“Their battle cry is‘natural gas is killing us. We are not making the money we were making five years ago,’ ” said Jenis. “But it’s hard for us to sit here and see these raises go out to management.”"This is a workplace that has been beaten down over the last few years," he said.
“There seems to be a total attitude change toward the workers from the corporate level.”...This comes from a discussion I had with the senior resident NRC inspector in Seabrook.
I asked the resident, well then it’s a falsification and you can’t trust the integrity of the staff at the plant. He said he agreed with that...but we called it just gross incompetence. What is the difference I said, if you are so grossly incompetent you can’t accurately assess the leaking hole in a pipe in an unbelievable important plant and reactor cooling pipe. The UT said a rather large area had a zero thickness.
NextEra Energy Seabrook License Renewal Application Supplemental Response - RAI B.2.1.11-2 and B.2.1.12-6
SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2013004 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) REPORT NO. 07200063/2013001
As a result, the inspectors determined that the reasonable expectation of operability was no longer credibly assured based on the following factors:
Subsequently, through discussions between the NRC and NextEra, on August 31, NextEra was granted relief to perform a temporary, non-ASME code repair to the SW piping through the installation of a weldolet assembly over the affected flaw area, in compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii), and completed the repair efforts on September 1, 2013. Current NextEra planning includes replacement of the flaw area in the next refueling outage, and completion of corrective actions associated with a number of apparent cause evaluations and other associated activities.1. The subject carbon steel (belzona-lined) piping was newly-installed on or about April 2011, with a nominal thickness of 0.375-inches. The leak in August 2013, directly indicates an average loss over the approximate 28 months of 0.160-inches/year, which far exceeded the corrosion rates of 0.030-inches/year utilized in the POD to justify continued operability;
2. The actual, rapid leak propagation that occurred from 10 dpm on August 7, to 90 dpm on August 20, to 25 gpm (while running CT SW pumps) on August 28, and ultimately, the estimated 15 gpm with normal ocean SW pressures, indicated a flaw degradation that appeared to be consistent with the flaw evaluation conducted following the volumetric examinations;3. The physical condition of the piping at the flaw location was characterized initially as “weepage,” on August 7, followed by a “concavity” that appeared at the flaw location on August 20, and ultimately as a through-wall hole on August 28 with a resultant estimated leak rate of 25 gpm. This rapid deterioration of ASME Class 3 piping wall was also consistent with the flaw evaluation and volumetric examinations that predicted very little remaining material of a specific geometry;
4. Information regarding the leak-rate from a hole characterized in the flaw evaluation, i.e., bounded by “…2.327-inches circumferentially by 1.50-inches axially with a remaining wall thickness of 0.00-inches…” was not integrated into the evaluation under the POD regarding the reasonable expectation of operability. Moreover, when the bounding flaw size was used to determine potential leak rates using standard engineering equations, an approximate 570 gpm leak rate was calculated. This resultant leak rate was outside the Operability criteria established in the POD of (1) 137.25 gpm (excluding SW boundary valve leak-by) based on leakage criteria associated with UFSAR design basis values of CT inventory for a 7-day mission time without makeup, (2) 130 gpm available margin from calculations that address SW cooling the primary component cooling heat exchanger, and (3) 250 gpm available margin from calculations that address SW cooling the diesel generator heat exchanger; and5. It was known that the rapid leak propagation occurred from 90 dpm to 25 gpm on August 28, during surveillance testing of CT pumps, which directly indicated that a 20 psig increase in fluid system pressures caused the rapid leak propagation. Coupled with the volumetric flow information that was also known, a direct challenge to the reasonable expectation of operability should have been identified, or, more directly, a recognition that for all specified safety functions and design basis mission times, further operability of the “B” SW header with a rapidly degrading pipe wall and increased leak rates, was not assured.