They reported it on May 3,
2013.
You get it, the standard
of safety for Target Rock and Entergy is they have to prove a not transparent component
or internal is not safe.
They are not required to
prove the material has the required quality for its safety requirements.
So we had some defect in
these new valves that caused two plant required shutdowns, some eight leak. In
addition to that, we have another defect in the bellows that would have prevented
the valve’s automatic relief capability. And they don’t know the mechanism of
the failure and the magnitude of it.
Right, that pilot valve
was in the plant and then was heading back to the plant after testing…and there was no expectation
the bellow corrosion would have been discovered in a regular turnaround.
I will give them the benefit
of doubt, got to look at my timeline…it came from the Nemo Nor'easter when they replaced leaking
Holy freaken shit!
My April 2, 2013 petition
MR. MULLIGAN: “I think that in the beginning, you were -- the NRC. I won't get personal, but the NRC was really rude to me and disruptive because they didn't know all the other ones went (other 2.206's of mine). This was off normal as far as how it was-- you disrupted me and got me off my thought train and stuff. And I interpreted it as being rude and disrespectful and part of a coverup. Thank you.”
March 3, 2013
Part 21 (PAR)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Operations Center Event Report
Event# 48996
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL
CO. Notification Date / Time:
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY ERIC
DUNCAN R3DO
10 CFR Section: 21.21 (a)(2) INTERIM
EVAL OF DEVIATION
INTERIM PART 21 REPORT OF POTENTIAL
DEFECT IN A RELIEF VALVE BELLOWS
The following was excerpted from a
fax:
(ii) Identification of the basic
component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States
which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.
Target Rock P/N: 303480-1, Bellows,
Manufactured by Target Rock.
(iii) Identification of the firm
supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. Target
Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
(iv) Nature of the defect or failure
to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect
or failure to comply.
During as-found steam testing on March
5, 2013 of a Pilgrim Main Steam Safety Relief Valve (MS-SRV) (TR Model 09J-001,
valve assembly SIN 5, pilot assembly S/N 23, bellows PIN 303480-1 SIN
607) a loud pop was heard and as-found testing was secured. Subsequently,
the pilot assembly was removed from the valve assembly and
subjected to a leak test and would not
hold pressure. The pilot assembly was disassembled and a visual inspection of
the PIN 303480-1 bellows convolutions revealed a through wall failure in one of
the convolutions. It is noted the steam testing was performed at an offsite
test facility and the valve did not fail installed in the plant.
The bellows acts as a pressure sensor
responsible for initiating the opening of the MS-SRV at set pressure. Failure of
the bellows does not directly impact the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System
(RCS) pressure boundary, which is maintained by the bonnet assembly that
surrounds it, but does impair the ability of the MS-SRV to provide over-pressure protection of the RCS. This technology has
an extensive history of reliability in nuclear power systems and has been used
in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) since the 1970s. This is the first
reported incident regarding a thru wall bellows failure.
Target Rock initiated a comprehensive
root cause evaluation pursuing several areas of investigation. In parallel, Entergy
is conducting an independent investigation and we are cooperating with them. A
complete review of our paperwork confirms all manufacturing procedures and
processes were performed in accordance with all specified requirements. This
includes:
- Raw material analysis
- Dimensional inspections
- Cleaning
- Heat Treatment
- Manufacturing processes
- Testing
- Review of design stresses
Preliminary metallurgical analysis of
the failed bellows indicates cracks forming in an inter-granular manner as would
be expected from Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracks (IGSCC) originating at
pit like location on the interior pressurized surface. The source of this
cracking is the focus of on going investigations. Target Rock has also visually
inspected two other bellows of the same part number, one manufactured from the
same material lot and another manufactured from an earlier material lot. Both
of these bellows were installed in valves steam tested at Target Rock. One of
these valves bellows was also full flow
tested at Wyle Labs. Neither of these additional bellows contained pit-like
locations and may indicate this potential failure mechanism is an isolated
incident. However, to date, neither Target Rock nor Pilgrim can draw final
conclusions with the information collected and analyzed.
The mode of failure has not been
determined; however, in order to address the potential for a common mode failure,
Target Rock is continuing metallurgical testing of the failed bellows and the two
other bellows with the same part number. Based on these results, it is likely we will need to evaluate bellows that have
been installed in other NPP as they become available.
(v) The date on which the information
of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
The as-found steam test and
identification of the potential defect occurred on March 5,
2013.
(vi) In the case of a basic component
which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components
in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for,
manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities
subject to the regulations in this part.
The following plants are running with
bellows P/N 303480-1 installed: Limerick 1 & 2, Pilgrim, and J.A.
Fitzpatrick.
(vii) The corrective action which has
been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible
for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to
complete the action.
The following plants are running with
bellows P/N 303480-1 installed:
Limerick:
28 valves installed, 3-Stage MS-SRVs, Units 1 and 2, with bellows installed 1999
Pilgrim:
4 valves installed, 3-Stage MS-SRVs, with bellows installed in 2011
Fitzpatrick:
3 valves installed, 3-Stage MS-SRVs, with bellows installed 2011
(vii) The corrective
action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual
or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has
been or will
be taken to complete the action.
The root cause of the potential defect
is not yet known as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific
corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Corrective Action Request CAR
13-013 will document the corrective actions when they are determined. This
determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR
anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event
the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report
within 45 days.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or
failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has
been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
Target Rock will recommend that the
end user perform a detailed visual inspection of the interior convolutions of
installed bellows P/N 303480-1 at the next opportunity to determine if any
areas of pitting or cracking exist on the interior wails of the bellows. This
is a difficult inspection to perform due to the following: internal geometry of
the convolutions, a trained inspector is required and specific inspection
technology is needed to yield reliable results, (ix) In the case of an early
site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
No comments:
Post a Comment