Point Beach has had a lot of partial loops, transformer problems and switchyard troubles.
Why did the "auxiliary feed water system actuated based on low steam generator level"?
So already we are seeing Point Beach isn’t keeping components feeding the vessel in a reliable state and now really the operation's department is implicated in they didn’t get power down to below 50% (two half capacity condensate pumps). Actually sounds like a poorly designed condensate system without three half capacity condensate pumps?
Power Reactor Event Number: 51570 Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit:  [ ] [ ]
RX Type:  W-2-LP, W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ALEX RIVAS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/28/2015
Notification Time: 23:54 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2015
Event Time: 19:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO GENERATOR LOCKOUT AFTER VOLTAGE REGULATOR MALFUNCTION
"Unit 1 automatic reactor trip actuated due to an automatic voltage regulator (AVR) malfunction which caused a generator lockout and turbine trip. The cause of the AVR malfunction is unknown at this time.
"All control rods fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feed water system. The auxiliary feed water system actuated based on low steam generator level, but since has been secured. Off-site power remains available. No release is occurring and emergency core cooling systems did not actuate. Emergency plan entry was not required."
The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup at normal operating temperature and pressure. Unit 2 was not affected by the Unit 1 transient.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
Licensee Event Report 266/2015-002-00 Unit1 Manual Reactor Trip
On December 2, 2014, operators commenced a rapid power reduction of Unit 1 due to noted degradation of Unit 1 B Condensate Pump. At 2050 on December 2, 2014, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 62% power, operators initiated a manual reactor trip of Unit 1 following securing of the Unit 1 B Condensate Pump due to imminent failure. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as expected on low steam generator level experienced due to the reduced steam demand from the turbine trip in response to the reactor trip. All other plant systems functioned as required.
The degrading Condensate B pump and motor assembly required the immediate removal from service. A reduction in reactor power was necessary to support the continued operation, considering limitations of a single train of condensate and feedwater. At the time when the condensate pump assembly failure was imminent, the reactor power was not low enough to support removal of one of the two operating condensate pumps, which necessitated a manual reactor trip.