NRC Checking if Gonads protected With Titanium Vest On Employees at Palisades (offical NRC pictures).

Entergy-Palisades replaced leaking CRMD housings more often than you change the oil in your car. To do this job, they take off the reactor vessel head and place it aside on the refueling floor. It is pretty radioactivity hot job and I think they are in respirators. They had lots of preventable fuel failures in the recent past and that makes this job particularly radioactivity hot.

Hmm, does these employees feel so insecure about the high radiation levels, the "not required vest" acts as a toddler blanket comforter?

Is it for beta or alpha protection?  

The below translated, Entergy said these titanium vest gave them more protection than they actually provided...meaning Palisades put down on the paperwork for these employees a radiation dose lower than what they actually got. They collectively got 98 rems more dose than what they first put down on paperwork. I am wondering of the HP contractor talked Entergy into this artificial titanium shield reduction in dose...hey, you can report your dose to the NRC lower than it actually is. How much of this titanium dose crap is going on throughout the industry. Palisades and Entergy is supposed to have highly educated and experience professional people on their staff such that this never could occur.

Well, it is a lot more complicated than I stated it. It is basically they got a tremendous radiation gradient, if they put  radiation detectors in the upper chest and their ass is sitting on a hot spot without a detector there…the dose detected is not accurate. Their fingers might be taking off a nut in a hot zone, with the rest of the body not being in that field. They basically got computer programs that can take these peripheral reading and come up with a whole dose.  

That reactor head and its control rod drive mechanism was defective and obsolete since the first day that reactor came into operation. Palisades should have designed, manufactured and installed a new head and CDRM package decades ago. But they been always been crying poor boy and one step away from permanent shutdown.

See, you can’t see this in its proper context. I bitterly complained about the dangerous and poorly designed primary coolant pumps during this very same outage. The NRC has been letting them get away with operating not according to plant designs and licensing for decades…thus causing impeller blades to fly out of the housing and get flung all around the coolant and stuck in areas in the reactor.

 It is like the tire nuts on your right front wheel being loose and you feel front end shaking as you drive the car. The NRC says this it is safe to drive until you get to the next oil change. If the NRC allows 100 nuclear plants to operate with that kind of attitude, then our nation is in deep trouble when eventually one plant pops its cork. 

Basically this is a slap on the wrist of Entergy having no meaning to interrupt the work on the CRDM job. This happened around early this year in Feb/Mar...why is this inspection report especially so late? Typically the NRC makes these reports like this, it is harmless to the big boy players… but it acts as protection against somebody calling it as a cover-up. This is how you do cover ups today…disclose it as a shield against somebody calling it coverup in in the future. It is corruption and cover-up protection. It is pretty smart really.

These guys are on artificial respiration and one breath away from a permanent plant shutdown…the NRC now has a policy to handle these guys with kit gloves..

December 2, 2014

EA-14-168

SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT, NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2014010, PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Preliminary White. The NRC identified a finding and two apparent violations of NRC requirements associated with the replacement of CRD housings between February 6 and March 8, 2014. Specifically, the inspectors identified an apparent violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 20.1201, "Occupational Dose Limits for Adults," because the licensee failed to ensure that radiation worker dosimeters calibrated to the Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) were located at the highest exposed portion of the respective compartment, a condition of the NRC-approved method for determining effective dose equivalent external (EDEX). The inspectors also identified an example of an apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4 "Procedures," associated with this finding. Upon identification of this issue, the licensee suspended the use of EDEX and tungsten shield vests. The licensee re-calculated the dose received for the workers involved and updated the nuclear power industry’s dose tracking system with the revised dose results. Additionally, a root cause evaluation was initiated under Condition Report CR-PLP-2014-04683.

Definitely gonads not protected.

What’s the NRC’s proof that body got gonads? 

Wall Street Scam: Relicensing Nuclear Plants for 80 Years and Nuclear Grade Titanium Gonad Protection Shields.

Wall Street Scam: Relicensing nuclear plants for 80 years and titanium gonad protection shields.

I think the aims of this is to artificially increasing the value of the utility company and its stock price. They get a free couple of pennies worth of corporate valuation over this lie.

A lot of these plants are destroying the long term value of these plants by tolerating gross fuel failures aiming to buttress short term profits over the long term viability of the plant.   

Bet you before the 50 year old mark most of these nuclear utilities will find it at the uneconomical tipping point to keep up with the maintenance of these nuclear plants. The primary core and the coolant system radiation and contamination levels constantly build up in the life of these plants.  With the high radiation levels, these guys will find it impractical (without harming their employees) to service and perform maintenance in their primary system. They  will waste a lot of money trying to protect their employees against radiation instead of maintaining and increasing safety through upgrades and maintenance.

The Palisades CRDM housing replacement job is a prime example. Did you ever see the “Silver Lining Playbook” movie. The Entergy employees at Palisades working on the CRDM housing job wore greater than 30 pound titanium chest vest in order to protect themselves from radiation. Do you remember Pat Solatano Jr wearing a black plastic trash bag chest vest? The must also have been wearing 50 pounds lead diapers to protect their gonads.

   

Nope,  the NRC dinged Palisades on not protecting their employee's gonads. How would you like that job, an NRC radiation titanium shield gonad  protector inspector? 

NRC inspector: "Furthermore, some photos depicted workers sitting in the work area in an orientation that negates the protective qualities of the tungsten shield vest for the gonads while the dosimeter for those organs remained shielded by the tungsten shield vest."

I think this is a male sitting on a radiative hot nuclear reactor head with a titanium gonad shield...this is how not to protect you gonads!!!

Gonads definitely not protected! 

Titanium vest shield and gonads not protected(one with black vest on)

60.

Although no applications for an SLR have been submitted, several utilities are evaluating whether to apply for one, including Dominion Resources for its Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia (current license expiration dates of 2032 and 2033) as well as Exelon for its Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 in Pennsylvania (current license 

Nearly all U.S. nuclear power plants need extension past 60 years to operate beyond 2050 

December 8, 2014

When nuclear power plants are built, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the authority to issue initial operating licenses for a period of 40 years. Beyond that, the reactors need license renewals, and the NRC has granted 20-year license renewals to 74 of the 100 operating reactors in the U.S., according to the Energy Information Administration.

These reactors may now operate for a total period of 60 years. They represent a cumulative capacity of a little more than 69,000 MW. The NRC is currently reviewing license renewal applications for an additional 17 nuclear reactors, and expects to receive seven more applications in the next few years. 

With the bulk of the existing nuclear fleet licensed before 1990, nearly all existing reactors will be more than 60 years old by 2050. Unless a utility applies for and receives a subsequent license renewal that could further extend the operating lives of their reactors up to 20 additional years, the reactors will not generate power beyond age 60...

Entergy-River Bend fined $70,000 for Improper Security Department Decorium.

I had a high NRC OIG official asked me if I know about any more security department events at the Palisades plant. Now we know why she asked me that. What a terribly troubled company. How many of these Confirmatory Orders with the repeated basic aims of training the plant staff and flee, all surrounding ethics and NRC requirements have we seen in recent years at Entergy-nuclear? There has been a tremendous amount of similar Confirmatory Orders and the focus always is telling the truth, following NRC regulations and ethics fleet wide. It is call crazy doing the same wrong thing over and over again without change.

I bet you this is about offensive materials in the security watch stations or offices. You notice Entergy's management and the  NRC can't figure out who are the culprits with violating the decorum not stated policies.  I thinking it is either porn, racial intimidation and it even might be right wing anti government propaganda. Is these even against any NRC rule.

You get it, it is national security terrorism secrecy information where they can't publicly describe what this $70,000 decorum violation is all about?  

Basically we are talking about two systems of accountability...a NRC secret system of withholding information that obviously doesn't work and the transparently shaming a bad utility actor with openly disclosing all security violations. If you can’t control these guys through your regulations, we can control them through public shaming and shutting down nuclear plants.

But mike, that would give information to terrorist. The vulnerabilities are giving terrorist information or allowing these utilities in a secret system of bloodless paper cuts of no NRC accountability ...not requiring a change in behavior that allows the security staff to cycle down into hidden dysfunction. We have seen this as example at Vermont Yankee. I think we would all be a lot more safer if we'd seen all the security violations and we effectively shamed a corporation publicly with their bad behaviors. Then the public and community could drive the NRC and utility into behavior change with a bad actor utility.

As this system of security secrets stands now, is these secret protect the industry and the NRC from accountability. The system allows these licensees to spend less money on security. It is a tragic abuse of using national security as a tool to protect these corporations...it is in our highest societal interest to maintain faith in a centralized organizing force or government in time of a crisis. If these security staffs at these nuclear plants are more dysfunctional than disclosed through the paper cut punishment NRC bad behavior change...then we will lose faith in government if the security staff collapses in the face of insignificant terrorist like pressure.

In other words, shaming these utilities with the truth on violations would create a system that bolsters and increases the public safety more than the vulnerabilities of giving terrorist insignificant advantages with insider security information prior to an attack. The sin would be if the NRC gave River Bend the old wink wink and documentation paper cut punishment of no bother...their security department cycles down unseen into dysfunction more that the community can see and correct. Then a terrorist attack occurs and the security department isn't really prepared for it.
The last time I put terrorism and nuclear plant in the same sentence, I had two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force agents at my door asking questions and threatening to out me into jail. 

Democracy in not a system for cowards!!!    

CONFIRMATORY ORDER, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND CIVIL PENALTY- NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2014407 AND NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2012-022- RIVER BEND STATION

On September 22, 2014, the NRC and Entergy met in an ADR session mediated by a
professional mediator, arranged through the Cornell University Scheinman Institute on Conflict
Resolution. ADR is a process in which a neutral mediator, with no decision-making authority,

OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION

assists the parties in reaching an agreement on resolving any differences regarding the dispute.
During the ADR session, a preliminary settlement agreement was reached. The elements of
that preliminary agreement, with the exception of the section that includes SRI, are described
below. The portions of the agreement that contain SRI, as well as the sections of this
Confirmatory Order that address SRI, are described in the aforementioned non-public
Attachment. The following description of the preliminary ADR agreement, and the required
actions described in Section V of this Confirmatory Order, include references to the non-public
Attachment to allow for public release of this Confirmatory Order. The publicly available
elements of the agreement consist of the following:

The NRC recognizes the corrective actions that Entergy has already implemented associated
with the apparent violation and preliminary finding. Entergy's corrective actions are described in
the non-public Attachment.

A. The NRC and Entergy agree that a willful violation of Title 1 0 Code of Federal
Regulations (1 0 CFR) Part 73 occurred on March 18, 2012, at River Bend Station.
However, the NRC and Entergy disagree on the specific aspects of that willful
characterization of the violation. The details regarding these aspects are described in
the non-public Attachment.

1. The NRC concluded that the security-related violation occurred because of the
deliberate misconduct of an unidentified security officer at River Bend Station.
2. Entergy does not believe that willful intent was involved in all aspects of the violation.
3
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION

B. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will revise its security
procedures.

C. Within 3 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will, at each of its
nuclear plants, conduct a review of its controls for SRI and communicate to the NRC the
results of the review. Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy
will establish new controls and will provide its proposed controls to the NRC for its
review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy any concerns regarding the controls
within 60 days of submittal for resolution in a manner acceptable to both parties.
Entergy will implement the controls within 15 months from the date of this Confirmatory
Order. The details regarding these controls are described in the non-public Attachment.
D. Within 9 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will review and
evaluate the location and storage of SRI at each of its nuclear plants. The details are
described in the non-public Attachment.

E. Entergy will develop a "commitment to compliance" statement or a similar document
highlighting the special responsibilities of nuclear security personnel. This document will
explain that nuclear security personnel need to comply with regulations and procedures,
and it will describe the potential consequences if compliance does not occur. Within
12 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will require at each of its
nuclear plants that nuclear security personnel read and sign the statement (subject to
any collective bargaining obligations it may have). Entergy will include the reading and
signing of this statement in the initial qualification process of nuclear security personnel.
The details are described in the non-public Attachment.
4
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION
OFFICIAL USE! ONLY SEiCURITY REiLATEiD INFORMATION

F. Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will identify those
security posts in each of its nuclear plants that should be subject to certain decorum
standards that will ensure a professional environment in those areas. Once identified,
Entergy will establish decorum protocols for those security posts. In addition, within
6 months of the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will provide its proposed
decorum protocols to the NRC for its review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy any
concerns regarding the proposed decorum protocols within 60 days of submittal for
resolution in a manner acceptable to both parties. Entergy will implement the decorum
protocols within 12 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order.

G. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will prepare a
"lessons learned" presentation to be delivered to Entergy nuclear employees at each of
its nuclear plants describing the event that formed the basis for this violation. Prior to
making the presentation, Entergy will provide its proposed presentation to the NRC for
its review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy any concerns regarding the
presentation within 30 days of submittal. Entergy will deliver the presentation to Entergy
nuclear employees within 12 months of this Confirmatory Order.

H. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will prepare a
presentation describing the event that formed the basis for this violation. The
presentation will be delivered to the Nuclear Security Working Group and the National
Nuclear Security Conference (subject to acceptance of the conference-organizing
committees). This presentation will include, among other subjects, the subjects covered
in the non-public Attachment to this Confirmatory Order. Prior to making the
presentation, Entergy will provide its proposed presentation to the NRC for its review.

OFFICIAL USE! ONLY SEiCURITY REiLATED INFORMATION
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION

The NRC will communicate to Entergy any concerns regarding the presentation within
30 days of submittal. Entergy will deliver the presentation within 12 months of this
Confirmatory Order.

I. Within 6 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will ensure that an
independent third party conducts a safety culture assessment of the Security
organization at River Bend Station. The results will be incorporated into Entergy's
corrective action program as appropriate. A copy of the completed assessment will be
made available for NRC review.

J. Within 4 months from the date of this Confirmatory Order, Entergy will prepare refresher
training on the provisions of 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9 for Entergy employees at each of its
nuclear plants. Prior to conducting the training, Entergy will provide its proposed
refresher training plan to the NRC for its review. The NRC will communicate to Entergy
any concerns regarding the plan within 30 days of submittal for resolution in a manner
acceptable to both parties. Entergy will complete administration of this refresher training
within 12 months of

( North Anna) Dominion's Intentionally Running Their Nuclear Reactor to Failure Philosophy

Dec 14

WAM-E.1   
08:30  Tungsten Shield Vest Barbara Thompson*, Dominion - North 
Anna Power Station 


Abstract: This paper 
will discuss the evaluation and implementation of the tungsten shield vest as an 
ALARA measure to reduce personnel exposure. The tungsten shield vest was 
invented in 2009 by an industry veteran from Entergy Arkansas Nuclear One. The 
form-fitting shield vests are 
similar to lead vests worn to protect dental and medical patients from 
radiation exposure – but much lighter. Tungsten shielding reduces the amount of 
radiation to the parts of the body that are most sensitive to ionizing radiation and 
is flexible enough to move with the worker. In 2010, the North Anna Power 
Station became the first nuclear facility in the Dominion Fleet to test and use 
tungsten shielding vests. Due to the non-uniform radiation field created by the 
vest, the Radiological Protection group utilized Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) 
monitoring of individual whole body compartments. The tungsten shield vests have 
been used for fuel manipulator roller replacement, pressurizer spray valve 
repairs, and transfer canal upender sheave replacement. Initial test results 
showed up to a 30 percent reduction in personal radiation exposure for workers 
doing outage maintenance tasks within the containment building at North Anna. 
The use of tungsten vests has allowed the benefits of shielding to become mobile 
with the worker and their tasks, thus reducing the overall radiation exposure to 
the worker. 

Fuel Reliability: How it affects the industry, and one fuel vendor's journey to flawless fuel performance
http://www.power-eng.com/articles/npi/print/volume-7/issue-4/nucleus/fuel-reliability-how-it-affects-the-industry-and-one-fuel-vendor-s-journey-to-flawless-fuel-performance.html

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML14338A739

Trait Talk: A questioning Attitude

For example, ten years after 
removal from a reactor, the surface dose rate for a typical spent fuel 
assembly exceeds 10,000 rem/hour, whereas a fatal whole-body dose for humans is 
about 500 rem (if received all at one time). Furthermore, if constituents of 
these high-level wastes were to get into ground water or rivers, they could 
enter into food chains.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1993/in93082.html

Information Notice No. 93-82: Recent Fuel and Core Performance problems in Operating Reactor

These fuel failures have been attributed to high cross flows,
caused, in part, from mixed fuel designs which induced fuel rod vibration with
fretting wear at the lower grids.  The mixture of standard and VANTAGE 5H fuel
(with debris filter bottom nozzles) resulted in axial mismatches between the
bottom nozzles and the grid spacers of the two fuel types.

Although the staff recognizes that it is impossible
to avoid all fuel rod failures and that cleanup systems are installed to handle a
small number of leaking rods, the review must ensure that fuel does not fail as a
result of specific causes during normal operation and AOOs.

The allowable fretting wear should be stated in
the safety analysis report, and the stress and fatigue limits in items (i)
and (ii) above should presume the existence of this wear.

2.3 Fuel Dispersal
Fuel dispersal is the ejection of fuel fragments or particles through a rupture or opening in the
cladding. For the purpose of this report, fuel dispersal is said to have occurred if any fuel
material is found outside of the fuel rod. Even if the fuel material is small in quantity, the finding
will be noted and qualified by the nature of the dispersal (e.g., “only a small black powder on the
test chamber wall was observed”).


3.14. Fuel fragmentation and fuel dispersal
In this chapter, fuel fragmentation refers to situations for which the fuel
cladding breaks into pieces and fuel dispersal to situations for which fuel particles
escape from the cladding following a rupture.
Although fuel fragmentation is traditionally considered to exist only in
conjunction with highly energetic events such as the reactivity-initiated accidents
(RIA), recent results from the Halden test reactor show that fuel fragmentation can
also occur during the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).


1981: US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

4.2


"Fuel rod failure" means that the fuel rod leaks and that the first fission product barrier (the cladding) has,
therefore, been breached.

Fuel rod failure is defined as the
loss of fuel rod hermeticity.


007

In a “fuel rod failure,” the fuel rod leaks and the first fission product barrier (the cladding) is breached.

Definition

1. (General Physics) sealed so as to be airtight

2. hidden or protected from the outside world

Fuel Vendor
PWR
Fuel Failure Management
Handbook
The tendency of grid-rod fretting
increases with increased cross flow, e.g. due to different pressure drops of
different fuel assembly designs sitting adjacent to each other. Baffle jetting will
also increase the risk of getting grid-rod fretting. To reduce the risk of getting
grid-rod fretting, appropriate loop tests should be performed to verify the
fretting performance of a new grid design.

The ultimate solution is the conversion of down-flow design to up-flow
design.
These above mentioned corrective actions have successfully reduced the
number of plants and fuel assemblies that are affected by this failure
mechanism. Very few fuel failure as the result of baffle jetting has been
observed in recent years.


Brief Description: This 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation is being performed to support the
transition to RFA-2 fuel at North Anna.

Reason for Change: ETE-NAF-2011-0173 implements the analyses supporting the
RFA-2 fuel transition at North Anna. UCR-2010-007 is a UFSAR change request that
encompasses the changes related to the RFA-2 fuel transition at North Anna. Three
License Amendment Requests (LARs) were submitted to the NRC for approval in
support of the RFA-2 transition at North Anna. The LAR for Optimized ZIRLO has been
approved and the LARs for VIPRE-D and Westinghouse's Best Estimate Large Break
LOCA evaluation were being tracked and were subsequently approved by the NRC.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0631/ML063110095.pdf

BAFFLE JETTING RESULTS IN FUEL ROD DEGRADATION AT VIRGIL C. SUMMER

Examination of two previous cycle fuel assemblies from the same location showed indications of baffle jetting (shiny areas) on the same fuel rod location as P1.



https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML14316A338

November 10, 2014
Mr. David A. Heacock
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060
SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000338/2014004 and 05000339/2014004

The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Review (OSR) and contingency plans for the
Unit 2 refueling outage, which began September 7, 2014, to confirm that the licensee
had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific
problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense in-
depth.




1998:
North Anna Unit 1 Fuel Failures
During the present refueling outage, it was determined that there were 19 failed (leaking) fuel rods in 9 assemblies in the completed cycle at North Anna
Unit 1. Coolant activity had indicated fuel failures, but the number was unknown until the outage. These failures were all in third-cycle, ZIRLO clad fuel,
located near the baffle. The root cause investigation is underway, with the most likely cause being grid to rod fretting at the mid grids. These failures
appear to be similar to vibration related failures that were experienced in the 1993 time frame at two other plants. The North Anna fuel had incorporated
the rotated grids which was the fix for the previous problem. All affected assemblies were scheduled for discharge during this outage. Virginia Power has
installed vibration suppression devices on all peripheral locations for the upcoming cycle. The Reactor Systems Branch (SRXB) will continue to follow this
issue.


https://www.nukeworker.com/forum/index.php?action=printpage%3Btopic=38257.0

Title: Re: North Anna Fuel Failure
Post by: cheme09 on Sep 18, 2014, 05:39

---

Has been Areva, but we're in the process of going to W fuel. I think the last Areva bundles come out next outage.

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML060200275
G45 Fuel Assembly Clad Damage

The G45 assembly has been ultrasonically and visually inspected and the failure is in a high power IFBA rod and is believed to have occurred during the initial power ascension for Cycle 6. This is evident by the secondary hydriding of the failed rod and the high Iodine concentrations experienced in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) during R Cycle 6.

The existence of a cladding leak was initially established during Cycle 6 operation through sampling of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) that identified elevated levels of Iodine 131 (1-131) and Xenon 133 (Xe-133).

This condition was documented in TVA's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 9174. A limit for the concentration of 1-131 is defined in Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.16, "Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity." In order to ensure this limit was closely monitored during Cycle 6, the RCS was sampled three times a week and reviewed by site management.

At the time a fuel leak was initially identified in October 2003, Operations personnel notified appropriate site
management of the problem and ensured the problem was documented in TVA's corrective action program.
When the cladding defect in rod G45 was identified in November 2005, the Operations staff ensured the
required notifications were made to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.

http://www.orau.org/ptp/PTP%20Library/library/NRC/Info/in87039.pdf

August 21, 1987
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 87-39: CONTROL OF HOT PARTICLE CONTAMINATION
AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
In a recent study for the NRC (Reference 3), it was reported that a plant
operating with 0.125 percent pin-hole fuel cladding defects showed a
general five-fold increase in whole-body radiation exposure rates in some
IN 87-39
August 21, 1987
Page 4 of 5
areas of the plant when compared to a sister plant with high-integrity
fuel (<0 .01="" around="" certain="" degraded="" leakers="" p="" percent="" plant="" systems="" the="">fuel may elevate radiation exposure rates even more.


http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1982/in82027.html

Information Notice No. 82-27: FUEL ROD DEGRADATION RESULTING FROM BAFFLE WATER-JET IMPINGEMENT

Although the baffle water-jetting problem has been experienced in a limited 
number of Westinghouse PWRs, this information notice is being distributed to
all licensees and construction permit holders, including PWRs whose core 
baffle designs may have features which contribute to fuel rod failures as 
previously described.  Such fuel degradation may result in relatively high 
primary coolant activity and thereby impede periodic maintenance-related 
functions and/or pose radiological hazards to personnel. 

2010: CR319099, “North Anna 2 confirmed single fuel rod failure” (subsequently
determined to result from unidentified debris)

Just in Time Training Presentation, Response to Recently Identified Fuel Failures, dated 09/22/2014

09/06/2014

REFUELING OUTAGE

LER 2014-002-00: Failed Fuel Assembly  

Nov 12, 2014

05000338/340

On September 15, 2014, with Unit 2 defueled, debris that had the potential to be fuel fragments was located on the core plate directly below the B131 core location, where fuel assembly 4Z9 resided during Cycle 23. Video inspection of fuel assembly 4Z9 identified that the top springs of two fuel pins were dislodged.

Due to the fact that the fuel damage exceeded expected conditions, at 1454 on September 15, 2014, this event was reported as an eight hour report as per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. Detailed video inspections estimated that 15 fuel pellets were dislodged from fuel assembly 4Z9. During efforts to identify and recover the fuel pellets, 7 fuel pellets worth of material were not found and have already or are expected to granulate into fine particles that will dissolve in low flow areas of the primary plant systems, or be removed by normal purification processes. Since the specific location of the 7 fuel pellets is undesignated and because those pellets contain licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in App. C of 10 CFR 20, a report was made at 1227 on September 30, 2014, pursuant to 10 CFR 74.11(a) and to 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(ii). The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

At 0900 on September 15, 2014, with Unit 2 defueled, debris that had the potential to be fuel fragments was located on the core plate (EIIS System - AC) directly below the B1 1 core location. Ten pieces of material, approximately 1/8" in diameter, were found. The material was near the edge of the outer flow hole and partially under the gap between the baffle plate and the core plate. Fuel assembly (ElIS System -AC) 4Z9 was located at the B131 location during Cycle 23. Video inspection of fuel assembly 4Z9 identified that the top springs of two fuel pins were dislodged.

Due to the fact that the fuel damage exceeded expected conditions, at 1454 on September 15, 2014, this event was reported as an eight hour report as per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded.

Detailed video inspections estimated that fifteen (15) fuel pellets were dislodged from fuel assembly 4Z9. For reference, the reactor core contains approximately 15 million fuel pellets. During efforts to identify and recover the fuel pellets, debris fragments estimated to represent five (5) fuel pellets were found in the damaged fuel assembly that is currently in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) (EIIS System - DA). In addition, an estimated three (3) pellets worth of material was retrieved by the foreign object search and retrieval (FOSAR) efforts in the reactor vessel and are now located in the SFP. The remaining seven (7) fuel pellets have already or are expected to granulate into fine particles that will dissolve in low flow areas of the primary plant systems or be removed by normal purification processes. However, since the specific location of the seven (7) fuel pellets is undesignated, a report was made at 1227 on September 30, 2014, pursuant to 10 CFR 74.11 (a) for the loss of special nuclear material (SNM). At that same time, a report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(ii) because the seven (7) fuel pellets contain licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C of 10 CFR 20. 10 CFR 20.2201(b) requires a written report after the initial notification for the occurrence of any lost, stolen, or missing licensed material that was reported under 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(ii) for licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C of 10 CFR 20. The following topics are required to be addressed:

(i) A description of the licensed material involved, including kind, quantity, and chemical and physical form:

Fuel Pellet Description - Based on the review of the video of the recovered material, the possibility that these fuel pellets have remained intact is very low.

Type of Special Nuclear Material Uranium dioxide pellets initially enriched to 4.45% 

Length of fuel pellet 0.4 inches nominal Pellet diameter 0.3225 inches 

Total Uranium in the 7 fuel pellets 32.3 grams (Sept 2014) 

Total Uranium 235 in the 7 fuel pellets 0.4 grams (Sept 2014) 

Total Plutonium in the 7 fuel pellets 0.4 grams (Sept 2014) 

Total Fissile Plutonium in the 7 fuel pellets 0.3 grams (Sept 2014) 

Activity Level 266 Ci 

Average Burnup of Assembly 4Z9 46733 MWD/MTUEffective Full Power Days (EFPD) of Assembly 4Z9 1160 EFPD

(ii) A description of the circumstances under which the loss or theft occurred:

The fuel pellet loss occurred as a result of baffle jetting on the fuel assembly. The affected fuel rods had their top springs dislodged and fuel pellets were able to escape the fuel rod. Fragments of fuel pellets were found within the associated fuel assembly and on the core plate. However, about seven (7) fuel pellets worth of material were not located and have already or are expected to granulate into fine particles that will remain in low flow areas of the primary plant systems or be removed by normal purification processes. The possibility of theft is not plausible because of the plant's radiation monitoring instrumentation, physical security measures, and the size and type of container required for transporting nuclear material of this nature.

(iii) A statement of disposition, or probable disposition, of the licensed material involved:

During efforts to identify and recover the fuel pellets, debris fragments estimated to represent five (5) fuel pellets were found in the damaged fuel assembly that is currently in the SFP. In addition, an estimated three (3) pellets worth of material was retrieved by the FOSAR efforts in the reactor vessel and are now located in the SFP. The remaining seven (7) fuel pellets have already or are expected to granulate into fine particles that will dissolve in low flow areas of the primary plant systems or be removed by normal purification processes.

(iv) Exposures of individuals to radiation, circumstances under which the exposures occurred, and the possible total effective dose equivalent to persons in unrestricted areas:

No unauthorized exposure to radiation occurred to the plant staff or members of the public because the fuel pellet fragments either remain in the SFP or granulated into fine particles that will dissolve in low flow areas of the primary plant systems or be removed by normal purification processes.

(v) Actions that have been taken, or will be taken, to recover the material: During efforts to identify and recover the fuel pellets, debris fragments estimated to represent five (5) fuel pellets were found in the damaged fuel assembly that is currently in the SFP. In addition, an estimated three (3) pellets worth of material was retrieved by the FOSAR efforts in the reactor vessel and are now located in the SFP. The remaining seven (7) fuel pellets have already or are expected to granulate into fine particles that will dissolve in low flow areas of the primary plant systems, or be removed by normal purification processes.

(vi) Procedures or measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence of the loss or theft of licensed material:

Westinghouse fabricated and delivered a low-enrichment RFA-2 fuel assembly armored with seven (7) stainless steel rods in place of fuel rods which could be affected by jets from baffle gaps for core location B1 1 in cycle 24. A similar modification to that of the reactor vessel upflow conversion design change that was performed on Unit 1, DC NA-95-001, will be developed and implemented on Unit 2.

2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

No significant safety consequences resulted from this event because the reactor coolant system activity levels during Unit 2 Cycle 23 were well within the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.16, Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity. After Cycle 24 startup, the activity remains well within the requirements of TS 3.4.16. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

3.0 CAUSE

The direct cause of the event was due to baffle jetting. Baffle jetting is the process by which water on the outside of the core baffle plate is forced through small openings in the baffle seams and onto the fuel assemblies. During Unit 2 Cycle 23, baffle jetting caused two rods in assembly 4Z9, located in core position B11, to begin rotating and vibrating. This movement resulted in fuel rod wear and eventual mechanical failure and rod separation. Once separated, a maximum of 15 fuel pellets were released from the two affected fuel rods. The Root Cause of the failed fuel assembly was the change in material properties of the baffle plates and bolting due to aging mechanisms resulting in the gap widening at the baffle joint. Stress, temperature, and irradiation since initial plant start-up have resulted in relaxation, creep, and loss of pre-load in the bolting and baffle plates. The changes in material properties allowed the gap in the corner baffle joint, adjacent to location B1 1, to widen when subjected to the relatively high differential pressure, approximately 25 psi, associated with the baffle-barrel downflow configuration in North Anna Unit 2.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

Westinghouse fabricated and delivered a low-enrichment RFA-2 fuel assembly armored with seven (7) stainless steel rods in place of fuel rods which could be affected by jets from baffle gaps for core location B1 1 in cycle 24. Visible debris on the core plate from 4Z9 was found and retrieved. An inspection of the baffle was performed with no anomalies noted. An inspection of the fuel assembly that was previously located at B1i1 for fuel cycle 22 was performed and no indications of baffle jetting were noted. An inspection was performed of other cycle 23 fuel assemblies in other baffle locations for baffle jetting damage. Ten of the other assemblies exhibited some indications at the center injection locations ranging from slight marks on a mid-grid adjacent to rod 15 or rod 3 to some slight surface erosion or buffing of the grid at the same locations. Other than being in the proper location for where center injection would be expected to occur, it was not clear whether the indications were due to baffle jetting or to some other interaction such as fuel handling or wear from a bowed assembly rubbing against the baffle plates. The indications were reviewed by Dominion's Nuclear Analysis and Fuel (NA&F) Fuel Performance Analysis (FPA) group, and it was determined that no further action was required. Both AREVA and Westinghouse reviewed the video of 4Z9 and concluded that the cause was baffle jetting. A revised Reload Safety Evaluation (RSE) incorporating the replacement fuel assembly for location B1 1 was completed and approved. An Operability Determination, OD000600, was completed for baffle jetting.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

No additional corrective actions were identified by the Root Cause Team.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

A modification similar to the reactor vessel upflow conversion design change that was performed on Unit 1, DC NA-95-001, will be developed and implemented on Unit 2.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS

Unit 2 has operated without indications of baffle jetting for 34 years and Unit 1 has operated without baffle jetting since 1996 when the upflow conversion was performed. While Unit 1 did have baffle jetting issues prior to 1996, the baffle jetting issues were from the center joints. Whereas the Unit 2 baffle jetting was from a corner joint. Additionally, Unit 2 has a different bolting configuration that made it less susceptible to the baffle jetting experienced on Unit 1.

8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Unit 1 continued operating in Mode 1, 100 percent power during this event.

Skyrocketing Wholesale Electricity Price this Winter (not)

Dec 3:

The high price of ISO electricity today seems to have made me eat my prior words...

because:

1) The grid crooks and speculators know the authorities and politicians are watching them. 

2) Natural Gas pipelines planning is ongoing.

3) The crooks and speculator would like to see weakening prices so as to disrupt the new pipelines.

4) The benchmark energy source petroleum is in steep decline. 

ISO-New England's Winter Outlook Again Shows Need ForMore NatGas Pipelines

David Bradley 

November 21, 2014

New England should have sufficient resources in place this winter to meet consumer demand for electricity, but "insufficient pipeline capacity to meet power generators' demand for natural gas continues to be a particular concern during the winter months," according to the region's grid operator. 

"New England's dependence on natural gas puts the region in a vulnerable position, especially during cold weather, because the current pipeline infrastructure cannot deliver all the gas required to serve both heating customers and power generators," the Independent System Operator of New England (ISO-NE) said in its 2014-2015 Winter Outlook. "Most gas-fired generators do not have firm contracts for natural gas delivery and instead rely on the release of spare pipeline capacity from gas utilities. 

"With increased residential and business conversions to natural gas for heating, spare pipeline capacity is often not available for power plants." 

The call for more natural gas infrastructure has become a common plea from the region in recent years (see Daily GPI, Oct. 31; Sept. 30; Jan. 23). New England's governors last year vowed cooperation to improve the region's energy infrastructure (see Daily GPI, Dec. 6, 2013).

Last winter, demand for electricity in ISO-NE's footprint peaked at 21,453 MW on Dec. 17, and "periods of sustained cold weather boosted demand for natural gas, causing severe pipeline constraints that led to record-high natural gas prices," ISO-NE said. "As a result, for much of winter 2013/2014, natural gas was often more expensive than oil, which is relatively uncommon."

 

Is Exelon Terrorizing their Nuclear Employees over Threatening Plant Shutdowns this Christmas?

About Six percent of the fleet is severely threatened. If you owned these plants, would you be throwing money into these plants for maintenance.

The only way I would approve any more subsidies would be if they they replaced these plants with new and larger units.

What would happen if one of these plants had a large and embarrassing accident?
Quad Cities (2) 

Byron(2)

Clinton (1)

Davis Besse (1) 

Emagine the poor employees being terrorized with losing their jobs come next outage just around Thanksgiving and Christmas. Exelon has been yapping about doing this for a few years, you got to know the smart employees don't want to continuously put up with the media show and political shutdown. You know they are bailing out of the plant.

Byron is a two plant facility. It is rather new in coming on line in 1985.

Clinton is a single unit and it came on in 1987.

Quad Cities is another two plant facility and it is an old dog who can't see and hear anymore.

SO we are talking about five plants. 

The tactic of the utilities up here in New England is to remove generation solely to boost the price of electricity. This creates real time insecurity on the grid that tends to boost the grid prices. These guys can make a lot more money yanking capacity off the grid instead of creating grid reliability. The real gold mine will be in coming years as other capacity becomes obsolete and with any economic growth...this artificially creases capacity shortage. Then it will be many year and much dragging of feet of excessive prices before new capacity gets added to the grid.You get it,the size of Exelon allows them to get away with what the smaller and more localized utilities can't get away with.  

Then if the mega utility is a poor economic and public service model...everyone else then pays for its dysfunction.

***Is the forward market (Seeking Alpha) a good indicator of the future price of electricity or is the grid speculators distorting the future markets. 

Monday, December 1, 2014

Ohio's Electricity Providers Seeking State 'Bailout'

Debate Comes Against Backdrop of Frozen Energy Standards in Ohio

Posted By Eric Sandy on Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 11:59 AM

The three largest electricity providers in Ohio — FirstEnergy (the Northeast Ohio-based company we'll focus on here), AEP, and Duke — are hoping the state will approve individual plans to keep their older power plants operating. The proposals — "bailouts," essentially, as critics put it — would lock in fixed-rate contracts for customers, regardless of fluctuating market price.

For FirstEnergy in particular, the proposal would simply guarantee/force a market for energy produced at plants owned by its deregulated subsidiary, FirstEnergy Solutions — the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near Toledo and the coal-fired W.H. Sammis power plant (see photo) on the Ohio River. The proposal covers 15 years.

You can almost count on the many tens of millions of dollars of poor quality maintenance jacking up the cost fleet wide leading to threat of a shutdown. Where is the rainy day fund during the nuclear plant golden years, when the nuclear fleet was making money hands over fist compared to everyone else? Why didn't they plow money into the nukes back then to make these plant more efficient and less costly.

This is the grandpa of all blackmails. You can see it coming for a million miles. The will declare the shutdown of the dog plants Quad Cities next June…then they will continue the blackmail on Clinton and Byron. Has the size and breath of Exelon’s influence created this new opportunity. How does this blackmail game going to play out outside the nuclear fleet. How will Exelon creatively destroy grid capacity for an ends. How will utilities throughout the nation play the Exelon’s game of creative destruction of capacity. Is Exelon saying you destroy coal capacity we will destroy our nuclear capacity.

I mean, aren't they in the process of destroying as lot of coal grid capacity in the future because of the CO2 initiatives... threatening capacity and future price spikes and insufficient grid capacity. 

These plants are on the outskirts of Chicago area…bet you these guys are critical when grid is testing it limits. So in a arctic vortex or in the sweltering summers not having these guys available…the grid will be tons more sensitive with price spikes. These guys can make way more money creating long term grid instability and shortages than doing their societal duty of serving the vital needs public needs. This strategy’s aims is jacking up the price of electricity. Bottom line, this indicates Exelon is focused on jacking up grid price and their dismal stock price on the backs of the consumers. They are not about being a low cost producer.

These poor employees, think about how they feel this Christmas season with exelon terrorizing their employees with shutdowns. This is probably terrorizing the whole fleet...  

Exelon weighs closing 3 power plants

PreviousNext

Small Newspaper Group | John GreenwoodExelon weighs closing 3 power plants

As Exelon Corp. considers shutting down three of its nuclear facilities in Illinois, it's asking lawmakers and the public to recognize the multifaceted value of the energy it produces.

The three stations at risk for closing are Quad Cities Generating Station in Cordova, Byron Generating Station in Ogle County, and Clinton Power Station in DeWitt County.

Operations in La Salle County, Morris and Braidwood are not at risk.

During a Monday editorial board meeting with the Dispatch/Rock Island Argus — a sister paper to The Times — Richard Myers, senior vice president of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, said nuclear facilities are facing several economic challenges, including little to no growth in energy demand since 2008, historically low natural gas prices, a congested power grid and energy policies that benefit renewable wind energy.

Congested grid is basically a way to created an artificial shortage of electricity. Having a dysfunctional grid confers an advantage over one from another. How does Exelon benefit from a congested grid? Powerful forces many times sabotage fixing grid congestion. And our terrible political dysfunction makes all this possible.     

At times, the Quad-Cities station is operating at negative pricing, said William Stoermer, senior communications manager for the Quad Cities station. He said the company won't make a final decision on closings until after next June, giving state lawmakers time to study the market and find solutions.

He said they want lawmakers to create a model to regulate a fair and equitable marketplace, identify what needs to be done to improve the grid and recognize nuclear power is a carbon-free source of energy.

"We are not looking for a bailout," Stoermer said.

Exelon Corp. owns and operates 11 reactors at six nuclear energy facilities in Illinois, which provide 48 percent of Illinois' electricity and about 90 percent of the state's carbon-free electricity. The facilities in Illinois spark $8.9 billion in direct and secondary output, officials said.

The station in Cordova has an economic impact of $1.4 billion in total output, employs roughly 900 people and paid $7.4 million in property taxes this year -- more than half of which went to the Erie School District.

Myers said people tend to take the economic impact of nuclear facilities for granted.

"When they do go away, if they go away, the impact is pretty large," Stoermer said. "These facilities are real economic engines for the community and counties in which they operate."

The three plants under review provide electricity to about three million homes. Myers said if they were shut down, the energy needed for those homes would come from somewhere, but likely would cost more and be generated from a source producing more carbon emissions.

Stoermer said they are asking legislators, grid operators and residents to recognize the economic impact. "We want to be the provider of electricity in Illinois long-term," he said.

The Cordova facility is licensed to operate through 2032.