"Foreign material" on the brain and risk perspective

 

“Foreign materials” on the brain and Nuclear industry risk perspective.

Do we really know the risk in a nuclear plant?

So what does “safety related” mean. I don’t think there has been net increase in safety coming from the responses of Fukushima; gear, procedures, pumps and diesel generators. They are just moving safety from one category to another. As example, they are justifying more unsafety like in violating regulatory or licensing bases rules in the Palisades PCP (flung off impeller blades) continuing event based on fixing or mitigating the shortcomings of the USA’s Fukushima SBO issues. Those pumps are unfit for use in a nuclear power plant primary system (poorly designed) and Palisades have had a host of serious problems with these pumps beginning in 1971 according to the NRC.

There has been and continues to be a secret massive and increasing acceptance of plant centric risk in a tradeoff of reducing risk in a Fukushima style USA SBO event. We are trading electrical reliability safety in a highly improbable accident in a beyond a design accident for less safety in plant components and system degradations on a daily or very frequent bases. This is vastly kicking up capacity factor or obscuring a decline in plant reliability and safety. It is mostly the stuff we can’t see or measure while up at power. Most plants are probably making a lot of money over this or obscuring the detection of decline in competence with operating a nuclear power plant.

Something bad going to is happen if we globally “normalize the deviance” on safety degradation through an accepted bureaucratic process (risk perspectives) like in the Palisades PCP impeller problem. A known, unknown and not measure risk unsafety could coagulate into an imaginable accident like the red finding like in ANO and Browns Ferry.

What if, say in 10,000 components or safety systems, we collectively reduce USA fleet wide safety, tolerate more degradations or accept a reduction in component reliability wholly based or keyed off a distance and improbable increase of safety in a beyond a design event. Instead of talking about isolated plant inncidents, we are talking about global or US flleet wide safety...changing the regulatory safety philosophy USA fleet wide. The tiny increase in “improbably used” safety and the massive increase in regularly “used unsafety” are so disproportional. An infrequent and improbable single aspect of a plant can influence so many other frequent and simultaneous probable aspects of a plant. Your get it, through the Fukushima responses and the beyond the plant design accident new components; you could justify the degradation of safety in say 100 components simultaneously. It can mitigate the threat of a shutdown caused by degraded components and it can mitigate size of a NRC violation at the same time. It could be a one to a thousand relationship or more with an increased in improbable  safety by adding safety components in beyond plant design accident to actual unsafety by tolerating degraded component in a safety system, tolerating a violation plant licensing and NRC violations But you will probably never consume the increased in the public safety through the beyond the plant design accident safety or mitigation components by the ongoing degradation in on going components and rules violations.

And remember, we have little idea what the total level of component degradation, failure to obey NRC regulations or to stay within plant designs and licensing rules. The licensee doesn’t disclose and the NRC captures only a very small percentage of these. If we unjustly increase on a US fleet wide bases the risk profile in the nuclear plant centric systems we are heading for big trouble!

Risk perspectives is like complexity on steroids and heroin in our aging fleet of nuclear plants. It is collectively and increasingly blinding us. It is not shining light and understanding on problems in the industry....it is enabling and prolonging problems in our USA fleet. It is nothing to do with a fix it first and early philosophy!

Supplement to Palisades Defective PCP Pumps 2.206

 

The problem here is the licensee and NRC didn’t think a USFAR, licensing and other requirement violations were a substantial safety hazard either on the pump or repetitively spewing blade fragments all over in the coolant. They weren’t forced to justify it publicly...

 SUBJECT: STATUS OFRECOMMENDATIONS: AUDIT OF NRC’S IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR PART 21, REPORTING OFDEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE (OIG-11-A-08)

Attached is the Office of the Inspector General’s analysis and status of recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 as discussed in the agency’s response dated

April 27, 2011. Based on OIG’s analysis of this response, recommendations 1, 3, and 5 are unresolved and recommendations 2 and 4 are resolved.

OIG notes that NRC management has accepted, but uses conditional language to articulate, the actions planned. This obfuscates the agency’s intentions with regard to the recommendations. It is paramount for OIG to have a clear understanding of the NRC management position with regard to reportability under Part 21. Recent manufacturing defects at two separate nuclear power plants illustrate why this is important.

One nuclear power plant recently received a Red finding under NRC’s Reactor Oversight Program because a safety-related coolant injection valve was discovered to have been broken and unable to perform its safety function for an extended period of time. Had this same valve been out of service for less than 7 days, the failure of the valve would not have been reportable under Part 21 according to some interpretations because it would not have met Part 50 event reporting requirements, and the nuclear industry would not have been informed of a manufacturing defect in a safety-related component.

At another nuclear power plant, the licensee discovered that a safety-related part necessary to operate a circuit breaker had a manufacturing defect that would prevent the breaker from performing its safety function. Some of the breakers were installed in the plant and some were on the shelf in the plant’s warehouse. Under the interpretation of some in industry and at NRC, the failure of the part installed in the operating nuclear plant would not be reportable under Part 21 because the failure did not meet Part 50 event reporting requirements, but the same defective part, if in the warehouse, would be reportable under Part 21.

Until NRC makes a final determination as to whether Part 21 defect reporting should be required separate from Part 50 event reporting requirements, some licensees and NRC staff will continue to assume that Part 21 evaluation and reporting is not necessary at operating nuclear power plants unless the defect causes an event. Accordingly, please provide the proposed corrective action for the unresolved recommendations and an updated status of the resolved recommendations by August 20, 2011. If you have any questions or concerns, please call me at 415-5915 or R.K. Wild, at 415-5948.

...The response states that it agrees that Part 21 and associated staff guidance are open to interpretation. The fact that NRC staff and licensees have varying interpretations of Part 21 reporting requirements is the problem OIG identified in the subject report.

...Does not clearly indicate that the staff will propose clarification so that Part 21 is in full conformity with Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, As Amended, Section 206, Noncompliance, with regard to industry’s obligation to report to NRC defects in basic components that could cause a substantial safety hazard.

... Substantial safety hazard means a loss of safety function to the extent that there is a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to public health and safety for any facility or activity licensed or otherwise approved or regulated by the NRC, other than for export, under parts 30, 40, 50, 52, 60, 61, 63, 70, 71, or 72 of this chapter.

So the above picture are examples of cavitations. Remember a 5 by 12 inch loose blade in Palisades. They only talk about pieces broken...they never talk about how worn the rest of the blades are.

April 10:

Basically controlling the sequencing of the PCP means they start the impellers who are weld free before the impeller who have been welded!

On the Oct, 1211 Palisades had a incident where one of their PCP pump broke off a impeller blade. They continued operating the plant for about 10 months...then went into outage. They did a simple search for the blade...couldn’t find it. IR 2012003 detailed the event. The outage occurred between April 9 and May 12, 2012. IR 2012003 was written up post this outage. During the Palisades 2014 outage, this is when they found the Oct, 2011 broken blade when they did a ten year inspection of core components...they removed components from the core gaining the ability to see this stuck blade.

I consider the NRC not mentioning Palisades couldn’t find the broken blade constitutes a cover-up in IR 2012003. The NRC should have given outsiders opportunity to make comment or inter into a process like a 2.206. The NRC secrecy impeded my ability to interact in an agency process with a dangerous and untrustworthy nuclear poor staff.

In the direct vicinity of the Oct 11 broken blade event Palisades was starting up from the yellow finding  DC bus breaker short and this placed employees in serious risk of death. There weren’t following their procedures...the procedure if followed won’t have worked. During that time they were dealing with multiple shutdowns with the leaking safety injection/refueling water tank and six shutdowns for a host of other reasons. Palisades with their operations and shutdown was considered one the most economically vulnerable plant is the USA. I think the NRC secrecy with not disclosing the unrecoverable blade and forcing the staff to do a ten year style inspection of the reactor internals to find broken blade was intended by the NRC to protect Entergy and Palisades from millions of dollars of expenses and extending the outage for days.

As I spoke about yesterday, I believe the agency sets these events up to be not scutinizable. Outsiders weren’t notified of the Oct 11 broken bladed until about 10 months after the event and on south side of the outage. In the post outage inspection report, the agency never admitted the licensee couldn’t find the broken. The NRC gave “secret” permission to start up the plant without finding the Oct 11 5 inch by 12 inch broken blade and yanking it out of the core. This plant has a long history of finding broken in their system and not repairing the degraded pump.

Further, I can name a 2007 incident where pieces of blades were found in the core. It sounds like finding PCP blade pieces in the core is a frequent experience. Then the Palisades staff played Abbot and Costello’s ‘Who’s one First’ on what PCP pump did the discovered in the core broken blade come from. They stated up the plant with a pump and pumps missing blades and degraded PCP pumps.        

I consider the free floating 5 by 12 inch broken blade post Oct 11 a direct threat to a very serious partial core meltdown. This is the event that remained unscrutinizable to outsiders for 11 mouths...where the agency hid that the blade could not be found and gave secret permission to restate the plant in a dangerous condition.  I contend that plant should have been shut down shortly after Oct 11 to replace the defective impeller with a missing 5 inch by 12 inch blade and inspect all the other impellers for cracks. The NRC should have forced the staff to find and remove the missing blade up and including a ten year style core internal inspection. I know it would have been very expensive...that is why a staff should preclude the possibility of broken PCP blades and degraded pumps. I am convinced if they would have found the blade in the current stuck position between the vessel and the flow shirt shorty after Oct 11it could have been easily removed. I am convinced 11 month later in the April 2012 outage if the NRC would have forced the Palisades staff to find the Oct 2011 blade it would have been removable. I’d like to see the Palisades internal report and analysis near the May 12, 2012 startup, where Palisades thought the broken 5 inch by 12 inch laid in the plant. It doesn’t take a PhD to figure it was somewhere near its current location....they knew it was there.

Right, again the agency sets this up to be unscrutinizable...all the information hidden...until after the bulk of the operation threat is long gone past a possibility. The outage is long gone by and the agency now analyses what they feel what will make them gone. You get what I am talking about...the NRC makes Palisades unscutinizable to outsiders. The big picture here is the agency is making themselves and congressional oversight unscutinable to outsiders. The NRC gets to pick the selective happy news to the outsiders making government unaccountable to the voters!       

Is Exelon "The Boy Who Cried Wolf"

Right, would the plant fade away one by one...or would it be a race to the door?

Everyone it the energy sector is advocating for massive increases in prices...while the middle class and poor have a very poor increase in income. Usually the highest price sets the price for everyone else?

April 23, 2014, 3:01 p.m. EDT

Exelon Urges Lawmakers to Take Hard Look at Energy Policies to Preserve Benefits of Nation’s Nuclear Plants

William A. Von Hoene, Jr. explains to USEA public policy forum what’s at stake for the nation’s nuclear fleet

WASHINGTON, Apr 23, 2014 (BUSINESS WIRE) --Unless policymakers take action soon, a series of additional early nuclear power plant retirements could threaten the reliability of the nation’s electric grid and hinder the country’s ability to meet its carbon reduction goals, Exelon Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Strategy Officer William A. Von Hoene, Jr. told members of the United States Energy Association (USEA) today.
In a keynote address at the 2014 USEA Annual Membership Meeting & Public Policy Forum at the National Press Club, Von Hoene said that current government policies and market structures fail to account for the full value that nuclear power provides as an always-on source of carbon-free energy.
“The unfortunate reality for nuclear right now is that despite being the largest, most reliable and lowest-emitting power plants – and among the lowest cost – they are not getting recognized or compensated for those attributes,” he said.
In addition to low natural gas prices and slow demand growth, which have driven down wholesale electricity prices, Von Hoene pointed to market-distorting policies that subsidize renewable generation as part of a perfect storm of challenges threatening the continued operation of many nuclear plants.
“Renewable energy is an important and growing part of our own generation portfolio and a critical component of our efforts to advance clean energy,” he said, “but government policies designed to incent investment in low-carbon resources end up threatening that very goal by putting increased economic pressure on certain nuclear plants.”
Von Hoene said the performance of the nation’s generating fleet during the severe cold of the past winter underscored the critical role of nuclear plants in ensuring the reliability of the electric grid. At the height of the polar vortex, he explained, when some fuel sources faltered, the U.S. nuclear fleet continued to generate electricity at its usual, industry-leading productivity rates.
“Our nuclear fleet proved critical to keeping the lights and heat on for millions of homes and businesses,” he said. While the PJM electricity market serving large swaths of the Midwest and Northeast experienced record winter demand, most other resources experienced higher-than-expected outages rates. In fact, Von Hoene said, “many natural gas-fired plants didn’t run, either because they couldn’t get fuel, couldn’t start, or because other units were more cost-effective. Similarly, wind was generating at only about one-quarter of its nameplate.”
On the day after Earth Day, Von Hoene emphasized that, in the absence of a federal, market-based carbon policy, closing nuclear plants prematurely would deal a major setback to the nation’s efforts to reduce carbon emissions.
“We simply cannot achieve our emissions reduction goals without the U.S. nuclear fleet,” he said. “The loss of 25 percent of existing nuclear facilities would cut U.S. progress toward achieving its 2020 climate change goals in half. In fact, closing even a few nuclear plants could make achieving state and national carbon reduction goals difficult or impossible.”
Von Hoene emphasized the urgent need to repair policy shortcomings if the nation wishes to safeguard the value of existing U.S. nuclear plants and their role in ensuring a future energy supply that is reliable, clean and affordable. He also commended policymakers, including those at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy and state commissions, who have acknowledged the need for action.
“Our state and federal lawmakers need to seriously examine, now, how their policies must change if they want to preserve the benefits of the nation’s nuclear fleet,” he said. “This is a national challenge, and so we need attention of all of the nation’s policymakers to solve it.”

April 15, 2013 Comments of Exelon Corporation

Committee on Ways and Means

Energy Tax Reform Working Group
United States House of Representatives

Exelon's been blackmailing or threatening to shut down Quad Cities and Dresden for decades.

Coal and Nuclear Nearly Invisible at Platts Global Power Markets

The headline of this event report should come as no surprise. Although the event was kicked off by Exelon Generation President & CEO Kenneth Cornew, who sang the praises of his company’s “largest and best-run nuclear fleet,” otherwise only passing mention was made of the new nuclear units under construction in the U.S.

Cornew made the case for keeping nuclear in the fleet. This past winter demonstrated the need for reliable“always-on generation,” he began. With nuclear plants swerving into uneconomic positions as a result of low natural gas prices, even the Department of Energy is concerned about the viability of some of Exelon’s fleet, he said. However, retiring nuclear plants will make it “difficult to impossible” to reach the administration’s greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals—not to mention the goal of maintaining grid reliability. In the question and answer period, Cornew added that Exelon has three nuclear plants with economic problems—unless federal policy incentivizes nuclear clean energy as well as solar, he said. In another intriguing hint of what may lie ahead, Cornew noted they’d “have to see” if Exelon is “the right owner” of those nuclear plants, implying that that they might be better off under a regulated generator.

Despite the merits of nuclear capacity, nuclear was clearly not where other participants saw any business or market action. In the Wednesday project finance session, Donald Kyle, senior managing director of GE Capital Markets Inc., said his company sees a lot of greenfield gas projects ahead. And he was not alone in that view. Another field with enormous growth potential: energy storage. RES Americas Chief Development Officer Rob Morgan claimed, “We’re scratching the surface on storage.” (For a look at the state of energy storage technology and implementation, see “The Year Energy Storage Hit Its Stride” in the forthcoming May issue of POWERat powermag.com.)

What Exelon wants is for the high cost producers setting the price for all of the sources and then they could all gang up on the government. We should subsidize the rate payers and never Exelon's profits.

Chair Jerry Bloom of law firm Winston & Strawn LLP followed up by saying, “Everything is subsidized. . . . Shouldn’t we acceptsubsidies and just ensure they are available to all?” A little later, Todd Carter, president and senior partner of Panda Power Funds, said he didn’t think there should be any subsidies. Next into the fray was Exelon’s Cornew, who said we need to get the market rules right “for all technologies.”But how, asked Morgan of RES Americas, do we deal with externalities? Taxing carbon to level the playing field was his solution, even though there was limited optimism among his fellow panelists that the U.S. would see a carbon tax in the foreseeable future.

Exelon must shoulder financial burden of its nuclearplants

State bailout would insulate utility from cost of its decisions

March 30, 2014

A Tribune analysis has found that Exelon's six nuclear power plants in Illinois have failed to turn a profitduring the past five years. Exelon, the Chicago-based parent of Commonwealth Edison, said it may announce plant closings. We asked Exelon and the Citizens Utility Board to address the future of nuclear power in Illinois:

Over the last decade, Exelon has reaped more than $21 billion in profits, running a fleet of nuclear plants that benefited from high electricity prices.

But thanks to a surge in natural gas supply and increased energy efficiency, wholesalepower prices have fallen, and Exelon's business model isn't necessarily the winner it used to be.

As a result, the company is reportedly threatening to close as many as three of its six Illinois nuclear plants, unless state legislators force consumers to pay more to boost Exelon profits and minimize its market risk.

A bill that would insulate Exelon from the costs of its business decisions, while obligating consumers to pay the consequences, would be the financial equivalent of nuclear waste. Lawmakers should reject any one-sided proposal that causes this kind of fallout for consumers.

Not only does it pose risks for our pocketbooks, but it's also hypocritical. After all, Exelon advocated for the same energy markets it now bemoans.

And Exelon has opposed state support for its competitors' plants, suggesting that such aid illegally interferes with federal jurisdiction over power markets.

Though Exelon asserts the virtues of competitive markets in its rhetoric, its actions suggest that what it really wants is privatized profit and socialized risk — the worst of all worlds for consumers.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that a deal would collapse simply because it's hypocritical.

Exelon has political power. And closing nuclear plants would threaten good-paying jobs, large amounts of carbon-free electricity and the local tax revenues generated by the sites.

So it is possible that Springfield will entertain proposals that leave ratepayers accountable for Exelon's plants.

If they do, lawmakers should follow three principles to protect consumers:

•First, risks and rewards should be shared equitably. If Exelon gets protection from market forces when prices are low, consumers must get protection when prices rise.

•Second, the state's power portfolioshould prioritize cost-effective clean energy resources. The clean energy economy — based on energy efficiency, the smart grid and alternative sources like solar — is key if we are to maximize consumer and environmental value.

•Third, any support must be based on a thorough and transparent analysis of Exelon's financial situation. We can't simply take its word that plants are losing money, especially when its overall fleet remains profitable.

Without these safeguards, consumers might be forced to consider taking shelter. Anything resembling a full-fledged bailout of Exelon's plants would be radioactive for our pocketbooks.

Kolata is executive director of the Citizens Utility Board, a nonprofit group that represents the interests of residential utility customers of Illinois.

 

Exelon CEO calls for US electricity market reform

10 April 2014 by Will Dalrymple

In a keynote address to the 29th Annual Platts Global Power Markets Conference, Exelon Generation president and CEO Kenneth W. Cornew said that competitive market rules and state and federal energy policies need immediate reforms to ensure a diverse, clean, reliable and affordable energy supply.

Cornew said the energy industry has experienced seismic shifts in how energy is produced and consumed, with an influx of low-cost natural gas, rapid expansion of subsidized renewable generation, smart grid deployment, behind the meter technologies and low demand growth combining to reshape the energy landscape. Market rules have failed to keep pace, he said.

"Rules that are in place today were designed for a fundamentally different energy market," Cornew said. "They need to be reformed to reflect our current environment and recent changes in how we produce and use energy."

He said that electricity demand during a cold snap this past winter demonstrated the problems with the current regime. Grid operators struggled to keep up with demand as many resources had high forced outage rates or were otherwise unable to perform. A large number of natural gas plants across the country were unable to get access to fuel, highlighting the consequences of an overreliance on gas generation. But nuclear plants, which have 18 months to 24 months of fuel on site, performed at a 95% capacity factor, a key measure of reliability.

"The current patchwork of state and federal energy policies subsidizing renewable energy do not properly compensate nuclear for its unrivaled reliability and 24/7 emissions-free energy"

However, flawed market rules and the current patchwork of state and federal energy policies subsidizing renewable energy do not properly compensate nuclear for its unrivaled reliability and 24/7 emissions-free energy, Cornew said. The problem is exacerbated in regions where low load growth and an oversupply of subsidized wind generation are driving wholesale energy prices even lower.

The combination of competitive market forces and artificial price suppression resulting from well-intended but poorly-designed energy policies could force some highly-efficient nuclear plants to shut down, threatening grid reliability and setting back efforts to meet the nation's carbon reduction goals, Cornew said.

"The economic viability of these highly reliable, low-carbon generation sources is at risk, not because they can't compete in the marketplace, but because they can't compete when the playing field is uneven," he said.

Exelon has long advocated for market-based policies that treat all carbon-free resources equally, regardless of technology, Cornew said.

"We need to better align our energy policies with our competitive market rules to ensure we have a clean, reliable and economic energy supply going forward," he said.

Power price recovery may be too late to aid its nuclear plants: Exelon exec

Las Vegas (Platts)--9Apr2014/1033 am EDT/1433 GMt

While Exelon expects a recovery in power prices, it may not come in time to save some of the company's nuclear plants, a senior company executive said in Las Vegas Tuesday.

"Nuclear power has taken the biggest punch" of all generation sources in the current low power price environment, Kenneth Cornew, president and CEO of Exelon Generation, said in an interview.

Exelon owns the largest fleet of nuclear power stations in the US. Of the company's total 35-GW power generation capacity, nuclear accounts for 55%. But several of those plants are "financially challenged," Cornew said.

The smaller, single unit plants, such as its 610-MW Ginna plant, are particularly challenged as are three of its five nuclear plants in Illinois. The Illinois plants are primarily challenged because of location. They are in places where large amounts of low-priced wind power comes into the system, depressing wholesale power prices, Cornew said. The busbar price at the Quad City plant on the western side of Illinois, for instance, has been $5-6/MWh below prices at the NiHub prices, he said.

In addition, the capacity revenues available from the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, are "negligible," Cornew said. That environment is even a challenge for Exelon's single reactor plant in Clinton, which is one of the newest nuclear plants in MISO, he said.

The owners of some power plants in MISO are able to earn higher capacity prices by exporting their capacity to the PJM Interconnection market. MISO's most recent capacity auction cleared at about $1/MW-day. PJM's last capacity auction cleared at $59.37/MW-day.

The problem is that a transmission link to PJM could be very expensive, but "we are exhausting every option, including linking the [Clinton] plant to the north or the east," Cornew said.

POWER PRICES 'TOO LOW'

Meanwhile, Exelon still believes power prices are too low. Forward prices are not reflecting market fundamentals in part because of a lack of liquidity in the market, which Cornew said is "as bad as it has been."

He attributed that to the fact that many banks are getting out of power trading and many participants are only buying for the short term because of the uncertainty created by the prospect of large numbers of coal plants retiring in the next couple of years due to pending environmental regulations.

As the level of coal retirements unfolds in 2015 and 2016, power prices should recover with the prospect of a "$2 to $4 expansion of heat rates," Cornew said. But, he added, "We can't afford to lose money until the recovery comes."

In the meantime, Exelon is advocating for changes in the way reliability is priced in the market, particularly in capacity markets. "Price formation this winter was a very positive sign," he said, with prices shooting up above the $1,000/MWh cap, he said.

That is an indication that more attention needs to be paid to winter peaks and suggests that there should be some sort of seasonal capacity market, Cornew said. The polar vortex events of this winter showed that the grid is vulnerable in the winter, not just during the summer peak season, he said.

One of the key issues that needs to be addressed is that all capacity should be treated equally, Cornew said. For instance, demand response should be required to bid into the day-ahead market just as other resources are and there should be limits on the ability of bidders to buy out their positions in the incremental auctions RTOs conduct in the periods between capacity auctions.

"As a trader it hurts me to say this, but capacity markets should focus on physical not financial assets. It is too easy to bid into PJM and buy back at a low price through the incremental auction or to only face a small penalty. Until that is fixed, we should focus on physical assets, not financial," he said.

Cornew had no specific, detailed recommendations for how such reforms should be implemented, but said that Exelon would continue to work through the stakeholder process to achieve those goals.

Ultimately, however, "if we cannot find a solution, we would move toward the option of closing plants," Cornew said. "We would focus on other technologies and businesses we can be good at and grow in." He mentioned that Exelon already has investments in both in the upstream and retail side of the gas business.

The Ongoing 2011 Accident at Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant

 How stable is Fort Calhoun with this?

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO FAILURE OF CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING

"At 1505 CDT the 'A' control room air conditioner (VA-46A) trouble alarm annunciated in the control room. The unit was confirmed to be not functioning properly and was declared inoperable at time 1515 [CDT]. The 'B' control room air conditioner (VA-46B) was previously declared inoperable due to maintenance. With both control room air conditioners inoperable the plant entered technical specification 2.0.1, a 6 hour shutdown action statement. Repairs to the 'B' had been previously planned and are in progress to allow the unit to be returned to service as soon as possible. Troubleshooting and subsequent repairs to the 'A' unit are in progress. At 1812 [CDT], the station commenced a shutdown to comply with the required action statement."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

* * * UPDATE FROM ORTIZ TO KLCO ON 4/15/14 AT 2237 EDT * * *

"At time 2050 [CDT], VA-46A was declared operable based on installation of an emergency temporary modification. TS 2.0.1 has been exited. Shutdown has been secured and FCS is stable at a nominal 33% power."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Reposted from 3/18/2014
 

March 20: Fort Calhoun was up to 38% this mourning...looks like the generator survived.

Being safe means you never ever ever ever depend on a safety device.

They were probably seconds away from destroying their stator and generator. Imagine if the automatic turbine trip didn’t work. You get it, the amps are so high and the time to damage is so short...they got to depend on an automatic trip.

  See, crap quality assurance and crap maintenance. This came out on the same date of the new scram.
 

These scrams and shutdowns are damaging the plant...

Sluice Gate Shutdown LER on Jan 9, 2014

"Engineering Analysis (EA) 12-018 upgraded the sluice gates to limited-critical quality element (LCQE). The CW-14 sluice gates had not been previously credited as safe shutdown equipment. Even though the CW-14 sluice gates became credited as safe shutdown equipment, FCS did not treat the sluice gates any different than before the reclassification. Consequently, the valves' motor operators (MOVs) were never entered into the MOV program, additional analyses and preventative maintenance (PM) items were not implemented.

CW-14C torque switch as found setting was different than the last time the switch was adjusted. In April, 2013, the torque switch for CW-14C was set to increment 2.5. The as found value after the event initiating this report was 3.75. Additionally, the torque switch was found preloaded in the open direction - meaning that it would take more torque applied to the valve before the valve would trip on torque in the shut direction. The torque switch was preloaded 2 increments bringing the total value of the torque setting to 5.75, placing the MOV in a condition where it would cause significant damage to the MOV had the stem not bent.

Additionally, the spring pack - the part of the MOV which translates motor torque to the torque limiter switch was unable to complete its function due to the amount of grease that had seeped into the spring plate section. The grease would not allow the spring pack to compress thereby not translating motor torque to the torque limiter switch. The combined effect as described above in addition to the extreme cold temperatures on the intake structure veranda was that the MOV would not have tripped on over-torque before failure of the MOV."

March 18

Junk! Another plant scram! They fixed the stuff relevant to NRC rules...but neglected components support reliable plant operation.

Facility: FORT CALHOUN Region: 4 State: NE Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: (1) CE NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOECK HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 03/17/2014 Notification Time: 15:55 [ET] Event Date: 03/17/2014 Event Time: 12:02 [CDT] Last Update Date: 03/17/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): GREG PICK (R4DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP INITIATED BY LOSS OF STATOR COOLING WATER "Ft. Calhoun station automatically tripped due to a loss of turbine load. The turbine tripped due to loss of stator cooling water. Maintenance was in progress on the stator cooling system when inventory was lost and low pump discharge pressure caused an automatic turbine trip and reactor trip. All systems operated as expected. Ft. Calhoun station is shutdown and stable in mode 3 at this time." All control rods fully inserted into the core and decay heat is being removed using the normal condenser steam dump system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Originally published on Jan 13

Jan 15: They are up to 60% power today. Any bets on how many days before the next scram! Hope they make a week?

I first put this on my other blog by mistake. 

Three years and 200 million dollars...16 days of operation...and they already had two shutdowns.

Were the new sluice gates cheaply purchase at Walmart...

Would that be great, putting on this kind of debt for 10 years...then have to shutdown within a year.

Goes to show you, if the majority of the plant is obsolete and degraded gear...throwing 200 million is a waste of money! They just didn't go in big enough!

Good job bankrupt Exelon!

Notification Date: 01/09/2014
Notification Time: 06:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2014
Event Time: 05:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2014

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE RAW WATER PUMPS.

"At 0315 CST T.S. 2.0.1 was entered for all four Raw Water pumps being declared inoperable. The pumps were declared inoperable due to inability to close one of the sluice gates. There are six sluice gates and one is not functional.

"At 0518 the technical specification required shutdown commenced."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM AMY BURKHART TO NESTOR MAKRIS ON 01/09/14 AT 1915 EST * * *

"At 0900 CST 1/9/14 Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 was manually tripped and entered Mode 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown to less than 300 deg F was commenced at time 1030 CST 1/9/14. The RCS temperature was less than 300 deg F at time 1433 CST. A press release has been issued."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO [Hagar]

Notification Date: 01/12/2014
Notification Time: 06:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2014
Event Time: 03:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2014

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING CONTROL ROD POSITION DEVIATION  

"After achieving criticality a deviation between control rods was observed by plant personnel. When attempting to level the control rods, one rod could not insert to the level of the rest of the group. A manual reactor trip was initiated by the operating crew. All tripable control rods fully inserted into the core."

The trip was uncomplicated and the licensee is investigating the cause of the control rod position deviation.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Pilgrim Plant's Service Water Pipe Hole Belzona!

Seabrook

Just like Seabrook's service water problem. This getting relief from the NRC  from the ASME code requirement is going on all over the  place.  

"On February 24, 2014, seawater was observed leaking from Salt Service Water (SSW) pipe spool JF29-8-4, an elbow, located in the Class 3 SSW system downstream of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) heat exchanger E-209B. Leakage of approximately 60 drops per-minute (dpm) was found to originate from an approximately 3/8"diameter hole in the extrados of the downstream elbow of the 18" rubber-lined carbon steel (schedule 20, 0.312" nominal wall thickness) pipe spool. Leakage is minimized due to the rubber lining immediately behind the hole remaining intact and blocking flow and the fact that the normal operating pressure for the heat exchanger discharge flow at this location is 2 psig."

The original rubber lining failed, they replace it with the magic Balzona epoxy...then it quickly developed into a hole. They were watching this pipe degradation developing into a hole. They had a opportunity to fix it right in the outage.   

"The lining of this spool was known to be degraded following an internal inspection of the rubber lining in RFO19 in April 2013. Localized Belzona repairs of the lining were implemented on April 25, 2013. The current condition may indicate a failed Belzona repair as some of the RFO19 repairs were made to the elbow ID within a few inches of the current pressure boundary flaw."

Is this the first time a corrosion hole showed up and it was completely unforeseen? Of does this come up all the time and it indicates a global or systemic issue with the carbon steel pipe material where they are indifferent to fix it once right. Pilgrim seems to be saying it happens all the time.

How come they don’t throw us the historic context with blowing out the rubber coating and the Belozona...give us a ten year list of all the localized corrosion or pitting corrosion at the plant with the service water. Have they been responsible or irresponsible with this kind of corrosion in the service water system?

Will they be responsibly with their service water system in the future?

"PNPS has extensive experience with this failure mechanism in the SSW system and it is well understood by PNPS staff."

I feel these rubber coatings could peel off in sheets from the pipes and clog up the emergency cooling water heat exchangers and other components. It already happened at Seabrook.   

Alert And Heavy Smoke Coming Out Of Quad Cities.

Was the water pipe corroded...

April 4:

Water pipe to blame for Exelon plant emergency

Operators of Exelon Nuclear's Quad-Cities Generating Station in Cordova know the cause of an electrical short that resulted in the facility going on emergency status Wednesday afternoon.

Now the investigation will center on why it happened and what measures can be taken to ensure it doesn't happen again, plant spokesman Bill Stoermer said Thursday.

"There was a malfunction of a water pipe," he said. "It caused water to spray on a cable tray where there were electrical wires. And where these lines are hooked together, there are connections. It caused a spark, which caused the insulation of the wiring to melt. When that happens, that caused the smoke. There is a safety feature in the pipe that was supposed to prevent it from leaking."

Stoermer said workers noticed smoke in a turbine building in Unit 2 at 1:40 p.m. Wednesday. He said on-site firefighters handled the possible electrical short "within seconds." Some employees were evacuated from the unit, and no one was injured. The plant immediately declared an alert, which was removed at 9:32 p.m.

He said the reactor was taken offline Monday night to replace a valve on the control-rod drive system. It was about two hours from being brought back into service when the incident occurred. The reactor cannot be brought back online until the investigation into the leak and electrical short is concluded, Stoermer said...
Smoke from electrical problem shuts down Unit 2 reactor at nuclear plant in Cordova

Heavy smoke was visible from a reported electrical fire at the Exelon Nuclear Plant in Cordova, Illinois.

Fire was reported at the facility just after 1:30 p.m. Wednesday, April 2, 2014 at the Quad Cities Generating Station at 22710 206th Avenue.

Initial, unconfirmed reports indicated an electrical fire happened inside the plant, and that heavy smoke was visible outside the facility.

Firefighters and equipment from at least four departments were sent to the plant. Cordova Fire Protection District Chief Chuck Smalley later said a total of 68 personnel responded from various departments.

There were no immediate reports of any injuries or area impact associated with the possible fire. Exelon spokesman Bill Stoermer later said employees were evacuated as a precaution, but that no one was in any danger from the incident.

Exelon classified the incident as an “alert,” saying that is the second-lowest of four emergency classifications established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Stoermer confirmed smoke was visible, but said it may have come from an electrical “short” and that actual fire was not yet confirmed.

“It appears that there could have been an electrical short,” Stoermer said. “There is a lot of electrical cabling, as you can imagine, inside the power plant. So, they’ll take a hard look at all of their electrical cabling and determine, ‘Did something short out or what happened there?’ that would have caused maybe some smoke or some sparks.”

The activity happened in Unit 2, the same reactor that was taken out of service the evening of March 31 to “replace a valve on the control rod drive system,” according to a statement from Exelon. The valve replacement could not be performed while the unit was operating. That shutdown did not affect electrical service.

The April 2 incident happened as Unit 2 was being re-started after the shutdown.

Stoermer said they would assess Unit 2 before it was restarted. He said representatives from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would investigate the April 2 incident.

“The NRC’s primary concern right now is to make sure the public is protected and that the plant operator is taking swift and appropriate action to continue to maintain plant safety,” said NRC spokesperson Viktoria Mitlyng. “Once the situation is resolved, the NRC will fully inspect the cause of and contributing factors to the event.”

“We train with these guys, we know this plant, so it all went very well today,” Chief Smalley said.

“There is no impact to public health or safety or to plant personnel,” Stoermer said. Unit 1 remained at full power.