Power Reactor Event Number: 52655Facility: PILGRIMRegion: 1 State: MAUnit:  [ ] [ ]RX Type:  GE-3NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIAHQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO Notification Date: 03/31/2017Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]Event Date: 03/31/2017Event Time: 11:55 [EDT]Last Update Date: 03/31/2017Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY10 CFR Section:50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATIONPerson (Organization):BILL COOK (R1DO)Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode1 N Y 97 Power Operation 97 Power OperationEvent TextPRESSURE SUPPRESSION POOL DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO TORUS HIGH WATER LEVEL"On March 31, 2017 at 1155 hours [EDT], with the reactor at 97% core thermal power and steady state conditions, operators inadvertently caused water level to rise in the Pressure Suppression Pool (TORUS). Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was restoring normal system valve line-ups after performing flushing of the suction piping of the Core Spray system in accordance with station procedures. During the process of restoring the appropriate valve line-ups, water was inadvertently transferred to the TORUS from the Condensate Storage Tank. The cause of the event is understood."The Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.7.A.5 was entered. The LCO AS was exited at 1540 when TORUS water level was restored to the limits specified in LCO's 3.7.A.1.b and 3.7.A.1.m. Because the TORUS was declared inoperable, PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."This was a case of the water level in the TORUS being above the TS limit. The TORUS was potentially available to provide cooling to the reactor if required."The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Plymouth County.
No: IV-17-003 March 6, 2017CONTACT: Victor Dricks, 817-200-1128NRC Will Conduct a Special Inspection at Cooper Nuclear StationThe Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a special inspection at the Cooper Nuclear Station to review operator errors that affected a safety-related heat removal system. The plant, located in Brownville, Neb., is operated by the Nebraska Public Power District. “This special inspection will help us better understand the circumstances that led to the operator error,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Kriss Kennedy. “We need to assess the potential impact on plant safety and the licensee’s corrective actions to ensure that the cause has been effectively addressed.”On Feb. 5, 2017, workers discovered that a misalignment of valves may have rendered one of the plant’s residual heat removal systems inoperable for several months. Operators also performed maintenance and testing on a second residual heat removal system during the same period. As a result, there may have been a period of approximately 72 hours when both systems were unavailable. The residual heat removal system is used to mitigate the effects of a variety of accidents.Two NRC inspectors will begin their weeklong inspection on Monday, March 13, 2017. Areport on the findings will be publicly available within 45 days of the end of the inspection.Power Reactor Event Number: 52600Facility: WATERFORDRegion: 4 State: LAUnit:  [ ] [ ]RX type:  CENRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHNHQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON Notification Date: 03/08/2017Notification Time: 20:13 [ET]Event Date: 03/08/2017Event Time: 16:27 [CST]Last Update Date: 03/08/2017Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY10 CFR Section:50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION Person (Organization):JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power OperationEvent TextBOTH TRAINS OF LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE ERROR"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3."On March 8, 2017 at 1627 [CST] Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours."It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable."Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve [SI-135B] was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Sunday, April 09, 2017
Entergy: Why All The Valve Line-up Problems?
Is there a Potential Adverse Trend?
Here are 3 different plants with valve mis-positioning events.
One thing in common – valve mis-positioning events.
One thing not in common, these are three different plants.
Another thing in common - is this the same fleet operator?
Could this be an adverse trend?
How come we do not hear of other plants with different fleet operators having valve mis-positioning events?
( We are waiting for Grand Gulf's special inspection report on generally licensed operator incompetence and poor training. They voluntarily shutdown for four months to retrain their employees It emerged from a valve line-up problem.)