Friday, January 16, 2015

The Millstone Problem: Reorganize Dominion!


New Millstone chief brings Navy sensibility to the job
Published February 11. 2015 4:00AM
Updated February 11. 2015 2:39PM
Publication: The Day
From his office window, John Daugherty looks out over Niantic Bay to the clusters of beach cottages and year-round homes of the Crescent Beach neighborhood, where he has been living since Dec. 1.
Daugherty, 55, took over as site vice president of Millstone from Steve Scace, who retired Jan. 31. As he assumes leadership of the two operating nuclear power plants, one decommissioned plant, a waste storage facility and a workforce of 1,080 Dominion employees and 300 contractors at the 520-acre site, one of his main tasks will be to ensure Millstone is back on the right course. 
Millstone ghosts emerge with new problems
Published January 18. 2015 4:00AM
By Paul Choiniere Publication: The Day
I reported many of the stories written during the bad old days at Millstone Nuclear Power Station. While none of the problems cited of late by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approach the corporate misconduct seen in the 1990s, the recent spate of NRC violations is disconcerting.

"That's at least a yellow flag, if not a red flag. Why suddenly does it look like they're having performance problems?" said Bill Sheehan, chairman of the Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC), about the rash of issues.

Why indeed?

NEAC was created in reaction to the crisis at Millstone in the 1990s. State and local officials found themselves largely in the dark back then as the seriousness of the safety problems emerged through news coverage, much of it initiated by the investigatory reporting of this newspaper and aided by whistleblowers within the company.

While documenting the problems, the NRC was initially reluctant to draw the conclusion that they collectively meant something was seriously wrong at the nuclear station. The NRC cracked down hard only after media and political pressure grew.

Recognizing the need to monitor matters and ask questions at the local level, the state created NEAC.

Northeast Utilities, then owners of Millstone, had created a culture that discouraged plant workers from speaking up about technical problems, punishing those who did point to performance errors, while rewarding those who kept such issues covered up.

Due to concerns that safety margins had been significantly eroded, the NRC closed down the Unit 1 reactor in November 1995 and the other two units in early 1996. The commission did not give the OK for Millstone 3 to restart until the summer of 1998, later followed by Millstone 2. NU took Millstone 1 permanently out of service.

The $2.1 million fine issued against NU by the NRC in December 1997 was then the largest in the commission's history. The regulatory agency pointed to more than 50 significant violations. Among the negligence was the build up of sentiment at the bottom of a reactor containment vessel. Had it been necessary to pump water from the vessel floor to cool the reactor during an emergency, as designed, the pumps could have quickly clogged.

In August 2000, Dominion Resources purchased the station for the bargain price of $1.3 billion and nuclear was dropped from the name, becoming Millstone Power Station. Except for the occasional reactor going offline, changes to deal with nuclear waste storage, and routine business stories, Millstone receded from the headlines.

In the past year, however, that has changed. Recently, a Nov. 24 NRC inspection detected two security violations. Because they involved security vulnerabilities, regulators did not disclose details. Plant operators corrected the problems, according to Dominion and the NRC.

The NRC earlier cited Millstone for failing to promptly identify and correct problems with a feedwater pump that is part of the reactor coolant system. In May, the NRC subjected Millstone to a special inspection after the unplanned shutdown of both reactors. Inspectors concluded Dominion operators failed to take steps that could have avoided the reactor shutdowns.

Millstone's own internal review found no common root cause for the series of issues and no evidence the safety culture had eroded.

NEAC needs to keep the heat on. Perhaps Millstone has just had a bad run. But history cautions that assuming this is no big deal could prove to be a big mistake.

Hewett appointment

Last Sunday I wrote that Rep. Ernest Hewett, D-New London, stripped by House Speaker Brendan Sharkey of his deputy speaker post in 2013 after the infamous "snake" comment, was named an "assistant majority leader" for the current legislative session.

Speaker Sharkey's office finally got back to me last week about the change of heart.

"Rep. Hewitt (sic), reflective of his legislative experience, is an Assistant Majority Leader in the House. Speaker Sharkey looks forward to working with his entire leadership team this legislative session," read the statement.

That's not exactly enlightening, but it's all I got.

Paul Choiniere is the editorial page editor.

Twitter: @Paul_Choiniere
Updated on Jan 17
So actually, I got what I wanted. You just have to work too hard for this shit.

A public declaration of a awareness of it...

But what about North Anna, next we will need to hear about systemic nuclear management issues at Dominion and a necessity of a reorganization of their nuclear unit.

"Those findings are preliminary pending a meeting between the NRC and plant owner Dominion officials and finalization of the NRC's report. Amid the series of findings, members of the citizens advisory panel that oversees the plant have questioned whether there are systemic problems at Millstone.
I think they allowed the machine components to deteriorate through operational, obsolescence and and age related issues. This created a problem that is too hand to understand for their staff. Basically their maintenance techniques couldn't keep up holistically to the material situational awareness of the machine. They didn't have the enough granularity to know the true magnitude of the material properties of the machine. Their primitive maintenance processes didn't give them enough granularity to understand the true materiel conditions of the machine. Their testing and surveillance...the maintenance regime...just didn't provide the staff with enough granularity to understand the material properties and their degradation.
I’ll ask Dominion the hard question their organization is too chicken to ask themselves….how is North Anna’s costly and embarrassing nuclear fuel damage incident similar to Millstone’s TDAFP problem and switchyard slots system? You should hire me. The only difference is North Anna hasn’t had their three special inspections in one year and their plant LOOP yet?  
In our primitive maintenance and upkeep conditions as a society, you got to make a judgement we can't keep up knowing the true conditions of the material conditions of the machine. We all do it with our cars and planes. The solution is to purchase a new car with the benefits of jumping into advanced engineering and technology the obsolete parts can't buy us. 

*The sin of this 2013 below NRC Inspection report is they couldn't elevate it to a much higher violation appropriate to the risk of the organizational engineering deterioration that was shortly going to create the repetitive TDAFP failures, the two plant LOOP and the transmission system SLOD fiasco. If the agency was given permission to thoroughly expand on the 2013 feed water steam generator isolation valves design flaws fix on their organizational troubles with "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges"...the NRC slapping the hell out of Millstone nuclear safety engineering 2013 dysfunctions...Millstone could have repaired their engineering department heading off the future threats of risk increases. Remember the TDAFWP troubles were just emerging in 2013. If the NRC was competent enough to put the emerging TDAFWP and the feed water isolation issues of "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges" together, they would have aggressively figured out a way to interact with the increasing declining engineering capabilities of Dominion. The NRC ROP is purposely design to teach the local NRC inspectors to stove pipe licencee problems...to minimize blacking the eyes of the licencees in the public.


*This is a institutional failure, the Millstone oversight panel, the NRC and Dominion...they could see the declining performance thanks to the local inspectors. It wasn't a failure to see and understand the information presented. It was a failure to act on the plentiful available information contained in "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges" and not following tech specs with the feed water isolation valve being degraded beginning in 2007 and finally expressed by the NRC in 2013.
*Events like this utterly destroys the safety culture of the licenced operators because they know the NRC and Dominion selectively follow the rules and tech specs. If these powerfull institutions can lie like that openly and play word games...they will crush me with their power if I contest their ethical problems and rule breaking.         
My blog: Millstone: UFSAR Safety Valves not fixed because of "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges".
SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION – NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2013004 AND 05000423/2013004 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT NO. 07200047/2013001
"Dominion had deferred correcting this condition over a period of six years (three refueling outages) which the inspectors noted in NCV 05000423/2012010-01, a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” Dominion has since deferred repairs from the April 2013 refueling outage until the October 2014 outage."
The valves were initially scheduled to be restored to full qualification during refueling outage (RFO), 3RFO12, in October 2008, but the repairs were deferred to 3RFO13 due to maintenance schedule conflicts. Subsequently, repairs were not completed in 3RFO13, 3RFO14, or 3RFO15 due to scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges."
*Basically, the NRC forced Dominion to report on this. It is finally Dominion's pubic validation on the NRC inspector's prior "scheduling, engineering, and funding challenges in his 2013 inspection report. The Dominion engineering safety staff at Millstone is chaotic and lacks the ability of "attention to detail", the staff is not proficient in wide areas of nuclear safety and plant engineering, and they lack education, training, and expertise to fully support nuclear safety in all their engineering departments. 

*How many other plants are wildly spinning out of control like this in the nuclear industry, everyone is aware of it...but something is preventing them to act on what they know and repair their organization, which is always in the best interest of the USA?

*Dominion below explaining how a non disclosed engineering change (SlOD)in the switch-yard and local transmission system spun terrible out of control. My position is all aspects of Dominion's nuclear safety and engineering at Millstone is very similar to how the organization acted in this.     
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC. (DNC) MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 RESPONSE TO AN APPARENT VIOLATION IN NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2014011AND 05000423/2014011; EA-14-12
The root cause evaluation for this AV identified the direct cause as a lack in proficiency and skill in performing 10 CFR 50.59 screens. The root cause for this AV was determined to be that continuing training was not adequate to maintain the proficiency and skills for consistent, accurate screens. Corrective actions were needed to address the screening deficiency identified in the apparent violation.
The complexities associated with the technical issue, multiple responsible entities involved, and understanding of the MPS2 and MPS3 licensing basis are also relevant to understanding the contributing factors for the AV. During review of this AV, it was determined that DNC's error of not performing a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation occurred during the design development for the removal of SLOD by the transmission owner, Northeast Utilities (NU). During the design development, DNC did not recognize that NU's removal of SLOD resulted in a change in the method of compliance with GDC 17 that required DNC to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. This matter is further addressed in the Additional Information provided below.
*It is a corruption of intelligence to think we can detect all deterioration within our primitive maintenance processes and then replace piecemeal the obsolete components in a half ass third party vendor Chinese black market voodoo replacement parts stream. What Dominion is doing is much like whistling in the dark with churning their employees in their half ass organizational processes. If we just churn organizational energy and resources, then that is automatically and perfectly in the aims of what is in the best interest for the the utility and USA. Worthlessly spinning bureaucracy is in the highest aims of all life on planet earth! This really is a rendition of corporate and organizational insane budgets and maintenance priorities Ludditism.

Millstone flagged for safety problems


Waterford - A Nuclear Regulatory Commission special inspection of the backup feedwater pump at the Millstone Power Station has uncovered two findings of very low safety significance.
The two "green" findings, announced Thursday, are the latest in a series of safety and security lapses the NRC has identified at the nuclear power plant. Earlier this week, the NRC announced two other new findings, one "green" - the lowest level - and one "greater than green," both related to plant security.
Those findings are preliminary pending a meeting between the NRC and plant owner Dominion officials and finalization of the NRC's report. Amid the series of findings, members of the citizens advisory panel that oversees the plant have questioned whether there are systemic problems at Millstone.
NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said the latest findings stem from a special inspection of the Unit 3 reactor in September in response to problems with the backup pump used to help cool down the reactor after a shutdown. The reason for the inspection was the failure of the pump to pass quarterly surveillance tests on July 15 and Sept. 10, he said in an email message.
"During both tests, the pump started and then unexpectedly stopped," he said. "It then restarted without operator intervention and reached rated speed approximately 15 minutes later. The pump has since undergone repairs and been restored to service."
Inspectors found that plant staff failed to properly troubleshoot the problems affecting the pump. The other finding stemmed from "a failure to correct adverse conditions affecting the pump."

Sheehan said that since they are "green" findings, Dominion will be able to initiate a corrective action program, and NRC inspectors will follow up to ensure problems have been appropriately addressed.
Millstone spokesman Ken Holt noted that the NRC said in its letter announcing the new findings that "overall Dominion responded acceptably to these ... failures ... taking appropriate actions to address and correct the potential causes through maintenance and modifications and demonstrated adequate system performance with surveillance testing and electrical circuit verifications."
Specifically, Holt said, during a recent refueling outage crews performed extensive maintenance on the pump, and brought in representatives of the equipment manufacturer to ensure that the work was being done correctly.
"Since then, we've run it 10 times and had no issues," he said.
Holt said there is no connection between these and the other recent findings.
Earlier last year, the NRC conducted another special inspection of other issues pertaining to the same pump. In an Aug. 28 report that was later finalized, the NRC issued a "white" finding of "low to moderate safety significance." "White" is the second lowest level of the NRC's four-tiered color-coding system.
As a result of the white finding, the plant was placed under additional NRC oversight.

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