Sunday, January 30, 2011

2.206 liquid scintillation counter emergency evacuation delay

I withdrew this 2.206!


I could inquire about the hydrogen production and release in a accident, then turning into water, but that be nit picking. I have no bases for a 2.206 and will not sunmit one.
Mike,
The liquid scintillation counter at Vermont Yankee is only used for tritium analysis. It is not used in any accident scenario.
NRC Public Affairs
Waiting as answer:
Mr Sheehan,
"He determined that the liquid scintillation counter is not vital to the plant’s radiological emergency response."
So it played no role in the radiological emergency response?
Was there training and practice with a loss of scintillation detector accident?
Mr Sheehan,
"All he had to say is the liquid scintillation counter plays no role in the radiological response?"
Are you saying the scintillation counter plays no role in radiological emergency response capability, or the lead up to the detection of a radiological emergency condition?

I didn't send in the 2.206...but I asked Neil Sheehan about it.
Jan 31 11:00 What does this mean?
...Mr. Mulligan,
A staffer in the Region I Division of Reactor Safety I has reviewed the issue and its potential impact on Vermont Yankee’s radiological emergency response capability. He determined that the liquid scintillation counter is not vital to the plant’s radiological emergency response. In fact, in-line beta-gamma monitors are used for real-time emergency response indications and dose-significant radionuclides are measured via gamma spectroscopy counters in the chemistry laboratory, based on sample measurements. There is sufficient redundancy in the in-line plant monitors and chemistry laboratory gamma monitors to evaluate radiological conditions affecting emergency response. Therefore, there is no safety concern associated with out-of-service liquid scintillation counting equipment with respect to emergency response capabilities.
I hope this addresses your concerns.
Neil Sheehan


Jan 30, 2011
R. William Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 Request a emergency shutdown of Vermont Yankee because the radiological and evacuation emergency procedures and plans were secretly inoperable or impaired between Dec 29, 2010 and Jan 11, 2011.


Dear Mr. Borchardt,

“Rutland Herald Susan Smallheer Jan 29
Irwin said the failure of the test equipment was disturbing.
They told me about the liquid scintillation counter being down and that was the cause of the delay. Irwin said, I figured like most labs, they would get the instrument repaired relatively quickly but for some reason that did not the case.
Irwin said that he only found out about the equipment failure last Friday (Feb 21?) (disclosed at the end of the week Jan 28, 2011), when he asked why the test results form the first well were so late.”


Timeline with Vermont Yankee events: http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2011/01/vt-gov-shumlin-patsy-to-entergy.html


I request a immediate emergency shutdown of Vermont Yankee because of the unreliability of their radiological and emergency plans for a indeterminate amount time. The liquid scintillation counter was broken between Dec 29, 2010 and Jan 11, 2011. That makes the radiological procedures inoperative or severely degraded in this time frame. Not having a backup liquid scintillation counter would make the emergency evacuation plans unreliable. If a nuclear power plant doesn’t have the capability to make reliable their evacuation plans, then they shouldn’t be licensed to operate a nuclear plant.

1) I request a NRC OIG and congressional investigation with why the NRC didn’t immediately notify the community that the Vermont Yankee radiological procedures and evacuation plans were not functional during these dates.

2) Request a investigation, in making sure that all radiological capabilities at the nuclear plants are reliable and durable with sufficient back ups in order to be able to carry out their emergency plans. Request all USA plants have sufficient back up liquid scintillation counter capabilities.

3) Request a information notice to given to all plants about this.

4) Request a disclosure of all delays with getting any radiological measurements that effected any normal or emergency requirement of a procedure.

Sincerely,

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH 03451
1-603-336-8320
steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

(I know they get a rough measure of liquid radioactivity from other detectors...the downfall in this is I am not exactly clear what the scintillation detector plays in the radiological plans. It seems preposterous the agency would let them get away with ineffective emergency evacuation plans.

You know, if it ain't defined as safety related and in a requirement of a procedure, they let the world fall off a cliff.)

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