Now the NRC pops out saying they could not substantiate intimidation. It seems like the intimidating chilling atmosphere come from a Quality Assurance "non employee" and this OI guy comes as a Quality Assurance "employee"?
August 21 , 2015Adam C. Heflin, President andChief Executive OfficerWolf Creek Nuclear Operating CorporationP.O. Box 411Burlington, KS 66839SUBJECT: CLOSURE OF INVESTIGATION (01 4-2014-019)Dear Mr. Heflin:This refers to an investigation conducted by the NRC's Office of Investigations regarding activities at Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The Office of Investigations initiated the investigation to determine whether a quality assurance specialist at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Burlington, Kansas, was the subject of discrimination for raising safety concerns regarding a design change modification package.
Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, the allegation that a quality assurance specialist employed by the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station was the subject of discrimination for raising safety concerns regarding a design change modification package was not substantiated. The NRC plans no further action related to the discrimination aspect of this allegation and considers this investigation closed.
Both coming from new reactors? They seem light? What do you see?You should note that final NRC documents may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act subject to redaction of information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Requests under the Freedom of Information Act should be made in accordance with 10 CFR 9.23, Requests for Records. Information is accessible from the NRC's website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-request.html#how.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,'' a copy of this letter will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.Docket: 50-482License: NPF-42Sincerely,7Jt<L ( (_ l4yMichael C. Hay, Team LeaderAllegations Coordination and Enforcement
My bad, the resident has no history of new reactors?
Resident,Thomas joined the NRC’s Region IV office in Arlington, Texas, in 2013 as a project engineer in the Resident Inspector Development Program. Previously he worked for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration overseeing facility and infrastructure upgrade projects. Thomas holds a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from Southern University at Baton Rouge and a master’s degree in business administration from Our Lady of the Lake University in San Antonio. He is a registered professional engineer in the state of Texas.The senior resident,Dodson joined the NRC in 2007 as an engineer in the Office of New Reactors in Rockville, Md., as part of the Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program. Most recently he was a Resident Inspector at the Ginna nuclear power plant outside Rochester, N.Y. Prior to that, he was the temporary Resident and Senior Resident Inspector at Fitzpatrick and Hope Creek stations. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in mechanical and aerospace engineering and a bachelor’s degree in religious studies from the University of Missouri.
Maybe both NRC inspectors resigned from Wolf Creek over NRC upper management not backing the on-scene inspectors. They asked for a immediate reassignment on protest...What does this mean...what does it buy them this is so important?
"gain margin for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI)"Have the inspectors been nit-picking the plant?
See how pathetically weak the NRC. It took a complaint by a contractor to OSHA to get the NRC off their ass over intimidation issues with the extremely important Quality Assurance Group?
The NRC also issued a Chilling Effect Letter (CEL) (ML13233A208) to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation on August 19, 2013. The CEL was issued because the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had issued a finding of discrimination for raising safety concerns against a former employee of an engineering contractor employed by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, and due to the NRC identifying that a chilled work environment existed within your facility’s Quality Assurance Group.
The idea the agency can't immediately eradicate a sense of intimidation within a week of discovery again shows how pathetically weak the agency. This has been going on since Aug 2013 and they have made such pathetic progress.
The forces the "be" has turned the agency into a cheap absolution process.
The forces the "be" has turned the agency into a cheap absolution process.
April 7, 2015
SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – NRC CHILLING EFFECT LETTER FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2015008Between problems in Pilgrim's LOOP last year with their Diesel Generator FLEX-SBO air compressor and this...I think all FLEX systems are junk. The NRC is just not enforcing good standards with the flex gear. It is for show systems...
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. The inspection focused on the station’s progress in addressing safety culture issues related to the NRC Chilling Effect Letter dated August 19, 2013, (ML13233A208). The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
*However, the team identified that some general work environment issues associated with supervisory styles and trust in management remain within the QA, Security and HP departments.
*Although the focus group interviews indicated that some QA personnel stated that they were not sure if they were ready to fully trust licensee management, the licensee has made reasonable progress in addressing the SCWE in the QA department.
*However, prior to receiving the CEL, the QA organization had had an internal policy that QA personnel could only initiate CRs following approval by their supervisor or manager.
The SBO and Flex crap...
August 6, 2015
Description. In mid-2012, the licensee decided to add station blackout (SBO) diesel generators in order to gain margin for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI). The SBO diesel generators were originally expected to be completed during the spring 2013 Refueling Outage, however construction fell behind schedule. In April 2013, the licensee opted to finish the SBO diesel generator installation online. The licensee acknowledged that it could not energize a safety related bus from the SBO diesel generators at power without rendering the bus inoperable, and that testing to fully demonstrate capability could not be performed until the spring 2014 mid-cycle outage. In August 2013, the licensee announced their plans to revise the station Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and, by extension, the MSPI to include credit for the SBO diesel generator system effective October 1, 2013. The inspectors expressed concerns that it was not appropriate to take the credit for the equipment without performing all testing necessary to verify the equipment’s capability to perform its required function. The licensee documented the testing of each of the components under Work Order 12- 354257-205. The disposition credited the load bank testing of the engines, the successful racking of the breakers, and the continuity checks of the associated cables as sufficient to have high confidence that the equipment would perform its required function. The licensee declared the system operational on September 26, 2013 and the revised MSPI PRA inputs were submitted to the NRC to be effective for the 4th quarter performance indicator data.
On April 25, 2014, the licensee attempted testing on the NB01 train A Class 1E 4kV bus to show the safety related bus could be powered by the SBO diesel generators. While attempting to load the bus from the SBO diesel generators, feeder breaker PB0508 opened unexpectedly, which de-energized NB01. Troubleshooting identified the cause of PB0508 opening was due to incorrect wiring of a current transformer inside the NB0114 breaker cubicle. An extent of condition also identified the same wiring performed incorrectly inside NB0214 breaker cubicle on the NB02 train B Class 1E 4kV bus. Neither safety related 4kV bus could have been powered from the SBO diesel generators for the time the system was credited as being functional, from September 26, 2013, to April 25, 2014. The wiring was corrected and the test was performed satisfactorily prior to restarting the reactor.
The licensee wrote Condition Report 83370 and performed an apparent cause evaluation. The licensee found that Design Change Package 14117 removed the existing current transformers (CT) and wiring in the NB0114 and NB0214 cabinets, because the existing CTs did not have the correct turns ratio required by the new design. When installing new CTs, the licensee found that they would not fit as designed. The licensee stopped work on the new CT installation but continued work on the wiring installation. The licensee decided to re-orient the CTs so that they would fit into the NB0114 and NB0214 cabinets. Wiring drawing WIP E-009-00132-W08-A-1 was revised, but the terminations that were already completed on terminal block “N” inside the cabinet were not changed to match the drawing.
When the modification completed the current transformers were installed per revision 2
of the drawing, and the wiring was installed per revision 1. This went unnoticed because the work was performed under separate sub-work orders. After the work was completed, the instrument meter relay team tested the cabling from terminal block N to the SBO diesel generators, but they did not test the cabling from terminal block N to the current transformers because it was not specified in the work order. If it had been, this wiring error could have been detected even without a full functional system test.
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