Entergy : Opinion Turco: ‘We want a future, not a Fukushima’ NRC inaction on Pilgrim has failed region12/11/2015 | 02:45pm US/EasternRecent concerns raised alarm regarding safety at the Pilgrim nuclear reactor and the lack of serious federal oversight. TheU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported five security safety violations, promulgated a new ruling to allow an increase of safety infractions before additional oversight and initiated a rule-making proposal on decommissioning, which would allow the funds to be used for spent fuel storage, end off-site emergency planning and reduce security and insurance costs. Federal regulators with benefits for the nuclear industry prevail.
First, the NRC identifies five security safety violations concluding, "Entergy failed to take effective corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with safety significance.” Sound familiar? This conclusion is repeated in multiple NRC assessments regardingEntergy . Even after increased NRC oversight for the past two years,Entergy and the Pilgrim reactor continue to fail. The consequences for such poor operation are not a deterrent. When asked what timeline is given forEntergy to respond to the failing September report, NRC spokesmanNeil Sheehan replied, “There is no required timeline forEntergy to notify us of its readiness for the review. The company is supposed to present its improvement plan before the Commission within six months.” Six months? This timeline reinforces sluggish action by the NRC. Being downgraded due to repetitive degraded assessments, the pattern is clear. The industry is not held accountable for public safety and neither is the NRC.
The second concern is a ruling allowing an additional infraction before increasing oversight. If the expense to an operating reactor is cost prohibitive, the industry will pressure the NRC to change the rules. An exemption to the rule is generally the avenue corporations have chosen to avoid additional costs or loss of revenue. The NRC made it easier by allowing an additional safety infraction before increased oversight.
Finally, the NRC proposal for rule making for decommissioning is a vehicle for the industry to meet minimal standards and continue to evade serious public health and safety concerns. The current regulations prohibit use of decommissioning funds for costs other than cleaning up the site and returning it to public use. Also, multiple studies confirm the serious dangers from the densely packed and tightly racked spent fuel. The NRC, however, has determined the current crowded configuration is safe. Their practice to exempt the industry from responsibility of all off-site emergency planning and deny the documented dangers from the spent fuel pool is both irresponsible and immoral. The new rules will codify that practice.
In their book “Fukushima, The Story of a Nuclear Disaster,”Union of Concerned Scientists authorsDavid Lochbaum ,Edwin Lyman andSusan Stranahan warn us, “Absent significant upgrades in nuclear operation and regulation, it will only be a matter of time until the world watches another Fukushima unfold.”
Pilgrim is assessed as one of the worst operating reactors in the country, with ongoing failing reports. The NRC has proven it is incapable of regulating. The mission to prop up the failing nuclear industry at the expense of public safety is a failure of government. If a day care center or restaurant had comparative federal safety violations, would the owners be given months to respond while they continued to rack up failing assessments? I doubt it. But here is a nuclear reactor where a catastrophic event would challenge the entire region, includingBoston and Providence.
What more evidence do we need to expose the NRC as set on weakening safety rules and oversight? This demands immediate public outcry.
Assurances of public safety through the regulatory process are revealed as a fatal farce. U.S. Sen.Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) admonished the NRC commissioners for lack of attention to serious public safety issues in her home state. She said, “This is not hyperbole but life and death for my people.”The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not just failing the people inMassachusetts but the entire nation.
We want a future, not a Fukushima.
***You get it, these types of violations and problems are seen throughout the plant in other issues and is systemic. It not just relegated to security issues.***Tell that to NRC ChairStephen Burns at chairman@nrc.gov
—Diane Turco is the executive director ofCape Downwinders
© Copyright 2015 The Barnstable Patriot. All Rights Reserved., sourceNewspapers
It sounds like broad budget problems and disillusionment of the staff?
It is like a neighborhood speeder. The cops stops him all the time for speeding and just give him a warning. The driver is oblivious to the fear of the cops, so he keeps speeding without a care in the world. And the cops in the neighborhood see a pick up in speeding violation across the board. The disease seems to be catchy. It is just a matter of time before a kid gets hit.See we all make light of this because we don't the nature of the violation.
Avoid Complacency, because Entergy failed to recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes [H.12I sounds like they got a demoralized security force basically because it isn't funded appropriately.
Resources, because Entergy failed to maintain adequate procedures to support nuclear safety [H.1],I think in our greater interest we should know the nature of the violations. The community and politicians would have a better take on the professionalism of Pilgrim. They could provide feedback to the Pilgrim to quickly fix their security problems.
Work Management, because Entergy failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority [H.5].Basically it is a insignificant risk if terrorest knew the nature of these violations. How come security violation disclosures aren't risk based. Yes it is a tiny risk, but it is insignificant. How come the common good of security disclosures doesn't offset the possibility of giving information to terrorist risk. Why don't we look a holistic risk.
One cross-cutting aspect was assigned to a finding in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Resolution, because Entergy failed to take effective corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with safety significance [P.3].Cause the public knowing the true security violations would degrade the credibility of the NRC and licencee. All this is, they are protecting inappropriately the credibility of the industry.
Remember if you game Homeland security in the name of a private of corporate interests, we are undermining our faith in government. "Faith in government" is our most precious national security issue...it is our highest and greatest priority.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATIONOFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATIONUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713December 1, 2015Mr. John Dent, Jr.Site Vice PresidentEntergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station600 Rocky Hill RoadPlymouth, MA 02360-5508SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION – NRC SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2015404Dear Mr. Dent:On October 23, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a security inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.NRC inspectors documented five findings of very low security significance (Green) in this report. These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest these violations or their significance, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Three cross-cutting aspects were assigned to the findings in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy failed to recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes [H.12], Resources, because Entergy failed to maintain adequate procedures to support nuclear safety [H.1], and Work Management, because Entergy failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority [H.5]. One cross-cutting aspect was assigned to a finding in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Resolution, because Entergy failed to take effective corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with safety significance [P.3]. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC resident inspector at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
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