Tuesday, March 22, 2016

Junk ANO: Massive NRC Inspection Discovers More Flooding Vulnerabilies

So this is the third one I mentioned last night. There just is no behavior changing deterrence going on here. It is just one special deal after another. Just remember, they had massive leaking flood barriers prior to the march 2013 event. The NRC did nothing to uncover the yellow finding on its own. They all had to wait for a 600 ton stator to  drop bursting a pipe for everyone to discover the leaking flooding seals. Bottom line, the NRC is complicit with campaign contribution insufficient oversight. How can they really hold Entergy fully accountable with oversight so broken. It is really a show trial or violation level. Remember it is highly likely the plants would have melted down if they would have had the design flood. Remember the deal here is to make Entergy spend a tremendous amount of money without any skin off the executives heads. What is really happening here, on a startling large level with tremendous amount money, the NRC is punishing the ratepayers and businesses with expensive 'recoveries" and financially weakening the industry. It is vastly cheaper to deal with leaking flood seals proactively instead of re-actively. 

You either use power as a tool of deterrence or create a bureaucracy that is so complicated that effectively their is no oversight.

What you are seeing at ANO is effectively a NRC show trial or slap on the wrist...it is collectively making the industry weaker and punishing the users of electricity.

I wonder how it works. Say the dropped stator and leaking seals cost $30 million dollars. Do they just charge the users of electricity $30 millions dollars plus a 12% rate of return? Imagine how much they can write off state and local taxes? It this just a money making venture in the big picture? 

So who pays, the scrap-goated little guy at the bottom who gets tagged with the violation and the users of electricity???
Power ReactorEvent Number: 51808
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RODRICK JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 03/19/2016
Notification Time: 22:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2016
Event Time: 17:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

UnitSCRAM CodeRX CRITInitial PWRInitial RX ModeCurrent PWRCurrent RX Mode
1NY100Power Operation100Power Operation
2NY100Power Operation100Power Operation
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD CHALLENGE RHR EQUIPMENT DURING FLOOD CONDITIONS

"Two (2) potentially degraded flood barriers at penetrations 0073-01-0034 and 0073-01-0063 were identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barriers are a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing, however, it is currently unknown if the aggregate of these two flood barriers could potentially overwhelm and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition.

"Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern.

"This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program.

"Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barriers. If required these seals can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE AT 0044 EDT ON 3/22/2016 FROM KEITH LEDBETTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"This is an 8 hour non-emergency supplemental notification to previously issued Event Notification number 51808. In EN 51808, two non-functional barriers were identified and reported, and during an extent of condition review, a third barrier has been identified that does not conform to expected flood barrier standards

"A potentially degraded flood barrier at 'blockout' penetration 0073-01-9018 was identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barrier is a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing; however, it is currently unknown if this flood barrier could potentially be overwhelmed and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition.

"Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern.

"This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program.

"Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barrier. If required this seal can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified earlier in the evening that this event would be updated.

Notified the R4DO (Haire).

Update:
I called the ANO senior resident. He said the 2013 findings haven't been cleared yet. ANO seemed to bring in a engineer to third verify all flooding violations were cleared. They don't know yet if the seals are degraded. The engineer discovered the three seals had absolutely no paperwork on them ever. ANO and the NRC never knew they were installed. The NRC never identified it. 
I asked, you had a battalion of NRC people in plant and doing massive inspections. How incompetent is the agency with not discovering it on your own. He says the NRC is investigating ANO and the NRC itself.      
I mean really, how can these guys have any credibility? Entergy spent massive resources on the plant over this and then the intensive inspection...then new failed flooding seals.

Don't tell me, the stator drop accident, it wasn't a accident, and the flooding multiple yellow findings, knowing these guys, they cleared out all the yellow findings...the new flooding violations are going to start with a clear state.

Did Entergy strategically push the discovery of the flooding violation to after  the close-out of the 2013 events?
March 21, 2016 CONTACT: Victor Dricks, 817-200-1128
NRC To Hold Public Meeting on Arkansas Nuclear One
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will meet in Russellville, Ark., on April 6 with representatives of Entergy Operations to discuss the 2015 safety performance of Arkansas Nuclear One as well as the results of a comprehensive inspection. The plant is located in Russellville.
The meeting, which will be open to the public, is scheduled to begin at 6 p.m. in the Reeves E. Richie Training Center, 1448 S.R. 333, Russellville. The public is invited to observe the meeting and will have an opportunity to ask questions or make comments after the business portion of the meeting is concluded.
A letter sent from the NRC Region IV office to plant officials addresses the performance of the plant during 2015. Current performance information for the plant can be found on the NRC website.
“By assessing each plant’s performance in a comprehensive manner, we are able to focus our inspection resources on those areas most in need of attention,” NRC Region IV Administrator Marc Dapas said. “Overall, the plant operated safely in 2015. However, Arkansas Nuclear One is receiving the highest level of NRC oversight because of the significance of previously issued inspection findings.”
Specifically, in June 2014, the NRC issued yellow findings to Arkansas Nuclear One in connection with a 2013 heavy equipment handling incident at the plant. In January 2015, the NRC issued yellow findings associated with degraded flood protection at the plant.
Why should this plant even be running. Bet you the dropped 600 ton stator inspection team prodded Entergy to uncover this. So its three years after discovering the flooding vulnerabilities, now they keep uncovering more bun flooding seals.

They should have gotten a red finding and forced to shutdown for a year or more. Made them double check all the seals. The incentives to keep their plant according to plant licensing just isn't there...a tough  regulator who make the corporation's knees tremble in fear.
Power ReactorEvent Number: 51808
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RODRICK JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 03/19/2016
Notification Time: 22:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2016
Event Time: 17:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)


UnitSCRAM CodeRX CRITInitial PWRInitial RX ModeCurrent PWRCurrent RX Mode
1NY100Power Operation100Power Operation
2NY100Power Operation100Power Operation
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD CHALLENGE RHR EQUIPMENT DURING FLOOD CONDITIONS

"Two (2) potentially degraded flood barriers at penetrations 0073-01-0034 and 0073-01-0063 were identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barriers are a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing, however, it is currently unknown if the aggregate of these two flood barriers could potentially overwhelm and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition.

"Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern.

"This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program.

"Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barriers. If required these seals can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE AT 0044 EDT ON 3/22/2016 FROM KEITH LEDBETTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"This is an 8 hour non-emergency supplemental notification to previously issued Event Notification number 51808. In EN 51808, two non-functional barriers were identified and reported, and during an extent of condition review, a third barrier has been identified that does not conform to expected flood barrier standards

"A potentially degraded flood barrier at 'blockout' penetration 0073-01-9018 was identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barrier is a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing; however, it is currently unknown if this flood barrier could potentially be overwhelmed and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition.

"Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern.

"This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program.

"Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barrier. If required this seal can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified earlier in the evening that this event would be updated.

Notified the R4DO (Haire).

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