Wednesday, September 24, 2014

The NRC Doesn’t Have The Statutory Horsepower to Control the Behavior of Palisades.

Do you speak Mulliganese?
 
If I read just one more time my "stuff like that" phrase I am going to hang myself:)


Official Transcript of Proceedings
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
 
Date: Wednesday, September 3, 2014

Excerpts
 
·         MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you. Deterrents. You know, we look at deterrents as far as the NRC's activities associated with a nuclear power plant, and we see that the NRC doesn't have any, very little deterrents on the bad behaviors of other plants.

·         As far as all of the issues with Palisades over the years, a recent newspaper wrote up an interesting set of articles about Palisades and all the troubles they had. And what you see over this thing is there is, one thing, the NRC doesn't have any horsepower to, you know, put fear in the eyes of these guys. And that's, basically, you know, if you go one-by-one with these regulations and stuff like that, you're going to consume all the NRC's resources stuff like that.

·         And so there's the deterrence part of the NRC's activities. You know, the utilities are going to exhaust the agency with all the nickel and dime stuff if there's not a deterrence part of this deal, if they don't fear the NRC and that type of thing.

·         We also know that -- I believe that, generally, in the last five years, as shown by the articles in the newspaper, that with all of our troubles, Palisades had better capacity factor than they had in the early years and stuff. And this is all, essentially, because of risk perspectives and reductions of regulations and all that sort of stuff. And so in spite of all their troubles and that type of thing, Palisades has been allowed to continue on in the way they've always done.

·         Palisades did a relatively good job on the control rod drive mechanisms of recent, but they had a horrible history of CRDM problems and that type of stuff. Palisades has had numerous issues of falsifying documents, intimidating employees, lying to inspectors over the recent years and that type of stuff. And, you know, like the recent issue with the security guards, they had a similar incident four or five years ago, basically the same thing: lying and falsifying documents to the NRC. And I know the NRC basically says after two or three years, we’ll just make believe that it never happened, you know, the history never really is caught up knitted together. And you don't have enough influence and power to keep a plant like Palisades straight.

·         What's happened here is really ugly. What's happened with the impellers is ugly. It's unprofessional. It makes our nation a laughing stock to all the other nations that are desperately trying to, you know, maintain their fleet safely and stuff like that.

·         And I've heard from numerous professional people in the industry basically saying they cannot believe that we allowed the Palisades plants to operate for so many years with these reactor coolant pumps and all these different kind of warnings we've had over the years and stuff and all these indications. And we're only getting, the outsiders are only getting the bits and pieces of what really went on with these impellers and stuff. You know, a lot of nations think of this as irresponsible and not worthy of a great nation when you get down to these impellers and stuff.

·         And then you've got Salem, like I talked about, the recent issues with a horrendous, all their bolts being loose and stuff like that, prior, you know, prior warnings and that type of stuff that were ignored, and the NRC really hasn't stepped in there and done what the public wants. They don't want to have a Salem. You know, a crack starts somewhere in a reactor coolant pump. They want that crack fixed. They don't want to have to deal with these problems for years and years and deal with the broken bolts and fallen down components and the pumps and stuff. That's ugly. The amount of cracked and broken impellers, it's ugly. It's unprofessional. It's an essence of an indicator,

·         you know. If they can't keep these impellers, you know, if they don't have to spend so much resource on these broken components, impellers, the tank that recently leaked, the control rod drive mechanisms, and stuff like that. You know, they're just consuming plant resources, and we fear that other safety problems aren't being dealt with adequately.

·         A lot of these kind of components breaking and stuff like that, that has a tendency to make the employees disillusioned and they know that it's wrong and stuff like that. And they know that the NRC doesn't back them. They know that, you know, we have to make they'll be up in the control room and they'll have the indications of a big blade being thrown off the pump, and everybody will sit back and not give what the public really wants the Agency to force Palisades to do, to shut down, pay a price, deterrence, deterrence, and make them pay a price so that, you know, when they're in their little rooms and they're making these decisions about, you know, well, we've got some part of the impeller cracked, we can either fix it right, put in new parts so we don't have to deal with this in the past, or the NRC is going to, down the road, if, you know, bigger parts start falling off the pump or it gets strewn about the plant, they're going to make us pay a horrendous price.

·         Most of the people, you know, what is safety related and all that sort of stuff, you know. We think when you talk about Palisades is safe that means that you are pretty sure that they won't have a, you know, a type of severe core damage and off-site relief where you'll have a fatality. That's what you're saying when you say a plant is safe, and that's just not an appropriate standard. We don't think that's an appropriate -- we think this ugliness is a pretty good indicator of the future and that it shouldn't be tolerated. It should be nice and clean, and the operation of the plant should be nice and clean, and they're not all caught up with these degradations and broken components and all that sort of stuff. It's a clean plant. The staff is not excessively busy or the control room employees don't have all these complicated procedures in place of, you know, a well-engineered plant. And, you know, everybody is diligently paying attention to the plant, not paying attention, not worrying about the degradations.

·        We worry about Palisades, but there's a risk if a lot of plants have degradation mechanisms that the NRC doesn't have under control and, you know, necessarily what you can prove isn't the most unsafe. It's a lot of the stuff that's behind the barrier that's degraded, that's degrading in an unknown fashion, and that's a threat to the nation and to a plant.

·         So that's kind of what we're worried about with -- rules don't carry a lot of information and stuff. You know, staying within the rules doesn't have a lot of information. Usually, human intelligence and a brain can process a lot of information and that type of thing, and so that's what I worry about is a lot of these rules and stuff is designed to make us become more stupider than we really are.
 
·         I think, like I said, we worry about what's going on if regulations will tolerate this kind of ugly behavior at Palisades, certain events in the industry that are pretty concerning that are out there that kind of questions whether it's a lot more uglier than what's being portrayed by the NRC.

·         You know, it almost gets to the point of, you know, the NRC says, you know, well, cheating isn't safety related, you know. We can't -- it doesn't, it's un-safety related. It can be repaired, or it's not a big deal, or it's not modeled appropriately in all your risk perspectives and stuff like that.

·         Another issue we have is really you don't have any proof, there's no engineering proof that those reactor coolant pumps are safe. You don't have any, I don't see any model of, you know, actual building a plant, building, more or less, a prototype type of deal where you're beating the hell out of the pumps and you're getting those kind of blade failures and everybody, you know, you're experimenting a lot on a system like the Palisades pumps and its relationship to its primary coolant system and stuff like that. You don't have really any actual, I don't see any actual engineering that those pumps are safe. Studies, actual studies. It's all kind of, more or less, you know, the fallback of the NRC, it's our opinion that it's safe and stuff like that. That's the privilege of the NRC. They get to say that, basically, the professional people, they get to say, you know, a guy like me needs triplicate proof that Palisades is unsafe, even when it's all there. You guys get to say, "It's my opinion that it's safe," and you don't have any evidence to back it up.

·         So the evidence I'm talking about is, would be some engineering document showing that, you know, we've gone through all of the, you know, not necessarily intellectual kind of thing that the NRC likes to do, but we really set up a system and we've repeated the degradation mechanisms on Palisades with their PCP pumps and stuff like that, and we actually seen the results of the broken impellers and stuff like that. We have a full engineering understanding of the mechanisms of what potentially could go wrong in the future with those pumps. I don't think a lot of you guys really understand how difficult that is being in the control room and, you know -- you guys all mostly get to see a lot of this stuff in hindsight. Those guys in the control room get to see those events when equipment fails and they have no idea why it failed and why it's behaving that way. Then they get stuck with procedures that don't work. It's a terrifying situation and unnerving situation in the control room.

·         And we think, you know, with this Palisades deal being ugly and stuff, your inability to enforce integrity and truth-telling -- Palisades is not afraid to lie when they need to or be deceptive to the NRC. That's the history of Palisades and stuff like that, and we think actually that happens a lot throughout the industry.

·         And then the general stated the nuclear industry as a whole and incentives nowadays for a lot of these utilities with their economic troubles to cut back and stuff. You know, our fear is if we seen all that was going on there, we could foresee, and the NRC could behave in a different way. But there's tremendous barriers. A lot of rules are set up, you know, like in this thing here. I can't see all the documents and stuff like that.

·         And if we had all of the knowledge in front of us of what was going on, outsiders could intervene, just like if everybody seen what was going on in Fukushima and the anti-nukes could have that kind of ammunition, maybe that wouldn't have happened. Maybe we could have captured a couple of minds and consciences and not have such an ugly situation facing us in the future.

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