Thursday, May 19, 2011

BWR Torus Venting Scam

work in progress

BWR Torus Venting Scam
Remember complexity drives the system towards the counter intuitive direction and we are really talking about a extremely complex outcome with a meltdown and large public release. I see the vent as a risk amplification tool...i think its intention was to be that tool.

Maybe a facility use amplification tool...a tool to cloak the true understanding and knowledge of risk. A risk understanding disrupter.

Right, risk is a calculation of the relative worth of the safety systems and the design of the system, defined by the corporation.

But total risk is the design the facility, and how we maintain and operate the facility, and the human-machine interactionm and how the world interactes with with the plant.

Right, we could collectively turn off all the safety systems, meltdown the reactor and destroy or bypass all the containment.

Right, our risk calculations don't capture this possible human machine interaction...I am trying to make the case that all risk is not captured in our corporate risk calculation. Actually, it carries a very narrow sector of risk and it doesn't capture chaos theory and complexity. It doesn't understand true complexity.

I think as you go down the road of complexity you reach a point where a out come is not predictable and unknowable. A risk amplification tool is one that replaces uncertainty with illusory certainty.

Somebody really predicted large scale human responses...the torus hard vent path wasn't designed to vent the torus. It was designed to increase facility capacity factor. Its sole purpose was to increase corporate profits and it was the cheapest capacity factor increaser ever invented. They knew we would default into the primitive model or incomplete model with how system worked.

...Ok, so if you turned off the hardened vent input into the PRA and risk calculation what would happen? It would change the behavior of plant operations and the plant structure itself? Everything changes. Basically the harden vent in risk calculation says there has been a overall reduction in the risk at the top of the risk hierarchy...thus we got a chunk of global risk reduction we can play with to bring risk back up to the orginal limit. A case may now be made where you can say we can work with less redundancy, the NRC interaction with a utility is reduced, we accept larger infraction with a utility. So that chunk of harden vent path risk reduction is filled back up to its original level with global risk increases.

I don't how this is get played out, do we trade one full meltdown for 10 half meltdowns down the line, certainly we trade up to more plant upsets and more severe plant accidents?

We fill in that chunk of harden vent risk reduction with running the plant harder and at a higher capacity factor...or running the plant in more risk?

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Browns Ferry red finding over RHR valve

Should we allow these gunslingers engineering firm without morals to support the nuclear industry...?

Is a engineering firm like a defense attorney where they can throw up any plausible story disconnected from the truth...or are engineers bound to tell the whole truth? Are engineers bound to tell the whole thruth, what about their engineering ethical obligation, or are they gunslingers for hire:

Southwest Research Laboratory (weld examinations)
Westinghouse Laboratory (valve component forensics)
Structural Integrity (thread strength analysis, sensitivity study)
Independent Burns & Roe metallurgist (aggregate review of forensics reports)
Idaho National Laboratory

Are you under a engineering ethics obligation to tell the truth when doing a RCA...?

Excerpts of my TVA safety complaint...

Associated Press

ATLANTA—Federal regulators on Tuesday ordered in-depth inspections at an Alabama nuclear-power plant after deciding the failure of an emergency cooling system there could have been a serious safety problem.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a rare "red" finding against the Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry nuclear plant, near Athens, Ala., after it investigated how a valve on a residual heat-removal system became stuck shut. Safety regulators said only five red findings—the most severe ranking the agency gives to problems uncovered in its inspections—have been issued nationwide in the past decade.

In an emergency, the failure of the valve could have meant that one of the plant's emergency cooling systems wouldn't have worked as designed. The problem, which was identified as the plant was being refueled in October 2010, was fixed before the reactor was returned to service.

"The valve was repaired prior to returning the unit to service, and Browns Ferry continued to operate safely," said Victor McCree, the NRC's Region II administrator. "However, significant problems involving key safety systems warrant more extensive NRC inspection and oversight."

It wasn't clear whether TVA officials would appeal the finding. TVA officials had attributed the valve to a manufacturer's defect and said it inspected all similar valves in the facility to catch any problems.

NRC officials were critical of the utility for not identifying the problem sooner through routine inspections and testing. The valve failed sometime after March 2009 but wasn't discovered until more than a year later.

As part of the upcoming inspections, the NRC said it will review the plant's performance, its safety culture and its organization.

"The results of this inspection will aid the NRC in deciding whether additional regulatory actions are necessary to assure public health and safety," Mr. McCree said in a letter to TVA officials.

Past problems at the plant have led to increased scrutiny. The Browns Ferry Plant is known in the industry as the site where a worker using a candle to check for air leaks in 1974 started a fire that disabled safety systems. It is similar in design to the reactors that malfunctioned at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant in Japan after an earthquake and tsunami this year.

The TVA, the county's largest public utility, supplies power to about nine million people in Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee.

Monday, May 09, 2011

Vermont Yankee Emergency drill (May 3, 2011)

Update 8 am May 10

The Deputy Director of NH Homeland Security and Emergency Management says:

1) NH Don't do "out drills" because sending kids to Keene increases the risk to the kids (bus accident). This is patently ridiculous, it is like saying kids don't go off site with buses for sports and for invaluable off site educational experience because they can get into a bus accident...

They don't want to create a oppertunity of time test of the bus companies to get a fleet of buses to Hinsdale.

Where did the Hinsdale offical come up with the phrase "out drill"...

2) She said the drill wasn't completed at 11:30 as that contradicted Hasting and the command center...

Vermont Yankee Emergency drill (May 3, 201!)

How the information came to me

Information from a angry Hinsdale official

9 AM: Hinsdale got a phone announcement a VY drill was going to happen...everyone for days had been warned.

10 AM: alert to site area.

11:05: General Emergency and sending buses @ 11:45 AM

!!! it going to be a "full out drill" meaning the kids are going to Keene coming from the emergency command post...

High school immediately when into lunch mode for all the kids and then they all went to the auditorium in anticipation of going to Keene...

Absolutely no communications cues through the command post back channel with Hinsdale school officials...going to bus your kids out shortly after noon, you might want to feed the kids beforehand...

12:45 PM: Hinsdale got itchy with no communications and no buses yet, they called the emergency command post, Cliff Hasting said he called the drill completed at 11:30am. Hinsdale was never was called to say drill has been completely and canceled.

*** absolutely no communication with the Hinsdale school superintendent.

*** we don't think the Hinsdale elementary school was ever notified of anything, maybe the command post thew them a record message... it looks like the elementary school was completely out of the loop and fried.

*** seems to be rumors if you call the emergency command post right now there is still a loop recorded message saying VY is in a general emergency...

Tuesday, May 03, 2011

PWR Fukushima much worst than GE Mark 1

I don't think you can yet make the case this was a GE mark 1 centric event.

In other words, this outcome is rather mild to what would have happened if large PWR were sitting on the east coast of Japan.

I think the isolated loop of the PWR's primary system...this much higher pressure of the primary system, thus much harder to cool...

I think the PWRs would be a much more painful accident....

In other words, the core would have melted down much sooner and the pins would have skyrocketed to much higher temps...

I think tons more radiation would have been released to the world inviroment...