "trouble" printed circuit boards or electronic modules, controllers, power supplies, etc., and suggest corrective action which will improve the reliability of these components.

April 30, 2013

Mr. Kevin Doyle, President

Pentas Controls, LLC

20650 N 29

th Place

Suite 106
Phoenix, AZ 85050

Dear Mr. Doyle:

We have reviewed the information you included in your various email submissions. As noted in our April 4, 2013, email response, please be aware that Pentas Controls, LLC (hereinafter

referred to as Pentas Controls) is subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC inspections, which will determine whether Pentas Controls is meeting all applicable NRC regulations and requirements as well as the Terms of Probation contained in your sentencing document. NRC requirements that apply to Pentas Controls include, for example, that Pentas Controls shall comply with NRC regulations 10 CFR §§ 50.5, Deliberate Misconduct; 50.7, Employee Protection; 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information; 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance; and Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants. The Terms of Probation are additional requirements that Pentas Controls must complete as it engages in activities as a vendor of nuclear services and repairs.

In light of your submissions to the NRC in response to the Terms of Probation contained in your sentencing document, the NRC has the following responses:

I. Communication:

A. Requirement:

1(a): Within 30 days of sentencing, defendant shall provide a letter or memo to his employees at Pentas Controls, LLC (hereinafter Pentas Controls) involved in any nuclear safety-related activities including, but not limited to, the repair, refurbishment, or replacement of nuclear safety-related items, advising them that he violated NRC requirements and the consequences of his violation.

B. Submission:

You sent an initial letter to Pentas Controls employees within the appropriate time in response to Requirement 1(a) above; however, the first letter failed to capture the basis for this communication as articulated in the Terms of Probation. You subsequently sent a revised letter to your employees addressing most of the issues the NRC raised but concluded the letter with a statement that Pentas Controls employees could bring safety-related concerns to you in addition to the other points of contact. In a subsequent email, the NRC advised you that including yourself as a point of contact was not appropriate.

On March 26, 2013, you sent the NRC an email with an attachment containing a third letter you provided to Pentas Controls employees that removes the offending language, i.e., this revision excludes your name as a point of contact.

C. NRC Response: Your email states that you provided the revised letter attached to your March 26, 2013 email to Pentas Controls employees involved in any nuclear safety-related activities including, but not limited to, the repair, refurbishment, or replacement of nuclear safety-related items. You removed your name as a point of contact for Pentas Controls employees to bring safety-related concerns and appropriately addressed the other information included in Requirement 1(a). The NRC will review Pentas Controls documentation during inspection to verify this.

II. Safety-Related Training:

A. Requirement:

 

2 (a): Pentas Controls will create a written policy, develop training, and train employees
involved in any nuclear safety-related activities including but not limited to the repair, refurbishment, or replacement of nuclear safety-related items, addressing compliance with NRC regulations within 60 days of sentencing.

B. Submission:

You have hired a Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, Mr. Robert Prigmore.

You submitted a document entitled “Pentas Controls, 10 CFR Part 21 Notifications.”

You also submitted QA Procedures for Qualification of Inspection and Testing Personnel and Qualification of Solder Personnel.

C. NRC Response: Mr. Prigmore’s resume indicates that he is qualified to create the written policy, develop training and train employees in areas addressing compliance with NRC regulations specifically focusing on QA processes and procedures that are contained in 10 CFR Part 21 and Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50.

The NRC is not aware of any written procedures indicating that Pentas Controls has a written policy addressing the requirements in Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50.

The QA Manager is responsible for evaluating qualification procedures for adequacy. As part of NRC inspection, we will review these procedures and verify their implementation, including training that the QA Manager provides, per the Terms of Probation and Appendix B requirements. However, the NRC does not intend to review Pentas Controls qualification

procedures to provide guidance on how to meet Appendix B requirements.

III. Employee Protection Training:

A. Requirement: 2(b): Within 90 days of sentencing, Pentas Controls shall hire an outside consultant, approved by the NRC, with expertise in NRC employee protection regulations to develop and conduct training modules, and provide recommendations for improvement. The training will include:

1. Information regarding the important role an open and collaborative work environment

plays in a positive safety culture as described in the NRC’s Safety Culture Policy Statement, which applies to vendors and suppliers of nuclear safety-related items;

2. The importance of providing complete and accurate information to the NRC, including a

focus on the actions that led to the subject terms of probation and the lesson-learned from the precipitating event to include a review of the consequences of and the potential actions that NRC may take against an individual for willful violations;

3. A focus on 10 CFR 50.5, “Deliberate Misconduct,” 50.7, “Employee Protection,” and 50.9. “Completeness and Accuracy of Information” to include potential enforcement outcomes when these requirements are violated either by an organization such as Pentas Controls or an individual.

4. This requirement then lists several items that must be included in this training, including that training records shall be retained consistent with applicable Pentas Controls record retention policies and made available to the NRC upon request.

B. Submission:

To satisfy this requirement, you initially submitted a list of employees that had attended training that was developed and completed by the Pentas Controls QA Manager, Mr. Prigmore. Because Mr. Prigmore is the QA Manager for Pentas Controls, he does not meet the requirement that initial training be developed and provided by an outside consultant. The NRC called this to your attention. In response, in emails dated April 8 and April 9, 2013, you

submitted the resumes of three outside consultants, i.e., Mr. David A. Taggart, Mr. Peter J. Rail, and Mr. Russell Wise, to develop and conduct the training specified in 2(b).

C. NRC Response:

The NRC has reviewed the resumes of the consultants and all three consultants appear qualified to develop and provide this training; however, Mr. Taggart is associated with the NDT Consulting Group, LLC, which is the same consulting company with which Mr. Prigmore has been associated. This association does not provide the independence envisioned by this requirement. While an actual conflict of interest may not exist; the appearance of a conflict of interest does exist. As with the training discussed in item 2(a) above, as part of its inspection, the NRC will review the training records and verify its implementation per the Terms of Probation.

IV. Organizational Changes:

A. Requirements:

3(a): For the first 365 days of probation, defendant is banned from any decision-making authority under the purview of the NRC regulatory authority regarding any nuclear safety-related activities included but not limited to repair, refurbishment or replacement of nuclear safety related tems. 3(b): Defendant shall be removed indefinitely as the individual responsible for QA oversight of activities regarding the repair, refurbishment or replacement of nuclear safety-related items. The NRC, in consultation with the U.S. Probation Office, will have the authority to reduce the restrictive nature of this term as appropriate.

3(d): Pentas Controls will hire a Quality Assurance Manager to provide oversight for the repairs, refurbishment or replacement of all nuclear safety related items. Defendant will not have any authority over the quality assurance activities in order to ensure sufficient independence from cost and schedule when opposed to safety considerations.

B. Submission:

You submitted a “Statement of Authority and Policy” which notes, in pertinent part, that the

Quality Assurance Program is delegated to the Quality Assurance Director; however, this
statement includes language that allows you to act in the place of the QA Manager in his/her
absence.

C. NRC Response:

The Statement of Authority and Policy does not provide the independence specified by the

requirements in paragraph 3. Specifically, the last paragraph of this delegation of authority
indicates that, “In the absence of the Quality Assurance Director, the president may act in his stead. In the absence of the President, the Quality Assurance Director may act in his stead.”

V. Additional Comments:

You asked whether Pentas Controls can use Skype to provide the initial employee protection training. While the method of training is not expressly specified in the Terms of Probation, as noted above, the NRC will review the actions taken to satisfy NRC regulations and the requirements specified in the Terms of Probation to verify that they have been appropriately implemented. The NRC will also review the effectiveness of this training during NRC inspections. While the NRC has provided Ms. Schwartz as a point of contact in the event that you have questions pertaining to the implementation of the Terms of Probation, you are solely responsible for ensuring the implementation of these terms. As noted above in this letter, Pentas Controls is subject to NRC inspections, which will determine whether Pentas Controls is meeting all applicable NRC regulations and requirements as well as the Terms of Probation contained in your sentencing document.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Dave Solorio, Chief

Concerns Resolution Branch

Office of Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

K. Doyle - 5 -

While the NRC has provided Ms. Schwartz as a point of contact in the event that you have questions pertaining to the implementation of the Terms of Probation, you are solely responsible for ensuring the implementation of these terms. As noted above in this letter, Pentas Controls is subject to NRC inspections, which will determine whether Pentas Controls is meeting all applicable NRC regulations and requirements as well as the Terms of Probation contained in your sentencing document.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Dave Solorio, Chief

Concerns Resolution Branch

Office of Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

DISTRIBUTION:

MLemoncelli, OGC DCopeland, NRO RZimmerman

ERoach, NRO ACampbell RArrighi

OE R/F

ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: ML13115A953