Junk Plant River Bend: Intentionally Starting Up With a Dead Rod

05000458

I doubt this plant is designed for finding something wrong with a rod, calling it inop, and then intentionally starting up with the dead rod until the next refueling period. Is is plainly unprofessional.\

The causal analysis for this event will be completed when the control rod can be removed for inspection during the next refueling outage. The results of that investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report.

We are getting a lot of exotic LERs out of these guys.

I doubt the NRC disclosed whats going on in their inspection report? 

They don't tell us what is wrong with the rod. They kinda make believe they don't know what caused this. I believe they know what is wrong. I wonder why they don't disclose it? The idea they don't fully know what is wrong with the rod is mind boggling. How do they know this problem won't effect different rods. 

River Bend: Operations Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Reactor Control Rod Drift During Core Alterations

On January 19, 2016, at 5:28 a.m. CST, while conducting core alterations, an alarm was actuated in the main control room alarm indicating that a' reactor control rod had drifted out of the fully inserted position. At the time, a fuel bundle was being raised out of the core, and the control rod in the same cell drifted out one notch with no "withdraw" command present. This condition actuated a corresponding alarm on the refueling platform, and system interlocks stopped the platform hoist with the fuel bundle partially withdrawn. When the control rod moved from the fully inserted position, the Technical Specification applicability for the intermediate range neutron monitoring system was inadvertently entered, while a certain function of those instruments was not operable. This event constituted operations prohibited by Technical Specifications, and is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). After a detailed assessment of the situation, the fuel bundle and the control rod were returned to their original positions. The drive mechanism for the control rod has been disabled, and the control rod will remain fully inserted for the remainder of the current fuel cycle. The causal analysis for this event will be completed when the control rod can be removed for inspection during the next refueling outage. The results of that investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report.