Thursday, April 18, 2013

The NRC Is A Filthy Dirty Rotten US Safety Regulator

New Entergy-Pilgrim Licensee Event Report that contradicts earlier LER...they lied and falsified federal documents to stay up at power.
 















I panicked Entergy- Pilgrim into writing the content of the new LER



The NRC is a severely dishonest United States Of America federal agency!


April/May 2011: New SRV valves installed.

*May 18, 2011 (disclosed on April 18, 2013) first small leak on SRV RV-203-3C

*Nov 25, 2011 (disclosed on April 18, 2013) second small leak on SRV RV-203-3C 

Dec 26, 2011: First Pilgrim plant leak, shutdown and 3 day shutdown.  Replaced  SRV RV-203-3D per LER 2013
*RV 203-3C on this shutdown per LER 2013-002-00



Nov 27, 2012: NE ISO says grid price crisis over natural gas began (NH Union Leader).

*Jan 20, 2013: Second leak, required shutdown and another 3 day shutdown. ("On Sunday, January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours, the station entered a 24-hour action statement...)

Jan 21, 2013: NE ISO asserts grid emergency, near mandatory rolling black outs in really cold winter weather (NH Union Leader).
 
Jan 24, 2013: NE ISO says natural gas shortage began in earnest with $300 megawatt-hour(NH Union Leader).

Jan 2013: Peak demand this year 20,800 megawatt, overall peak demand of 22, 818 megawatt (NH Union Leader).

Feb 3, 2013: Third leak, restricted to 80-84% power to control leak.

Feb 6, 2013: Pilgrim admitted leaking media.

*Feb 8, 2013: Nemo blizzard strikes, plant trip, two LOOPs, and just repair and replace of one SRV.

Feb 9, 2013: NE ISO says grid crisis developed during the early morning hours of the blizzard...gas generators couldn't get gas from the market (NH Union Leader).

Feb 13,2013: My Peach Bottom presentation to the NRC and Exelon. I always had issues with coloring within the lines with my crayons.

"This is a Hurricane Katrina. This is a Hurricane Sandy. This is a Blizzard Nemo that's coming down on you guys..."

"This is a climate change. This is a huge economic climate change that's going on in the industry as far as this natural gas business..."
Feb 14, 2013 NRC senior project manager discussion with Entergy-Vermont Yankee worrying VY may no longer be financially qualified to operate a nuclear plant.

Feb 15, 2013: NYT's article 'The Natural Gas Trap' and $130 megawatt-hour prices all month long.

Feb 16, 2013: Start-up from blizzard trip.

*Feb 26, 2013: New leak develops and restricted to 94% power to control leaks.


*March 13, 2013: Submitted my Pilgrim SRV request for emergency shutdown on March 13, 2013.

March 17, 2013: NH Union Leader article 'Reliance On Natural Gas A Threat To The Grid'.

March 21, 2013: Still leaking and NRC is questioning the financial qualifications of Vermont Yankee.


March 30, 2013: Power restricted to 85%. We don't know if the leak got worst or an addition SRV is leaking, or something else.

*Added April 19, 2013

April 11, 2013: My Pilgrim Safety Relief Valve NRC Petition.  

April 14, 2013: Pilgrim had difficulties with shutdown for refueling.

April 18, 2013:  Feb 20, 2013 SRV leak and plant shut down LER 2013-02-001

1) Get a load of the  title: SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

2) March 18, 2013: Entergy's LER 2013-02-00 date of submittal is March 21, 2013.

3) Event date: Jan 20, 2013 per Entergy

4) Submitted my Pilgrim SRV request for emergency shutdown on March 13, 2013. 

4) Reported date: March 21, 2013 per Entergy

5) Pilot


              S/N         SRV Position         As-Found         Deviation
              23           RV-203-3B             1112 psig         (-)3.8%

6) This LER disclosed: 


   a) First small SRV leak on May 18, 2011 (SRV RV-203-3C)

    b) Second small leak on Nov 25, 2011 (SRV RV-203-3C)

    c) Shutdown on Jan 26, 2013  RV- 203-3DRV- 203-3D















SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

On Sunday January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (RMSS in RUN), PNPS declared SRV-3B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 that requires with an SRV inoperable to initiate an orderly reactor shutdown such that reactor coolant pressure is less than 104 psig within 24 hours. On Monday January 21, 2013, at 1300 hours (16 hrs and 10 minutes) reactor coolant pressure was less than 104 psig. SRV-3B was declared inoperable consistent with PNPS procedures that state an SRV is inoperable if the first stage pilot thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature.

The reactor was depressurized and a new pilot valve assembly was installed on SRV-3B. On January 22, 2013, at 1015 hours reactor restart was commenced. On January 24, 2013 at 0312 hours 100% core thermal power was achieved.

This LER also reports the as-found setpoint of one SRV pilot valve tested was less than the minimum
pressure required by TS 3.6.D.1.

This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

As background, pressure relief system includes four (4) SRVs and two (2) spring safety valves (SSVs).

During Refueling Outage (RFO-18), in April/May, 2011, the four SRVs were replaced with Target Rock Model 0867F 3-stage SRVs. The SRVs discharge through their individual discharge piping, terminating below the minimum suppression pool (torus) water level. The four SRVs are installed on the main steam piping in containment between the reactor pressure vessel and the flow restrictors.

Each 3-stage SRV contains a pilot (also called the first stage), a second stage, and a main stage and an air operator. The main stage contains the steam discharge path, the second stage consists of second stage pilot valve, and the first stage consists of pilot valve with surrounding bellows.

To monitor these valves for leakage, Pilgrim installed thermocouples at the pilot (first stage), at the second stage, on the tailpipe near the valve (4.5' to 6' away), on the tailpipe far from the valve (-20' away) and at the pilot bellows. Procedure 2.2.23, "Automatic Depressurization System", provides guidance for interpreting the thermocouple data and determining valve operability based in part on testing performed by Target Rock.

Subsequent to installation in RFO-1 8 and prior to this event, Pilgrim experienced minor second stage pilot valve leakage from SRV RV-203-3C on May 18, 2011 and November 25, 2011. Also, on December 26, 2011, SRV RV- 203-3D first stage pilot valve experienced leakage while operating at full power. The SRV was declared inoperable and the plant was shutdown on December 26, 2011 in accordance with TS 3.6.D.2 and RV-203-3C was replaced entirely, and the RV-203-3D pilot assembly was replaced (LER 2011-007-00).

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On Sunday January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (RMSS in RUN), PNPS declared SRV-3B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 that requires with an SRV inoperable to initiate an orderly reactor shutdown such that reactor coolant pressure is less than 104 psig within 24 hours. On Monday January 21, 2013, at 1300 hours (16 hrs and 10 minutes) reactor coolant pressure was less than 104 psig. SRV-3B was declared inoperable consistent with PNPS procedures that state an SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature.

While at full power, indication of a steam leak across the first stage pilot of RV-203-3B was identified. The leakage was evaluated and in accordance with criteria specified in procedure 2.2.23, specifically, if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 35 degrees F below its baseline temperature (with a smaller decrease at the second stage thermocouple) and cannot be explained by a corresponding downpower, the SRV is inoperable.

The safety relief valve was subsequently declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 was entered. Per TS 3.6.D.2 the plant was shutdown and reactor coolant pressure below was 104 psig within 24 hours.

CAUSE:

The SRVs were purchased new, installed, and tested for the first time in April/May 2011 during RFO-18.

Entergy and Target Rock personnel are currently evaluating the SRV failure events and setpoint drift to determine the root cause and contributing causes.

At this time three (3) separate pilot assemblies which had indications of leakage while installed, have been tested and dissembled at Wyle Laboratory. Thus far, a definitive root cause has not been established. A supplemental report with additional casual analysis is projected to be submitted on September 30, 2013.

EXTENT OF CONDITION:

This condition potentially applies to all four three stage SRVs that were installed in RFO 18. During Cycle 19 operation, Pilgrim observed leakage from RV-203-3B, 3C, and 3D, which is being evaluated as part of the ongoing root cause evaluation.

* On May 18, 2011 and November 25, 2011, SRV RV 203-3C second stage pilot valve minor leakage was observed. SRV RV-203-3C was replaced during the December 26, 2011 shutdown.

*On December 26, 2011, SRV, RV-203-3D first stage pilot valve experienced leakage that exceeded the operability criteria while operating at full power. Plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.D.2, RV 203-3C and 3D were repaired and the plant returned to full power operation.

* On January 20, 2013, Pilgrim experienced the event described in this Licensee Event Report, first stage pilot valve leakage of SRV, RV-203-3B. The plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.D.2. The pilot valve was replaced with a refurbished pilot and the plant was returned to full power operation.

* On February 3, 2013, RV-203-3B first stage pilot valve leakage was identified while at full power.
Reactor power was lowered to 80% and at 1000 psig pressure, the pilot was reseated. An Operability
Determination with a compensatory measure was implemented to maintain the reactor power at 80%
and reactor pressure at 1000 psig. An Operations Decision Making Issue (ODMI) was implemented to monitor and take corrective actions. During the forced outage on February 8, 2013, caused by a loss of offsite power due to a major winter storm, RV-203-3B first stage pilot valve was replaced with a new pilot valve and the plant was returned to power operation. The removed RV-203-3B pilot valve was sent to Wyle Laboratory for testing.

As-found test results for the SRV, RV 203-3B pilot valve were: Pilot S/N SRV Position As-Found Deviation 23 RV-203-3B 1112 psig (-)3.8%

Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 requires the as-found setpoint to be within 1155±34.6 psig (1120.4 psig to 1189.6 psig). The as-found setpoint was less than the minimum pressure specification required by TS 3.6.D.1. This test result was entered into the corrective action program as a separate event, and is included in this LER since the condition was discovered within 60 days from the initial discovery of pilot leakage. Accordingly, this as-found value being out of Technical Specification setpoint is reported in this LER pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The following corrective actions were completed to address this event related to leaking RV-203-3B.
The first stage pilot valve of RV-203-3B was removed. A new pilot from another valve assembly which was verified to meet set pressure and leakage criteria was installed during the February 8, 2013 loss of offsite power outage.

Additional corrective actions will be implemented based upon the results of the testing, inspection, and evaluation of the leaking first stage pilot from RV-203-3B and other SRV failures by a joint team of Target Rock and Entergy Engineering. Additional corrective actions will be documented in the supplement report referenced earlier.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:

The leaking SRV pilot valves and the plant shutdown to repair the SRV in accordance with Technical
Specification 3.6.D.2 posed no threat to the public health and safety.

All leakage from the valve was collected in plant systems, the suppression pool (torus), and processed in accordance with normal station practices.

Pilgrim installed temperature monitoring to provide sufficient indication of SRV leakage to ensure that timely actions can be taken to ensure that the plant is maintained in a safe condition. Procedure 2.2.23 provides the instructions and guidance for interpreting and responding to SRV temperature indications. Based on these instructions, the plant was shutdown. The SRV would have been able to respond if needed to meet its core cooling or reactor pressure vessel over protection functions prior to leakage developing. As a result, the plant safety was maintained. The risk of operating with a leaking SRV is characterized by an increased chance of having an inadvertently opened SRV with increased chance of that valve failing to reclose. Assuming the plant operated for 24 hours with this condition, this results in a change in core damage frequency of less than 1.0E-7. The impact of setpoint drift (0.8% below the 3% tolerance) is considered to be bounded by delta change in core damage frequency of less than 1.OE-7.

PREVIOUS EVENTS:

Prior to Cycle 19, there were no leakage or setpoint drifts occurrences with three stage safety relief valves since all four valves were newly installed in April/May, 2011, during Refueling Outage 18.

During Cycle 19, Pilgrim observed minor leakage from the second stage pilot valve of RV-203-3C. Also, first stage pilot valve leakage was observed from RV-203-3D which was confirmed, plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.0.2, and first stage pilot valve was replaced. This event is described in LER 2011-007-00. During the outage for RV-203-3D, the entire RV 203-3C was replaced with a new valve assembly.

The industry has experienced numerous instances where SRV leakage has occurred at other plants with other Target Rock Model three stage safety relief valves OE33766 - Three Stage Safety Relief Valve Pilot Leakage just below Normal Operating Pressure - Plant Hatch.

The plant Hatch installed the same model 3-stage SRVs in Unit 2 in April 2011. Hatch experienced numerous pilot leaks during 2011. On some occasions, leakage was reduced by power and/or pressure reductions. Hatch Unit 2 had some success through power and/or pressure reductions and operating for several months after reseating the first stage pilot valve through power and/or pressure reductions.

OE26394 & OE26892 - Planned Shutdown due to a three stage Safety Relief Valve Leak - Peach Bottom Unit 3

OE32805 - Safety Relief Valve Temperature Phenomenon - Fitzpatrick

OE34730 - Target Rock 3 Stage Main Steam SRV Bore to Seat Misalignment - Limerick 2

OE19219 - Plant Shutdown Due to Increasing Tailpipe Temperature - Duane Arnold


April 19: So operational problems and operator safety determinations issues for safety relief valves and pilot operating relief valves are metastasizing throughout the nuclear industry.

 

April 11, 2013

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2013002 AND 05000423/2013002

Description. In October 2012, during the Unit 2 refueling outage, Dominion overhauled the ‘B’ PORV because of seat leakage during the operating cycle. Work order 53102395511 specified the following PMTs: PORV stroke time IST, normal pressurizer vent path verification and PORV position IST, and PORV functional test. The stroke time test was performed on October 21 in Mode 6 and the vent path verification and PORV position test was performed on November 11 in Mode 5, but the functional test was not performed prior to entering Mode 3 on November 15. TS 3.4.3 requires both PORVs to be operable in Mode 3. Dominion entered Mode 4 on November 16 at 08:10 to rework the PORV due to seat leakage.

The inspectors questioned why the PORV function test had not been performed prior to entering Mode 3. The primary plant senior reactor operator who determined the post maintenance testing requirements for the PORV repair, put a restraint on the work order indicating that hot functional test had to be performed prior to Mode 2 since the surveillance requirement stated that the PORV had to be stroked at conditions representative of Mode 3 or 4. The shift manager was unaware of the PMT requirement. His concern at the time was low temperature overpressure protection and determined that the stroke time test and vent path verification tests, which were performed under cold plant conditions, were sufficient to demonstrate operability. The inspectors

disagreed with the shift manager’s determination based on Generic Letter 90-06 which stated that testing of the PORVs in HOT STANDBY (Mode 3) or HOT SHUTDOWN (Mode 4) was required in order to simulate the temperature and pressure environmental effects on the PORV. The inspectors concluded that Dominion’s PMT was inadequate because it did not demonstrate the valve’s capability to stroke under all operating conditions prior to entering Mode 3.


Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Nuke Plant Sues Vendor

Apr 16, 2013, 2:52pm CDT

Wolf Creek nuclear plant repairs lawsuit seeks $25M

 Kansas City Power & Light Co. owns 47 percent of the Wolf Creek nuclear plant.
Kansas City Power & Light Co. owns 47 percent of the Wolf Creek nuclear plant.

Paul Koepp Reporter- Kansas City Business Journal
Kansas City Power & Light Co. and the other owners of the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant are seeking more than $25 million in damages from a vendor that allegedly caused a 10-week shutdown at the plant last year.
KCP&L, Kansas Gas and Electric Co., Kansas Electric Power Cooperative Inc. and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. filed suit Friday in Jackson County Circuit Court, claiming that ABB Inc., a North Carolina-based company that provides engineering services for power plants, did faulty repairs on a startup transformer.
Also named as a defendant is Charles Moses, an ABB electrician who supervised the repairs.
KCP&L owns 47 percent of Wolf Creek.
The repairs in question involve electrical pathways for redundant offsite power sources that keep safety systems running without interruption. An April 2011 inspection showed “a green substance” on wires in the transformer that had to be replaced; the replacements were not properly insulated, according to the lawsuit.
On Jan. 13, 2012, a main generator output breaker failed, and the startup transformer short-circuited because of the missing insulation, the suit claims. Follow-up inspections allegedly showed more shoddy work by ABB.

NRC proposes civil penalty for CB&I Shaw, cites poor safety culture

April 19, 2013
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a notice of violation and proposed a civil penalty of $36,400 against Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) for discrimination by one of its newly purchased Shaw subsidiaries against an employee who raised a safety concern. The NRC also requested CB&I take action to improve safety culture at a second former Shaw subsidiary.
CB&I completed a takeover of the Shaw Group of companies in February. These separate actions, issued April 18, stem from complaints filed with the NRC before the takeover was effective.
The notice of violation, issued by NRC’s Office of Enforcement, describes two violations of NRC employee protection requirements at Shaw Nuclear Services. A quality assurance supervisor was fired in May 2011 for notifying Shaw and Louisiana Energy Services, an NRC licensee, of some potentially faulty rebar that may have been shipped to its National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico by a third-party vendor. The second violation related to language in Shaw’s Corporate Code of Conduct that could prohibit, restrict, or otherwise discourage employees from participating in protected activities, including providing information to the NRC.
Because Shaw did not identify the violations or take corrective action once the NRC identified them, the NRC doubled the normal civil penalties, for a total fine of $36,400. The company is to respond within 30 days describing corrective actions it intends to implement, and it may request alternative dispute resolution to explore settlement options.
In a separate letter to Philip K. Asherman, president and chief executive officer of CB&I, the NRC cited a “chilled work environment” at CB&I’s facility in Lake Charles, La., formerly known as Shaw Modular Solutions. Workers hesitant to raise safety concerns through company channels have reported them directly to the NRC.
While there are more than 600 vendors supplying safety-related goods and services to the nuclear industry, approximately 35 percent of all vendor-related safety allegations received by the NRC from January 2010 through January 2013 involved the Lake Charles facility. The NRC’s review of these complaints did not identify any specific quality issues with parts supplied by Shaw or CB&I; however, the significant number of employee concerns reported to the NRC suggests a poor environment for raising safety concerns within the company.
The NRC’s expectations in this area are described in policy statements addressing safety culture and maintenance of a safety-conscious work environment.
“The NRC takes seriously the ability of employees to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and employee protection from discrimination,” Glenn M. Tracy, director of the Office of New Reactors, said in the letter. He acknowledged that CB&I was already implementing management changes at the former Shaw companies and said, “It is vital to assess the work environment and address unresolved conflicts.”
Tracy requested CB&I respond within 30 days and explain corrective actions it intends to take to improve the safety-conscious work environment at the Lake Charles facility. The company is also to inform employees about the letter and corrective actions.
NRC licensees are ultimately responsible for the safety of their facilities and the quality of the safety-related goods and services they procure for their sites. The NRC inspects licensee and vendor performance to assure that licensees are verifying the quality of goods and services they receive.




 

Monday, April 15, 2013

The Tragic Serial Cult Of Falsifications At Arkansa Nuclear One




April 17: This is a Kewaunee Nuclear Plant fracting extinction level event with Unit 1. At the end of the day, electricity price are too low to make the needed repairs on this plant.
"We have a permanently installed turbine building crane rated for around 150 tons. The generator stator weighs ~4x that much. The stator is something that hasn't been moved in ~39 years since original installation. It isn't really practical to install a permanent crane capable of moving that size load that might need to be moved once every 40 or so years. The turbine building crane spans ~100' or more. The size of the girders necessary to span that length and carry ~500+ tons would be huge, not to mention the size of the trolley, winch, cables and other hardware. Note that this crane was installed around 1970."
So the right way to do this is to bring in the heavy load cranes and yank it out through the roof like they did during new constructions. This is the cost of doing shortcuts. It would have turned it into a prolong outage..

I doubt the NRC will allow the plants to restart....

You know, this had to happen in "the government as terrorists" deep south who  hates oversight and regulations. I always thought a nuclear industry extinction level level event with the extremist right wingers, would emerge from the south exactly for that reason.
ANO Contrator Initiated Layoffs After Accident
Howard West

10:00 AM, Tuesday, April 16 2013 | 1572 views

LONDON — In the wake of Easter Sunday’s industrial accident at Arkansas Nuclear One where one worker was killed and eight others injured, at least one ANO contractor has laid off employees who have worked at the plant during shutdowns.

Entergy contractor Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) laid off more than 100 employees during the first week of April, a source who is employed by the contractor told The Courier.

CB&I has corporate offices in The Woodlands, Texas, and builds power plant industrial complexes, and maintains infrastructure for those facilities.

As of Monday afternoon, CB&I officials had not responded to requests from The Courier for comments about layoffs with their company at ANO.

An ANO spokesperson said last week when workers aren’t needed at the plant during down times, the contracting company is released from their contract with Entergy.

“Typically, contract workers are hired to perform specific jobs during refueling outages,” ANO spokesman Michael Bowling said last week. “These workers would be released from their contract when their jobs are complete or when there services are no longer needed. Some contractors hired for the 1R24 [refueling outage] have been released.”


According to an employee who was laid off on April 3, iron workers, pipe fitters, painters, laborers and carpenters joined the ranks of those who are temporarily out of a job.

“They told my supervisor not to call anybody in on Sunday,” the source said. “The supervisor told everyone to stay home. I went in on Wednesday and received layoff paperwork. All they needed was scaffold builders and extra labor. They said they are supposed to recall us, but CB&I and Entergy officials were vague about it. They said we weren’t needed.

“They gave no estimated time of when they will recall those who got laid off. We were scheduled to be there till June. Some traveled as many as 200 miles to work the outage. What now for them?”

The source reported that Entergy officials said there will be a quick-as-possible turnaround on restarting the Unit Two reactor.

“Supervisors said they were trying to bring Unit Two back on line by the end of the month,” the source said. “They said they would call people back.” The laid off employee is trying to find work now. A second source, another laid off employee, said she doesn’t blame ANO for the layoffs, and anticipates unemployment benefits to arrive this week, but with a nearly 70 percent reduction of her regular pay.

“I have no hard feelings towards the contracting company I worked for, or ANO, because I was laid off,” she said. “I understand the need for investigations and a plan to move forward.

“Filing for unemployment through Michigan has presented some challenges. I’ve had no income for the past two weeks. Hopefully, I will receive a check this week.”

The second source, who has a residence in Atkins, traveled back to Arkansas after working as a laborer in Florida during the past year. She was somewhat surprised by the way she and her coworkers were informed of the layoff.


“They called Sunday to tell me not to come in till tomorrow’s shift [April 2],” she said.

“The next night, they called and said come in to be processed out. They didn’t tell us anything other than we were being laid off. I hope to get the opportunity to work at ANO again.”

She said she understands the dynamic impact the accident had on plant workers and administrators. She feels fortunate she was able to enjoy her time with family this past week.

“The accident was so tragic and unexpected, and impacted the whole community,” she said. “Who am I to complain.”

One Little Rock union representative believes the best thing they could do for newly unemployed workers is find them work.

“I anticipate once the plant is back on line, they will be back to work,” Lindsay Brown, Local Union 424 representative, said. “The layoff is based on no need for these folks until Entergy navigates its way through its accident investigation. Entergy has laid off individuals who aren’t pertinent to restarting the plant.”

“It is intrinsic to the construction industry to have temporary layoffs due to unforeseen circumstances such as weather and supply issues. This particular incident, a 550-ton stator falling from rigging, is no exception,” Brown said.

“Construction is the only job I know where one works themselves out of a job,” he said. “Some painters would be done by now. It depends on the work packages. Our folks know what they’re in for. Maybe there should be a better safety net.

 

April 19: Did Entergy lose trust in  CB&I?

NRC proposes civil penalty for CB&I Shaw, cites poor safety culture

April 19, 2013
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a notice of violation and proposed a civil penalty of $36,400 against Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) for discrimination by one of its newly purchased Shaw subsidiaries against an employee who raised a safety concern. The NRC also requested CB&I take action to improve safety culture at a second former Shaw subsidiary.

CB&I completed a takeover of the Shaw Group of companies in February. These separate actions, issued April 18, stem from complaints filed with the NRC before the takeover was effective.

The notice of violation, issued by NRC’s Office of Enforcement, describes two violations of NRC employee protection requirements at Shaw Nuclear Services. A quality assurance supervisor was fired in May 2011 for notifying Shaw and Louisiana Energy Services, an NRC licensee, of some potentially faulty rebar that may have been shipped to its National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico by a third-party vendor. The second violation related to language in Shaw’s Corporate Code of Conduct that could prohibit, restrict, or otherwise discourage employees from participating in protected activities, including providing information to the NRC.

Because Shaw did not identify the violations or take corrective action once the NRC identified them, the NRC doubled the normal civil penalties, for a total fine of $36,400. The company is to respond within 30 days describing corrective actions it intends to implement, and it may request alternative dispute resolution to explore settlement options.

In a separate letter to Philip K. Asherman, president and chief executive officer of CB&I, the NRC cited a “chilled work environment” at CB&I’s facility in Lake Charles, La., formerly known as Shaw Modular Solutions. Workers hesitant to raise safety concerns through company channels have reported them directly to the NRC.

While there are more than 600 vendors supplying safety-related goods and services to the nuclear industry, approximately 35 percent of all vendor-related safety allegations received by the NRC from January 2010 through January 2013 involved the Lake Charles facility. The NRC’s review of these complaints did not identify any specific quality issues with parts supplied by Shaw or CB&I; however, the significant number of employee concerns reported to the NRC suggests a poor environment for raising safety concerns within the company.

The NRC’s expectations in this area are described in policy statements addressing safety culture and maintenance of a safety-conscious work environment.

“The NRC takes seriously the ability of employees to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and employee protection from discrimination,” Glenn M. Tracy, director of the Office of New Reactors, said in the letter. He acknowledged that CB&I was already implementing management changes at the former Shaw companies and said, “It is vital to assess the work environment and address unresolved conflicts.”

Tracy requested CB&I respond within 30 days and explain corrective actions it intends to take to improve the safety-conscious work environment at the Lake Charles facility. The company is also to inform employees about the letter and corrective actions.

NRC licensees are ultimately responsible for the safety of their facilities and the quality of the safety-related goods and services they procure for their sites. The NRC inspects licensee and vendor performance to assure that licensees are verifying the quality of goods and services they receive.
So the stator drop happened on March 31 and this is from Commissioner Magwood's speech on March 13, 2013
"Utilities—who are you? The current fleet of nuclear plants in this country represents a tremendous success story. Over the last 30 years, capacity factors have increased from around 75% to consistently over 90% while at the same time showing tremendous advances in safety by every measure.

However, while you have grown strong in operations—due in no small part to the success of INPO—I believe your engineering capabilities are another story. Many of the power companies present today once maintained large engineering and project management teams that oversaw and often managed the construction of nuclear power plants. Early in my career, I worked with electric utility research managers; how many companies still have senior people on their staffs with this title? Most companies reduced significantly their engineering capabilities as deregulation came into vogue.
To be entirely honest, I am skeptical that most of you could successfully oversee the construction of a new nuclear power plant today—even among those companies that currently have new plant applications before the agency. This isn’t simply an issue about new plants. These reduced capabilities also affect your ability to maintain the current fleet. As your plants age, your ability to analyze and manage change will face important and unpredictable challenges.

Are you certain you are ready for this? Are you the companies you think you are, or are some of you falsely confident in your reputations for engineering and management excellence when much of your past expertise is sitting by a pool in Florida? Or are some of you expecting that you will be able to call your favorite vendor to deal with complex emerging issues? Even under the best circumstances, vendors will require close, expert oversight. These are your plants and you are responsible to your ratepayers and the public for all the work done at your sites. Blaming the vendor if things go wrong will buy you little sympathy.
Remember, the NRC could have issued a stop work order at any point and called in the heavy lift NRC experts....

They are debating how a secondary system and supposedly non safety risk system cascaded into severely threatening nuclear safety systems at two plants. They are talking about the how turbine has been moved off the concrete pedestal.
"Looks like the blue equipment of Bigge was ok.The stator made it from the turbine deck to the hatchway and was turned correctly to be lowered to the transport below.

It appears that the front left leg of the gantry crane was positioned on a floor beam.That beam is bent.Simple guess is that the floor that supported the front two legs of the gantry beams was not strong enough.The under beam buckled and the gantry came apart.

The turbine deck was strong enough to support the back two legs of the gantry, probably had jack plates built into the foundation, legs of gantry probably right above foundation columns under turbine deck.Front legs were on building floor.This looks like the fatal flaw.Floor beam held for a while then deflected.

Be interesting who decided that the front legs could be supported by the floor with not under columns to the ground floor.Not going to be pretty."



Entergy and Arkansas Nuclear One has a long history of Falsification, running their plants horrendously not safe and corrupted staffs. Of course, I got turned around talking about both plants have different emergency response organizations.

April 16...
















The accident:
Update: RUSSELLVILLE, AR- Pope County Coroner Leonard Krout has identified the worker killed in the accident at Arkansas Nuclear One as 24-year-old Wade Walters.

New information Sunday night revealed one person died from a maintenance accident at the Arkansas Nuclear One plant in Pope County, while at least eight others were injured.

Images of the 600-ton stator that fell Sunday morning, killing one man and injuring eight others, are beginning to surface online...
April 17: Atomic Power Review: There are inside reports of structural damage to the (very large) support structure for Unit 1's turbine generator. (A nuclear plant's turbine generator can be over 225 feet long and weigh over 5000 tons completely assembled; the support structure is even larger and heavier.) None of those has been either confirmed or denied by Entergy -- or for that matter even acknowledged.

So the structural girders around the turbine deck floor opening gave way...

Timeline
  • Jan 9, 2012 The licensee researched exercise drill document in late Dec 2011  
  • retained the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham 
  • Jan 12, 2012, the ANO Emergency Preparedness Manager notified the NRC resident inspector and regional emergency preparedness inspectors that senior employee a had apparently falsified documents. 
  • April 2012: NRC IO initiated investigation 
  • Dec 14, 2012: Completed investigation 
  • NRC MCL line in the TSC was inoperable from February 2008 through November 2008 
***A corruption and lying that is so pervasive within the NRC, the NRC Office Of Investigation and Entergy...it is so blatant.



***It frightened me when I found this.



LICENSEE FACTUAL SUMMARY OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2012-024
 Submitted by NUCBIZ on April 14, 2013 - 15:05 
In April 2012, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation to determine if a senior emergency planner at Entergy Operations Incorporated, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), willfully falsified documents related to miscellaneous drills and surveillances. The investigation was completed on December 14, 2012. 
The NRC OI investigation reported that on January 9, 2012, the licensee researched the exercise drill documentation as a result of recordkeeping discrepancies identified in late December 2011. The licensee spoke with the senior emergency planner, who admitted that he had falsified the paperwork.  The licensee initiated a condition report (CR) to document the incident and retain the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, to conduct an investigation. The Balch & Bingham investigation also identified that the senior emergency planner falsified surveillance documents. 
During the NRC OI investigation, the senior emergency planner at ANO admitted to generating false documentation over a period of four years.  The false documentation does not meet the requirement under 10 CFR 50.9(a), Completeness and Accuracy of Information. This regulation states, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. The false documentation included 2 miscellaneous drills involving the Post Accident Sampling (PAS) system, as recorded on December 14, 2010 and December 7, 2011, and 2 drills involving environmental monitoring, as recorded on December 14, 2010, and December 6, 2011. The drills were required by the licensee's procedure number 1903.004, "Admin and Maintenance of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures," which fulfills the requirement under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14). In addition, it was determined that the senior emergency planner at ANO falsely documented 3 surveillances required by EP-010, "Emergency Response Facility Walkthrough Surveillance, Technical Support Center (TSC)" on May 12, June 4, and September 30, 2008. The TSC surveillance required checking the operation of the NRC management counterpart link (MCL) telephone line in the TSC. The false documentation indicated that the NRC MCL line was operable. The investigation determined that the NRC MCL line in the TSC was inoperable from February 2008 through November 2008. This surveillances was also required by the emergency plan, to meet the regulatory requirement under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). 
The senior emergency planner admitted that he was knowledgeable of the regulations and requirements to conduct drills and surveillances. He admitted that he generated false documentation as a result of his lack of time management, and that the falsification of documents was the most effortless action to take. 
The licensee took immediate corrective actions, which included requiring additional documentation to support a drill package, with management's review and signature. In addition, the licensee took remedial action against the employee commensurate with the circumstances that demonstrated the seriousness of the violation, thereby creating a deterrent effect with the licensee's organization.
Right these two statements are contradictory... 
Based on the results of this investigation, one apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. 
In addition, since you identified the violation and based on our understanding of your corrective action...
I am getting word that the NRC was sniffing around the emergency planner's work...thus Entergy jumping out of the bushes admitting it wasn't accurate...

 These lawyers are the cleaners...their job is to sterilized the employees into not admitting senior managers participated in the falsification. Seeing how this was going to the courts, why didn't they allow the OI to investigate the events first. 
The licensee initiated a condition report (CR) ANO-C-2012-00098 to document the incident and retain the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, to conduct an investigation.
 A very similar and long last falsification event
4 fired, 34 disciplined at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

 A series of investigations at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in Scriba has resulted in four workers being fired and 34 being disciplined, a spokeswoman for the plant owner said Thursday. 
Meanwhile, federal prosecutors announced that one of the fired workers has pleaded guilty to falsifying tests of safety equipment at the plant.

Also Thursday, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission notified the owner of the plant, Entergy Nuclear Northeast, that it could face civil actions in the wake of the investigations.

Results of the three investigations were handed over to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Syracuse, which brought criminal charges against Michael McCarrick, 56, of Oswego, a former radiation protection technician at the plant. McCarrick admitted to falsifying records relating to more than two dozen plant worker.

In his guilty plea, he admitted he failed to adequately perform tests to make sure the workers’ emergency respirators were properly fitted and sealed, and then falsely documented that they were.

The plant is required to refit workers’ emergency respirators every year. The respirators, which protect against chemical releases or other fumes during emergencies, must fit snugly, and the fit can change as workers gain or lose weight or otherwise change.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Craig Benedict said that on 32 documented occasions between 2006 and 2009, McCarrick falsely claimed he had completed such tests. Benedict said the incidents were investigated by special agents from the NRC. 

No known injuries occurred as a result of the falsified tests

 McCarrick pleaded guilty to one felony count of violating the Atomic Energy Act. He could receive up to two years in prison and a $250,000 fine when he is sentenced Jan. 10.

The NRC also found that two unidentified “staff level individuals” acted with “careless disregard” by not following through on their suspicions that the respirator fit tests were inadequate.

The NRC informed Entergy that the second investigation found that McCarrick deliberately failed to document required surveillance of air samples or to make sure workers leaving the radiologically controlled area went through contamination monitors.

The third investigation found that McCarrick and another radiation protection technician failed to conduct other leak testing and surveillance duties.

McCarrick was the only worker charged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office . However, the NRC notified Entergy that it could face civil action pending the result of either an enforcement conference with the NRC or a mediation session, whichever the company chooses. 

Entergy spokeswoman Tammy Holden said the plant conducted an internal investigation in June 2009 after learning the NRC had received a phone call alleging a potential violation at the plant.

Most of the 34 workers who were disciplined were workers who should have known that their “fit tests” for the respirators were either not done or were incomplete, Holden said. She said those workers were removed from the site during the investigation and later received either suspensions of pay or verbal or written warnings. They were also retrained.

Holden stressed that the masks are rarely required, and that none of the workers who had inadequate fit tests did any work during that period that would have required the masks to be used.

“At no point was there any risk to the public health or safety at any time during this process,” she said.
 Escalated Enforcement Action: 
Enforcement Policy. Whether the violation involved willfulness. Willful violations are of particular concern because the NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees and their contractors employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. The Commission cannot tolerate willful violations. Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance if it includes indications of willfulness. Violations with willful aspects will typically be considered for escalated enforcement (i.e., SL I, II, or III). The term “willfulness” as used in this Policy refers to conduct involving either a careless disregard for requirements or a deliberate violation o requirements or falsification of information. In determining the significance of a violation involving willfulness, the NRC will consider such factors as the position, training, experience level, and responsibilities of the person involved in the violation (e.g., licensee official or nonsupervisory employee), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., careless disregard or deliberateness), and the economic or other advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation. The relative weight given to each of these factors in the significance assessment will depend on the circumstances of the violation. However, if a licensee refuses to correct a minor violation within a reasonable time such that it willfully continues, the violation should be considered at least more than minor. Licensees are expected to take significant remedial action in responding to willful violations commensurate with the circumstances, such that the action reflects the seriousness of the violation, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee’s organization.
They were lackadaisical with safety and caring about the integrity and honor of their company.  Palisades DC event that nearly killed a guy and spun the plant around barely in control.
Finally, based on the facts gathered during the special inspection, the inspectors determined that a possible cause for the September 25, 2011, event was that the Palisades organization did not establish safety policies amongst the management team and employees, which reinforced that nuclear safety was an overriding priority. Specifically, several of the organizational decisions demonstrated in this event were not consistent with the established nuclear safety policies and procedures at the site. In addition, production and schedule goals were not developed, communicated, and implemented in a manner that reinforced nuclear safety on September 25, 2011, as demonstrated by the organization’s performance during the execution of this emergent work.













Another recent worthless confirmatory order. Can't trust them at their word the NRC seems to be saying...
March 14, 2013
EN-13-003

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc. (EA-13-031)
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1
Docket Number 50-313
Subject: CONFIRMATORY ORDER TO ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
This is to inform the Commission that a Confirmatory Order (CO) will be issued on or about  March 20, 2013, to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy, licensee), confirming Entergy’s commitment to submit its license amendment request (LAR) by January 31, 2014. This LAR will transition the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, “Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,” in accordance with Section 50.48(c) to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
On June 28, 2011, Entergy committed to the date of August 31, 2012, for submission of its license amendment application. However, due to ANO-1’s implementation of its transition strategy and continued development of a high-quality application, the LAR will require more time than anticipated. In a letter dated August 23, 2012, the licensee proposed a new submittal date of January 31, 2014. This proposed date is beyond the previous committed submittal date and, thus, exceeds the enforcement discretion (i.e., until August 31, 2012) that the NRC granted to ANO-1 for certain fire protection noncompliances.


Wednesday, April 10, 2013

Nuclear Evacuation May Bog Down

I know how the NRC will respond to this. We got to throttle information coming outof a plant meltdown...in order to protect human lives. We got to release just enough information to get local people to start evacuating without scaring the greater than 10 mile people who will clog up the evacuation.

We got to better control information from the plant across the board so we never create the environments where a real accident will create a human stampede.

This is how we preserve the greatest amount health of the most the most people...to release less information so we won't create a huge human clog on our roads if a human stampede occurs in a potential core meltdown...

Hey, we are strictly following the rules from congress....

 
Alert to Congress: Nuclear evacuation may bog down
Wednesday, April 10, 2013

Associated Press

A new government report challenges a pillar of planning for disasters at American nuclear power plants, finding that people living beyond the official 10-mile evacuation zone might be so frightened by the prospect of spreading radiation that they would flee of their own accord, clog roads, and delay the escape of others.

For more than 30 years, community readiness has been based on the belief that evacuation planning isn't needed beyond 10 miles from nuclear sites. But the Government Accountability Office report — to be released later Wednesday but obtained in advance by The Associated Press — found that regulators have never properly studied how many people beyond 10 miles would make their own decisions to take flight, prompting what is called a "shadow evacuation."

As a result, the GAO report says, "evacuation time estimates may not accurately consider the impact of shadow evacuations."

However, Neil Sheehan, a spokesman for the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shot back in an email statement: "We disagree with the view that evacuations cannot be safely carried out."

The investigation was requested by four U.S. senators: Democrats Barbara Boxer of California, Robert P. Casey Jr. of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island and independent Bernard Sanders of Vermont. They asked for the report in 2011 in response to an AP investigative series reporting weaknesses in community planning for nuclear accidents, including the likelihood of surprisingly large shadow evacuations. The GAO acts as an investigative arm of Congress.

Monday, April 08, 2013

The NRC Is A Safety Information Black Hole At Pilgrim Plant

The NRC Is A Information Black Hole At Pilgrim Plant

A US agency without a conscience is an agency only out for itself. All the individuals in the agency are predominantly aimed toward self interest.

So they don't want to answer me because they know that will show everyone with what they really are. So they game...doesn't document anything that makes the NRC look bad or hurt us.

I know these guys are highly competent...they have been trained for comprehension in extreme detail and they are all great writers. They seen and understood what i wrote...they just chose to completely blow me off.

So they had 25 days to respond to me like a good standing US federal agency and professionally...more than three weeks.

Michael Mulligan
To: "Guzman, Richard"
Sent: Friday, March 15, 2013 11:17 AM
Subject: Re: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown
 

Dear Mr Guzman,

It is interesting, just after the Nemo blizzard LOOP, I called up the Pilgrim plant resident inspector's office requesting a discussion with him about their SRV problems and the hard plant trip. I talked to Neil Shaheen too, e-mails also....never got a response. Certainly sounds like a cover-up... then the fourth one began to leak a few weeks after the start-up and no public notification of it. I left my telephone number and never got a call back?

Could I get a telephone discussion about said events with the residents and a region I officials as soon as possible...in preparation for the PRB pre hearing?
How will they answer me...say they didn't get it. Or just ignore me again like I don't matter.
From: Michael Mulligan
To: "Guzman, Richard"
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2013 3:27 PM
Subject: Re: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown
 

Mr. Guzman,
Thanks, I see it now today.
Is your agency totally blowing me off on my earlier request to speak with a Pilgrim resident inspector and a senior region 1 official (like region III did for me with Palisades)?
Can't even send me an email saying the request was denied, give me a reason...that would be the professional way of handling it?
After all that recent hard talk with the community and the Plymouth selectman about poor NRC communication and agency mistrust during the Pilgrim performance meeting?
Thanks
Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH  
He reminded me on Friday it was the following Thursday! 

From: "Guzman, Richard"
To: 'Michael Mulligan'
Sent: Friday, April 5, 2013 4:21 PM
Subject: RE: 2.206: Pilgrim Nuclear Plant SRV Request for Emergency Shutdown


-->
Mr. Mulligan,

I’ve included your below email message (along with your March 20, 2013 email) as supplements to your petition for the PRB’s review.

Also, this message is to confirm that the PRB teleconference is set for Thursday, 4/11 at 11am – 12pm.The bridge line information is provided below:

Dial-In No.: 800-772-3842 or 301-816-5120
Password: 2206 followed by the pound sign (#).

Thanks,

Rich Guzman
Sr. Project Manager
NRR/DORL/LPL1-1
US NRC
301-415-1030
 







Sunday, March 31, 2013

Entergy-Arkansas Nuclear One

April 28: Was Waterford A Precursor To Arkansas Nuclear One?

April 19: Personally, you know what is ahead of us...there are going to drop a fuel cast from the refueling floor to the first floor...with the refueling floor as the top floor.

























Updated April 26: Is Entergy lying to the stockholder and the financial people? Bet you the NRC won't allow them to start up until the investigations are over with.

Maybe OHSA and the NRC has found malicious rule breaking and fraud...they need permission for restart...

You get it, they don't have the skills to know how damaged their plant is...

Entergy says Arkansas Nuclear Unit 2 to restart in May


April 26

HOUSTON (Reuters) - One of two shut reactor units at Entergy Corp's Arkansas nuclear plant will return to service in May, Entergy chairman Leo Denault told investors on Thursday.

Both reactors at the Arkansas Nuclear One station have been down since March 31, when an industrial accident related to a refueling shutdown at the 834-megawatt Unit 1 killed one worker and injured eight others.

Denault said Unit 2, rated at 989-MW, will restart in May.

He said it is too early to know when Unit 1 might be repaired and restarted.
Entergy Plans for Restart of Unit 2 at Arkansas Nuclear Plant

Published April 04, 2013

Dow Jones Newswires

Entergy Corp. (ETR) said it is making plans to restart one of its units at an Arkansas nuclear-power plant, a process that is expected to take several weeks, after the unit shut down automatically following an accident on Sunday that left one worker dead....

April 8:

So the NRC gave them a week to shred incriminating documents or back date missing documents...everyone wink wink, along with their corporate lawyers, now got their story straight....

 NRC SENDS AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM TO ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE



The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will send an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to Arkansas Nuclear One to review the circumstances surrounding an industrial accident in which a heavy load fell onto the Unit 1 turbine deck, causing a loss of offsite power to Unit 1 and an automatic shutdown of Unit 2.

Workers were moving a massive generator stator out of the plant’s turbine building during maintenance activity when a lifting rig collapsed about 7:45 a.m. on March 31, killing one person and injuring eight others. Entergy Operations Inc., which operates the plant, declared a Notice of Unusual Event, the lowest of four emergency classifications used by the NRC, but terminated it after taking corrective actions to stabilize the plant’s power supplies.

“An AIT is used when the NRC wants to promptly dig deeply into the circumstances surrounding an operational event,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Arthur T. Howell. “We want to make sure that all the circumstances that contributed to this event are well understood in order to prevent a recurrence.”

...We know that this event will change us forever, and that we have a huge task before us as we recover the units and continue preparations to bring them back to service. It will be a challenge, but we will not be facing it alone. We’ll have the support of the Entergy nuclear fleet and experts in the industry.

“We have even had some of our Entergy retirees offer to come back and work for free if they could be of help,” she continued. “This incident has served to draw us closer together.”

Gregory acknowledged the community’s concern, but reinforced Entergy’s commitment to safety.

“We understand that our industry is unique and special,” Gregory said. “Our top responsibility is ensuring the health and safety of the community and our workers. Our commitment to that is stronger than ever.”
April 5: It baffles the mind why they were using the temp crane for the stator. Entergy says the new stator is out of the building waiting to be moved into the turbine deck. Maybe they needed the main crane to remove components of the turbine or other large components.
You know, maybe these super fast outages needed two main cranes?

April 4: It sounds like they severely flooded the lower levels of the turbine building...
Entergy Corp. (ETR) said it is making plans to restart one of its units at an Arkansas nuclear-power plant, a process that is expected to take several weeks, after the unit shut down automatically following an accident on Sunday that left one worker dead.
Freaking crazy Southerners!
UPDATE: Ga. Power reports total of 4 minor injuries at Plant Bowen

Update:Georgia Power is now reporting a total of four minor injuries in an explosion Friday at Plant Bowen in Euharlee.

Bartow County Sheriff's Office officials have reported that a generator turbine exploded at Plant Bowen this afternoon causing "major structural damage" to one of the units. All roads around the plant are closed at the moment and motorists are advised to stay away from the area. Currently, the Bartow County Fire Department and Georgia Power have command centers set up on scene and the sheriff's office is supplying perimeter security for the roads leading to the plant.
April 3:
I  had a transcipted 2.206 meeting with the NRC yesterday with many NRC officials. I spent much time inarticulately explaining since Entergy purchased VY, in the lead up to the tritium issue and  hen the craziness of the palisades before the red finding.  I documented...this was a giant nuclear utility spinning totally out of control and everyone knew it. If you listened to me, more disclosed truth and accurate documents...these deaths and injuries over in Arkansas would never have occurred.   
...Just human tissue being fed into a meat grinder! 
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELECTRICAL FAULT IN SWITCHYARD RESULTING IN PERSONNEL INJURIES

"At 1707 CDT on 4/2/13 an arc flash occurred at the 'B' safeguards transformer (XMDV24) in the plant switchyard at Callaway. At the time of the flash, ground straps were being placed on the 'B' safeguards transformer which had been removed from service for maintenance. The event resulted in a loss of power to areas/buildings outside the power block. There was no impact to equipment and systems in the plant.

"Four workers were injured or affected by the flash. The extent of the electrical-related injuries has not been determined. However, based on reports from the scene, all of the workers were conscious and walked away from the scene. One person was transported by helicopter and two by ambulance to a local hospital. The fourth person experienced only a minor injury.
At the end of the day, this building went through a severe vibration event. The question asked, did this damage the other stator, turbine and other equipment...

With Arkansas one, this sounds like a repeat of the Vermont Yankee cooling tower collapse. It became the most damaging negative image and icon of the anti nuke establishment in the history of Vermont Yankee. I bet you these pictures will be the same for the Arkansas Nuclear.  

You can't help noticing...are they hiring cheap second string employees and contractors...the low cost WalMart world.

Because of the stress on the grid, we will begin to see nuclear employees as human detritus  and waste sacrificed on the altar of profits and a financially unstable electric system.

Callaway Nuclear plant: Ameren Missouri is part of St. Louis-based Ameren Corp., which reported a 2012 net loss of $974 million on total operating revenue of $6.83 billion. Ameren Corp. is led by President and CEO Thomas Voss.


Generally, the NRC is the on scene arm of the federal government...OSHA and the NRC have a memorandum of understanding...effectively nuclear plants aren't covered by unbelievable weak OSHA.

So you get it, this is the secondary system that unimportant to nuclear safety and risk analysis, the NRC doesn't oversee heavy loading. So effectively there is no government employee safety oversight... 

1988:
In recognition of the agencies' authorities and responsibilities enumerated above, the following procedures will be followed:

Although NRC does not conduct inspections of industrial safety, in the course of inspections of radiological and nuclear safety, NRC personnel may identify safety concerns within the area of OSHA responsibility or may receive complaints from an employee about OSHA-covered working conditions. In such instances, NRC will bring the matter to the attention of licensee management. NRC inspectors are not to perform the role of OSHA inspectors; however, they are to elevate OSHA safety issues to the attention of NRC Regional management when appropriate. If significant safety concerns are identified or if the licensee demonstrates a pattern of unresponsiveness to identified concerns, the NRC Regional Office will inform the appropriate OSHA Regional Office. In the case of complaints, NRC will withhold, from the licensee, the identity of the employee. In addition, when known to NRC, NRC will encourage licensees to report to OSHA accidents resulting in a fatality or multiple hospitalizations.
With Arkansas one, this sounds like a repeat of the Vermont Yankee cooling tower collapse. It became the most damaging negative image icon of the anti nuke establishment in the history of Vermont Yankee. I bet you these pictures will be the same for the Arkansas nuclear...

Again, lower level and middle level employees are MALICIOUSLY sabotaging senior management by releasing these pictures... 

You can't help noticing...are they hiring cheap second string employees and contractors...the low cost WalMart world.

Because of the stress on the grid, we will begin to see the nuclear employees as human detritus waste sacrificed on the altar of profits and a financially unstable electric system.

Generally, the NRC is the on scene arm of the federal government...OSHA and the NRC have a memorandum of understanding...effectively nuclear plants aren't covered by unbelievableYweak OSHA.

So you get it, this is the secondary system that unimportant to nuclear safety and risk analysis, the NRC doesn't oversee heavy loading. So effectively there is no government employee safety oversight...
 
April 2
Look at how flimsy the turbine deck floor looks around the hole...see the far floor at a steep angle from the horizontal.


I mean, they had an installed gantry crane on a rail and they brought in a temporary crane. Was something wrong with the installed gantry crane?

I bet you they did this to speed up the refueling outage. The rented the temporary crane. They used the main crane to haul up the new stator. Parked it in a distant corner. Took out the old stator from the generator with the temporary crane. Once the old stator got out of the way, they quickly move the new stator into it position as they were moving the old stator out of the building. Meanwhile with the temp, they were moving the old stator to the railway door.

1) The operator ended up putting most of its weight on one leg and it collapsed.

2) The turbine floor wasn't designed for the rollers or wheels of the lifting crane...one leg punched through the floor.

3) They wouldn't be that stupid to put both stators in the same area of the floor...and they both collapsed the floor?  


Direct quote from my Feb 2011 2.206!

"Palisades: Request Emergency Palisades Shutdown"


Feb 22, 2011(Pg 19)

Dear Mr. Borchardt,
"In the 1942 movie Casablanca:

Rick Blaine: How can you close me up? On what grounds?

Captain Louis Renault: I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here."  
.
.
.
"Wouldn't you want to be on the Palisades refuel floor for the heart thumping loud bang and vibration coming from a dropped reactor head by a crane? How neat would that be for worker with industry bragging rights? I was there for the ten seconds it took for the head to rattle and smash through multiple floors to the basement floor. They could be saying by my age, that was the neatest 10 seconds in my life, besides when I was alone with Linda Lue when I was seventeen. News at lI pm? I see Entergy thinks it smore efficient to not follow procedures in an outage."
This is the Arkansas One stator.


It is not as bad as I thought...


Wow, look at that bent deck concrete floor below the crane beam on the left...


NRC...500-ton component.

The accident happened when a crane fell while moving a large generator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said

April 1:
"At this time, the full extent of structural damage on Unit 1 is not known. There was one known fatality and 4 known serious injuries to workers. The local coroner is on site for the fatality and the injured personnel have been transported offsite to local hospitals. Investigation into the cause of the failure and extent of damage is ongoing."
So Entergy dropped a turbine stator at a shutdown nuclear...then the plant next door tripped on something caused by the crash...

I am thinking the stator crashed through two or more floors...this is what killed or injured the employees.
RUSSELLVILLE, Ark. (AP) - One worker died Sunday morning, three others injured in a Sunday morning accident at Arkansas Nuclear One near Russellville according to the power plant's owner Entergy.
Entergy calls the incident a ‘significant industrial accident'. The injured employees were taken to a local hospital.
In a statement from Entergy is says the accident occurred when a generator stator fell as it was being moved out of the turbine building.Unit 1 is in a refueling outage and Unit 2, which was operating at full power, automatically shut down. Both plants are in a stable shutdown condition and there is no danger to the public. The plant is in an unusual event classification, the lowest of four emergency classifications designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Additional staff has been brought to the site to manage the situation. 
I hope they got a standby stator...it is going to be a long shutdown!

Homeowners around the plant heard the loud crash...that has got to a lot of noise!

Wouldn't that be something if it fell into the main condenser or control room.

So now it is 9 hurt or dead...
An Entergy spokesperson told The Courier the total number of Arkansas Nuclear One employees injured in the Sunday morning accident at the plant was eight, not three, as earlier reported.
What did they take out or crush to cause this...

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A BREAKER EXPLOSION IN THE PROTECTED AREA

"At 0750 [CDT] on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator Stator (~500 tons), the Unit 1 turbine temporary lift device failed. This caused a loss of all off site power on Unit 1. The ANO Unit 1 #1 and #2 EDG [Emergency Diesel Generator] have started and are supplying A-3 4160V switchgear and A-4 4160V switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit 1 has entered [procedures] 1202.007 - Degraded Power, 1203.028 - Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 - Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit 1 is in MODE 6.

"ANO-1 entered TS 3.8.2 A, 'One Required Offsite Circuit Inoperable'. All required actions are complete. The event caused a loss of decay heat removal on ANO Unit 1 which was restored in 3 minutes and 50 seconds.

"Unit 2 tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water was initiated on Unit 2 and Unit 2 was in [Technical Specification] 3.0.3 from 0817 [CDT] to 0848 [CDT] due to Emergency Feedwater. Unit 2 is being powered by off-site. Unit 2 Startup 3 [transformer] lock out at 0921 [CDT]. [Bus] 2A1 is on Start up 2 [transformer] and [bus] 2A3 is on #2 EDG.

"10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - 4-hr. notification due to the ES [Engineered Safeguard Feature] actuation on both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
10CFR50 72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4-hr. notification due to RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuation on Unit 2.
10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(xi) - 4-hr. notification due to Government Notification.
29CFR1904.39a - [OSHA] 8-hr. notification due to death on site.

"At 1033 [CDT] on 3/31/2013, Unit 2 entered a Notification of Unusual Event based on EAL HU4 due to damage in 2A1 switchgear. Notification of the NUE will be made lAW Emergency Plan requirements. Follow-up notifications will be made as appropriate."

At this time, the full extent of structural damage on Unit 1 is not known. There was one known fatality and 4 known serious injuries to workers. The local coroner is on site for the fatality and the injured personnel have been transported offsite to local hospitals. Investigation into the cause of the failure and extent of damage is ongoing.

On Unit 2, all rods inserted during the trip. The core is being cooled via natural circulation. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to atmosphere. There is no known primary to secondary leakage.

The licensee has notified the State of Arkansas, local authorities, OSHA and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA and Nuclear NSSA (via email).

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID THOMPSON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1934 EDT ON 3/31/13 * * *

The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1821 CDT. The basis for termination was that the affected bus (2A2) is de-energized and no other equipment on Unit 2 was damaged.

The licensee has notified the state and local authorities and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Pick), NRR EO (Howe), IRD (Gott), DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA and Nuclear SSA (via email).