Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Junk Plant Indian Point Baffle Former: They Will Never Restart the Plant

I blame this on governor Cuomo. He jumps up and down like a madman railing about the recent problems at Indian Point and nothing ever changers. He doesn't effectively use his political powers. 
***Their aging management  system through campaign contribution is severely flawed. 
 
Most people in the USA in a new Gallup poll disapprove of Nuclear power...does this even make them more vulnerable? 
There is a well know corrosion problem with these bolts, many plants had to fish bolts out of the coolant system.

***They are supposed to replace the bolts...it will be worst if the new bolts failed.
 
***Why didn't the loose parts monitor inside the core pick up all the circulating broken bolts???
Look up these terms,
Baffle former
Baffle Jetting  
Most plants have changed the flow around the baffle plates. What is it a upflow conversion.
Bottom line, Entergy-Indian point is going to be implicated in not doing the industry and Westinghouse required inspections associated with the baffle plates and their bolting.
Has there been fuel damage?
Steam generator damage?
Pipe damage or other associated with bolts loose in the coolant.
Acceptable Baffle-former Bolt Pattern Analysis for Reactor Internals Evaluation
Lower Internals Upflow Conversion

Their licence renewal documents...it shows a vulnerability. 


Page 17 and 18? 

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0719/ML071910220.pdf

You get the idea...page

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAM ATrRIBUTES FOP
AGING MANAGEMENT OF C ORE BARREL'FORMER BOL'rS (AMP-4.7)
Attribute OJescriptlon
Scope Efects of ,racking caused by fatigue, irradiation-in luced cianges in
material properties, and irradiation-induced changes in stresses
Surveillance a Visual inspection per Examineition Calegory B.N-3 of ASME Sqction Xl,
Techniques Subsection IWB and Draft Subsection IWG
. LoosE parts detection monitoring system
& Augmented inspections
Frequency a Monitor with loose paits detection system
0 ASME Section Xl requirements, IWB-2410, -24111, -2412, -2420, -2430
and Draft IWG-2410, .2420, and -243)
• Perform sample baseline inspections prior to l.R term with enhanced
frequency in accordance with corrective actions
Acceptance Criteria # No loose parts from barre/fonrner bolt assemlt,ly and
9 Fatigue management program in Figure 4-1 and
6 Number of acceptable bolts and location a the minimum number and
location requilvd to maintain core coolability and DNBR within CLB
limits, or, if needed, for JCO, number of acceptable bolts and location a
than JCO assumptions.
Correctie Actions The following courses of action depend on the boll conditkin detennined biy
the monitoring and inspection progirams:
. Supplemental examinations, analytical justifications or
repair/replacement when relevant conditions are detected
* Visual inspecJons, augmented inspections (e.g., ultrasonic inspectiont),
analytical justificationi or repadr/replac:ement when barTel/formar bolt
assembly Iooise parts are detced
* Adjustment of frequency of inspections and coverage
A"n alysis (e.g., fractunm mechanics techniques, risk-based technology,
advanced thermal/hydraulic methodo0gies)
SB olt rsplaceffent of a sample set so the existing bolts with incications
may be analyzed (materials testing) and the row bolti; monitored
* Follow action; prescrbed in fatigue rrmagerrent program
Conf:Tation Aiceptabils performance per
* Loose parts rnonitorirg program
0 Augmented examinatons (e.g., ultrasonic examinations)
• Analylical jusificatlon
CORIGM DIOE6 BRAO~r

9APRATO PORKBMO T





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