Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Insane Flash Crash In Utilities Stocks

Future prices to reserve generating capacity at power plants in 13 Eastern and Midwestern states including Illinois fell by more than half, confounding industry observers.

“That optimistic theory propped up Exelon shares until this week, when a closely watched electricity market auction blew a gaping hole in Mr. Crane's hypothesis. Future prices to reserve generating capacity at power plants in 13 Eastern and Midwestern states including Illinois fell by more than half, confounding industry observers. The auction portends a significant revenue hit for Exelon after June 1, 2016.

More troubling, the auction signaled power prices aren't likely to recover anytime soon. It also confirmed that the economic recovery still hasn't recharged power demand. Conservation measures and energy-efficient appliances are restraining the growth of electricity use by consumers and businesses.

Exelon stock fell 7 percent on the news, extending a month-long decline that has wiped out three-quarters of a 27 percent rise from January through April.

Along with the stock tumble came signs that Wall Street is losing faith in Mr. Crane's theory that power prices will rise as new regulatory burdens put coal-fired plants out of business. Experts say a surge in bids from gas-plant operators drove down the auction price, indicating abundant power from those plants will fill any supply gap caused by coal-plant closings. As my colleague Steve Daniels wrote recently, developers keep building new gas-fired plants despite low electricity prices.”

So what is going on here? I see prolonged weakness in the whole group. FirstEntergy and Exelon is down 8% today. A weak quarter or surprise is now going to hammer any utility stock price...
Just, extreme pressure to reduce whole sale electric prices...

I think the financial community globally is beginning to balk at purchasing utility stocks?
Why There Was An Insane Flash Crash In Utilities Stocks At The Opening Bell
May 23
When markets opening in New York City this morning, shares of American Electric Power and Nextera Energy, two big electric utilities trading on the NYSE, took a complete nosedive. 
American Power briefly plunged 54%, and Nextera Energy plunged 62% — the question is why. 
To figure out what caused this crash, Business Insiderreached out to Eric Hunsader, founder of Nanex, a research firm that compiles and analyzes market data. 
First thing's first, it's important to realize that this morning was the morning after a Fed announcement. Hunsader said that since utility stocks are impacted by moves in interest rates, it's likely that traders were repositioning themselves based on Bernanke's comments. 
The problem is that as they were all rushing to sell, there weren't enough buyers.
"It just so happened that this morning there was no liquidity and that sector just got killed," said Hunsader. 
Now the question, then, is why hasn't this happened before?
Say it ain't so!  

Exelon, FirstEnergy, NRG Hit By Natgas FearsTue, May 28 2013 00:00:00 E00_WEB


Posted 02:23 PM ET 


Exelon Corp. (EXC), the largest U.S. operator of nuclear reactors, and FirstEnergy Corp. (FE) fell the most in more than three years after a surge of proposed new plants in the nation's largest wholesale power market caused forward prices to drop.

Exelon, based in Chicago, declined 7.2 percent to 32.14 at 1:37 p.m. in New York, after earlier falling as low as 31.92 for the company's biggest intraday drop since May 6, 2010. FirstEnergy, based in Akron, Ohio, dropped 7.6 percent to $39.42. Earlier it fell to 39.32, its worst one-day decline in four years. NRG Energy Inc. (NRG), based in Princeton, N.J., fell 4.6 percent to $25.92.

The companies, which stood to gain from coal plant retirements, are facing more competition from planned natural gas-fueled facilities and imports from neighboring markets. PJM Interconnection, which oversees power markets in 13 states, said on May 24 that capacity market prices fell 56 percent for delivery from June 2016 to May 2017 from last year's auction. Capacity payments are made to generators to assure a sufficient supply of power.

"It is becoming increasingly clear that significant new low-cost generation and imports are likely to enter the market over the medium term and may be a substantial offset to the positive impact on power prices from coal plant retirements," Deutsche Bank AG's Jonathan Arnold and Keith Stanley wrote in a research note today to clients.

"This essentially risks keeping the market oversupplied with future power price improvement more dependent on a rise in natural gas prices," they wrote.

Sunday, May 26, 2013

At Arkansas Nuclear One NRC Dumps Inspector

This sounds fishy. Like his tenor pre fatality looks messy…so the agency pulled the senior inspector from the site...  

So why couldn’t the past senior NRC inspector spend six more months till the crane fatality issues was cleared?
 
Sounds like he didn't do his job?
May 24, 2013

CONTACT: Victor Dricks (817) 200-1128

Lara Uselding (817) 200-1519

NRC Names New Senior Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has assigned Brian Tindell as the new senior resident inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One in Russellville, Ark. The plant is operated by Entergy Operations.

“Brian Tindell’s technical and regulatory experience will assist the NRC in carrying out its mission of protecting people and the environment and ensuring the safe operation of nuclear power plants,” said NRC Region IV Administrator Arthur T. Howell. Tindell joined the agency’s Region IV office in Arlington, Texas, in 2003. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from Oklahoma Christian University. After completing the Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program, he worked as a reactor inspector and as a operator licensing examiner. He has served as a resident inspector at the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant near Glen Rose, Texas,

Friday, May 24, 2013

The Hinsdale NH-Brattleboro Route 119 Bridge Collapsed Today?




http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/video-of-bridge-collapse-north-of-seattle/?comments#permid=67




ImageImage


The Brattleboro-Hinsdale NH route 119 bridge was built in 1921 while I-5 Skagit River Bridge was built in 1955...

Both: The bridge was fracture-critical, which means there is no redundancy in the structure – if one component fails, the whole bridge can collapse.

Both: structurally obsolete!

They spent about a week a month ago fixing problems under the bridge. They say the report is ready to come out...

This bridge looks much better than the our bridge...

Of course, the real scandal in many states is the corrupt engineering codes they use for bridge inspection purposes. And many bridges never see a licensed engineer.
Inadequate resources always lead to bridge inspection corruption…the politicization of bridge inspection results.  
This accident got me to question if I could find a way to take out the bridge. I did a thorough search and came up amazing pictures of the bridge deterioration. I renamed the bridge "The Daddy Killer Bridge".  Everyone believes my pictures got the ball rolling. This is how I made meaning out this tragic death...
"Coincidence, God or The Universe...The Meaning of The I 91 Accident?"
http://www.ibrattleboro.com/article.php/20080207184948939
Course today, we all are driving across a brand New Bridge.











Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Fire: The Pilgrim Plant Saga Continues

 Humm, used bother CO2 and dry chemical...

Once started up just like comming out of a outage...will they will have their first secret SRV leak. It will occure a week or two after start.

Least they don't have new SRV valves, or do they?


Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/20/2013
Notification Time: 07:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2013
Event Time: 03:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)


Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 0 Startup 0 Refueling

Event Text

OFF-SITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FIRE IN TURBINE BUILDING

"At 0353 hours [EDT] on Monday, May 20, 2013 Pilgrim Station responded to indications of a fire in the Turbine Building (TB) Lubricating Oil Room. The Pilgrim Fire Brigade responded to the fire and was able to extinguish a small fire associated with the 'A' Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor. The plant was in start-up at the time of the event with the reactor critical and reactor coolant system temperature approximately 180 degrees F.

"The Plymouth Fire Department was contacted and responded to the site. The event did not require entry into the Emergency Action Levels (EALs). The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause. The plant will be restarted after a thorough evaluation and any necessary repairs are completed.

"This informational notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) .

"The Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this notification."

This was an electrical fire confined to the aux oil pump motor and was extinguished using hand held CO2 and dry chemical extinguishers


What a piece of junk...


Power Reactor Event Number: 49061
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/23/2013
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2013
Event Time: 04:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)


Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 2 Startup 2 Startup

Event Text

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING HPCI TESTING

"At 0455 hours on Thursday, May 23, 2013, with Pilgrim Station in the Startup/Hot Standby Mode and reactor coolant pressure approximately 550 psig, primary containment was declared inoperable due to a leak on the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) turbine exhaust line while performing the HPCI system flow rate test. Power ascension was suspended pending investigation and repair. Repair plans to restore system integrity are in progress.

"The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause. The Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)."

The licensee has entered Technical Specification 3.7.A.2 to be in cold shutdown within 24 hours.


Two Independant issues: a leak and flow controller problems.


Power Reactor Event Number: 49064
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/23/2013
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2013
Event Time: 10:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)


Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 2 Startup 2 Startup

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING POST MAINTENANCE TESTING

"At 1050 hours on Thursday, May 23, 2013, with Pilgrim Station in the Startup/Hot Standby Mode and with the reactor coolant pressure at approximately 525 psig, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI system was being operated in accordance with plant procedures to complete post maintenance test requirements. The flow controller could not achieve required system flow rates with the flow controller in the automatic mode. Plans to restore the automatic flow control capability are in progress.

"The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.

"The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)."


















Friday, May 17, 2013

Pilgrim Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radiation Evac Plan Broke During Accident

NRC and Pilgrim Cover-up: Public Notification And Evacuation plan broke during accident

And still not fixed!

Did I catch them in a unreported violation and a problem they failed to fix or confront?

So they had  potential for winds over 75 mph according to Wiki. I'll bet you the failed met towers happens often in winter weather? 
Wiki: "In addition to the significant snowfall totals, hurricane-force wind gusts were recorded, reaching 102 mph (164 km/h) in Nova Scotia, 89 mph (143 km/h) at Mount Desert Rock, Maine, and 84 mph (135 km/h) off the coast of Cuttyhunk, MassachusettsBoston experienced a storm surge of 4.2 ft (1.3 m), its fourth-highest."
Cuttyhunk is off the coast of New Bedford Massachusetts. Pilgrim nuclear plant couldn't detect the wind speed for 18 hours in the below according to the Nemo LER 2013-003-00 report. Why did Pilgrim and Nstar have so much troubles, while Millstone with much more snow escaped with little problems? 
2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm."
The NRC has not a mention of this in their inspection report. Is this another cover-up with Pilgrim and the NRC...they couldn't perform their radiological emergency plan. And they didn't report it. The assumption is it is gummed up with ice and snow...but how do you know? Pilgrim is in hot water with Massachusetts and the local antis...is this a cover-up so as not to inflame these players.

Is there a wind speed and direction detectors that are qualified through all realms of blizzards and winter weather?

You catch it, it might not be blizzard...it might be related to a component that doesn't have power. The don't throw us the cause with what "stopped recording weather data until 1840 the next day. What do you think, the wording implies the recording stopped, but the real time indication could be seen in the control room?

New May 19: Wait, see this disconnected phase, the incompleteness of the sentence it implies Nemo snow or ice took the Met instrumentation out. The trip occurred at 2117. Did they lose the 120 safeguard bus like they did in LER 2008-006-00 and not disclose it.
During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. 
 Then later down in the report, we get the below. The 2340 B phase fault on the start-up transformer (SUT) took out the met tower.  The trip times and recovery times almost match?
At 2340 hours, a 'B' phase fault on the SUT bus work tripped the SUT bus lockout relay. Walkdowns of the switchyard were conducted by Maintenance and Engineering to assess the condition of the SUT bus. The relays that initiated the bus trip indicated the fault was within the SUT protection scheme, but external to the SUT. Breaker ACB-1 02 was closed at 1809 hours on February 9th.   
What are the history with anemometer failures in winter storms?

This is the entry into the emergency classification entry point: Unusual  Event. 
Sustained winds  (greater than 5 minutes) in excess of 75 mph indicated on wind speed recorder Panel MT1. 
What happens next storm when the lines don't trip and the meteorological instruments fail at 40 mph? So the plant has a inability to to cycle into their wind emergency classification procedures and there is no way that Pilgrim complete a evacuation. What wind speed are they required to be immediately shutdown? UE reports get to the NRC. How do you know where the radiation is heading and time frames?

It is absolutely astonishing the lackadaisical tack the NRC is taking towards public protection!

The "Preliminary Notification" should have been; we had a LOOP and our radiation evacuation plan (wind speed and direction) is severely degraded or non operational because our wind instrumentation failed in the blizzard. 
February 9, 2013
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE - PNO-I-13-001

PILGRIM STATION: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM NEMO

On February 8,2013, at 9:17 p.m. EST, while operating at 80% power, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station automatically scrammed following the loss of all three sources of offsite power, apparently caused by Winter Storm Nemo. All plant systems performed as designed. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system is being used to control reactor vessel water level and the High Pressure Coolant Injection is controlling reactor pressure. The Unusual Event was declared at 10:00 p.m. EST based on the loss of offsite power lasting greater than 15 minutes. As of 5:00 a.m. EST on February 9, 2013, both emergency diesel generators continue to provide power to the safety-related electrical busses. Pilgrim has three sources of offsite power: the 355 and 342 lines (both 345KV lines), which feed the plant's startup transformer and have been given priority restoration status by the electrical transmission company; and a 25KV line, which connects to the station's shutdown transformer and could not be immediately restored. Once one of the offsite lines is restored and determined to be reliable, the operators will reconnect offsite power to the vital and non-vital 4160 Volt AC buses and exit the Unusual Event. PILGRIM STATION: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING WINTER STORM NEMO
The operating staff is supposed to report to their emergency technical support center and the NRC...our meteorological station is dead. These federal and internal emergency technical support centers are supposed to be thinking three steps ahead of the accident. They are supposed to be thinking...OK, the plant lost the met instrumentation and they are going to need that in a eminent or actual release of radiation. So we (tech center) have to come up with a immediate plan to get the wind speed and direction data points outside the plant to the technical emergency support people running the evacuation. They have to be prepared way ahead of the eminent or real release even if the accident isn't on the observable horizon yet.    
NRC MONITORS PILGRIM STATION AFTER LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARATION
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I staff is monitoring the Pilgrim nuclear power plant after the site lost offsite power Friday evening. The plant is operated by Entergy Nuclear and is located in Plymouth, Mass.
Pilgrim automatically shut down after losing offsite power at 9:17 Friday night (2/8). The plant is stable and all plant safety systems responded as designed. The plant's diesel generators are currently supplying power to plant equipment. Plant operators declared an unusual event due to the loss of all off-site power. An Unusual Event is the lowest of four levels of the NRC’s emergency classification system.
There was no impact to plant workers or the public.
The below is the classification entry point...you could get there by an interpretation of the "other". They teach these guy to cue off only on hyper specific wording of the classification. Not close enough wording.

Nothing in there cues the staff about what to do with the loss of the met instrumentation...this seems to keyed to plant safety. The met instrumentation doesn't impact plant safety...just the potential of public safety.

Think about it as a example, say all the radiation instrumentation in the stack or maybe mysteriously Pilgrim discovered all their warning sirens didn't work. Nothing specifically would cue them into a classification entry and notifying the communities the emergency evacuation plan is unworkable. The staff can't see the radiation reading or give alarm by siren. There should be a rework on the emergency classification system!

Right, the met instrumentation is a communication device...but the operator's are trained too specifically that communications means telephone lines and notifications to the NRC. It doesn't mean wind speed or direction to the operators.

So you wouldn't see a notification for maybe three month if you get lucky in the NRC inspection report.

I think the emergency classification system is broke...it doesn't notify outsiders that the staff is blind... say, can't see the wind speed or direction to carry out the evacuating plan to the public.
8.1 Other8.1.1.4 8.1.1.3 8.1.1.2 8.1.1.1

UE: Any event in the opinion of the Operations Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director could or has lead to a potential degradation of the level of safety at the plant.

Any event In the opinion of the Operations Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director warrants the prompt notification of Commonwealth and local authorities and precautionary notification of Emergency Response Organization personnel.

SA: Any event in the opinion of the Operations Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director could or has causes actual substantial degradation of the level of plant safety.

6.4: Loss of indications, alarm, or com capability

Loss of indications and/or alarms which cause a significant loss of assessment capabilities such as loss of indication or annunciation on safety related equipment to the extend requiring a shutdown by technical specification. 
Licensee Event Report 2013-003-00

Loss of Off-Site Power Events Due to Winter Storm Nemo
April 8, 2013
Event date: 2/17/2013
Report date: 4/8/2013

 
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On Friday February 8, 2013, at 2117 hours with the reactor initially at 85% core thermal power, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) experienced a loss of off-site power (LOOP) resulting in a load reject and a reactor scram. All rods fully inserted and the Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and powered safety-related buses A5 and A6. All other safety systems functioned as required. The plant stabilized in Hot Shutdown. At the time of the event a significant winter storm (Nemo) was buffeting Southern New England. At 2200 hours PNPS in conjunction with the local grid operator determined off-site power sources were not reliable and efforts to restore off-site power were temporarily suspended. At 2200 hours, PNPS declared a Notification of Unusual Event. On February 10, at 1055 hours, one of two off-site power supplies was restored, all safety buses were powered from the startup transformer and the Unusual Event was exited. Later on February 10, at 1402 hours with the plant in Cold Shutdown, ice bridging on a startup transformer insulator caused its 345 KV supply breaker to open resulting in a second LOOP. Again the EDG's started and powered safety-related buses. All other safety systems functioned as required. Shutdown cooling was restored at 1426 hours.
On February 10, at 2020 hours, this occurrence was reported to the USNRC as documented in EN# 48739.
The severe winter storm which caused extensive generalized geographical damage to the electrical distribution network was root cause of the LOOP events.
These events posed no threat to public health and safety.
NARRATIVE
BACKGROUND:

Pilgrim Station is connected to the transmission lines through a 345KV ring bus located within the station's 345KV switchyard. The 345KV ring bus connects the output of the main transformer, the startup transformer (SUT), Line 355, and Line 342. There are four gas circuit breakers which comprise Pilgrim's 345KV ring bus: ACB-1 02, ACB-1 03, ACB-104 and ACB-105.
Line 355 is a two terminal line which connects Pilgrim to National Grid's Bridgewater Station and is connected to ACB-102 and ACB-1 05. Line 342 is a three terminal line, which connects Pilgrim to the Canal Power Plant's Switchyard in Sandwich, MA and to Auburn Street Station Switchyard in Whitman, MA. The Canal Switchyard is owned and operated by NSTAR and Auburn Street Station Switchyard is owned and operated by National Grid.
Pilgrim's ACB-103 and ACB-104 connect Line 342 to the plant's switchyard. The 345KV system is the Pilgrim Station output power connection and is the preferred off-site power source via the SUT.
The 345KV ring bus design locates the power transmission lines such that a failure of any one line will not result in the loss of the other line. Specifically, with both transmission lines in service, a failure of either 345KV line will not result in a main generator trip, a SUT trip, or a failure of the other 345KV line. Either of the two 345KV lines is capable of carrying full station output and supplying station loads via the SUT.
The 345KV protective relay system is designed and coordinated to isolate system disturbances and minimize the impact to the overall transmission system. The protective systems are comprised of a primary and secondary protection scheme and are divided into four zones of protection.
·         The main transformer (bounded by ACB-104 and ACB-105)
·         The SUT (bounded by ACB-102 and ACB-103)
·         Line 355 (bounded by ACB-102 and ACB-105 and Bridgewater Station)
·         Line 342 (bounded by ACB-103 and ACB-104 and Auburn Street Station Street and Canal Stations)
When ACB-104 and ACB-105 open, the main transformer is isolated from the 345KV transmission system thus resulting in a generator full load reject event.
In addition to the preferred 345KV off-site power lines, Pilgrim has a secondary off-site power source, a 23KV line from NSTAR's Manomet Substation that provides power to a shutdown transformer (SDT).
During normal station start-ups and shutdowns, the station's 4160V demands are supplied by the SUT. Once the station main generator is synchronized to the 345KV transmission system, the station unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) supplies all station 4160V demands, with the SUT maintained in standby, ready to provide 4160V power if necessary.
In anticipation of a major snow storm impacting Pilgrim Station (PNPS) on February 8, 2013, Operations entered Procedure 2.1.37 (Coastal Storm Preparations). Procedure 2.1.42 (Operation During Severe Weather) and ENEP- 302 (Severe Weather Response, currently, EN-FAP-EP-010) at 0800 hours on February 7, 2013. At 1021 hours on February 8th, Station Risk was elevated to YELLOW due to the winter storm warning (severe weather).
During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm.
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
On Friday, February 8, 2013, at 2018 hours, the shutdown transformer (SDT) was declared inoperable due to repeated off-site 23KV Trouble/Trip Bypass alarms and reports from NSTAR regarding the power loss and restoration events on the Line via the Manomet Substation.
On February 8th, two line faults occurred on both 345KV transmission lines connected to the PNPS ring bus. At 2102 hours a major fault occurred on off-site Line 342 which remained de-energized for the remainder of the storm. At 2117 hours a fault on Line 355 occurred resulting in a full load reject of the PNPS generator, a subsequent reactor scram, and loss of the SUT. Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) automatically started and provided power to safety buses A5 and A6. Groups 1, 11, and VI isolations went to completion. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was placed in service to maintain reactor vessel water level. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was placed in service to control reactor pressure. All systems performed as designed to bring the reactor to Mode 3, including initiation of reactor water cleanup isolation, reactor building isolation system, and standby gas treatment system.
At 2200 hours, an Unusual Event was declared (EAL SU 1.1) for loss of off-site power to Emergency Busses.
At 2211 hours, off-site line 355 was restored and ACB-102 was closed manually to reenergize the SUT.
At 2340 hours, a 'B' phase fault on the SUT bus work tripped the SUT bus lockout relay. Walk downs of the switchyard were conducted by Maintenance and Engineering to assess the condition of the SUT bus. The relays that initiated the bus trip indicated the fault was within the SUT protection scheme, but external to the SUT. Breaker ACB-1 02 was closed at 1809 hours on February 9th.
At 0813 hours on February 9th, NSTAR reenergized Line 355 and the SUT was energized and non safety related buses Al, A2, A3, A4 were energized from the SUT commencing at 1815.
At 0400 on February 10, off-site power was restored to safety-related 4160V bus A5 through the SUT via a single 345KV line. At 0830 hours, off-site power was restored to safety-related 4160V bus via A6 through SUT.
The EDGs were secured and were on standby. Residual heat removal was in shutdown cooling mode maintaining the reactor in cold shutdown. Fuel pool cooling was in service with fuel pool temperatures trending down.
Effective at 1055 hours on February 10, 2013, Pilgrim terminated the Unusual Event and transitioned to recovery.
At 1401 hours on February 10th, with all control rods fully inserted and the reactor in cold shutdown conditions, the plant experienced a second loss of off-site power with a flashover fault on the B phase bus work of the SUT due to salt contaminated ice bridging on the phase insulator. This resulted in the tripping of the breaker ACB- 102 and loss of power to 4160V busses. Both EDGs auto-started as designed and provided power to the emergency buses. This loss of off-site power resulted in de-energization of both reactor protection system (RPS) channels resulting in a reactor scram signal and loss of Shutdown Cooling. At 1426 hours, Shutdown Cooling was returned to service. All other plant systems responded as designed. Station personnel established back-up power to A5 and A6 buses in accordance with plant procedures. On February 12, at 0405 hours off-site power was restored to the non safety buses via the Main/ Unit Aux Transformers. At 0601 hours on February 12th, offsite power was restored to safety bus A6 through the Main/Unit Aux Transformers. Off-site power was restored to all 4160V buses through the SUT as of 2147 hours on February 12. The plant returned to power operation on February 15, 2013.
CAUSE:
The coincident loss of transmission Lines 342 and 355 from faults external to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station switchyard due to the winter storm resulted in the loss of offsite power, full load rejection, and reactor scram. The subsequent flashovers in the switchyard were due to snow and ice buildup on insulators and electrical distribution components.
CONTRIBUTING CAUSES:
PNPS procedure 2.1.42, Operation During Severe Weather, provides limited guidance for Operations to determine which severe snow storms are most likely to challenge Pilgrim switchyard reliability.
Corrective actions to preclude recurrence taken in response to prior LER 2008-006-00 and LER 2008-007-00, Loss of SUT on line 355 flashover and ACB-1 05 flashover, and plant trip did not prevent recurrence.
Previously identified internal Operating Experience (OE) was not successfully utilized to direct the removal of snow and ice from insulators on the SUT prior to reenergizing.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
The following corrective actions were completed to address the LOOP and flashover events prior the restart of Pilgrim Station:
The component of the capacitor coupled voltage transformer (CCVT) that was damaged due to the flashover fault was repaired.
Pilgrim reviewed LOOP events with NSTAR to improve reliability of service to the SUT.
Additional corrective actions included in the corrective action program are as follows:
·         Procedural guidance containing a systematic process for removal and restoration of bus sections during and following blizzard conditions will be developed and implemented. This includes all 345KV and 23KV power lines.
·         Procedural guidance for de-icing insulating material susceptible to a flashover event in the switchyard following blizzard conditions will be developed and implemented.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:
The Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) event is analyzed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and assumes loss of both 345 KV and 23 KV (preferred and secondary) sources coincident with a design basis accident (DBA). The design imposes a 10 second delay in re-energizing the 4160V Emergency Buses required to mitigate the DBA. In cases where coincident loss of an EDG presents a bounding condition, the affected safety bus is not assumed to be picked up by the shutdown transformer (SDT). The bounding condition in which all off-site power and onsite AC (EDGs) sources would be lost is a Station Blackout (SBO) transient event (10 CFR 50.63). Pilgrim is designed to recover from the SBO event by having a separate SBO diesel generator capable of providing power to the required safety buses to shutdown the plant and maintain it in a safe condition. Thus, the LOOP events experienced by Pilgrim are within the analyzed conditions and plant systems responded as desiqned.
During and following the storm, operators were able to maintain safe shutdown conditions (reactivity control, reactor water inventory, decay heat removal, etc.). While loss of power to non-safety related spent fuel cooling was a key consideration, time-to-boil never became an overriding concern with respect to reenergizing buses and there was no freshly discharged spent fuel in the pool. The most recent freshly discharged fuel was almost 23 months old, and the time to boil was approximately seven days upon loss of fuel pool cooling. The spent fuel pool temperature was less than 105 degrees F.
The EDGs started and loaded as expected following each loss of SUT event. The amount of fuel onsite initially was sufficient to operate the EDGs for 7 days (under LOCA conditions) and the SBO DG was always available.
Based on the challenge to safety systems during and following the event, Conditional Core Damage Frequency (CCDF) of the event was estimated to be 1.8E-5.
Throughout these events there was no adverse impact on the public health and safety.
PREVIOUS EVENTS:
The most recent LOOP events at Pilgrim Station reported as LER are as follows:
LER 2008-006-00, Automatic Scram Resulting from Switchyard Breaker Fault During Winter Storm, dated February 12, 2009.
LER 2008-007-00, Momentary Loss of all 345KV Off-Site Power to the Startup Transformer from Switchyard Breaker Fault, dated February 12, 2009.
ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) CODES:
COMPONENTS CODES
Transformer (Startup AC) Bus XFMR
SYSTEMS
Switchyard System (Startup Transformer) FK
ESF Actuation (RPS, PCIS, RBIS) JE
Main Generator Output Power System EL
Medium Voltage Power System- Class 1 E (4KV) EB
REFERENCES:
Condition Report CR-PNP-2013-0798, Loss of Off-Site Power
NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)











Wednesday, May 15, 2013

NRC Chairperson Macfarlane: "The New Normal"

Mike Mulligan Translating Macfarlane's nuclear code words:
"Governments and industry collaborate – both among themselves on a domestic level and with their respective international counterparts – to ensure that lessons learned can be applied broadly to benefit safety and security."
You notice the "peoples of nations" aren't included in their hierarchy of privileged people that stands out "among themselves"...who partake as equals in "electronic media" with this government and the industry's well heeled class of people. As they all are increasingly making the nuclear industry less transparent, especially the great leader the USA, in the ends of protecting themselves from the fallout of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. 
 ...this all transpires against the backdrop of a 24-hour news cycle, in which information is plentiful but not always accurate.
You get it, if you don't have our special class privileged with getting behind the high security fence of a nuclear generating facility, the copious secret information contained within that fence, all outsider never have the privileged to make their own determination with what information is contain within that fence. Thus the gods of "governments" and "nuclear industry" professionalism can always imply the outsiders who challenge them don't have the first hand factual information that the nuclear class professionals have. These gods of nuclearism solely have the power of  the determination with plant events and their relevance. The whole reality the outsiders see is through the self interested income interpretation of the so call nuclear credentialed professionals...basically a extremely insecure cohesive group not below direct lying who are selfishly out to push their ends above everyone else.

They mock all the others as "which information is plentiful but not always accurate" if any story challenges their status of being behind the high security fence of relevance determination in nuclear plant reality. Nobody ever gets to question if the nuclear professionals are putting out inaccurate, selective and contradictory information, which the 24 hour new cycle media parrots, then the professionals then can mock the media as being not much reliably accurate. And Fukushima is the prime example of self protection on a world wide bases...

Honestly, these guys are gods; they solely determined the truth outsiders see of the condition in a runaway plant.
...an appropriate balance between incorporating Fukushima’s lessons into our safety-mission activities and preventing the accident from dominating these activities.
And this "Bud" is for you NEI...this is proof out of the Chairperson's mouth, that all the big buck political contributions from our electric utilities and the other interested are getting translated into NRC inaction in preventing the next organizational meltdown. 
In essence, I’ve just alluded to the "cumulative effects of regulation."
The above means with the nuclear industry's big buck political contributions...you effectively muted the power of the agency and our government. All we (NRC) can do is slowly throw inconsequential nickle and dime regulations at you that just gum up your works. The agency only has the power to slowly gum up your works...but the agency doesn't have the power to change your heart and your behavior...to make you serve our societal and national ends to make all our lives better. Our USA government doesn't have the heart to make our lives better, just to appease the big forces who use contribution to lesson all out lives!
whether your facilities are high performers or are experiencing challenges, I believe it’s equally important for you to engage interested parties in the communities around your plants regarding the plants’ performance, how you’re meeting the NRC’s requirements, and what you may be doing voluntarily in addition to what’s required by the regulator. Transparency and openness are essential to show both the industry’s and the agency’s processes can be trusted to be protective of public health and safety. 
Guys, just keep throwing them those disconnected platitudes to the cheap poorly educated media, it seems to be working. God help us all if public was to demand equal participation and powers as the elite, insecure and educated nulear professiona. You know, we are the only ones can be trusted with self interest altruistic power. We know what you want!
International operating experience informs performance at nuclear power plants in the United States and elsewhere, and is essential in ensuring safe operation of these facilities. 
I get it, we only see events through the industry's happlyland lens. Like, let me see all OEs and assortment of other plant secret documents.

Why don't all you cowards put all your cards on the table associated with Target Rock safety relief valves at Pilgrim nuclear stations and it national ramification.
More than ever, it’s essential for countries contemplating nuclear power to consider all aspects of what a nuclear program entails. This includes having an independent regulator that can make safety-related decisions without undue influence from other governmental or promotional entities, with enough staff to support its activities, and enough financial resources to be sustainable. I believe that it also includes addressing the ultimate disposal of waste as part of the initial licensing process, as well as having sufficient mechanisms in place to communicate transparently with the public.
Yea, that means, efficiently getting out the high security fence sole single lens relevancy interpretations and determinations polluted by the self interest of the industry and agency. It means exactly parroting what we tell you to say in the most efficient communicative way. This is the great USA way...
 I would point to the "Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct," established in 2011, as a good example of industry collaboration in this area. Through these voluntary "Principles," civilian nuclear power plant vendors have committed to share best practices that reinforce and enhance existing codes, standards, and regulations. 

As I mentioned earlier, all industries are dealing with a global supply chain. There are many associated benefits, but there are also risks that must be considered and managed on a routine basis, not just in response to isolated incidents. Counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect parts have found their way into in a variety of products, particularly computer-related equipment. 
This is certainly the classy president Obama way of ending a speech. Ending it with humanizing gut busting and can't catch your breath joke between friends. And "voluntarily principles" is the god speaking in the extremist right wing government hating teabagger Republicans. Wait a minute, let me catch my breath I am laughing so hard.  Mrs. Macfarlane does have a wild sense of humor!

Life after Fukushima: "The New Normal"

Prepared Remarks of NRC Chairman Allison M. Macfarlane

At the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Nuclear Energy Assembly

May 14, 2013 – Washington, D.C.

Good afternoon. I appreciate the introduction and the opportunity to be here to share my thoughts with you today. This morning, you heard Susan Eisenhower reflect on the evolution of "Atoms for Peace" in the 60 years since her grandfather’s speech on the subject. Today, nuclear power operates on a worldwide scale, with a global supply chain and the benefit of international operating experience to inform our work as nuclear regulators and industry’s approach to nuclear safety and security.

Adjusting to life in a globalized world with ever-advancing technology presents any number of new considerations. Increasing reliance on electronic media makes it easier than ever to share operating experience internationally, but also creates potential challenges like cyber security threats. Governments and industry collaborate – both among themselves on a domestic level and with their respective international counterparts – to ensure that lessons learned can be applied broadly to benefit safety and security. And quite unlike President Eisenhower’s time, this all transpires against the backdrop of a 24-hour news cycle, in which information is plentiful but not always accurate.

Over the course of the past two years, we’ve also had to contend with the additional, often dominating influence of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. I’ve had the opportunity to see the damaged reactors first-hand, and meet regularly with my new Japanese counterparts, most recently last week. Japan continues to face an enormous task in addressing on-going issues at the site in a way that fosters public confidence. The lessons learned from this accident should serve to strengthen nuclear safety worldwide. But, beyond that, we must also ensure that we have a plan in place for moving beyond our initial responses. After all the analyses are done and the reports are written, the changes we implement must be appropriate, effective, and sustainable.

As our work to understand the Fukushima accident evolves, and we examine our own approach to nuclear safety, we must strike an appropriate balance between incorporating Fukushima’s lessons into our safety-mission activities and preventing the accident from dominating these activities. The NRC is mindful of this, and we’ve discussed the need for this kind of balance at length with industry during our post-Fukushima interactions. If we continue to isolate Fukushima work in the long term, rather than incorporating it into existing programs and processes, it may appear as though we’re too narrowly focused on a single set of circumstances instead of on safety as a whole. This approach could cause us to overlook important priorities. It’s equally important for both regulators and industry to discuss this issue at an international level to benefit from what others are doing. At the same time, we 2

must consider the impacts of other changes unrelated to Fukushima. As technologies become more complex and involvement of the public becomes more frequent and sophisticated, the challenges placed on nuclear technology continue to evolve. Together, we must define "the new normal."

As we consider what this concept means, we should recognize that in many cases, Fukushima added a new dimension to existing priorities. Above all, the accident brought a renewed emphasis on certain aspects of nuclear safety – particularly for beyond-design-basis events. We need to work together – both domestically and internationally – to reduce the potential for another accident and ensure that our mitigation strategies are robust should an accident occur.

In essence, I’ve just alluded to the "cumulative effects of regulation." This was a subject of discussion long before Fukushima, but has taken on greater visibility in the months since we began our collective efforts to implement lessons learned from the accident. Our objective in addressing Fukushima’s lessons has been to enhance nuclear power plant safety worldwide in a way that will stand the test of time without distracting from other safety or security priorities.

While we continue to pursue these enhancements, we remain focused on the day-to-day safe and secure operation of our licensed facilities. Although the majority of the plants continue to operate safely, those that are currently shut down and under heightened oversight – like SONGS and Fort Calhoun – must address a significant number of questions before the NRC can determine whether they can be operated safely. Absent technically complete and satisfactory information from our licensees, the NRC is not able to reach conclusions about operational safety.

The NRC is working hard to explain these situations to the public in a clear and accessible way. This is a tough assignment when some of the issues are extremely complex with many moving parts. The situation at SONGS is an excellent case in point.

Whether your facilities are high performers or are experiencing challenges, I believe it’s equally important for you to engage interested parties in the communities around your plants regarding the plants’ performance, how you’re meeting the NRC’s requirements, and what you may be doing voluntarily in addition to what’s required by the regulator. Transparency and openness are essential to show both the industry’s and the agency’s processes can be trusted to be protective of public health and safety.

More than ever, nuclear power plant management must be plugged into the needs of its employees and the local community. I continue to maintain that good management goes a long way toward good performance. In any organization, nuclear or otherwise, managers are responsible for establishing both the priorities and the environment in which work is accomplished; managers set expectations and then ensure that employees live up to them. Unfortunately, and I can say this from experience, being a manager too often means being in a seemingly endless stream of meetings that prevents us from spending as much time as we should getting to know our staff and listening to their feedback. I believe good practices in this area should be captured and broadly applied. I’m sure you share my view that it’s essential that nuclear safety remains the highest priority from the newest entry-level employee to the most senior manager. 3

The NRC and industry alike can also derive great benefit from international operating experience. I’m sure you’ve heard me and my colleagues talk on numerous occasions about the benefits the NRC gets from cooperation with our international regulatory counterparts. In the Fukushima context, international cooperation is a key element in ensuring that we’re learning and applying the right lessons. I believe industry should consider international cooperation an essential component of ensuring nuclear safety. I’d note the recent establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding between WANO and the IAEA as another positive step in enhancing these important relationships. There are also some opportunities for government and industry to collaborate internationally for mutual benefit. To that end, the NRC benefitted greatly from INPO’s participation in last summer’s Extraordinary Meeting of Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Vienna.
International operating experience informs performance at nuclear power plants in the United States and elsewhere, and is essential in ensuring safe operation of these facilities. Exchanges with our foreign partners are fruitful in sharing this type of information. For example, I’m sure that as the U.S. industry considers the question of filtered containment venting and other filtration strategies, you will benefit from the collective years of experience other countries have with this technology. One critical aspect of the "new normal" is that public interest in nuclear power, whether positive or negative, remains heightened. Where certain technology is in place in some countries and not others, both the public and our elected leaders are naturally predisposed to make comparisons. I believe that we must ensure that clear and accurate explanations are given for the choices made in establishing and implementing new NRC requirements.

One area of particular interest with respect to international cooperation is that of countries considering nuclear power for the first time. Though some countries have made policy decisions to cease or limit nuclear power operations, many countries are still moving forward with plans to introduce nuclear power into their energy supply mix. The Fukushima accident has brought some new considerations to bear, and placed other considerations in a new light.

Countries considering nuclear power for the first time have an opportunity to assess issues surrounding its use holistically and create their programs with "the new normal" in mind. Reflecting once again on "Atoms for Peace," there’s an important need for balance between the right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses, and the responsibilities that go along with it. Because these programs are new, there’s also an opportunity to get it right the first time – to incorporate past lessons into the establishment of the nuclear safety and security infrastructure and the facility’s design, construction, and operation. The responsibility to operate nuclear power plants safely and securely is at the forefront of the discussion in this post-Fukushima environment, but we must also consider the very important responsibility of ensuring that nuclear material is kept out of the wrong hands. A strong regulator is essential for accomplishing this. Some countries are still developing basic infrastructure while they’re entertaining multiple design bids. Even before the accident two years ago, the NRC was strongly advocating the establishment of an independent, well-funded regulatory infrastructure for any country considering nuclear power. The accident at Fukushima only reinforces the importance of these regulatory criteria.

More than ever, it’s essential for countries contemplating nuclear power to consider all aspects of what a nuclear program entails. This includes having an independent regulator that can make safety-related decisions without undue influence from other governmental or promotional entities, with enough staff to support its activities, and enough financial resources to be sustainable. I believe that it also includes addressing the ultimate disposal of waste as part of the initial licensing process, as well as having sufficient mechanisms in place to communicate transparently with the public. As regulators, the NRC and its international counterparts play an important role in providing assistance to countries with emerging nuclear programs in establishing appropriate laws and regulations and devising strategies for sufficient staffing and resources. It’s also important for national leaders to identify nuclear safety and security as priorities so that the regulator has strong support for its decisions.

But our best efforts in this area won’t be enough without similar collaboration on the industry side. I believe vendors, in particular, have a responsibility to ensure that the appropriate infrastructure is in place in any country that is considering their technologies. Countries should be able to demonstrate that they can not only operate a nuclear power plant, but can do so safely and with a high level of security and independent oversight. I would point to the "Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct," established in 2011, as a good example of industry collaboration in this area. Through these voluntary "Principles," civilian nuclear power plant vendors have committed to share best practices that reinforce and enhance existing codes, standards, and regulations.

As I mentioned earlier, all industries are dealing with a global supply chain. There are many associated benefits, but there are also risks that must be considered and managed on a routine basis, not just in response to isolated incidents. Counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect parts have found their way into in a variety of products, particularly computer-related equipment.

The U.S. nuclear industry does not yet appear to be feeling the acute impacts of these challenges, but several reports of counterfeit and fraudulent items have surfaced abroad. The increased use of digital technology has also led to enhanced concerns about evolving cyber security threats. While there are no requirements compelling vendors to do this kind of due diligence about the countries that are interested in their designs, I think it’s a good practice that makes both business and ethical sense. I believe addressing these challenges can go a long way in further enhancing public trust.

So how should we define "the new normal"? As we know, many of the most safety-significant post-Fukushima actions will be completed by 2016 in the United States. Some longer-term activities will continue into later years. As this work continues, the NRC, for its part, will reabsorb staff who have been devoted to Fukushima work back into our line organizations. Throughout this time, the day-to-day safety and security of our licensed facilities will remain NRC’s top priority. Should new and different challenges arise, we will promptly evaluate our processes and ensure they are adequately addressing these issues. Our resident and regionally-based inspectors will continue to maintain their rigorous oversight over the operating fleet and new plants under construction. The staff will continue to review license renewal and new reactor license applications, and, once we have fully addressed the Waste Confidence issue, we’ll begin issuing final licensing decisions again. We’ll continue to prepare ourselves for potential activities related to new technologies and permanent waste disposal. To a large extent, the priorities we had prior to Fukushima remain unchanged.

However, the commitments we’ve made to learn lessons from the Fukushima accident, and what we’ve accomplished thus far in this area, should appropriately influence each of these other activities. Domestically, our review of the potential of normal earth processes – such as earthquakes and floods – to affect reactors will inform future regulatory decisions. By default, they’ll also inform industry’s operations, future applications, and NRC’s inspections and technical reviews. Internationally, government and industry alike should maintain a commitment to continued cooperation. The exchange 5

of operating experience will continue to yield important lessons learned, not only from Fukushima but from other issues that arise. Industry leaders should evaluate experiences with technologies already in use in other countries as they consider future enhancements to U.S. plants. Taken together, these activities represent a demonstrated commitment to maintaining a high level of nuclear safety and security here and abroad. This commitment is essential in enhancing public confidence in the work we do. Countries considering nuclear power for the first time stand to gain particular benefit from this cooperation.

In the months and years ahead, we should continue to consider "the new normal," and assess the nature of the influence Fukushima will have on our daily work. By incorporating these activities over time into established processes, we’ll ensure the continued applicability of lessons learned, while ensuring that we’re maintaining focus on the highest safety priorities. After all, there’s no going back to the mindsets that existed prior to March 11, 2011.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and would be happy to answer your questions.