A Terrorist Probe And Shots Fired At A Nuclear plant?

"If you see something, say something"

Update April 26: 

Was the Terrorist on TVA property (dirt) or shooting from the boat?

This is what happens when you think you need to lie or provide selective information in the name of altruism or doing good. 

You understand what's going on. They get into a big accident, the story is going to crazily switch between the intruder fired shots while on their property, to the intruder fired shots while he was in a boat. This is TMI where they are talking in a untrustworthy way...we could instantly lose confidence in the industry and the NRC if they talk like this in a big accident. And the NRC is too indifferent to catch it and provide feedback to the utilities with how their message is getting out to the community...

Freaking FBI must be asleep at the switch...

You catch how the story obscenely shifted from the intruder fired on TVA's property and then to today that he was in a boat.

You can't trust anyone. It was important identifying they escaped by boat first, as this would key peoples memory if you wanted the crowd sourcing public input...

What is WBIR channel 10 on dope...they don't even question their own reporting shift from the TVA property to the boat...

We got a brain dead southern media...

... Generally all this secrecy by the system, FBI, TVA and the NRC...it makes all the player unaccountable for making the system serve our higher national interest...    

Today- the shooter was shooting in the boot

 WBIR 10: KNOXVILLE April 25 — Investigators are running down leads in an early Sunday shootout between a security officer at Watt Bar Nuclear Plant and an individual on who fired multiple shots from a boat on Chickamauga Lake near Spring City, Tenn., property. 

...TVA spokesperson Jim Hopson said the subject traveled up to the plant on a boat and walked onto the property. When the officer questioned the suspect, the individual fired multiple shots at the officer. The officer shot back, and when he called for backup, the suspect sped away on his boat

The opening statements... he was on TVA property (dirt) shooting 

Oak Ridge Today April 22: As the officer came around a curve, the truck’s headlights illuminated a person on the shore of the Tennessee River, on the eastern side of the plant and near its southern boundary.

Channel 3 WRCN April 23: "When the officer came around the patrol path, one individual was on the shore. They challenged him. They spoke for a few seconds. The officer didn't believe there was any danger," TVA spokesperson Jim Hopson says.

WBIR channle 10..."Jim Hopson, a TVA spokesman stationed at Watts Bar, said the incident occurred about 2 a.m. when a TVA security officer patrolling the plant's perimeter encountered the intruder near the Tennessee River, about 200 yards away from the cooling towers in territory clearly marked as a restricted area.  

"The officer challenged that individual, and the individual fired at the officer," Hopson said. "The officer returned the fire, and as the officer was calling for backup as well as switching to a higher-powered weapon [he] had in the vehicle, the individual fled the site. 

"Hopson said he did not know how the person escaped -- by river or land." There was no indication that the intruder was injured.""

..."An unidentified suspect fired multiple rounds at a security officer on patrol at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant early Sunday morning, and at least one round hit the security officer’s vehicle, an official said. 

The Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear security officer fired back, also shooting multiple rounds. 

The suspect appeared to have initially been on the ground but may have fled in a boat, TVA spokesman Jim Hopson said." 

I am not kidding, the last time I criticized the security in a nuclear plant I was visited by the FBI's JTTF for making terrorist threats against a nuclear plant. They never charged me. 

They made me promise not to ever say "three bad words" in a row and in the same internet paragraph or story ever again...

They were tough on me in the beginning...but generally they were good guys. They just got used by an undisclosed interest and I was a little disappointed by that. Both of them were as sharp as a tack...they were very bright..

 And everyone knows in a situation like this with manpower in the ready...he should have backed off until help arrived. He should have gone into a "eyes on mode" and never confronted such a dangerous situation by himself. There should have been no conversation attempt. TVA should have called a terrorist emergency to the outside authorities saying terrorists were on site and leaving by boat. It is ridiculous only getting a UE with bullets going into the front window of a police cruiser.

What I don't see at 2 am in the night...his pistol or long arm immediately out of his holster and pointing it at the potential terrorist. I don't see the presumption of it could be a terrorist in our state of emergency with the Boston event. .

You know, get down on the ground with your hands above your head, or you are a fucking dead man...

Did he contact the security control room about a unauthorized person(s) on the site before he got out of the car and struck up a conversation?

Everything about this guy's job was about him being the first one to discovered a ongoing terrorist action before he got shot...report it to the control room, eyes on, and demanding off site police resources and others to counteract the security threat. The deal is for your head to stay ahead of the ball...   

So why isn't TVA show-boating that guard in the media like the Boston police heroes? He is a nuclear power plant security guard and his actions are certainly heroic. Why aren't they happy to show off all these nuclear security guards and much worthy of public display?Why are they so insecure with raising the status of nuclear security guards in the eyes of the public?

That means, we didn't have a camera and want to disclose it, it would be embarrassing to TVA.

He also would not comment on whether the gunfire exchange was captured on camera, saying he couldn’t reveal information on plant safeguards.

I was just saying, yesterday 600 pounds of WW II mortar rounds in a junkyard 20 miles from Browns Ferry? And one round detonated.  But they made a lot and tested WW II munitions in that area around the war.

"Army, ATF lock down school, detonating WW II explosives in Morgan County"...

See, I would think saying something like "our site is fully camera'd up"...you have no chance of getting away with anything. Then prove what TVA says by getting the pictures up in the media. That more than anything else, would keep the bad guys away..this place is known to be locked up tight.

Hopson declined to comment on the specific weapons carried by plant officers. He also would not comment on whether the gunfire exchange was captured on camera, saying he couldn’t reveal information on plant safeguards.

My National Security Philosophy: Crush The Monsters Before We Lose Faith In Government! This politically correct talk is going to destroy us.

So why didn't TVA and the FBI immediately make a request for crowd sourcing to the greater community, much like solved the Boston terrorist event. The, we are looking for a white man with a black hoody.

TVA says they have to withhold information to not disclosed tactics of plant protection. So they are going to put marginal security and safety issues over catching a terrorist.

Can you see them in a court proceeding against a terrorist....we can't disclose that because it might show security devices and issues. So they let the monster terrorist go free.

I am just saying this whole thing looks like it was shaped to protect the credibility and  the image of a nuclear plant and TVA .

Right, in a dire national emergency, we are going to lose the trust of TVA and our government if they begin to withhold information from the public in order to protect the image of organizations, businesses and government itself. All our typical organizations and government agencies put their own selfish interest above doing good. Our greatest national security interest is the trust and integrity of government!

We got a huge monster growing in our country where we hide our faults and accountability under the umbrella of national security restriction. We should never allow our weakness to override our Constitutional ideas...

The overall national homeland security philosophy I would ascribe to... is we dominate science, national intelligence and military resources...where we would in very limited situations ever trade constitutional ideals of transparency for national security.

I mean we could crush the bad guys first before we would hide public interest...

Anyways post 9/11, they decided to hide corporate wrong doing about plant security and public accountability, because they feared security issues was impacting the image of nuclear power.

  The FBI is leading the investigation. 

Call me crazy, the event happened around 2am Sunday morning. The timing sure sounds like they wanted to catch the one week anniversary of the Boston bombing in the media (Monday).  

It sounds like the individual was waiting for the security guard...was trying to create a scene.

"The episode began when a security officer on patrol outside Watts Bar plant noticed an individual standing on the bank of the Tennessee River on plant property. Hopson said the officer challenged the individual, believed to be a white male wearing a hooded sweatshirt"

Canadian terrorist today...al Qaeda elements living in Iran!

TORONTO -- Two men were arrested and charged with plotting a terrorist attack against a Canadian passenger train, police said Monday.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police said Monday that Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, who live in Montreal and Toronto areas, were conspiring to carry out an al-Qaida supported attack against Via Rail, but posed no immediate threat.

"It was definitely in the planning stage but not imminent," RCMP chief superintendent Jennifer Strachan told reporters.

Charges against the two men include conspiring to carry out an attack and murder people in association with a terrorist group. Police said the men are not Canadian citizens, but declined to say where they were from.

The investigation was part of a cross-border operation involving Canadian law enforcement agencies, the FBI and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

NYT: Assistant Commissioner James Malizia said that the two suspects had received “direction and guidance” from “Al Qaeda elements living in Iran,” but that there was no evidence that the effort was sponsored by the government of Iran.

How about a conspiracy by the security guards to stage a fake terrorist attack...so it gives them leverage for a pay raise and elevated status?

 To think about it, what if this terrorist shot the security guy dead and he was running around in Tennessee without any legal evidence to prove how it was done. Think of the huge headlines then. Nuclear guard shot dead...nobody knows how it happened.

So "fisherman and visitors" are allowed into this area during daylight...why would you even want to shoot at an officer. If you were kids or fishermen, bet you they would just kick you out...

It sounds like somebody intended to elevate this harmless event into the mainstream media by firing a weapon and hitting a security guard's car.

So why isn't there recorded security camera coverage with night vision thoroughly covering the river entry area. Certainly the security officer knew this area wasn't security camera'd up??

***Why wasn't the security guard wearing a military style night vision setup and why didn't he have a small camera on a head piece directly transmitting into the security control room? Why wasn't a dash cam on his security car? What I am talking about is the ability to have evidence to prosecute the bad guys.

"The NRC has dispatched two security inspectors from the Atlanta office to review the incident and the TVA response."

The NRC has dispatched two security inspectors from the Atlanta office to review the incident and the TVA response.

It sounds like the intruder knew that area wasn't covered by security cameras...

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant intruder, shooting under federal probe

by Pam Sohn

The FBI has joined the TVA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigating a trespasser who exchanged gunfire with a security officer on the property of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant early Sunday morning.

It is unclear why the intruder -- who escaped -- was there, and investigators are saying little.

But the nuclear plant, like all federal facilities, remains under high security alert in the aftermath of the Boston bombings last week, and investigators combed the area -- even with helicopters and surveillance aircraft -- for well over 12 hours Sunday.

"It's been a long day," FBI Special Agent Ed Galloway said Sunday evening. "All I can say is that we are devoting our resources and we are committed to resolving any issues here."

TVA officials said there was no threat to public safety or the security of the plant as the shots were fired well away from the plant's "protected area."

Jim Hopson, a TVA spokesman stationed at Watts Bar, said the incident occurred about 2 a.m. when a TVA security officer patrolling the plant's perimeter encountered the intruder near the Tennessee River, about 200 yards away from the cooling towers in territory clearly marked as a restricted area.

"The officer challenged that individual, and the individual fired at the officer," Hopson said. "The officer returned the fire, and as the officer was calling for backup as well as switching to a higher-powered weapon [he] had in the vehicle, the individual fled the site."

The officer was not injured, though his truck was struck, he said, and both the intruder and the officer fired multiple shots.

Hopson said he did not know how the person escaped -- by river or land. There was no indication that the intruder was injured.

He said investigators -- along with Rhea and Meigs County officials -- spent hours combing the riverbanks around the plant and across the Chickamauga Reservoir on the Meigs County side.

"A very detailed search of the site [including the plant's protected area] ... did not turn up any threats, which was why we exited out of the 'unusual event' notification," Hopson said.

The incident occurred about two football fields away from what TVA refers to as the plant's "protected area" where the reactors and power production equipment sits. But the river side is where water intakes are located that carry cooling water into the plant. The water that has circulated in enclosed pipes around the plant and through cooling towers is returned to the river.

NRC spokesman Roger Hannah said inspections of the protected area, the river area and that intake pumping station were made before the unusual event alert was ended.
"The plant staff has notified the NRC that it will continue to maintain security at higher than normal levels," Hannah said, adding that two security inspectors from NRC's Atlanta office will review the incident and TVA's response.

The Watts Bar plant is near Spring City and about 48 miles northeast of Chattanooga. One reactor there is at 100 percent power, and a second reactor is under construction.
TVA has had security problems at Watts Bar before, and two contractors have been convicted of falsifying records about inspections of nonexistent electrical cable that would have served the newest reactor's cooling system.

The NRC in 2011 placed Watts Bar under a security safety flag for several months, but neither TVA nor NRC would discuss why.

U.S. District Attorney William "Bill" Killian said he could not comment Sunday about this newest security investigation.
Contact staff writer Pam Sohn at psohn@timesfree press.com or 423-757-6346.

Drudge-UK Mirror

FBI hunting 12-strong terrorist “sleeper cell” linked to brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
The FBI was last night hunting a 12-strong terrorist “sleeper cell” linked to the Boston marathon bomb brothers.

Police believe Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were specially trained to carry out the devastating attack.

More than 1,000 FBI operatives were last night working to track down the cell and arrested a man and two women 60 miles from Boston in the hours before Dzhokhar’s dramatic capture after a bloody shootout on Friday.

A source close to the investigation said: “We have no doubt the brothers were not acting alone. The devices used to detonate the two bombs were highly sophisticated and not the kind of thing people learn from Google.

“They were too advanced. Someone gave the brothers the skills and it is now our job to find out just who they were. Agents think the sleeper cell has up to a dozen members and has been waiting several years for their day to come.”...

 Media:

"TVA exited the unusual event at 12:30 p.m. after performing inspections of the protected area, conducting a helicopter survey of the plant and adjacent river area and inspecting the intake pumping station. The plant staff has notified the NRC that it will continue to maintain security at higher than normal levels. '

The FBI:

The FBI responded, along with personnel from the Rhea and Meigs County sheriff’s offices, who searched both sides of the lake for the suspect. The plant is located on the Rhea County side of the lake, south of Watts Bar Dam.

Riverside, they had access to all power lines going into the plant and the critical cooling intake...

They have no idea if it was just one suspect, and once the gunfire, they all met back at the boat...

Is somebody trying to draw attention from another event somewhere else in the nation...

Normally the "owner controlled property boundary (fence)" have signs warnings saying no trespassing and someone passing into our property with mal-intent can be shot.

So why aren't they swarming the area with FBI agents....

So he was in a building of some kind.

The officer encountered the suspect in a clearly marked restricted area several hundred yards from the site’s protected area, which houses the reactor and power production facilities, but still within the plant property.

Sounds like the Boston neighborhood this week

The suspect fired multiple rounds at a Tennessee Valley Authority security officer who was on a routine patrol near the banks of Chickamauga Lake about 2 a.m. Sunday, TVA spokesman Jim Hopson said.

This is saying the feds are hnking its a big deal.

The FBI responded, along with personnel from the Rhea and Meigs County sheriff’s offices, who searched both sides of the lake for the suspect. The plant is located on the Rhea County side of the lake, south of Watts Bar Dam

TVA: Suspect shoots at security officer at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, officer shoots back

April 21, 2013  5pm

Federal and local authorities are continuing their search for a gunman who escaped after a shootout with a security officer on the perimeter of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant site near Spring City, Tenn., overnight.

The suspect fired multiple rounds at a Tennessee Valley Authority security officer who was on a routine patrol near the banks of Chickamauga Lake about 2 a.m. Sunday, TVA spokesman Jim Hopson said.

The officer encountered the suspect in a clearly marked restricted area several hundred yards from the site’s protected area, which houses the reactor and power production facilities, but still within the plant property.

When the officer confronted the person, “The individual fired on the officer, striking the officer’s vehicle,” said Hopson. “The officer returned fire, and as the officer was calling for backup, the individual fled the scene.”

Both parties fired multiple rounds, he added. The security officer was not hurt and, as of yet, authorities have found no evidence that the gunman was struck either, according to Hopson.
It was the first such incident at the Watts Bar plant since it became operational in 1996, he added.
The FBI responded, along with personnel from the Rhea and Meigs County sheriff’s offices, who searched both sides of the lake for the suspect. The plant is located on the Rhea County side of the lake, south of Watts Bar Dam.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission declared “an unusual event,” the lowest of the NRC’s four emergency classifications.

“We were on a heightened state of awareness before the event,” said Hopson, referencing last week’s bombings at the Boston Marathon.

The plant stood down from the “unusual event” classification at 12:30 p.m., once authorities sufficiently searched the property to ensure there were no threats to the site or to public safety, he said.

The plant remains on a heightened state of security, however, and the investigation is ongoing.
More details as they develop online and in Monday’s News Sentinel.
...Note: This story was last updated at 10:30 a.m.

An unidentified suspect fired multiple rounds at a security officer on patrol at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant early Sunday morning, and at least one round hit the security officer’s vehicle, an official said.
The Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear security officer fired back, also shooting multiple rounds.
The suspect appeared to have initially been on the ground but may have fled in a boat, TVA spokesman Jim Hopson said.

The incident occurred just after 2 a.m. this morning on the east side of the 1,700-acre plant, near the Tennessee River, toward the plant’s southern boundary, Hopson said. The officer was several hundred yards outside the protected area where the reactor and power equipment are located.
Hopson said some information can’t be released yet, such as the identity of the security officer, or it is not available, such as the total number of rounds fired. Hopson didn’t have a description of the suspect.

“Many of the details I won’t be able to share,” he said. “The investigation is still ongoing.”
TVA declared an “unusual event,” the lowest of the four Nuclear Regulatory Commission emergency classifications.

“There was no threat to public safety during the incident and no threat to the security of the plant due to the location outside of the plant perimeter,” TVA said in a Sunday morning statement. “An investigation is under way.”

TVA said the plant remains under a heightened state of security.

“Local law enforcement agencies are assisting TVA Police with the investigation,” TVA said. “The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and appropriate state and federal agencies were notified, and the NRC has staffed its incident response center in the Region II office in Atlanta and is monitoring the events, along with the resident inspector who has responded to the site.”

Hopson said it appears that only the suspect and the security officer were involved.
The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is near Spring City, which is about 45 miles southwest of Oak Ridge. It’s in Rhea County south of Watts Bar Lake and on the north end of Chickamauga Lake.
The 40-year-old plant has one 1,100-megawatt unit that is already operating and a second is under construction

...Gunshots fired involving a TVA nuclear security officer outside the Watts Bar nuclear plant

Gunshots were fired in an incident involving a TVA nuclear security officer outside the Watts Bar nuclear plant this morning, TVA officials said in a news release.

Just after 2 a.m., Watts Bar plant staff declared an unusual event, the lowest of the NRC’s four emergency classifications, officials said in the release.

There was no threat to public safety during the incident and no threat to the security of the plant due to the location outside of the plant perimeter, officials said. An investigation is underway.

The incident occurred on the Tennessee River side of the plant property, but several hundred yards from the site’s protected area, which houses the reactor and power production facilities. The site remains under a heightened state of security. Local law enforcement agencies are assisting TVA Police with the investigation. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has staffed its incident response center in the Region II office in Atlanta and is monitoring the events, according to the release.

...TVA Police along with other authorities are investigating after a shooting involving a TVA nuclear security officer at their Watts Bar plant.

Officials at the plant say the shooting happened early Sunday morning just after 2 a.m. on the Tennessee River side of the plant property.

The incident is being labeled as an "unusual event," the lowest of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's four emergency classifications.

In a release Sunday morning, TVA stated the incident happened several hundred yards from the sites protected area, which houses the reactor and power production facilities.

No suspect has been named in the investigation, and plant officials say there was no threat to public safety or the security of the plant.

Officials say the site remains under a heightened state of security, and the NRC has been notified, along with other federal agencies.

The NRC Is A Filthy Dirty Rotten US Safety Regulator

New Entergy-Pilgrim Licensee Event Report that contradicts earlier LER...they lied and falsified federal documents to stay up at power.

 

I panicked Entergy- Pilgrim into writing the content of the new LER



The NRC is a severely dishonest United States Of America federal agency!

April/May 2011: New SRV valves installed.

*May 18, 2011 (disclosed on April 18, 2013) first small leak on SRV RV-203-3C

*Nov 25, 2011 (disclosed on April 18, 2013) second small leak on SRV RV-203-3C 

Dec 26, 2011: First Pilgrim plant leak, shutdown and 3 day shutdown.  Replaced  SRV RV-203-3D per LER 2013

*RV 203-3C on this shutdown per LER 2013-002-00

LER 2011-007-00

LER 2011-007-01

Nov 27, 2012: NE ISO says grid price crisis over natural gas began (NH Union Leader).

*Jan 20, 2013: Second leak, required shutdown and another 3 day shutdown. ("On Sunday, January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours, the station entered a 24-hour action statement...)

Jan 21, 2013: NE ISO asserts grid emergency, near mandatory rolling black outs in really cold winter weather (NH Union Leader).
　
Jan 24, 2013: NE ISO says natural gas shortage began in earnest with $300 megawatt-hour(NH Union Leader).

Jan 2013: Peak demand this year 20,800 megawatt, overall peak demand of 22, 818 megawatt (NH Union Leader).

Feb 3, 2013: Third leak, restricted to 80-84% power to control leak.

Feb 6, 2013: Pilgrim admitted leaking media.

*Feb 8, 2013: Nemo blizzard strikes, plant trip, two LOOPs, and just repair and replace of one SRV.

Feb 9, 2013: NE ISO says grid crisis developed during the early morning hours of the blizzard...gas generators couldn't get gas from the market (NH Union Leader).

Feb 13,2013: My Peach Bottom presentation to the NRC and Exelon. I always had issues with coloring within the lines with my crayons.

"This is a Hurricane Katrina. This is a Hurricane Sandy. This is a Blizzard Nemo that's coming down on you guys..."

"This is a climate change. This is a huge economic climate change that's going on in the industry as far as this natural gas business..."

Feb 14, 2013 NRC senior project manager discussion with Entergy-Vermont Yankee worrying VY may no longer be financially qualified to operate a nuclear plant.

Feb 15, 2013: NYT's article 'The Natural Gas Trap' and $130 megawatt-hour prices all month long.

Feb 16, 2013: Start-up from blizzard trip.

*Feb 26, 2013: New leak develops and restricted to 94% power to control leaks.

*March 13, 2013: Submitted my Pilgrim SRV request for emergency shutdown on March 13, 2013.

March 17, 2013: NH Union Leader article 'Reliance On Natural Gas A Threat To The Grid'.

March 21, 2013: Still leaking and NRC is questioning the financial qualifications of Vermont Yankee.

March 30, 2013: Power restricted to 85%. We don't know if the leak got worst or an addition SRV is leaking, or something else.

*Added April 19, 2013

April 11, 2013: My Pilgrim Safety Relief Valve NRC Petition.  

April 14, 2013: Pilgrim had difficulties with shutdown for refueling.

April 18, 2013:  Feb 20, 2013 SRV leak and plant shut down LER 2013-02-001

1) Get a load of the  title: SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

2) March 18, 2013: Entergy's LER 2013-02-00 date of submittal is March 21, 2013.

3) Event date: Jan 20, 2013 per Entergy

4) Submitted my Pilgrim SRV request for emergency shutdown on March 13, 2013. 

4) Reported date: March 21, 2013 per Entergy

5) Pilot

              S/N         SRV Position         As-Found         Deviation

              23           RV-203-3B             1112 psig         (-)3.8%

6) This LER disclosed: 

   a) First small SRV leak on May 18, 2011 (SRV RV-203-3C)

    b) Second small leak on Nov 25, 2011 (SRV RV-203-3C)

    c) Shutdown on Jan 26, 2013  RV- 203-3DRV- 203-3D

SRV-3B Safety Relief Valve Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage and Setpoint Drift

On Sunday January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (RMSS in RUN), PNPS declared SRV-3B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 that requires with an SRV inoperable to initiate an orderly reactor shutdown such that reactor coolant pressure is less than 104 psig within 24 hours. On Monday January 21, 2013, at 1300 hours (16 hrs and 10 minutes) reactor coolant pressure was less than 104 psig. SRV-3B was declared inoperable consistent with PNPS procedures that state an SRV is inoperable if the first stage pilot thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature.

The reactor was depressurized and a new pilot valve assembly was installed on SRV-3B. On January 22, 2013, at 1015 hours reactor restart was commenced. On January 24, 2013 at 0312 hours 100% core thermal power was achieved.

This LER also reports the as-found setpoint of one SRV pilot valve tested was less than the minimum
pressure required by TS 3.6.D.1.

This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

As background, pressure relief system includes four (4) SRVs and two (2) spring safety valves (SSVs).

During Refueling Outage (RFO-18), in April/May, 2011, the four SRVs were replaced with Target Rock Model 0867F 3-stage SRVs. The SRVs discharge through their individual discharge piping, terminating below the minimum suppression pool (torus) water level. The four SRVs are installed on the main steam piping in containment between the reactor pressure vessel and the flow restrictors.

Each 3-stage SRV contains a pilot (also called the first stage), a second stage, and a main stage and an air operator. The main stage contains the steam discharge path, the second stage consists of second stage pilot valve, and the first stage consists of pilot valve with surrounding bellows.

To monitor these valves for leakage, Pilgrim installed thermocouples at the pilot (first stage), at the second stage, on the tailpipe near the valve (4.5' to 6' away), on the tailpipe far from the valve (-20' away) and at the pilot bellows. Procedure 2.2.23, "Automatic Depressurization System", provides guidance for interpreting the thermocouple data and determining valve operability based in part on testing performed by Target Rock.

Subsequent to installation in RFO-1 8 and prior to this event, Pilgrim experienced minor second stage pilot valve leakage from SRV RV-203-3C on May 18, 2011 and November 25, 2011. Also, on December 26, 2011, SRV RV- 203-3D first stage pilot valve experienced leakage while operating at full power. The SRV was declared inoperable and the plant was shutdown on December 26, 2011 in accordance with TS 3.6.D.2 and RV-203-3C was replaced entirely, and the RV-203-3D pilot assembly was replaced (LER 2011-007-00).

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On Sunday January 20, 2013, at 2050 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (RMSS in RUN), PNPS declared SRV-3B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 that requires with an SRV inoperable to initiate an orderly reactor shutdown such that reactor coolant pressure is less than 104 psig within 24 hours. On Monday January 21, 2013, at 1300 hours (16 hrs and 10 minutes) reactor coolant pressure was less than 104 psig. SRV-3B was declared inoperable consistent with PNPS procedures that state an SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 350 F below its baseline temperature.

While at full power, indication of a steam leak across the first stage pilot of RV-203-3B was identified. The leakage was evaluated and in accordance with criteria specified in procedure 2.2.23, specifically, if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 35 degrees F below its baseline temperature (with a smaller decrease at the second stage thermocouple) and cannot be explained by a corresponding downpower, the SRV is inoperable.

The safety relief valve was subsequently declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D.2 was entered. Per TS 3.6.D.2 the plant was shutdown and reactor coolant pressure below was 104 psig within 24 hours.

CAUSE:

The SRVs were purchased new, installed, and tested for the first time in April/May 2011 during RFO-18.

Entergy and Target Rock personnel are currently evaluating the SRV failure events and setpoint drift to determine the root cause and contributing causes.

At this time three (3) separate pilot assemblies which had indications of leakage while installed, have been tested and dissembled at Wyle Laboratory. Thus far, a definitive root cause has not been established. A supplemental report with additional casual analysis is projected to be submitted on September 30, 2013.

EXTENT OF CONDITION:

This condition potentially applies to all four three stage SRVs that were installed in RFO 18. During Cycle 19 operation, Pilgrim observed leakage from RV-203-3B, 3C, and 3D, which is being evaluated as part of the ongoing root cause evaluation.

* On May 18, 2011 and November 25, 2011, SRV RV 203-3C second stage pilot valve minor leakage was observed. SRV RV-203-3C was replaced during the December 26, 2011 shutdown.

*On December 26, 2011, SRV, RV-203-3D first stage pilot valve experienced leakage that exceeded the operability criteria while operating at full power. Plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.D.2, RV 203-3C and 3D were repaired and the plant returned to full power operation.

* On January 20, 2013, Pilgrim experienced the event described in this Licensee Event Report, first stage pilot valve leakage of SRV, RV-203-3B. The plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.D.2. The pilot valve was replaced with a refurbished pilot and the plant was returned to full power operation.

* On February 3, 2013, RV-203-3B first stage pilot valve leakage was identified while at full power.
Reactor power was lowered to 80% and at 1000 psig pressure, the pilot was reseated. An Operability
Determination with a compensatory measure was implemented to maintain the reactor power at 80%
and reactor pressure at 1000 psig. An Operations Decision Making Issue (ODMI) was implemented to monitor and take corrective actions. During the forced outage on February 8, 2013, caused by a loss of offsite power due to a major winter storm, RV-203-3B first stage pilot valve was replaced with a new pilot valve and the plant was returned to power operation. The removed RV-203-3B pilot valve was sent to Wyle Laboratory for testing.

As-found test results for the SRV, RV 203-3B pilot valve were: Pilot S/N SRV Position As-Found Deviation 23 RV-203-3B 1112 psig (-)3.8%

Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 requires the as-found setpoint to be within 1155±34.6 psig (1120.4 psig to 1189.6 psig). The as-found setpoint was less than the minimum pressure specification required by TS 3.6.D.1. This test result was entered into the corrective action program as a separate event, and is included in this LER since the condition was discovered within 60 days from the initial discovery of pilot leakage. Accordingly, this as-found value being out of Technical Specification setpoint is reported in this LER pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The following corrective actions were completed to address this event related to leaking RV-203-3B.
The first stage pilot valve of RV-203-3B was removed. A new pilot from another valve assembly which was verified to meet set pressure and leakage criteria was installed during the February 8, 2013 loss of offsite power outage.

Additional corrective actions will be implemented based upon the results of the testing, inspection, and evaluation of the leaking first stage pilot from RV-203-3B and other SRV failures by a joint team of Target Rock and Entergy Engineering. Additional corrective actions will be documented in the supplement report referenced earlier.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:

The leaking SRV pilot valves and the plant shutdown to repair the SRV in accordance with Technical
Specification 3.6.D.2 posed no threat to the public health and safety.

All leakage from the valve was collected in plant systems, the suppression pool (torus), and processed in accordance with normal station practices.

Pilgrim installed temperature monitoring to provide sufficient indication of SRV leakage to ensure that timely actions can be taken to ensure that the plant is maintained in a safe condition. Procedure 2.2.23 provides the instructions and guidance for interpreting and responding to SRV temperature indications. Based on these instructions, the plant was shutdown. The SRV would have been able to respond if needed to meet its core cooling or reactor pressure vessel over protection functions prior to leakage developing. As a result, the plant safety was maintained. The risk of operating with a leaking SRV is characterized by an increased chance of having an inadvertently opened SRV with increased chance of that valve failing to reclose. Assuming the plant operated for 24 hours with this condition, this results in a change in core damage frequency of less than 1.0E-7. The impact of setpoint drift (0.8% below the 3% tolerance) is considered to be bounded by delta change in core damage frequency of less than 1.OE-7.

PREVIOUS EVENTS:

Prior to Cycle 19, there were no leakage or setpoint drifts occurrences with three stage safety relief valves since all four valves were newly installed in April/May, 2011, during Refueling Outage 18.

During Cycle 19, Pilgrim observed minor leakage from the second stage pilot valve of RV-203-3C. Also, first stage pilot valve leakage was observed from RV-203-3D which was confirmed, plant was shutdown as required by TS 3.6.0.2, and first stage pilot valve was replaced. This event is described in LER 2011-007-00. During the outage for RV-203-3D, the entire RV 203-3C was replaced with a new valve assembly.

The industry has experienced numerous instances where SRV leakage has occurred at other plants with other Target Rock Model three stage safety relief valves OE33766 - Three Stage Safety Relief Valve Pilot Leakage just below Normal Operating Pressure - Plant Hatch.

The plant Hatch installed the same model 3-stage SRVs in Unit 2 in April 2011. Hatch experienced numerous pilot leaks during 2011. On some occasions, leakage was reduced by power and/or pressure reductions. Hatch Unit 2 had some success through power and/or pressure reductions and operating for several months after reseating the first stage pilot valve through power and/or pressure reductions.

OE26394 & OE26892 - Planned Shutdown due to a three stage Safety Relief Valve Leak - Peach Bottom Unit 3

OE32805 - Safety Relief Valve Temperature Phenomenon - Fitzpatrick

OE34730 - Target Rock 3 Stage Main Steam SRV Bore to Seat Misalignment - Limerick 2

OE19219 - Plant Shutdown Due to Increasing Tailpipe Temperature - Duane Arnold


April 19: So operational problems and operator safety determinations issues for safety relief valves and pilot operating relief valves are metastasizing throughout the nuclear industry.

　

April 11, 2013

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2013002 AND 05000423/2013002

Description. In October 2012, during the Unit 2 refueling outage, Dominion overhauled the ‘B’ PORV because of seat leakage during the operating cycle. Work order 53102395511 specified the following PMTs: PORV stroke time IST, normal pressurizer vent path verification and PORV position IST, and PORV functional test. The stroke time test was performed on October 21 in Mode 6 and the vent path verification and PORV position test was performed on November 11 in Mode 5, but the functional test was not performed prior to entering Mode 3 on November 15. TS 3.4.3 requires both PORVs to be operable in Mode 3. Dominion entered Mode 4 on November 16 at 08:10 to rework the PORV due to seat leakage.

The inspectors questioned why the PORV function test had not been performed prior to entering Mode 3. The primary plant senior reactor operator who determined the post maintenance testing requirements for the PORV repair, put a restraint on the work order indicating that hot functional test had to be performed prior to Mode 2 since the surveillance requirement stated that the PORV had to be stroked at conditions representative of Mode 3 or 4. The shift manager was unaware of the PMT requirement. His concern at the time was low temperature overpressure protection and determined that the stroke time test and vent path verification tests, which were performed under cold plant conditions, were sufficient to demonstrate operability. The inspectors

disagreed with the shift manager’s determination based on Generic Letter 90-06 which stated that testing of the PORVs in HOT STANDBY (Mode 3) or HOT SHUTDOWN (Mode 4) was required in order to simulate the temperature and pressure environmental effects on the PORV. The inspectors concluded that Dominion’s PMT was inadequate because it did not demonstrate the valve’s capability to stroke under all operating conditions prior to entering Mode 3.


Nuke Plant Sues Vendor

Apr 16, 2013, 2:52pm CDT

Wolf Creek nuclear plant repairs lawsuit seeks $25M

Kansas City Power & Light Co. owns 47 percent of the Wolf Creek nuclear plant.

Paul Koepp Reporter- Kansas City Business Journal

Kansas City Power & Light Co. and the other owners of the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant are seeking more than $25 million in damages from a vendor that allegedly caused a 10-week shutdown at the plant last year.
KCP&L, Kansas Gas and Electric Co., Kansas Electric Power Cooperative Inc. and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. filed suit Friday in Jackson County Circuit Court, claiming that ABB Inc., a North Carolina-based company that provides engineering services for power plants, did faulty repairs on a startup transformer.
Also named as a defendant is Charles Moses, an ABB electrician who supervised the repairs.
KCP&L owns 47 percent of Wolf Creek.
The repairs in question involve electrical pathways for redundant offsite power sources that keep safety systems running without interruption. An April 2011 inspection showed “a green substance” on wires in the transformer that had to be replaced; the replacements were not properly insulated, according to the lawsuit.
On Jan. 13, 2012, a main generator output breaker failed, and the startup transformer short-circuited because of the missing insulation, the suit claims. Follow-up inspections allegedly showed more shoddy work by ABB.

NRC proposes civil penalty for CB&I Shaw, cites poor safety culture

April 19, 2013

By PennEnergy Editorial Staff

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a notice of violation and proposed a civil penalty of $36,400 against Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) for discrimination by one of its newly purchased Shaw subsidiaries against an employee who raised a safety concern. The NRC also requested CB&I take action to improve safety culture at a second former Shaw subsidiary.
CB&I completed a takeover of the Shaw Group of companies in February. These separate actions, issued April 18, stem from complaints filed with the NRC before the takeover was effective.
The notice of violation, issued by NRC’s Office of Enforcement, describes two violations of NRC employee protection requirements at Shaw Nuclear Services. A quality assurance supervisor was fired in May 2011 for notifying Shaw and Louisiana Energy Services, an NRC licensee, of some potentially faulty rebar that may have been shipped to its National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico by a third-party vendor. The second violation related to language in Shaw’s Corporate Code of Conduct that could prohibit, restrict, or otherwise discourage employees from participating in protected activities, including providing information to the NRC.
Because Shaw did not identify the violations or take corrective action once the NRC identified them, the NRC doubled the normal civil penalties, for a total fine of $36,400. The company is to respond within 30 days describing corrective actions it intends to implement, and it may request alternative dispute resolution to explore settlement options.
In a separate letter to Philip K. Asherman, president and chief executive officer of CB&I, the NRC cited a “chilled work environment” at CB&I’s facility in Lake Charles, La., formerly known as Shaw Modular Solutions. Workers hesitant to raise safety concerns through company channels have reported them directly to the NRC.
While there are more than 600 vendors supplying safety-related goods and services to the nuclear industry, approximately 35 percent of all vendor-related safety allegations received by the NRC from January 2010 through January 2013 involved the Lake Charles facility. The NRC’s review of these complaints did not identify any specific quality issues with parts supplied by Shaw or CB&I; however, the significant number of employee concerns reported to the NRC suggests a poor environment for raising safety concerns within the company.
The NRC’s expectations in this area are described in policy statements addressing safety culture and maintenance of a safety-conscious work environment.
“The NRC takes seriously the ability of employees to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and employee protection from discrimination,” Glenn M. Tracy, director of the Office of New Reactors, said in the letter. He acknowledged that CB&I was already implementing management changes at the former Shaw companies and said, “It is vital to assess the work environment and address unresolved conflicts.”
Tracy requested CB&I respond within 30 days and explain corrective actions it intends to take to improve the safety-conscious work environment at the Lake Charles facility. The company is also to inform employees about the letter and corrective actions.
NRC licensees are ultimately responsible for the safety of their facilities and the quality of the safety-related goods and services they procure for their sites. The NRC inspects licensee and vendor performance to assure that licensees are verifying the quality of goods and services they receive.

 

The Tragic Serial Cult Of Falsifications At Arkansa Nuclear One

April 17: This is a Kewaunee Nuclear Plant fracting extinction level event with Unit 1. At the end of the day, electricity price are too low to make the needed repairs on this plant.

"We have a permanently installed turbine building crane rated for around 150 tons. The generator stator weighs ~4x that much. The stator is something that hasn't been moved in ~39 years since original installation. It isn't really practical to install a permanent crane capable of moving that size load that might need to be moved once every 40 or so years. The turbine building crane spans ~100' or more. The size of the girders necessary to span that length and carry ~500+ tons would be huge, not to mention the size of the trolley, winch, cables and other hardware. Note that this crane was installed around 1970."

So the right way to do this is to bring in the heavy load cranes and yank it out through the roof like they did during new constructions. This is the cost of doing shortcuts. It would have turned it into a prolong outage..

I doubt the NRC will allow the plants to restart....

You know, this had to happen in "the government as terrorists" deep south who  hates oversight and regulations. I always thought a nuclear industry extinction level level event with the extremist right wingers, would emerge from the south exactly for that reason.

ANO Contrator Initiated Layoffs After Accident
Howard West

10:00 AM, Tuesday, April 16 2013 | 1572 views

LONDON — In the wake of Easter Sunday’s industrial accident at Arkansas Nuclear One where one worker was killed and eight others injured, at least one ANO contractor has laid off employees who have worked at the plant during shutdowns.

Entergy contractor Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) laid off more than 100 employees during the first week of April, a source who is employed by the contractor told The Courier.

CB&I has corporate offices in The Woodlands, Texas, and builds power plant industrial complexes, and maintains infrastructure for those facilities.

As of Monday afternoon, CB&I officials had not responded to requests from The Courier for comments about layoffs with their company at ANO.

An ANO spokesperson said last week when workers aren’t needed at the plant during down times, the contracting company is released from their contract with Entergy.

“Typically, contract workers are hired to perform specific jobs during refueling outages,” ANO spokesman Michael Bowling said last week. “These workers would be released from their contract when their jobs are complete or when there services are no longer needed. Some contractors hired for the 1R24 [refueling outage] have been released.”

According to an employee who was laid off on April 3, iron workers, pipe fitters, painters, laborers and carpenters joined the ranks of those who are temporarily out of a job.

“They told my supervisor not to call anybody in on Sunday,” the source said. “The supervisor told everyone to stay home. I went in on Wednesday and received layoff paperwork. All they needed was scaffold builders and extra labor. They said they are supposed to recall us, but CB&I and Entergy officials were vague about it. They said we weren’t needed.

“They gave no estimated time of when they will recall those who got laid off. We were scheduled to be there till June. Some traveled as many as 200 miles to work the outage. What now for them?”

The source reported that Entergy officials said there will be a quick-as-possible turnaround on restarting the Unit Two reactor.

“Supervisors said they were trying to bring Unit Two back on line by the end of the month,” the source said. “They said they would call people back.” The laid off employee is trying to find work now. A second source, another laid off employee, said she doesn’t blame ANO for the layoffs, and anticipates unemployment benefits to arrive this week, but with a nearly 70 percent reduction of her regular pay.

“I have no hard feelings towards the contracting company I worked for, or ANO, because I was laid off,” she said. “I understand the need for investigations and a plan to move forward.

“Filing for unemployment through Michigan has presented some challenges. I’ve had no income for the past two weeks. Hopefully, I will receive a check this week.”

The second source, who has a residence in Atkins, traveled back to Arkansas after working as a laborer in Florida during the past year. She was somewhat surprised by the way she and her coworkers were informed of the layoff.

“They called Sunday to tell me not to come in till tomorrow’s shift [April 2],” she said.

“The next night, they called and said come in to be processed out. They didn’t tell us anything other than we were being laid off. I hope to get the opportunity to work at ANO again.”

She said she understands the dynamic impact the accident had on plant workers and administrators. She feels fortunate she was able to enjoy her time with family this past week.

“The accident was so tragic and unexpected, and impacted the whole community,” she said. “Who am I to complain.”

One Little Rock union representative believes the best thing they could do for newly unemployed workers is find them work.

“I anticipate once the plant is back on line, they will be back to work,” Lindsay Brown, Local Union 424 representative, said. “The layoff is based on no need for these folks until Entergy navigates its way through its accident investigation. Entergy has laid off individuals who aren’t pertinent to restarting the plant.”

“It is intrinsic to the construction industry to have temporary layoffs due to unforeseen circumstances such as weather and supply issues. This particular incident, a 550-ton stator falling from rigging, is no exception,” Brown said.

“Construction is the only job I know where one works themselves out of a job,” he said. “Some painters would be done by now. It depends on the work packages. Our folks know what they’re in for. Maybe there should be a better safety net.
 

April 19: Did Entergy lose trust in  CB&I?

NRC proposes civil penalty for CB&I Shaw, cites poor safety culture

April 19, 2013

By PennEnergy Editorial Staff

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a notice of violation and proposed a civil penalty of $36,400 against Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) for discrimination by one of its newly purchased Shaw subsidiaries against an employee who raised a safety concern. The NRC also requested CB&I take action to improve safety culture at a second former Shaw subsidiary.

CB&I completed a takeover of the Shaw Group of companies in February. These separate actions, issued April 18, stem from complaints filed with the NRC before the takeover was effective.

The notice of violation, issued by NRC’s Office of Enforcement, describes two violations of NRC employee protection requirements at Shaw Nuclear Services. A quality assurance supervisor was fired in May 2011 for notifying Shaw and Louisiana Energy Services, an NRC licensee, of some potentially faulty rebar that may have been shipped to its National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico by a third-party vendor. The second violation related to language in Shaw’s Corporate Code of Conduct that could prohibit, restrict, or otherwise discourage employees from participating in protected activities, including providing information to the NRC.

Because Shaw did not identify the violations or take corrective action once the NRC identified them, the NRC doubled the normal civil penalties, for a total fine of $36,400. The company is to respond within 30 days describing corrective actions it intends to implement, and it may request alternative dispute resolution to explore settlement options.

In a separate letter to Philip K. Asherman, president and chief executive officer of CB&I, the NRC cited a “chilled work environment” at CB&I’s facility in Lake Charles, La., formerly known as Shaw Modular Solutions. Workers hesitant to raise safety concerns through company channels have reported them directly to the NRC.

While there are more than 600 vendors supplying safety-related goods and services to the nuclear industry, approximately 35 percent of all vendor-related safety allegations received by the NRC from January 2010 through January 2013 involved the Lake Charles facility. The NRC’s review of these complaints did not identify any specific quality issues with parts supplied by Shaw or CB&I; however, the significant number of employee concerns reported to the NRC suggests a poor environment for raising safety concerns within the company.

The NRC’s expectations in this area are described in policy statements addressing safety culture and maintenance of a safety-conscious work environment.

“The NRC takes seriously the ability of employees to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and employee protection from discrimination,” Glenn M. Tracy, director of the Office of New Reactors, said in the letter. He acknowledged that CB&I was already implementing management changes at the former Shaw companies and said, “It is vital to assess the work environment and address unresolved conflicts.”

Tracy requested CB&I respond within 30 days and explain corrective actions it intends to take to improve the safety-conscious work environment at the Lake Charles facility. The company is also to inform employees about the letter and corrective actions.

NRC licensees are ultimately responsible for the safety of their facilities and the quality of the safety-related goods and services they procure for their sites. The NRC inspects licensee and vendor performance to assure that licensees are verifying the quality of goods and services they receive.

So the stator drop happened on March 31 and this is from Commissioner Magwood's speech on March 13, 2013

"Utilities—who are you? The current fleet of nuclear plants in this country represents a tremendous success story. Over the last 30 years, capacity factors have increased from around 75% to consistently over 90% while at the same time showing tremendous advances in safety by every measure.

However, while you have grown strong in operations—due in no small part to the success of INPO—I believe your engineering capabilities are another story. Many of the power companies present today once maintained large engineering and project management teams that oversaw and often managed the construction of nuclear power plants. Early in my career, I worked with electric utility research managers; how many companies still have senior people on their staffs with this title? Most companies reduced significantly their engineering capabilities as deregulation came into vogue.

To be entirely honest, I am skeptical that most of you could successfully oversee the construction of a new nuclear power plant today—even among those companies that currently have new plant applications before the agency. This isn’t simply an issue about new plants. These reduced capabilities also affect your ability to maintain the current fleet. As your plants age, your ability to analyze and manage change will face important and unpredictable challenges.

Are you certain you are ready for this? Are you the companies you think you are, or are some of you falsely confident in your reputations for engineering and management excellence when much of your past expertise is sitting by a pool in Florida? Or are some of you expecting that you will be able to call your favorite vendor to deal with complex emerging issues? Even under the best circumstances, vendors will require close, expert oversight. These are your plants and you are responsible to your ratepayers and the public for all the work done at your sites. Blaming the vendor if things go wrong will buy you little sympathy.

Remember, the NRC could have issued a stop work order at any point and called in the heavy lift NRC experts....

They are debating how a secondary system and supposedly non safety risk system cascaded into severely threatening nuclear safety systems at two plants. They are talking about the how turbine has been moved off the concrete pedestal.

"Looks like the blue equipment of Bigge was ok.The stator made it from the turbine deck to the hatchway and was turned correctly to be lowered to the transport below.

It appears that the front left leg of the gantry crane was positioned on a floor beam.That beam is bent.Simple guess is that the floor that supported the front two legs of the gantry beams was not strong enough.The under beam buckled and the gantry came apart.

The turbine deck was strong enough to support the back two legs of the gantry, probably had jack plates built into the foundation, legs of gantry probably right above foundation columns under turbine deck.Front legs were on building floor.This looks like the fatal flaw.Floor beam held for a while then deflected.

Be interesting who decided that the front legs could be supported by the floor with not under columns to the ground floor.Not going to be pretty."

Entergy and Arkansas Nuclear One has a long history of Falsification, running their plants horrendously not safe and corrupted staffs. Of course, I got turned around talking about both plants have different emergency response organizations.

April 16...

The accident:

Update: RUSSELLVILLE, AR- Pope County Coroner Leonard Krout has identified the worker killed in the accident at Arkansas Nuclear One as 24-year-old Wade Walters.

New information Sunday night revealed one person died from a maintenance accident at the Arkansas Nuclear One plant in Pope County, while at least eight others were injured.

Images of the 600-ton stator that fell Sunday morning, killing one man and injuring eight others, are beginning to surface online...

April 17: Atomic Power Review: There are inside reports of structural damage to the (very large) support structure for Unit 1's turbine generator. (A nuclear plant's turbine generator can be over 225 feet long and weigh over 5000 tons completely assembled; the support structure is even larger and heavier.) None of those has been either confirmed or denied by Entergy -- or for that matter even acknowledged.

So the structural girders around the turbine deck floor opening gave way...

Timeline

• Jan 9, 2012 The licensee researched exercise drill document in late Dec 2011  

• retained the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham 

• Jan 12, 2012, the ANO Emergency Preparedness Manager notified the NRC resident inspector and regional emergency preparedness inspectors that senior employee a had apparently falsified documents. 

• April 2012: NRC IO initiated investigation 

• Dec 14, 2012: Completed investigation 

• NRC MCL line in the TSC was inoperable from February 2008 through November 2008 

***A corruption and lying that is so pervasive within the NRC, the NRC Office Of Investigation and Entergy...it is so blatant.



***It frightened me when I found this.

LICENSEE FACTUAL SUMMARY OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2012-024

 Submitted by NUCBIZ on April 14, 2013 - 15:05 

In April 2012, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation to determine if a senior emergency planner at Entergy Operations Incorporated, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), willfully falsified documents related to miscellaneous drills and surveillances. The investigation was completed on December 14, 2012. 

The NRC OI investigation reported that on January 9, 2012, the licensee researched the exercise drill documentation as a result of recordkeeping discrepancies identified in late December 2011. The licensee spoke with the senior emergency planner, who admitted that he had falsified the paperwork.  The licensee initiated a condition report (CR) to document the incident and retain the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, to conduct an investigation. The Balch & Bingham investigation also identified that the senior emergency planner falsified surveillance documents. 

During the NRC OI investigation, the senior emergency planner at ANO admitted to generating false documentation over a period of four years.  The false documentation does not meet the requirement under 10 CFR 50.9(a), Completeness and Accuracy of Information. This regulation states, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. The false documentation included 2 miscellaneous drills involving the Post Accident Sampling (PAS) system, as recorded on December 14, 2010 and December 7, 2011, and 2 drills involving environmental monitoring, as recorded on December 14, 2010, and December 6, 2011. The drills were required by the licensee's procedure number 1903.004, "Admin and Maintenance of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures," which fulfills the requirement under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14). In addition, it was determined that the senior emergency planner at ANO falsely documented 3 surveillances required by EP-010, "Emergency Response Facility Walkthrough Surveillance, Technical Support Center (TSC)" on May 12, June 4, and September 30, 2008. The TSC surveillance required checking the operation of the NRC management counterpart link (MCL) telephone line in the TSC. The false documentation indicated that the NRC MCL line was operable. The investigation determined that the NRC MCL line in the TSC was inoperable from February 2008 through November 2008. This surveillances was also required by the emergency plan, to meet the regulatory requirement under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). 

The senior emergency planner admitted that he was knowledgeable of the regulations and requirements to conduct drills and surveillances. He admitted that he generated false documentation as a result of his lack of time management, and that the falsification of documents was the most effortless action to take. 

The licensee took immediate corrective actions, which included requiring additional documentation to support a drill package, with management's review and signature. In addition, the licensee took remedial action against the employee commensurate with the circumstances that demonstrated the seriousness of the violation, thereby creating a deterrent effect with the licensee's organization.

Right these two statements are contradictory... 

Based on the results of this investigation, one apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. 

In addition, since you identified the violation and based on our understanding of your corrective action...

I am getting word that the NRC was sniffing around the emergency planner's work...thus Entergy jumping out of the bushes admitting it wasn't accurate...

 These lawyers are the cleaners...their job is to sterilized the employees into not admitting senior managers participated in the falsification. Seeing how this was going to the courts, why didn't they allow the OI to investigate the events first. 

The licensee initiated a condition report (CR) ANO-C-2012-00098 to document the incident and retain the services of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, to conduct an investigation.

 A very similar and long last falsification event

4 fired, 34 disciplined at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

 A series of investigations at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in Scriba has resulted in four workers being fired and 34 being disciplined, a spokeswoman for the plant owner said Thursday. 

Meanwhile, federal prosecutors announced that one of the fired workers has pleaded guilty to falsifying tests of safety equipment at the plant.

Also Thursday, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission notified the owner of the plant, Entergy Nuclear Northeast, that it could face civil actions in the wake of the investigations.

Results of the three investigations were handed over to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Syracuse, which brought criminal charges against Michael McCarrick, 56, of Oswego, a former radiation protection technician at the plant. McCarrick admitted to falsifying records relating to more than two dozen plant worker.

In his guilty plea, he admitted he failed to adequately perform tests to make sure the workers’ emergency respirators were properly fitted and sealed, and then falsely documented that they were.

The plant is required to refit workers’ emergency respirators every year. The respirators, which protect against chemical releases or other fumes during emergencies, must fit snugly, and the fit can change as workers gain or lose weight or otherwise change.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Craig Benedict said that on 32 documented occasions between 2006 and 2009, McCarrick falsely claimed he had completed such tests. Benedict said the incidents were investigated by special agents from the NRC. 

No known injuries occurred as a result of the falsified tests

 McCarrick pleaded guilty to one felony count of violating the Atomic Energy Act. He could receive up to two years in prison and a $250,000 fine when he is sentenced Jan. 10.

The NRC also found that two unidentified “staff level individuals” acted with “careless disregard” by not following through on their suspicions that the respirator fit tests were inadequate.

The NRC informed Entergy that the second investigation found that McCarrick deliberately failed to document required surveillance of air samples or to make sure workers leaving the radiologically controlled area went through contamination monitors.

The third investigation found that McCarrick and another radiation protection technician failed to conduct other leak testing and surveillance duties.

McCarrick was the only worker charged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office . However, the NRC notified Entergy that it could face civil action pending the result of either an enforcement conference with the NRC or a mediation session, whichever the company chooses. 

Entergy spokeswoman Tammy Holden said the plant conducted an internal investigation in June 2009 after learning the NRC had received a phone call alleging a potential violation at the plant.

Most of the 34 workers who were disciplined were workers who should have known that their “fit tests” for the respirators were either not done or were incomplete, Holden said. She said those workers were removed from the site during the investigation and later received either suspensions of pay or verbal or written warnings. They were also retrained.

Holden stressed that the masks are rarely required, and that none of the workers who had inadequate fit tests did any work during that period that would have required the masks to be used.

“At no point was there any risk to the public health or safety at any time during this process,” she said.

 Escalated Enforcement Action: 

Enforcement Policy. Whether the violation involved willfulness. Willful violations are of particular concern because the NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees and their contractors employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. The Commission cannot tolerate willful violations. Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance if it includes indications of willfulness. Violations with willful aspects will typically be considered for escalated enforcement (i.e., SL I, II, or III). The term “willfulness” as used in this Policy refers to conduct involving either a careless disregard for requirements or a deliberate violation o requirements or falsification of information. In determining the significance of a violation involving willfulness, the NRC will consider such factors as the position, training, experience level, and responsibilities of the person involved in the violation (e.g., licensee official or nonsupervisory employee), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., careless disregard or deliberateness), and the economic or other advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation. The relative weight given to each of these factors in the significance assessment will depend on the circumstances of the violation. However, if a licensee refuses to correct a minor violation within a reasonable time such that it willfully continues, the violation should be considered at least more than minor. Licensees are expected to take significant remedial action in responding to willful violations commensurate with the circumstances, such that the action reflects the seriousness of the violation, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee’s organization.

They were lackadaisical with safety and caring about the integrity and honor of their company.  Palisades DC event that nearly killed a guy and spun the plant around barely in control.

Finally, based on the facts gathered during the special inspection, the inspectors determined that a possible cause for the September 25, 2011, event was that the Palisades organization did not establish safety policies amongst the management team and employees, which reinforced that nuclear safety was an overriding priority. Specifically, several of the organizational decisions demonstrated in this event were not consistent with the established nuclear safety policies and procedures at the site. In addition, production and schedule goals were not developed, communicated, and implemented in a manner that reinforced nuclear safety on September 25, 2011, as demonstrated by the organization’s performance during the execution of this emergent work.

Another recent worthless confirmatory order. Can't trust them at their word the NRC seems to be saying...

March 14, 2013
EN-13-003

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc. (EA-13-031)
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1
Docket Number 50-313
Subject: CONFIRMATORY ORDER TO ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
This is to inform the Commission that a Confirmatory Order (CO) will be issued on or about  March 20, 2013, to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy, licensee), confirming Entergy’s commitment to submit its license amendment request (LAR) by January 31, 2014. This LAR will transition the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, “Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,” in accordance with Section 50.48(c) to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
On June 28, 2011, Entergy committed to the date of August 31, 2012, for submission of its license amendment application. However, due to ANO-1’s implementation of its transition strategy and continued development of a high-quality application, the LAR will require more time than anticipated. In a letter dated August 23, 2012, the licensee proposed a new submittal date of January 31, 2014. This proposed date is beyond the previous committed submittal date and, thus, exceeds the enforcement discretion (i.e., until August 31, 2012) that the NRC granted to ANO-1 for certain fire protection noncompliances.